' This second appeal has been preferred by Muhammad Aslam and others against an order for their ejectment from certain premises owned by the respondent, Muhammad Yousaf.
2. The respondent had sought eviction of the appellants inter alia on the grounds of default and personal need. The appellants resisted the application alleging that the respondent had agreed to sell the property in dispute to them and thus they had ceased to be tenants under him. On this, the Rent Controller, who was seized of the ejectment application filed by the respondent, framed the following issues :-
(1) Whether the relationship of landlord and tenant has ceased to exist between the parties ? 0. P. R.
(2) Relief.
' The appellants did not produce any evidence on the above issues although a number of opportunities were given to them for the purpose. Therefore, the learned Rent Controller closed their case on 20th November 1978, and, after recording the respondent's evidence, passed an order of ejectment against the appellants. This order was challenged by the appellants by means of an appeal which was dismissed by an Additional District Judge. They have, therefore, come up in second appeal to this Court.
3. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that the Rent Controller had closed the evidence of the appellant, under Order XVII, rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and since the case was not adjourned to 20th November 1978 (when the appellant's evidence was closed) at the request of the appellants, their evidence could not be closed on that date. He cited Lal v. Ghulam Muhammad etc.
(1) to support his contention.
4. Another plea raised by the learned counsel for the appellants was that although the learned Rent Controller had closed the appellants' case on the said date yet he did not dispose of the ejectment application forthwith and took about two months to decide the same and thus the order passed by him was not warranted by the said provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. In this connection he placed reliance on Maulvi Abdul Aziz Khan v. Mst. Shah Jahan Begum and 2 others
(2) and Mian Ghularn Jafir v. Mian Muhammad Nawaz and another (3).
5. In reply, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the learned Rent Controller did not close the appellants' evidence by invoking the provisions of Order XVII, rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure nor did they said Code apply to the ejectment proceedings before the learned Rent Controller and, therefore, the cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellants were of no avail to the appellants.
6. In regard to the objection of the learned counsel for the appellants that the order of ejectment was not passed on the same day when the appellants' case was closed, learned counsel for the respondent pointed out that on 20th November 1978, when the appellants' evidence was closed, the case was adjourned to 7th December 1978, for arguments but the arguments could not be heard on that date as the learned counsel for the (1) PLD 1975 Lah. 385 (2) PLD 1971 SC 434 (3) PLD 1977 Lah. 965 appellants was not ready to argue the case. It was, therefore, adjourned to 23rd December 1978 for arguments. On 23rd December 1978 the arguments were heard and the case adjourned to 11th January 1979 for orders. On the last mentioned date the Rent Controller was on leave and the case was adjourned to 21st January 1979 when it was finally disposed of. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the respondent, there was no unreasonable delay on the part of the learned Rent Controller in deciding the case.
7. As for the applicability of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to the rent cases, I agree with the learned counsel for the respondent that the Rent Controller is not bound in every case to follo the procedure as laid down in the said Code. This is exactly what has been held in Ayub Khan and another v. Fazal Haq and others (1) and Khadi Mohy-ud-Din and another v. Ch. Rehmat Ali Nagra and another (2). As for the procedure to be followed by the Rent Controller the view expressed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Khadim Mohy-ud-Din and another reads thus :- "He has been given powers under sections 4, 10(3) and 12 to make orders after holding such enquiry as he thinks fit. In such cases the question of nature of enquiry is left to him. That means that in such enquiries the parties have no right to insist on production of such evidence which they desire to adduce in support of their case. Therefore, no machinery is prescribed for summoning witnesses or compelling production of documents in such enquiries. In short these enquiries may be such as are conducted by an Executive Officer."
' What the Rent Controller is obliged to do under subsection (2) of section 13 of the Ordinance is to afford seasonable opportunity to the tenant to present his view point. In the present case, the appellants were allowed three adjournments to enable them to produce their evidence but the failed to do so. On 20th November 1978, when the learned Rent Controlled refused to allow them any more time they did not offer any reason whatsoever for their failure to produce evidence on that date. It would, therefore, follow that the learned Rent Controller allowed "reasonable opportunity" to the appellants, in terms of the provisions of subsection (2) of section 13 of the Ordinance, of showing cause against the application for their eviction.
8. It may also be noted here that although the learned Rent Controller was not bound to follow the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure yet he secured substantial compliance with the provisions of Order XVII, rule 3 of the Code. Out of three adjournments allowed by him to enable the appellants to produce evidence, two were given to them at their request and the case was also decided by him within two months of the closing of the evidence. In the circumstances explained above, the delay of about two months in deciding the case by the learned Rent Controller C appears to be reasonable. It would, therefore, follow that in deciding the case against the appellants the learned Rent Controller, by and large, observed the provisions of Order XVII, rule 3, as interpreted in the authorities cited by the learned counsel for the appellants. No legitimate exception can, therefore, be taken to the order of the learned Rent Controller merely on the ground that on 20th November 1978 when the (1) PLD 1976 SC 422 (2) PLD 1965 SC 459 appellants' evidence was closed the case did not come up for their evidence at their request. To hold otherwise would amount to strictly applying the Code of Civil Procedure to the proceedings before the Rent Controller which will be contrary to the law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the cases of Ayub Khan and another and Khadim Mohy-ud-Din and another as also the intention of the law-makers who did not extend the provisions of the Code except those contained in section 16 of the Ordinance to the proceedings before the Rent Controller.
9. In view of the above discussion, there is no merit in this appeal. It is, therefore, dismissed with costs. The appellant is, however, allowed a period of three months to vacate the premises in dispute.