DECISION This appeal calls in question the order of the Labour Court No. 4, Karachi, allowing the petition under section 25-A(10) of the I.R.O. It arose as under.
2. There was an advertisement in a newspaper on behalf of the Principal of the Metallurgical Training Centre, PASMIC, Karachi, for a training course in different categories. The petitioners were among those who had applied in Batch No. 113 and were selected for training as `Heat Treatment Operators'. It is alleged that these candidates were to get training for two years which included one year's training in the erstwhile USSR.
3. It is further alleged that after 13 months training in Pakistan the idea of sending them abroad was abandoned and they got their posting on the Mechanical Repair and Heat Treatment Shop. It goes on to say that the respondents had allowed three additional increments to the trainees of Batches Nos. 106 to 108, some of whom had received no foreign training. However, in spite of representations, their case had gone by default, with the result that they had sent grievance notice in December, 1990 and receiving no reply had filed the petition.
4. The respondents in their Written Reply denied the veracity of the advertisement or the mode of training. It was said that the reason the employees referred to earlier had received three increments, was because of a Settlement with the C.B.A. As the petitioners had no right existing under the law, their petitions were liable to be dismissed. It was also contended that the petitions were barred by time.
5. The petitioners filed their affidavit-in-evidence, but only Muhammad Wasi Hashmi was cross- examined on behalf of all of them. Similarly Mubarak Ali Syed, Deputy Manager (Administration) appeared on behalf of the respondents and filed his affidavit-in-evidence in all the petitions but was cross---examined only in one case, referred to earlier, which by consent was to be treated as cross-examination on behalf of all the remaining petitioners.
6. The Labour Court, for the reasons given by it, had, allowed the petition with back benefits culminating in this appeal.
7. As for the bar of limitation, which was faintly argued, all that I need to say is that on the showing of Mubarak Ali Syed the respondents were for the first time informed through letters Annexures D-1 to D-10 that they were not entitled to 3 additional increments as they were claiming. I, therefore, agree with the finding of the Labour Court that in the circumstances of the case, which need not be dilated upon here, there been no delay in the service of the grievance notice and certainly there is no delay, thereafter, in the filing. Of the petition.
8. The case of the respondents as to be found in their petition was that Batch No. 113, to which they belonged, was to receive a training for two years: one year in Pakistan and one year in USSR.
According to advertisement, which they have filed with their petition and marked as `A', applications had been invited for a number of categories and one of them was for `Heat Treatment Operator'. The minimum qualification to be found therein is `Intermediate Science (Pre- Engineering) Second Division'. Recognised training and experience in the related field if added to that, was to be preferred.
9. The induction of the respondents in the training pursuant to the advertisement had been challenged by the appellants in their written reply and also otherwise. All that I need to say in this context is that on the showing of the respondents themselves, all of them are only Matriculates and the advertisement does not indicate, even remotely, that there was going to be any relaxation in the qualifications and that too wholesale. It is also to be seen that for years together, there was no protest forthcoming from the respondents.
10. The main contention of Mr. Abdus Samad, learned counsel for the appellant, was that the petition itself was not maintainable as it was only an advertisement for training and there was no promise of any employment in the Steel Mill. Otherwise too, according to him a remedy under section 25-A, I.R.O. Could be sought only on three grounds, namely (i) in respect of any right guaranteed or secured by or under any law, (ii) or for breach of any award or (iii) settlement.
11. Award being out of context, the question will be, whether any of the two remaining categories of the cause of action are attracted.
12. Admittedly there was a settlement between the appellants and the CBA. The entire settlement has not been put on the record but the relevant portion, which is admitted by the parties, was in the following terms: "The artisans who had received training abroad pursuant to the terms -of the advertisement and otherwise should be promoted as Supervisor. They will be entitled to three additional increments. It was also clarified that only those artisans will be entitled to this clause of settlement (i) who are F.Sc. At the time of training, (ii) that training must have been of two years duration; and (iii) one year out of these two years the training should have been abroad."
13. According to Mubarak Ali Syed, the artisans of Groups 106, 107 and 108 were paid advance increments on the basis of the settlement with the CBA, dated 31-1-1987, and in his cross- examination he has testified that the candidates of Group 106 were Inter Science (Pre-Engineering)
Group.
14. Looking to the clauses of the settlement and the evidence of Mubarak Ali Syed (and there being nothing contrary thereto in the evidence as furnished by the respondents) the trainees of Batches Nos. 106, 107 and 108 who had been awarded three additional increments, all possessed superior degrees. The respondents on their own showing did not fall in that category. They find no mention therein. So, settlement does not come to their support.
15. The additional three increments that went to some of the employees referred to earlier, would be ex gratia in nature.
16. Concessional grants do not come within the ambit of rights. They may be bargained for but not claimed as of right. I have not been told as to how the claim can be propped up on the basis of any right.
17. I am, therefore, clearly of the opinion that the order of learned Labour Court is unsustainable. I will, therefore, vacate the impugned order and allow the appeal.