This constitutional petition is directed against the award of the V Sind Labour Court, Karachi, dated 8th August, 1973 setting aside the order of the Junior Labour Court awarding certain money claims of the petitioner.
2. The petitioner, Ata Muhammad Raja, was appointed as, Sales Repre--sentative, by Messrs Duncan Stratton & Co (U.K.) Ltd., the respondent No. 1, on the terms and conditions set out in the letter of appointment dated 24 March, 1.965. In short, the petitioner was to receive a salary of Rs.
350 per month plus 10 per cent. Of the commission earned by the respondent-Company on the business concluded by him. The agreement was terminable on 30 days' notice on either side. The case of the petitioner was that he had introduced business but instead of the respondent- Company paying 10 per cent. Of the commission earned by it, he was paid only 10 per cent of 2J per , cent. Commission, which the respondent-Company received from its Principal, in the United Kingdom. The petitioner made various representations to the Company but received no satisfactory reply. Accordingly, he filed a petition to the Junior Labour Court IX, Karachi, under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as I. R. O.) The Junior Labour Court after cross-examination of witnesses held by its order dated 30th June 1973 that the petitioner was a workman under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the (Standing Orders), and awarded money claims of petitioner including payment of commission to the tune of Rs. 18,000.
The respondent-Company preferred an appeal to the V Sind Labour Court, Karachi, who by the impugned order dated 8th August 1973 set aside the order of the Junior Labour Court holding that the petitioner was not a workman employed to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical workth for hire or reward and also that no specific or exact amount was awarded which could be enforced. The present petition has been filed to challenge the said order of theSind Labour Court.
4. Mr. Fazle Ghani, learned counsel for the respondent-Company, raised a preliminary objection that the application under section 25-A of the I. R. O. To the Junior Labour Court itself, was not maintainable as no right has been guaranteed or secured to the petitioner under any law or any award or settlement. Mr. Abu Asim, learned counsel for the petitioner, replied that the petitioner's right is guaranteed or secured under (a) his contract of appointment and/or (b) under a "settlement" as defined in section 2 (xxiv) of the I. R. O. I find no force in submission. The petitioner may be entitled to certain contractual rights following from his letter of appointment. But until his right have been adjudicated up. "I evidence by the appropriate judicial authority, it cannot be said that he has a right guaran--teed or secured to him under "law". His proper remedy for enforcing his right to the commission earned by him and other monetary benefits under the contract, is by having it adjudicated by a civil Court and not before a Junior Labour Court, which is not the appropriate forum for that purpose. I am also impressed with the submission of Mr. Abu Asim which, in my opinion, is misconceived that the contract of appointment is a "settlement" as defined in section 2 (xxiv) of the I. R. O. As an agreement between an employer arid his workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of any conciliation proceedings. A contract with an individual workman is not a settlement as therein defined, which presupposes as agreement between an employer and his workman. Moreover, both the parties have not signed the letter of appointment, which is alleged to be an agreement, or a copy has been sent the Provincial Government.
Therefore, in my opinion, the petitioner's application under section 25-A of the I. R. O. Was clearly not maintainable.
5. It is, therefore, not necessary to discuss the question whether the petitioner has been rightly held to be a workman under the definition of the Standing Orders. However, I would agree with the submission of Mr. Abu Asim that the definition of a workman to be applied in the case Of their petitioner, was that under the I. R. O. And not under the Standing Orders) since the petitioner was not enforcing his right under the Standing Orders. 'The definition of workman under the I. R. O. Is much wider than that under the Standing Orders and clearly the petitioner falls within that definition.
6. For the foregoing reasons I do not see any force in this petition which is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs.