' Dispute, in this Constitution petition, pertains to a plot bearing No, 28 situated in Grain Market, Badami Bagh, Lahore and is between Muhammad Rafique Malik/petitioner and Mst. Surriya Khanum/respondent No,1. The disputed property shall be hereinafter referred as rented "premises" or "property". Muhammad Rafique Malik/petitioner is a tenant while Mst. Surriya Khanum is landlady.
2. Facts, briefly stated, giving rise to this petition are: That respondent No,1 instituted an application under section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (shortly stated as Ordinance) for eviction of petitioner from rented premises/alleging therein that she was the owner of the property and had rented it to petitioner at the rate of Rs,700 per month by means of rent note dated 4-4-1973; that the petitioner had not paid up rent of the property from 15-5-1973 to 13-11-1978 and so the petitioner had become wilful defaulter/warranting his eviction from the rented premises: that property was needed for the personal requirement of her son. This application was resisted. The case of the petitioner, as set out in his reply, was that although the rent note was executed on 4-4-1973, yet the possession of the rented premises was given to him on 15-5-1973; that the petitioner had paid an amount of Rs,30,000 to respondent No,1 as rent from 1-10-1978 to 31- 3-1982; that he had paid another advance rent of Rs,10,000 on 21-9-1976; that the respondent No,1 had obtained another advance of an amount of Rs,30,000, and so rent had been paid to Mst.
Surriya Khanum up to 31-3-1982; that the petitioner had been incurring an expense of Rs,1,000 per month on repair of "property" and he was entitled to adjustment of that amount from the rent of the property; that locality, in which the property was situated had become commercial in nature and the respondent, so, had become greedy and asked him to pay an amount of Rs,2,00,000 (Rupees two lacs) as Pagri and enhanced rent at the rate of Rs,2,000 per month. On this case, it was prayed that the eviction application be dismissed.
3. On the aforestated pleas, the necessary issues were framed. Mst. Surriya Khanum examined four witnesses namely, P.W.1, Naeemuddin, P.W.2, Faheemuddin, P.W.3, Malik Muhammad Abdullah and P.W.4, Abdul Hameed Warsi as her attorney. The application was fixed for the evidence of the petitioner on 9-7-1979, 4-9-1979, 4-3-1980, 17-4-1980, 25-5-1980, 28-6-1980 and 28-10-1980. The petitioner, however, was not able to produce his evidence and so the learned Rent Controller closed the evidence of petitioner on 28-10-1980 and fixed the case for the arguments of the parties.
It was in this scenario that the petitioner filed an application under Order XXVIII, Rule 2 read with section 114 of Civil Procedure Code/stating therein that petitioner had earlier moved an application for summoning the witness mentioned therein through the process of Court; that the petitioner had deposited the process fee; that the aforenoted witnesses were served but had not entered appearance on 28-10-1980; that on these circumstances, the Rent Controller was enjoined under the law to issue coercive process against the delinquent witnesses. This application, after contest, was rejected. The petitioner thereafter, moved another application on 23-11-1980 under Order VI, rule 17 of C.P.C. For grant of permission to amend the written statement by raising a plea that the property belonged to Lahore Development Authority: that Abdul Wahid. The real brother of Mst.
Surriya Khanum had forced him to sign the rent deed, This application was followed by another application for impleading L.DA. And Malik Abdul Wahid as respondents. All the above applications were found frivolous and were rejected by the Rent Controller. On 24-11-1980, the Rent Controller allowed the ejectment application. Against this order, petitioner filed an appeal but in vain. The learned appellate authority dismissed his appeal on 17-44982. This is how this Constitution petition has come to this Court.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of this petition, raised following points:- ' Firstly; that the order of closing of the evidence of the petitioner dated 2810-1980 was illegal, without any lawful authority on the premises that Rent Controller overlooked that the petitioner had summoned his witnesses through Tribunal and had filed diet money for dates, i,e, 9-7-1979, 4-9- 1979, 4-3-1980, 17-4-1980, 25-5-1980, 26-6-1980; that four witnesses so summoned, were actually served and the summon relating to 5th witness was served, though that witness declined to accept service. On these facts, the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction, whatsoever to close the evidence of the petitioner by applying the provisions of Order XVII, Rule 3, C.P.C.
' Secondly; that section 3(2) of the Ordinance clearly mandated the Rent Controller to provide reasonable opportunity of hearing to petitioner. On the facts, noted above, it was clear that no such opportunity was given to the petitioner.
' Thirdly; that the allotment of the property from the name of Mst. Surriya Khanum had been cancelled by Lahore Development Authority vide order Annexure-P/1. On this basis, it was contended that relationship of landlady and tenant between petitioner and respondent No,1 had ceased to exist and so respondent had, no longer, any locus standi to file application. Reliance was placed on Ali Muhammad v. Hussain Bakhsh (PLD 1976 SC 37), Shahid Afzal v. Government of Pakistan (PLD 1977 Lah. 117), Muhammad Shafi v. Shahzadi Bilquis (PLD 1978 Lah. 1133).
5. On the contrary, the learned counsel for respondent No,1, supported the impugned orders on following points: ' Firstly; that the Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority had concurrently found the relationship of landlady and tenant existed between the parties and that the petitioner was a wilful defaulter of rent of property from 15-5-73 to 13-11-78. According to the learned counsel, these concurrent conclusions of fact of two forums below were not subject to interference by this Court in Constitutional jurisdiction.
' Secondly; that eight opportunities were given to the petitioner to lead his evidence but he failed to produce the same and so the Rent Controller, correctly closed his evidence vide order dated 28- 10-1980. Continuing further he contended that the Rent Controller was not bound to follow the provisions of C.P.C. And Qanun-e-Shahadat Order. On the strength of this submission, it was urged that the order, dated 28-10-1980 passed by tFe Rent Controller closing the evidence of the petitioner, was not exceptionable. Reliance was placed on Khadim-Mohy-ud-Din v. Rehmat All (PLD 1965 SC 459).
' Thirdly; that respondent No,1 had, by overwhelming evidence proved her case.
6. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length, perused the record of the case and have gone through the findings of Rent Controller as well as appellate authority with minute care. None of the contentions urged by learned counsel for the petitioner has impressed me. As regards the first point, it is settled law that the Rent Controller is not a Court A and proceedings before him are not judicial in nature. This point came up for examination in PLD 1965 SC 459 (supra). His Lordship Justice Fazle-Akbar (as he then was), after a comprehensive survey of the applicable law and relevant precedents, came to following conclusion:-- "From the provisions of the Ordinance it appears that though under section 16 the 'Controller' has been given powers 'of summoning and enforcing the attendance of witnesses and compelling the production of evidence' he is not bound in every case to follow the procedure as laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure. He has been given powers under sections 4, 10(3) and 12 to make orders after holding such enquiry as he thinks fit. In such cases the question of nature of enquiry is left to him. That means that in such enquiries the parties have no right to insist on production of such evidence which they desire to adduce in support of their case. Therefore, no machinery is prescribed for summoning witnesses or compelling production of documents in such enquiries. In short these enquiries may be such as are conducted by an Executive Officer. Furthermore, the Controller has been given power to regulate the use by a landlord of his own property, inasmuch as within the Urban Area the landlord may not convert a residential building into a non-residential building. The power thus conferred on the Controller would appear to be a purely executive. Then subsection (3) of section 13 says that before putting the landlord in possession of the tenanted premises the Controller should be 'satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide'. But there is no express mention of any enquiry by the Controller. If the word 'satisfied' imports the necessity of an enquiry, even then it cannot be said that in holding such enquiry he will be bound by any particular procedure.
' We, therefore, conclude from the foregoing examination of the relevant provisions of the Ordinance that though some of the functions of the Controller are judicial in character, but yet he is not .Required to act judicially in discharging many of his functions. In these circumstances it will be difficult to hold that the Controller while performing his functions under this Ordinance acts as a Court. At the most it may be said that he acts in a quasi-judicial capacity Subsection (1) gives power to the Provincial Government 'to appoint such District Judges as it think fit' as appellate authority. Now the question is: Is the District Judge as contemplated in this section the District Judge in his judicial capacity as the Presiding Officer of the principal Court in the District or a persona designata ? If the Legislature really wanted that the District Judges should hear the appeal as the Presiding Officer of the Principal Court in the District, it could have easily said so. The fact that the Provincial Government is given power to select for this purpose 'such District Judges as it thinks fit' indicates that the intention was not to confer appellate power on him as the Presiding Officer of the principal Court in a District. This is also clear from the provisions of subsections (3) and (5) of section 15"
7. The rule laid down in Khadim Mohyuddin's case (supra) was reiterated by Supreme Court in Ayub Khan v. Fazal Haq (PLD 1976 SC 422) and was followed by this Court in Muhammad Aslam v.
Muhammad Yousaf (1980 CLC 467).Guided by the aforenoted principle, I have no hesitation in saying that the Rent Controller is not bound by the provisions of Order XVII Rule 2 and 3, C.P.C. It is true that he is master of his own procedure and while holding inquiry he had to provide a reasonable opportunity of hearing to parties within the parameters of reasonableness, fairness and equity. These are salutary principles which have to guide the Rent Controller in exercise of his duties. The question is whether the Rent Controller did deflect from the above-stated rule. The perusal of the record does not give any indication to that effect. I am constrained to note with anguish that none of the interim orders, relevant to the controversy, were brought on record of this petition. The petitioner seems to have contented to bring on record the certified copy of the summons issued for the service of summoned witnesses. The question is whether the Rent Controller had directed him to serve these summons on witnesses himself or process-serving agency was to carry the task of service. This is not denied by any party that this procedure can be legitimately adopted by the Rent Controller. All these questions which are material to points No,1 and 2 raised by the petitioner, cannot be answered from the record of this petition. What can be safely said, is that the petitioner was given eight opportunities to produce his evidence but he failed to do so. On the last date of hearing he himself even did not enter appearance. On this factual matrix the Rent Controller was eminently correct in passing the order dated 28-10-1980. The aforesaid order neither suffers from any jurisdictional defect nor is vitiated by any violation of law apparent on the face of record. See Zafar Ahmad v.Begum Amir Ahmad Khan (PLD 1982 Lah. 785) and Abdul Qayyum v. Additional District Judge (1989 SCMR 1768). On the above findings points Nos.1 and 2 urged by the petitioner are found to be devoid of merit and are accordingly repelled.
8. Turning to third point it is necessary to note that a tenant cannot dispute the title of a landlord/landlady without surrendering the possession of the rented premises to landlord/landlady. This principle was firmly laid down by the Supreme Court in Province of Punjab v.
Abdul Ghani (PLD 1985 Supreme Court 1) and was reiterated in Malik Wahid Bakhsh v. Mst. Fazal Bibi (1985 SCMR 1256), and Muhammad Shah Alam v. Muhammad Abdul Ghafoor (1979 SCMR 443), and Madrissa Darul Uloom v. Additional District Judge (PLD 1992 SC 401). Applying this principle to the facts of this case it is as evident as a day that the petitioner occupied the property as tenant of Mst. Surraya Khanam vide Rent Note dated 4-4-1973. The petitioner's contention is that the allotment of property in dispute was cancelled by the L.DA. As back as in 1971. This point is not between the petitioner and respondent No,1. This controversy is between L.DA. And Mst. Surraya Khanam. The petitioner has no right to raise this question before the Rent Controller before surrendering possession of "property" to Mst. Surriya Khanum. The point No,3 is so found to be wholly untenable and deserves to be rejected.
9. Now I eome to the last point. As already noted Mst.Surraya Khanam proved her case by producing P.W.1 Naeem-ud-Din, P.W.2, Fahim-ud-Din, P.W.3 Muhammad Abdullah and P.W.4 Abdul Hameed Warsi. Despite severe cross-examination nothing was extracted from the above witnesses to shake their credibility. As against this evidence no evidence was produced by the petitioner/tenant. This being the position I have no difficulty in saying that Mst. Surraya Khanam had proved her case by overwhelming evidence.
10. As a result of above discussion, this petition is found to be wholly without any merit and is accordingly dismissed. The petitioner shall bear the costs of the proceedings throughout. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.