DECISION This is an appeal against the order of learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No,IV at Karachi, dated 22-12-1988, whereby he dismissed the grievance petition of the appellant.
2. The brief facts of the case are, that the appellant was taken as Artisan Training Operation by the respondents somewhere in 1978. After completion of training vide order, dated 8-3-1981, he was appointed as a Mechanical Supervisor with effect from 28-12-1980. Mechanical Supervisor is admittedly in Group VII, whereas the appellant was allowed salary of Group VI. He made several representations from time to time. He was, however, given Group VII with effect from 29-12-1985, vide order, dated 28-4-1986. The appellant, however, claims Group VII retrospectively from the date of appointment. Being aggrieved this order, dated 28-4-1986. He served grievance notice in March, 1980, and thereafter filed the grievance petition. The respondent resisted the grievance petition on the ground that it was time-barred and that the appellant was accorded Groups VI and VII in accordance with the Rules and Regulations.
3. I have heard Mr. Shamsuddin Khalid, the learned Advocate for the appellant and Mr.S.M. Yaqoob, the learned counsel on behalf of the respondents and also gone through the record and proceedings of the case.
4. The main ground on which the appellant bases his right is the order, dated 8-3-1981 which has been produced as Exbt. A.W./1. Under this order, 24 Artisan Trainees were appointed against various posts. The main operative part of the order reads as under:- "Consequent upon successful completion of their training in Group No,134, undernamed Artisan Trainees Operation (Repair Mechanics) are posted as under at a salary of Rs,480 per month in the grade of Rs, 480-40-810 with effect from 28-12-1980, in the R.M.I.I. (Operations)."
The Head of Col. 4 in this order reads "Post against which posted." The name of the appellant is at Sl. No,4 and he has been shown to have been posted against the post of a Mechanical Supervisor.
Admittedly the post of Mechanical Supervisor is in Group VII and the Grade of pay awarded to all the appointees under this order was of Group VI. Contention of Mr. S.M. Yaqoob is that by this order, the appellant was appointed in Group VI though he was asked to work against the post of Mechanical Supervisor, but, in fact, he was doing the work of a Mechanic. Respondents have produced through the appellant letters written by him, wherein admittedly he has described himself as a Mechanic. In support of his contention, Mr. S.M. Yaqoob has pointed out that appointees at Si. Nos. 11 and 12 who have been appointed against the post of Fitter, which is shown to be in Groups IV and V, but, they were also allowed Group VI as per relevant portion of the order, reproduced above. It is submitted, that the posting against which these trainees were appointed did not confer on them any right to draw pay of that particular post, but, they had right to draw the pay in Group VI as per above order.
5. Reliance is placed also upon another order, dated 27-2-1980 under which the Artisan Trainees, who had completed their 24 months training in Metallurgical Training Centre, were required to undergo Job Training for a period of one year and on successful completion of that training, they were to be given regular scale of pay of Rs,480-30-810 which is of Group VI. The order A.W/1 appears to have been based on this order, dated 27-2-1980, which is Exb. A/16. It is submitted by Mr. Shamsuddin Khalid, that this order A/16 has been cancelled. There is no evidence about the cancellation of this order. P.W. Ahmed Mangi, who was also appointed as Supervisor Mechanical alongwith the appellant under order Exbt. A/16 had admitted in the cross-examination, that he was not granted the grade of pay of Supervisor from 28-12-1980 but it was given to him after 5 years on the basis of Time Scale vide Exbt. A/1. He has admitted to have received letter Exbt. A/16, but, admits that he had not received any order cancelling the order Exbt. A/16. Under Order Exbt. A/1, dated 19- 2-1986, the appellant and others were promoted in Group VII after completion of 5 years in service from 29-12-1985. It was further submitted during the course of the arguments, that subsequently another circular was issued on 22-5-1989, under which, those trainees, who were inducted for 2 years' training and had completed 2 years training and were awarded pay Group VI on their regularization were allowed pay Group VII after completion of one year's service. In pursuance of this order, another Memorandum dated 1-6-1989, was issued which shows that the appellant was allowed Group VII with effect from 28-12-1981. Both these circulars were issued after the decision by the learned Labour Court and as such they could not be produced there. As they are not disputed documents, they are admitted by this Tribunal as evidence and are taken into consideration while deciding this appeal. Even, this document, dated 1-6-1989 shows, that one year's Job Training as required under Circular A/16 was still prerequisite condition and the trainees have been given Group VII retrospectively instead of Group VI from the date they had completed one year's service in the job. This fact also belies the contention of the appellant that A/16 has been subsequently cancelled.
6. From the facts narrated above and the circumstances, it would appear that all the 24 Artisan Trainees, who had completed 24 months' training in M.T.C. and had completed one year's training in the job had to be accommodated by the respondents. It was apparently decided that they would all get pay in Group VI and were posted against various posts ranging from Mechanical Supervisor to Repair Mechanic, vide order A.W/1. They were awarded Group VI irrespective of the fact that some of them had to work against the posts carrying lower scale of pay or higher scale of pay. They appear to have been submitting representations etc. Finally, this question was settled and all of them were given Group VII from the date they had completed one year's job training. In fact the grievance of the appellant appears to have been redressed by the circulars, dated 22-5- 1989 and 1-6-1989, but,Mr. Shamsuddin Khalid, learned counsel, submitted that the appellant is entitled to Group VII even for the one year when he was working on the job as required under Circular A/16. I have already pointed out that this Circular A/16 does not appear to have been cancelled and even the regularisation in Group VII has been made under Circular, dated 1-6-1989 after completion of one year's job as required, under A/16. No evidence has been produced to show that this A/16 has been cancelled.
7. A workman can move the Labour Court under section 25-A I.R.O., 1969, to enforce the right guaranteed to him under any Law, settlement or award for the time being in force. No Law, settlement or award has been produced or cited in support of the claim of the appellant. He only basis his right on the appointment order, Exbt.A.W/1. In the case of Atta Mohd. Raja v. Duncan Stratton & Co. Ltd., reported in 1976 PLC 643, a learned Single Judge of Karachi High Court had held that "contract of appointment executed by employer with an individual employee does not fall within definition of settlement and application under section 25-A for enforcement of some right agreed to in contract of employment, was not maintainable." This decision was relied upon by a Division Bench of Lahore High Court in the case of Superintending Engineer (Headquarters)
Irrigation Lahore Zone and another v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, reported in 1987 PLC 180. It was observed by their Lordships that "a letter of appointment in favour of respondent did not fulfil requirements of Section 2 (xxiv) of I.R.O., 1969,and the order of appointment cannot be treated as settlement for the purpose of section 25-A."
8. In view of this legal position, it is submitted by Mr.S.M. Yaqoob and I think with great force, that the application of the appellant is not maintainable B under section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969.
9. The second objection of Mr.S.M.Yaqoob is that the application was hopelessly time-barred as the impugned order Exbt. A.W/1 was passed in 1981, whereas the second order allowing the appellant Group VII was passed on 28-4-1986. However, the appellant served grievance notice in March 1988, which is much after the statutory period envisaged in section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969. Mr.Shamsuddin.
Khalid, however, contended that the appellant had been moving representations and furthermore it was a continuous wrong and, therefore, there was no limitation against a continuous wrong. He had relied upon 1987 P.L.C. 380, where this Tribunal had observed that "where departmental appeals are provided, limitation for grievance petition would commence from date of decision of appeal". He also relied upon 1984 P.L.C. 632, where learned Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal had held that "representation filed even after rejection of appeal, where there was no proof that such representation was not permissible under Rules, but, the representation was rejected, the entertainment and rejection of representation, in circumstances, raised presumption that there may be provision for such representation and limitation for grievance notice and petition would start from rejection of representation." In the present case there is no evidence to show that there was a provision of appeal or representation under the rules nor any order has been produced rejecting the appeal or representation to get benefit of limitation. It is necessary for the appellant to prove that such appeal or representation was moved within the prescribed period and that he served the grievance notice within 3 months from the date of rejection of appeal C or representation. Where law provides that certain things are to be done within the prescribed time, a party cannot suo motu extend the period of limitation by making representations specially when there is no evidence that such representations were entertained or rejected.
10. Mr. Shamsuddin Khalid, learned Advocate for the appellant has also relied upon 1984 P.L.C. 194, where it was held that "a workman cannot be kept under suspension for more than 28 days for the purpose of enquiry, therefore, suspension thereafter was a continuous wrong and when it was challenged, during wits continuance, it was rightly set aside by the learned Labour Court." He also relied upon a decision of Lahore High Court in the case of Muhammad Javed Khan v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, reported in 1979 P.L.C. 307, wherein it was held that "petitioner according to circulars was entitled to benefit of merge of ad hoc relief and special allowance but such benefits were refused to him by respondent. The cause of action would accrue to petitioner every month and he could send a notice every month to employer to make payment." These two cases are obviously distinguishable from the instant case. In the instant case, the appellant got Group VII with effect from 29-12-1985, vide order, dated 28-41986. Thus, the alleged continuous wrong that he was not getting Group VII was also redressed much earlier to his grievance notice of March, 1988. The wrong, if any, cannot be said to have continued even upto 1988.
11. For the aforesaid reasons, in my opinion, the grievance petition filed by the appellant was time- barred as well as it was not maintainable under Section 25-A, I.R.O., 1969, as he has not proved that he had any right guaranteed under a law, settlement or award which could be enforced by the Labour Court. The grievance petition has been rightly rejected by the learned Labour Court and I find no reasons to interfere with the impugned order. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.