1. SAJJAD AHMAD, J.--The respondents, along with 8 others, are facing a charge under section 302/149, P. P. C. for causing the murder of one, Ali Muhammad, and also for causing injuries to Ameer and Ghulam Rasool (section 307/324/149, P. P. C.). The incident took place on account of a dispute over a water-course. After the Police investigation, the respondents were, at first, placed in column No, 2 as suspects, but after the Inquiry Magistrate had examined the complainant, they were summoned as accused persons, but were released on bail, which was later confirmed by the learned Sessions Judge, Sargodha. After some more evidence was recorded in the case, a petition was preferred to the learned Sessions Judge for the cancellation of the respondents' bail, which was accepted. The respondents then moved the High Court, and a learned Single Judge has ordered their release on bail.
2. Special leave to appeal was granted by this Court on the 2nd of March 1970, in this case to consider whether the learned Single Judge of the High Court was justified in interfering with the discretionary orders passed by the learned Sessions Judge in cancelling the bail of the respondents, particularly as no substantial reason was disclosed in the order of the learned Single Judge for reversing the order of the learned Sessions Judge. It was also submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that certain observations were made in the bail order by the learned Single Judge, which were bound to prejudice the trial of the prosecution case on its merits.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the respondents, as well as the learned counsel for the State, who supports this appeal. It has been brought to our notice that the respondents have since been committed for trial to the Sessions Court, but despite that they are still on bail, in view of the orders made by the learned Single Judge, referred to above.
4. As held by this Court in the case of Muhammad Shafiq v. Muhammad Hanif , before an accused person is committed for trial by a Magistrate, he has to be satisfied that a prima facie case has been made out against him, and in this situation, it is difficult to argue that there are no reasonable grounds for believing the accused to be guilty, and that they should be enlarged on bail. Grounds are entirely different from evidence, but in the matter of bail under section 497, Cr. P. C. for offences punishable with death or transportation for life, the Courts are only concerned in examining whether reasonable grounds do or do not exist to connect an accused person with that offence.
5. The commitment of an accused person for trial on a murder charge, which would disclose a prima fade case against him, would be a good ground for refusing bail to him during the pendency of the trial. The position, however, will be different if the commitment order itself is found to be wholly unsatisfactory, which might call for its quashment and incidentally also furnish a reason for bailing out the accused, who has thus been committed for trial without it any justification. However, in the present case, it is not shown that the commitment order suffers from any such defect. The commitment of the respondents, therefore, in the present case, furnishes an additional ground for cancelling their bail. This appeal is, therefore, allowed, and the bail of the respondents is cancelled.
6. The learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that one of the respondents is an old man of 70 years. He may make an application for his bail to the learned Sessions Judge on that ground, if so advised, under the proviso to section 497, Cr. P. C. It may be pointed out that under section 220, Cr. P. C., the commitment of an accused person to custody by a Magistrate under his warrant until and during the trial is subject to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding the taking of bail. The question for consideration in such an event would be whether even after commitment, any of the provisions for bail contained in the Code is attracted for the purposes of granting bail, which would, of course, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. 1970 SCM R 143