In a word, the facts are that respondent No. 1, Umar Bux (deceased) was appointed as Assistant Works Manager in the Punjab Urban Transport Corporation on 23-4-1978 vide Annexure `A'. It may be recalled that he was a Subedar Major in the Pakistan Armed Forces and after his retirement therefrom, be joined the petitioner-Organisation. It was made clear to the respondent that his appointment was for a period of two years which might be extended to three years. The services of the respondent were, terminated by the Managing Director of the Corporation in the first instance on 19-5-1979 without assigning any reasons vide Annexure `B'. The respondent challenged the validity of the order by filing a grievance petition which was heard and accepted by the learned Labour Court on 30-9-1979 vide Annexure `C'. It was held by the learned Labour Court that the respondent was a workman within the meaning of law and as such after the expiry of three months, he had already become a permanent employee of the petitioner-Organisation automatically by operation of law. The petitioner challenged this order by instituting an appeal which was declared infructuous on the ground that in the meantime, the services of the respondent stood already terminated on the expiry of the two years for which he was appointed.
Feeling dissatisfied with the aforesaid order, the respondent challenged it by moving petition under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 before the Punjab Labour Court No. 1, Lahore for his reinstatement in service. The petition was opposed by the petitioner by filing written statement. The learned trial Court, after recording evidence and hearing the learned counsel for the parties upheld its earlier order dated 9-11-1980 on the ground that the petitioner could not be allowed to challenge the finding of fact already arrived at by it. An appeal against the order was heard and dismissed by the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal on 30-11-1982. These orders have been assailed by the petitioner by means of this petition before this Court.
2. According to the learned counsel, it is established that respondent No.1 was not a workman and as such the learned Courts below were not competent to pass the impugned orders reinstating him in service. It is stated that the respondent was appointed in Basic Pay Scale No. 16 and as such was proved to be an officer in the Establishment. Learned counsel continues to say that he cannot be said to be a worker within the definition of workman. Learned counsel, therefore, argues that respondents Nos. 2 and 3 failed to hold in accordance with the evidence available on record. He has pointedly referred to the terms and conditions on the basis of which the petitioner was appointed. He maintains that the judgments already given in the first round of litigation cannot operate as res judicata in the given facts and circumstances of this case. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No. 1 argues forcefully that after thrashing out the entire evidence, the learned Courts below concluded that respondent No. 1 was a workman because he had been doing his duties with his own hands in the workshop. A specific reference was made to the statement of the respondent in support of his plea. It is, therefore, submitted that the finding of fact arrived at on the controversy in the first round of litigation would surely stand in the way of the petitioner in the second round of litigation to urge that the respondent was not a workman.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have also perused the entire record with their assistance. The position which would emerge is that the learned Labour Court accepted the grievance petition of the respondent on 30-9-1979 on the basis of evidence holding that the respondent was a permanent employee and that he could not be dismissed from his service without the issuance of a show-cause notice. An appeal against this order was instituted but the said finding of fact was not at all challenged by the petitioner and as such it was dismissed as having become infructuous in the given circumstances. The learned trial Court upheld its earlier decision by holding that the respondent was a permanent workman and that before terminating his service, he was entitled to have been given a hearing under the Standing Order No. 12(3) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders)
Ordinance, 1968. The evidence of respondent, Umar Bux was also recorded in which he emphatically stated that he used to remove the defects in the vehicles by doing manual labour alongwith other workers. It was stated on oath by the respondent that he had been performing his duties as a mechanic in the shop. This specific evidence of the respondent was not rebutted by the petitioner by any evidence to show that he was not doing any work with his own hands. Some officer of the Corporation should have been produced to testify that the respondent was not a workman. This was not done for unknown reasons. This being so, the deposition of the respondent goes unrebutted. The result is that the stand of the respondent that he was a worker for all intents and purposes and that he had been doing work with his own hands in the workshop would be deemed to have been accepted to be correct. This finding of fact arrived at by respondents Nos. 2 and 3, shall, therefore, operate as res judicata between the parties because the finding was given by the competent Courts after finally hearing the parties. The said decision was never further challenged by the petitioner before any competent Court of law. This finding of fact has, therefore, attained finality. The definition of "workman" given in the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 reads as follows:-- `Workman' means any person employed in any industrial or commercial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for hire or reward."
According to this definition, the respondent on the basis of evidence was rightly held to be a workman because he had been doing his job in the workshop as a Mechanic also. In order to determine the status of a person, the important test in a case like this would always be to see the nature of work being done by that person and certainly not his pay/grade or office whether high or low. Indeed, this case was assessed and settled by the learned Labour Court very ably on the basis of available evidence. This finding is thus not at all open to challenge.
4. The findings even otherwise, cannot be interfered with in the given facts and circumstances of this case in the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. A substantial relief was given to the respondent by the competent Courts on the basis of evidence in accordance with law by doing full justice. The respondent No. 1 admittedly died during the pendency of this petition. His legal heirs have already been brought on record by the petitioner. It is not just, fair and proper at this late stage to deprive the old widow and the orphan children of the deceased employee of service benefits which have already accrued to them under the law. It is well-settled that no writ can issue in aid of injustice. Reliance in this behalf may respectfully be placed on Tufail Muhammad and others v. Raja Muhammad Zia Ullah Khan, Claims Commissioner, Lahore and, another PLD 1965 SC 269 and Nawab Syed Raunaq Ali etc. v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others PLD 1973 SC 236.
There is thus no substance in this petition which is hereby dismissed with costs. This is an old matter and as such a direction shall issue to the petitioner to clear, the back benefits accruable to the respondents in accordance with law forthwith. A compliance report shall also be sent to this Court through the learned Registrar