' The petitioner filed a suit for possession. He fixed the value of the suit for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction at Rs,20,000 being the market value of the property and claimed that this amount is exempt from the payment of court-fee. The defendants contested this valuation. The trial Court after, protracted proceedings held that the value of the suit for the purpose of court-fee is Rs,3,30,600 and directed the petitioner to make up the deficiency in the court-fee. The petitioner failed to comply with the order, therefore, his plaint was rejected vide judgment and decree dated 31-3-1991, which was assailed through an appeal before the lower Appellate Court which after hearing arguments held that since the value Of the suit for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction was Rs,3,30,600, therefore, it had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the appeal. The memorandum of appeal was, therefore, directed to be returned to the petitioner, vide order dated 13-6-1991. The petitioner thereafter filed the present revision petition. The office raised various objections including the objection as to the competency of the revision petition. Therefore, the revision petition was returned on 26-9-1991 for complying with the objections. It was refiled after more than a year on 9-12-1992 without complying with the direction. The same was again returned and refiled on 23-12-1992. It was, thereafter, fixed in motion.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the order of the lower Appellate Court returning the memorandum of appeal is illegal and, it had failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it. The argument of the learned counsel is that since the trial Court did not get the corresponding para of the plaint corrected, therefore, the same value was reflected in the decree sheet. This way the valuation remained unchanged. The petitioner accordingly filed an appeal in the Court of the District Judge, Bhakkar, who should have simply followed the valuation in the decree-sheet and should not have looked into the order of the trial Court. It is complained that the valuation as given in the decree sheet was not followed by the lower Appellate Court, therefore, order returning the appeal is illegal. The learned counsel in support of the arguments referred to the judgments reported as Abdul Majid v. Muhammad Afzal Khokhar (1993 SCM R 1686), Jan Muhammad v. Abdul Ghafoor (PLD 1966 SC 461) and Ilahi Bakhsh v. Bilqees Begum (PLD 1985 SC 393).
3. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments of the learned counsel and gone through the record and the precedent cases. The petitioner has fixed the valuation of the suit for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction in para 6 of the plaint at Rs,20,000 being the market value of the property. However, the trial Court ultimately held that the value of the suit for the purpose of court-fee was Rs,3,30,600 and directed the petitioner to make up the deficiency in the court-fee.
The petitioner neither challenged this order in any forum nor complied with the same. Therefore, the plaint in the suit was rejected by the trial Court vide judgment and decree dated 31-3-1991.
Before proceeding any further it is relevant to refer to the provisions of Order VII, rule 11 which are as under:-- "The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:--
(a) .
(b) Where the relief claimed is under valued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so;
(c) Where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the Court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by the Court, fails to do so; (d)
' It would be seen that under clause (b) the relief claimed is undervalued. Therefore, the Court after determination of the real value should direct the plaintiff to correct the valuation in the relevant para of the plaint within the specified time. It means that order under clause (b) is to be followed by order under clause (c) to make up the deficiency in the court-fee. It may be a composite order.
Conversely speaking when the plaintiff is directed under clause (b) to correct the valuation of the suit for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction, then it becomes his duty not only to amend the plaint but also to pay the court-fee accordingly. This means making up of the deficiency in the court-fee in cases covered by clause (b) is automatic. To my mind, the proper order would be a composite order i,e, the plaintiff should be directed to amend the plaint and also to fix the court- fee accordingly and the failure shall entail the rejection of the plaint. But in a case under clause (c) the relief claimed is valued properly but plaint had been written upon a paper insufficiently stamped, therefore, the Court would simply direct the plaintiff to supply the requisite stamp paper within the time to be fixed by the Court. This way there is a clear distinction between the two provisions. The same was not kept in mind by the trial Court while invoking clause (b) of Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. In this case.
4. It is true that the Court while directing the petitioner to make up the deficiency in the court-fee should have directed him also to correct the valuation for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction in para 6 of the plaint. Had the correct procedure been followed then after the final rejection of the plaint the correct value for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction would have been recorded in the decree sheet. The gist of the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was misled by the valuation given in the decree-sheet, therefore, rightly filed the appeal before the District Judge. The failure of the trial Court to get para. 6 of the plaint amended would not bestow the jurisdiction on the District Judge. The fact remained that the valuation for the purposes of court-fee has been determined at Rs,3,30,600 and the same was to determine the forum of appeal. The petitioner, of course, could take the benefit while working out the limitation and explain his filing of appeal in the wrong forum and the same is the principle laid down in the judgment in the case Abdul Majid v. Muhammad Afzal Khokhar (Supra). The other cases cited by the learned counsel are not relevant to the controversy. The procedural mistake is not fatal and the same shall not vitiate the trial or the proceedings in view of the saving provisions of section 99, C.P.C.
5. Now coming to the legal side. The petitioner should have, therefore, presented the memorandum of appeal in this Court after it was returned by the Additional District Judge. The petitioner through this revision petition has challenged the judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 31-3-1991 and the order of the Additional District Judge dated 13-6-1991. Since the appeal is competent in this Court against the judgment and decree dated 31-3-1991 of the trial Court, therefore, civil revision is not competent in view of section 115, C.P.C. Now coming to the order of the Additional District Judge dated 3-6-1991 returning the memorandum of appeal for presentation to this Court. There is nothing wrong with the order of the Additional District Judge dated 13-6-1991. He has exercised the jurisdiction properly and legally. The order is held to have been passed legally and with jurisdiction.
' The anxiety of the petitioner seems to be not to pay any court-fee. He was directed by the trial Court to make up the deficiency in the court-fee but he failed. He filed the appeal before the lower Appellate Court with valuation as given in the plaint. He tried to capitalise the procedural mistake committed by the trial Court. The memorandum of appeal was returned to him for presentation in this Court but instead of filing that memorandum of appeal he opted to file the revision petition.
The reason was again to save the court-fee because if he had presented the memorandum of appeal then he was to pay court-fee at Rs,3,30,600. It was for this reason that the revision was filed.
This is not all. The revision for the first time was filed on 14-9-1991 and it remained at the objection stage till 23-12-1992. This clearly speaks the conduct of the petitioner.
6. Although the revisional power of this Court seems to be limited by the conditions of excess of jurisdiction, failure to exercise jurisdiction and illegal exercise of jurisdiction or material irregularity yet practically it is very vast because 'material irregularity' is a very wide term in its import. The revisional power of this Court has been compared with the writ of certiorari. But this is definitely more effective power of this Court in civil matters because firstly, the revisional jurisdiction may be invoked suo motu; and secondly this Court is empowered to 'make such order in the case as it thinks fit'. In this behalf reference may be made to Manager Jammu and Kashmir State Property in Pakistan v. Khuda Yar and another (PLD 1975 SC 678). The jurisdiction is discretionary. Every irregularity or illegality in exercise of jurisdiction by the subordinate Courts, therefore, would not render the order void and without jurisdiction. In this behalf reference may be made to Muhammad Swaleh and another v. Messrs United Grain and Fodder Agencies (PLD 1964 SC 97) and Srinibash Mukhopadhyaya and another v. Elahi Haldar and others (PLD 1959 Dacca 143). The Supreme Court while examining the scope of writs of `Certiorari' and 'Mandamus' held that the jurisdiction is discretionary and its object is to foster justice and correct wrong. This rule is not absolute. The main exception to rule is the case where although the impugned order is without jurisdiction yet the interference would amount to perpetuate an illegality, therefore, the relief would be refused. In this behalf reference may be made to Raunaq Ali v. Chief Settlement Commissioner (PLD 1973 SC 236) and the last judgment in this series is the case of Nagina Cotton Mills Limited v. Pakistan through the Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and four others (1990 CLC 1337).
7. The petition is also liable to be dismissed as being, hopelessly time- barred. It was, as already noted, for the first time filed on 14-9-1991 and it was returned with objections on 25-9-1991. The objections were to be removed within three days and the petition to be refiled. The petitioner, however, refiled the petition on 9-2-1992 without removing the objections, therefore, it was again returned on 10-3-1992. Thereafter, it remained with the petitioner till 23-12-1992 when it was refiled for the third time. In the meanwhile, proviso was added to subsection (1) of section 115, C.P.C. On 30th June, 1992 through Act VI of 1992. The proviso prescribed the period of limitation of ninety days for the filing of a revision petition from the date of the decision of the subordinate Court. This way this petition should have been submitted within thirty days from the date of the enactment of the proviso i,e,, before 28th September, 1992, when ninety days expired whereas this petition was refiled on 23-12-1992. Therefore, the same is also barred by limitation.
8. The upshot of the above discussion is that this revision petition is dismissed in limine.