' MALIK MUHAMMAD QAYYUM, J.---This appeal under section 3 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 calls in question the judgment dated 22-12-1975 whereby a learned Single Judge of this Court dismissed. W.P. No,1457/66 filed by the appellant.
2. The facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal are that the appellant held a share in land bearing Khasra No, 3347 within the revenue estate of Mozang, Lahore out of which an area of 5 Kanals 1 Marla and 134 sq. Ft. Was acquired by respondent No, 1 for the benefit of respondent No, 3, for extension of Mozang High School. The Land Acquisition Collector announced his award on 29-4- 1964.
' On 22-3-1966, the appellant filed an application before the Collector praying that the dispute about compensation be referred to the Civil Court for determination in terms of section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. That application was, however, rejected by the Land Acquisition Collector on 28-5-1966 as being barred by time.
3. The appellant challenged this order by filing a Constitutional petition averring that as he had not been served with any notice of making of the award, the limitation for filing application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act would run from the date of his knowledge and not from the date of the award and as such the refusal of the respondent to refer, the dispute to the Civil Court was without lawful authority. That petition was, however, dismissed on 22-12-1975 by a learned Single Judge of this Court who observed that the question as to whether the appellant was served with any notice under section 45 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, was one of fact and could not be decided in the Constitutional petition especially when validity of the award itself had not been challenged. Hence this appeal.
4. Mian Nisar Ahmad, learned counsel for the appellant has maintained that the learned Single Judge has erred in dismissing the appellant's Constitutional petition on the ground that it raised a disputed question of fact when it was apparent on the face of record that the appellant had not been served with a notice of making of the award as required by law. Further contention of the learned counsel, while relying upon Raja Harish Chandra Raj Singh v. The Deputy Land Acquisition Officer and another (AIR 1961 SC 1500) and State of Punjab v. Mst. Qaiser Jehan Begum and another (AIR 1963 SC 1604) was that in the absence of such notice, limitation for filing application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 would run from the date of knowledge of the making of the award by the appellant and not from the date on which it was made.
5. No one has appeared on behalf of the respondents.
6. The question which falls for determination in this appeal is as to what is the exact point of time from which the time for filing an application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 is to be recknoned. The answer to this question lies in true interpretation of section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which reads as under:- "Reference to Court.--(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the person interested.
(2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken: ' Provided that every such application shall be made--
(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award;
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, subsection (2) or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire."
7. On a proper analysis of proviso to subsection (2) of section 18 as reproduced above, it will be seen that different periods of limitation are provided therein, for different situations; firstly, when the applicant was present or represented before the Collector when he made his award; secondly, when he was neither present nor represented but had been served of making of the award and thirdly, when he was neither present nor represented before the Collector and had not been served with any notice of making of the award. The limitation in all the three cases is different and has to be computed on the plain wording of the provision from different points of time. In the first case, the time provided for making reference is six weeks from the date of the award while in the second case, an application can be presented within six weeks of the receipt of the notice of making of the award. However, in the case falling in the last category though a larger period of limitation namely of six months has been provided but that time is to run from the date of the Collector's award and the service of notice or knowledge about the award had no relevance.
8. The contention of the appellant's learned counsel that in all cases where there has been no service of notice of making of the award, limitation should be computed from the date of knowledge and not the date of award, cannot be accepted in view of the Clear language of clause
(b) of the proviso to section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It has been categorically laid down therein that in cases where no notice under section 12(2) of the making of the award has been served, objections must be filed within six months from the date of the Collector's award.
Consequently, there is hardly any justification for accepting the argument that even in such cases the terminus a qua should be the date of knowledge of person and not the date of the award itself.
The use of expression "whichever period shall first expire" in clause (b) of the proviso further fortifies this conclusion. It is trite law that redundancy cannot be attributed to the Legislature and every word used in the Statute must be given some meaning. Consequently, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant.
9. No doubt the view canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant finds support from the judgments of the Indian Supreme Court referred to above but it must be stated to his credit that he himself has brought to our notice that correctness of these two judgments was doubted by a Division Bench of this Court in Province of Punjab through Project Director, Housing and Physical Planning Department v. Sher Muhammad and another (PLD 1983 Lahore 578) wherein it was observed that as the Legislature has provided an extraordinary long period for making reference, it cannot be said that limitation should run from the date of knowledge. It was further held that utmost period within which a reference can be sought was six months from the date of the award.
To the same effect are the judgments of the Division Bench in Atta Muhammad and others v.
Assistant Commissioner (0), Bahawalpur and another (PLD 1961 BJ 69) and Gulzaman and another v. Collector, Land Acquisition and others (PLD 1984 Peshawar 35) and K.A. Marker, Director, A.D.
Marker and Sons v. WAPDA through its Chairman, Lahore (PLD 1979 Quetta 20). We do not feel persuaded to take a different view particularly in face of the following Observations of the Supreme Court in Ghulam Muhammad v. Government of West Pakistan (PLD 1967 SC 191) which to us appear to be conclusive of the controversy involved: -- "The fact that admittedly no notice of the filing of the award was served upon the appellant under section 12(2) of the Act, is in no way, relevant for the purpose of deciding this controversy as to the time within which the objection should be filed for, under section 18, proviso (b), it would appear that if notice is served the period of limitation is only six weeks from the date of the service of the notice but in other cases 6 months from the date of the Collector's award. This proviso fixes a special period of limitation and since the Land Acquisition Act does not make the provisions of the Limitation Act applicable it would appear that in the same case of an objection under section 18 the maximum period allowable is six months from the date of the making of the award in accordance with section 11."
10. The learned counsel for the appellant in support of his contention has also cited Muhammad Afzal and others v. Government of Sindh and others 1993 MLD 414 and Chairman, WAPDA and another v. Faqir Muhammad and another (1986 CLC 192) but these judgments do not deal with the question in issue before us and as such have no relevance. Similarly, the reliance of the learned counsel on Col. Bashir Hussain and 10 others v. Land Acquisition Collector and others (PLD 1970 Lah.
321), Mst. Maryam Bibi v. Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore (PLD 1973 Note 124 at p.191, Mst. Sardar Begum v. Lahore Improvement Trust, Lahore and 3 others (PLD 1972 Lah. 458) is of no avail to him as in all these cases, it was the validity of the award which had been questioned on the ground of non-service of notice of making of the award. In the present case, however, no challenge has been shown to the validity of the award itself and the only order impugned in the Constitutional petition was that of the Land Acquisition Collector dated 28-5-1966 refusing to refer the dispute to the Civil Court on the ground that the application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 having not been filed within six months from the date of the award.
'In view of the above discussion, we are firmly of the view that in cases even where a notice under section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act has not been served upon the person interested, the maximum period available to him is six months from the date of the award itself. The order passed by the Land Acquisition Collector on 28-5-1966 was, therefore, perfectly in accordance with law and calls for no interference. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.