' On 8-11-1997 the respondent filed an application under section 25-A of I.R.O., 1969, in the Punjab Labour Court No,9, Multan. According to this petition, the respondent was employed as a Guard by the, appellant when he was retired under the voluntary retirement scheme w.e.f, 19-8-1997. A departmental appeal was filed which was dismissed. According to him, he was a worker and a workman under the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders)
Ordinance, 1968, as well as I.R.O., 1969, while the appellants are the employers. The plea taken was that according to the Circular dated 9-7-1997 issued by the Head Office, his application for voluntary retirement was conditional. The benefits were to be paid to him on the basis of 25 years service according to the formula stated in the said circular and he made it clear that he is offering for retirement on the said condition. The grievance being made out was that he was given benefits on the basis of 10 years service and he was retired. The prayer made was that the appellants be directed to reinstate him in service or in the alternative he should be paid benefits according to the said circular. In the written statement tiled by the appellants on 29-6-1999 it was objected that the respondent had voluntarily opted for a Golden Hand Shake and the admissible benefits were granted. It was also objected that the respondent is not a workman and consequently the jurisdiction of the Labour Court was denied. It was also stated that the respondent having retired from service, the Standing Orders Ordinance was not applicable. There is no denial in the written statement that the service of the respondent was only two months short of 25 years and there is no denial of the formula for calculating the period of service. Evidence of the parties was recorded.
The learned Labour Court vide judgment dated 22-12-2003 allowed the grievance petition inasmuch as the appellants were directed to pay him benefits under the Category-I of the voluntary retirement scheme having completed 25 years service in accordance with the said circular.
2. Learned counsel for the appellants contends that the respondentshaving resigned would not fall within the definition of worker and workman in I.R.O., 1969. Similarly, there is no industrial dispute in existence which could be taken to the Labour Court. According to the learned counsel, the only dispute is regarding benefits and the same could only be taken to the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act and not to a Labour Court. The learned counsel relies on the case of State Bank of Pakistan v. Khyber Zaman and others (2004 PLC (C.S.) 1213), Muhammad Ayub Khan and 3 others v.
Messrs Muhammad Farooq Textile Mills Ltd. And 2 others (2004 PLC 250) and Trustees of the Port' of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem (1994 SCMR 2213). It has also been sought to be argued that the benefits under the voluntary retirement scheme was a concessional grant and cannot be claimed as of rights with reference to a judgment of Labour Appellate Tribunal, Sindh reported as 1994 PLC 193.
3. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contendsthat his client never resigned. A representation was (sic) to him by the employer that if he voluntarily retires, he will be paid benefits stated in the circular issued by the appellant. On the said representation, the respondent opted for retirement. He was, however, not paid benefits in terms of the said circular but at the same time was retired and as such he took his grievance to the Labour Court. According to the learned counsel his client is a worker within the meaning of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1969. Relies on the cases of Shahzar Khan v. Sind Labour Court No,4, Karachi and 2 others (1977 SCMR 103) and Rab Nawaz v. Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal and .2 others (PLD 1987 Karachi 175) to urge that his client was a workman under the said 1968 Ordinance. The precise plea is that being a worker under the said Ordinance, he could take his grievance to the Labour Court on the .Ground that having been retired from service i.e, in a manner other than the one stated in the provision of law, he be paid his benefits.
4. I have gone through the Labour Court records, with the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties. Admittedly, the Circular dated 9-7-1997 (Exh. P.2) was issued by the appellants. According to this circular, the employees were divided into two categories, Those who have completed continuous 25 years service on 30-6-1977 were placed in Category-I and those who have completed continuous 10 years service onthe said date were placed in Category-II. It was specifically provided that for computing the length of service or unexpired period of services, the broken period exceeding six months will be taken as full one year. It is an admitted fact on record and otherwise as per Exh. P.3 issued by the appellants themselves that the respondent commenced his service on 9-7-1972. This being so, on 30-6-1997 his continuous service was 24 years and about 9 months. This being so, according to the formula devised by the appellants themselves, the continuous length of service of the respondent was to be treated as 25 years.
Admittedly, he has been paid benefits by placing him in Category-II.
5. Now coming to the said contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, there is no manner of doubt in my mind that the respondent is a workman within the meaning of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. Under the Standing Order 15(4) and 15(6) where the services of a workman stand terminated for any reason other than mis-conduct he will be paid all the benefits to which he is entitled inter alia, in accordance with the terms of his employment.
6. Now there is no allegation of mis-conduct against the respondent. He was continuing in service and but for the said representation made by the appellant would have continued till such time that he had attained the age of superannuation or otherwise removed from service in accordance with law when he was assured that in case he retires voluntarily, he will be paid benefits in accordance with the Category-I of the employees as per contents of the said circular. This was, admittedly, not done whereas he had, in fact, been retired. This being so, the respondent had a grievance in terms of the said Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, which could be taken to the Labour Court under section 25-A of the I.R.O., 1969. In the case of Pak Arab Refinery Limited v. Muhammad Rashid (1999 SCMR 373) and Syed Matloob Hussain v. Brooke Bond Pakistan Limited, Lahore (1992 SCMR 227), it has been held that even if section 25-A of the I.R.O., 1969 is not applicable in terms to a grievance, then if the petitioner is a workman within the meaning of the said Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, then the two provisions are to be read together and any grievance in respect of the rights guaranteed under the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968, can be taken to the Labour Court under section 25-A of the I.R.O., 1969. Once the grievance is validly brought to the Labour Court then it has to be treated as an industrial dispute and decided accordingly wherein the learned Labour Court can pass any order which it deems fit and proper.
7. For all that has been discussed above, I do not find any force force in this FAO which is dismissed without any orders as to costs.
8. The records of the learned Labour Court be sent back immediately.