' SAAD SAOOD JAN, J.-This regular first appeal is by the Government of the Punjab from the decision of the Senior Civil Judge, Lahore dated 18-11-1981 on a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.
2. In early 1960 the Provincial Government through its Housing and Physical Planning Department decided to acquire land for its Lahore Township Scheme. The land affected by the scheme fell in ten revenue estates of which village Kirkalan alone is relevant in this appeal. A notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was published on 7-3-1960. Subsequently, the scope of the scheme was extended and a second notification under section 4 of the said Act for the acquisition of further area was published on 27-2-1962. Taking the two notifications together a total area of 9359 Kanals and 10 Marlas from village Kirkalan was affected. On 13-12-1962 another notification under section 6, read with section 17, of the Act was issued.
3. After the publication of the above notifications the Land Acquisition Collector, Public Works Department (B & R), Central Region, Lahore initiated proceedings for the determination of the compensations payable to the various owners of the land acquired. For this purpose he classified the land into different categories, such as, Nehri, Ghairmumkin Kalar, Banjar Qadeem, Banjar Jadid, Barani, Chappar, Bagh Nehri, Khal and Haveli and fixed different rates for each category. He then filed his award with the Collector on 4-7-1963. However, he did not give notice of this award to the owners as required by section 12(2) of the Act. On 27-5-1964 the respondents who were some of the persons affected by the acquisition proceedings applied to the Collector for making a reference to Court. On 11.10-1965 the Collector rejected their application in this regard on the ground that it had been made beyond the prescribed period. He took over possession of the land on 16-12-1964.
4. On 14-5-1966 the respondents filed a Writ Petition (W. P. No, 849 of 1966) against the Land Acquisition Collector seeking a declaration that the refusal of the Collector to make a reference was illegal and praying for a direction that the Collector should be made to refer the question of compensations to a civil Court.
5. This writ petition was laid before Shameem Hussain Kadri, J. (later, Actg. C. J). Two questions were raised before his Lordship. Firstly, as no notices under section 12 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act had been served upon the respondents the limitation did not start running against them and secondly, in any case the period of six months prescribed for applying for making a reference commenced from the date of knowledge of the award and not from the date of merely signing it by the Collector. By his order dated 17-2-676 his Lordship did not consider it necessary to decide the question of limitation but merely directed the Collector to issue notices with regard to the filing of the award to the respondents as required under section 12 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act.
6. In pursuance of the direction given in the writ petition the Land Acquisition Collector issued notices to the respondents on 21-6-1976. These were served upon them on 26-6-1976. On 28-6- 1976 the respondents moved an application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act for making a reference to the civil Court. On 8-6-1977 the Collector made the sought for reference to the Senior Civil Judge, Lahore. In the reference, apart from narrating the history of the acquisition proceedings, he stated that the reference was barred by time and prayed that it should be dismissed on that account. He also maintained that the rates awarded were quite adequate and reasonable.
7. On the pleadings of the parties before him the learned Senior Civil Judge framed the following issues :-
(1) Is the reference within time ?
(2) Are the compensations awarded to the petitioners low and illegal, if so, what should be the amount of compensations ?
(3) Relief.
8. On the issue of limitation the learned Senior Civil Judge found that the application for reference was made to the Collector within six weeks of the service of notices and that there was no evidence that the respondents had notice of the filing of the award before the service of notices, apart from that, the civil Court could not go into the question of limitation and in any event by making a reference the Collector should be taken to have waived the plea of limitation. Accordingly, he held that the reference was within time. On the issue of the legality and adequacy of compensations the learned Senior Civil Judge found that the land was 'charming', valuable and potentially suitable for raising a housing colony or a factory thereon. In support of these findings he mentioned that the land was situate two miles away from Railway Station Kot Lakhpat and three miles from Model Town ; further it was accessible by two Katcha roads from Model Town and adjoined the limits of the Municipal Corporation, Lahore ; besides, it was in the vicinity of the BECO factory. As regards the rate of compensations he noticed that in surrounding villages land was being sold at Rs, 4,500 per Kanal. He accepted the statement of one of the respondents that at the time of the issuance of the acquisition notices the land was being sold in village Kir Kalan at Rs, 2,000 per Kanal. He thought this amount was not exaggerated. He disregarded the classifications made by the Collector as he thought these were irrelevant as the land was no longer agricultural but had acquired the potential of a building area. Accordingly, he fixed the amount of compensations at Rs, 2,000 per Kanal for the whole area. In addition he allowed respondents 15 per cent. By way of solarium on account of the compulsory nature of acquisition as contemplated by section 23 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act. He also directed that compound interest at the rate of 8 per cent. On the excess amount be paid to the respondents from the date the Collector took possession of the land till actual payment of compensations now assessed by him.
9. Before considering the various contentions raised in this appeal we may mention that the Collector had fixed the rates of compensations for the various categories of land as follows :- {{TABLE TEXT}} CategoryRate per Kanal
1. Adjacent to Abadi.Rs. 1,200 2.-do-Rs. 1,000 3.-do-Rs. 900 4.-do-Rs. 850 5.-do-Rs. 800 6.-do-Its. 760 7.Nehri Niain.Rs. 700 8.Nehri.Rs.500 9.Nehri.Rs.460 10.Barani.Rs.400 11.Banjar Qadeem.Rs. 350 12.Banjar JadidRs. 310 13.Kallar.Rs.200 14.Rasta, Khal, etc.Rs. 100 {{TABLE TEXT}} ' Assessed on this basis the amount received by the respondents came to Rs, 37,16,718/99. After the decision of the learned Senior Civil Judge the amount of compensations now payable to the respondents after adding compound interest rose to many crores of rupees.
10. It may also be mentioned that the total area acquired in village Kir Kalan was 17003 Kanals and 12 Marlas whereas the land owned by the respondents was only 9359 Kanals and 10 Marlas. The number of persons affected by the acquisition in the said village was 120 whereas only 55 persons challenged the award through the present proceedings.
11. Taking up the issue of limitation, it is to be noticed that while making reference to the Senior Civil Judge the Collector had stated that the application of the respondents was barred by time and that it should be dismissed as such. There is no doubt whatsoever that the Collector, if he thought that the reference was barred by time, could himself reject the application for reference. However, he elected to refer the matter to the Court. He resorted to this course presumably because he thought that after the decision of the High Court in the writ petition filed by the respondents he had no other alternative open to him. Now, that he has chosen to refer the matter to the Court two questions arise for consideration, namely :
(i) whether instead of deciding the matter himself the Collector could have left the final decision to the Court ; and
(ii) whether the Court was competent to go into the question of limitation.
' It may at once be stated that there is nothing in the Land Acquisition Act which would prevent the Collector from adopting the course which he did in this case. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents was unable to cite any precedent wherein the Collector was held incompetent to refer the question of limitation to the decision of the Court. On the other hand the learned counsel appearing for the appellant cited two authorities one from Madras and the other from Bombay in support of the contention that the Collector could competently refer the question of limitation to the Court for decision. In Subramania v. Collector of Coimbatore (1) it was observed :- "We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Court has powers, when a reference is made under section 18, Land Acquisition Act, to go into the question of limitation, all the moreso in a case like the present, where the Collector himself has included the question of limitation as part of the reference in his letter accompanying the reference and has not decided the question himself."
' In Mahadeo Krishna v. Mumlatdar of Alibag (2) the Collector made a reference to the civil Court after expressing the opinion that the application was barred by time. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that the Court could examine the question of limitation in order to see whether the statutory conditions prerequisite for making a reference had been complied with. It may be mentioned here that a view similar to the one taken by the Bombay High Court was expressed as far back as in 1914 by the Lahore High Court in Ghulam Muhy-ud-Din v. Secretary of State (3). In this case the application made to the Collector for reference was barred by time ; nevertheless the Collector made the reference, without noticing if the application by the objectors had been made within tin e. Before the civil Court an objection was taken that there was no proper reference inasmuch as it proceeded on an application made out of time. In reply to this objection it was said that the question of limitation should be deemed to have been waived by the Collector by referring the matter to the Court. A Division Bench of the Lahore High Court took the view that there was no waiver and that it was open to the Court to hold that the application to the Collector could not form the basis of the reference under section 18 inasmuch as it was made beyond time. We should, therefore, think that in this case the civil Court could examine the question of limitation and the learned Senior. Civil Judge was not right in taking the view that by making a reference to the Court the Collector should be deemed to have waived the objection with regard to limitation, particularly when he invited the Court to reject the reference as time-barred.
12. The next point for consideration is whether the application for reference made by the respondents was within time. In this context two provisions of the Land Acquisition Act need to be noticed. The first is section 12(2) which reads as follows:- "The Collector shall give immediate notice of his award to such of the persons interested as are not present personally or by their representatives when the award is made."
' The second provision is section 18(2). It is in the following terms:- ' The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken: ' Provided that every such application shall be made,-
(a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award, and
(b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, subsection (2) or within six months from {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) AIR 1946 Mad. 184 (2) A-I-R 1944 Born. 200
(3) AIR 1914 Lhr. 394 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire.
' Here, although the respondents have been participating in the proceedings before the Collector they were admittedly not present when he made the award. Further, after making the award the Collector did not give immediate notice to the respondents as required by section 12(2). Thus, for the purpose of determining limitation we are concerned entirely with the construction of clause (b) of the proviso to section 18(2). A perusal of this clause indicates that it deals with two situations, namely:-
(i) where the Collector has given notice to the persons concerned; in this case the person dissatisfied with the award has to make the application within six weeks of the receipt of the notice, and
(ii) where notice has not been given by the Collector; in this case the person seeking reference has to move the Collector within six months of the making of the award.
' In Bashir Hussain v. Land Acquisition Collector (1), a Division Bench envisaged a third situation also, that is, where the Collector served notice not immediately after making the award, but shortly before the expiry of the period of six months. The Division Bench observed that in such a case the person aggrieved could make the application within six months of the making of the award irrespective of the date on which he received the notice. In taking this view the Bench was apparently influenced by the words 'whichever period shall first expire' as occurring in clause (b).
Although the learned Judges also went on to hold that if the Collector failed to issue notice in terms of section 12(2) within a reasonable period after making the award, the award itself would become void, but with due respect, this appears to be an extreme position and seems to be in conflict with the observations made in A ta Muhammad v. Assistant Commissioner (2). In any event it was nobody's position before the learned Senior Civil Judge that the award in this case was void as the Collector had not given any notice to the respondents within a reasonable period. It may also be mentioned that one of the learned Judges who constituted the Division Bench did not himself later follow this view while disposing of the respondents' writ petition as he directed, the Collector to issue notices to the respondents almost thirteen years after the making of the award. However, that may be, as it was not pleaded by any of the parties that the award was void, we leave the matter at that.
13. Learned counsel for the respondents contended that section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act which provided for issuance of a notice upon persons interested and section 18(2) thereof which prescribed the limitation for making an, application for reference ought to be read together for the drafter of the said Act did not contemplate a situation where no notice at all had been served.
Thus, the limitation could not possibly begin to run till a notice of the award had been served upon the persons affected by the acquisition proceedings. He did not cite any precedent in support of this contention and, on a plain reading of section 18(2), it is difficult to subscribe to it. As already noted, the proviso to section 18(2) provided for both situations, that is, the one where a notice had been served and the other where no notice had been served. In fact the drafter of the Act made a conscious effort to remove the handicap from which a person who had not been served with a notice suffered by giving him an extraordinarily long period of six months for making the application for reference. {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1970 Lah. 321 (2) P D 1961 B J 69 {{FOOT NOTE}}
14. As stated above, notices under section 12(2) upon the respondent were served for the first time on 26-6-1976 in pursuance of a writ issued by this Court. This was about 13 years after the filing of the award. A question arises whether the notices served upon the respondents furnished them with another period of limitation. I would answer the question in the negative. My reason for taking this view is that under clause (b) of the proviso to section 18(2) the limitation begins to run as soon as the award is made. In case where a notice has been served, the limitation expire after six weeks from the date of the service and in a case where the notice has not been served, it comes to an end after six months. The words 'shall first expire' as occurring in clause (b) leave no room for doubt that the period of six months is the utmost time within which the application for reference can be made by a person dissatisfied with the award. Thus, service of notice after six months of the making of the award cannot give fresh starting point for limitation for applying for reference. In support of the view which I take I would refer to Ghulam Muhammad v. Government of West Pakistan (1), where Hamoodur Rahman J. (later C. J.) observed:- "The fact that admittedly no notice of the filing of the award was served upon the appellant under section 12(2) of the Act is, in no way, relevant for the purpose of deciding this controversy as to the time within which the objection should be filed for, under section 18, proviso (b), it would appear that if notice is served the period of limitation is only six weeks from the date of the service of the notice but in other cases six months from the date of the Collector's award. This proviso fixes a special period of limitation and since the Land Acquisition Act does not make the provisions of the Limitation Act applicable it would appear that in the same case of an objection under section 18 the maximum period allowable is six months from the date of the making of the award in accordance with section 11."
' The same view was expressed by a Division Bench of the West Pakistan High Court in Ata Muhammad v. Assistant Commissioner (2). Even in Bashir Hussain v. Land Acquisition Collector.
There are observations which indicate that six months is the utmost period within which a reference can be sought.
15. The learned counsel for the respondents contended that the period of six months was to be counted not from the date of the award but from the date of the knowledge about the award by the persons affected. In support of his submission he referred to two decisions of the Indian Supreme Court reported as Harish Chandra v. Deputy Land Acquisition Officer (3) and State of Punjab v. Qaisar Jehan Begum (4). In both these cases the Indian Supreme Court did hold that in a case where no notice under section 12(1) had been served the starting point for limitation for applying for reference was the date of the knowledge of the award on the part of the person affected. Although, speaking with respect, it is possible to take a different view from the one taken in India on account of the extraordinarily long period provided by the Legislature for making the.
Application, it is unnecessary to examine this proposition for the disposal of this appeal, for even it be assumed that the respondents could apply for a reference within six months of the date of knowledge of the award it does not further their case. Here two applications were made by the respondents to the Collector for making a {{FOOT NOTE}} (1)PLD 1967 SC 191 (2) PLD 1961 B J 69
(3) AIR 1961 SC 1500 (4) A 1 R 1963 SC 1604 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' reference. One of these was made on 28-7-1976 after the decision in the writ petition. There is little doubt that it was made many years after the respondents had obtained knowledge about the making of the award. The other application was made on 27-5-1964, that is, about 10 months after the making of the award. Even if it be assumed that the reference made to the Court was relatable to this second application of 27-5-1964, the respondents cannot still get rid of the bar of limitation.
It is to be noticed that while directing the Collector to issue notices to the respondents, the learned Single Judge did not decide the question whether the application rejected by the Collector was within time. The learned Senior Civil Judge framed a specific issue on the point whether the reference was within time. The onus of proving this issue was on the respondents. They led no evidence whatsoever to show that they had obtained knowledge about the award within six months of making the application of 27-5-1964. It may be mentioned that the acquisition proceedings affected a large area falling in ten revenue estates and, as the order of reference mentions, the respondents had been attending the proceedings in June and July, 1963. The award was made on 4-7-1963. In the absence of any evidence that they had moved the Collector for reference within six months of receiving knowledge of the award, that is, within six months of 27-5- 1964, their application must be considered as barred by time.
16. The learned counsel for the respondents then contended that the requirements with regard to limitation for making an application for reference was only of a directory nature and could not as such form a basis for rejecting the same. In support of his contention he referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in Government of West Pakistan v. Ahmed Ali Jan (1). This was a case from the Northern-Western Frontier Province. The Collector rejected the application for reference on the ground of limitation. Under the special provision applicable to that Province the Additional Commissioner in revision set aside the decision of the Collector and directed that the reference be made. Thus, it was a case where the objection with regard to limitation was specifically waived and despite the bar of time the reference was made to the Court. It was in these circumstances that the Supreme Court held that the civil Court could not go into the question of limitation. The decision of the Supreme Court cannot be taken as laying down that an application for reference cannot be rejected or withheld by the Collector on the ground of limitation or that where the Collector himself finds difficulty in deciding the question of limitation he cannot refer the same to the civil Court for decision. It may be mentioned that in the case before us the Collector had earlier rejected the application for reference on 'the ground of limitation. When in pursuance of the direction given in the writ petition he issued notices to the respondents under section 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act he felt difficulty in rejecting on his own the application for reference on the ground of limitation.
It was in these circumstances that he referred the question of limitation to the civil Court and made a prayer to reject the same on the ground of limitation. It was not a case of waiving the plea of limitation.
17. For the reasons stated above, we are of the view that the application for reference was barred by time and the reference ought to have been rejected on this ground.
18. Before we take up the issue of legality and adequacy of the compensations awarded we may mention that in the proceedings before the Court {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) PLD 1981 SC 5.16 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' the position of the party who has sought the reference is that of a plaintion and it is for it to show that the award made by the Collector is illegal or inadequate. In case it fails to discharge its burden in this regard the award of the Collector must be confirmed. In support of this view we would refer/ to two decisions from the Indian jurisdiction, namely, Dhusabhai Polabhai v. Special Land Acquisition Officer (1) and Surjan Singh v. East Punjab Government (2). We are unaware of any decision from or own Courts where a contrary view has been taken. This being the legal position we shall proceed to examine if the respondents have succeeded in showing that the award given by the Collector was either illegal or inadequate.
19. As already stated land in village Kir Kalan was acquired in pursuance of two different notifications made under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The first was issued on 3-3- 1960 and the other on 27-2-1962. From the figures supplied by the learned counsel for the appellant the land of the respondents acquired under the two notifications can be split up as follows : 5220 Kanals 2 Marlas was covered by the first notification and 4139 Kanals 8 Marlas of land of the respondents fell under the second notification. These figures were not disputed before us by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. Under clause firstly of section 23 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act the market value of the land is to be determined with reference to the date of the publication of the notification under section 4 (1) thereof. It will thus appear that there were two different dates material for determining the market value of two different parcels of land owned by the respondents. It would be somewhat unusual that the publication of notification of 3-3-1960 which proclaimed the intention of the Government to set up a ownship Scheme in village Kir Kalan should not lead to appreciation of the price of the land which fell in the immediate vicinity of the laud sought to be acquired. However that may be, as none of the parties before us took up the position that there had been an appreciation in the value of the land covered by the notification of 27-2-1962 on account of the notification of 3-3-1960 it may be presumed that the value of land remained the same during the period between 3-3.1960 and 27-2-1962.
19-A. During the course of arguments before us great emphasis was placed by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents on the expression "potential value of the land". It was contended that the very fact that the land was being acquired for executing a Township Scheme indicated that it was a potential building site. The learned Senior Civil Judge was apparently impressed by this argument and he fixed the price of the acquired area at Rs, 2,0J) per Kenai on the assumption that the whole land was a potential building area. It was for this reason that he ignored the classifications made by the Land Acquisition Collector.
20. It is to be noticed that in 1960 or 1962 when the land of the respondent was acquired the expression "potential value" did not occur in the Land Acquisition Act. There were no doubt a number of reported cases where potential value of the land was taken into account while discovering the market value thereof. But as this expression could be easily misconstrued or given a very wide meaning; the Legislature stepped in and by Ordinance XL1X of 1969 added an explanation to clause firstly of section 23 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, which reads as follows :- "For the purpose of determining the market-value, the Court shall take into account transfer of land similarly situated and in similar use. The {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) AIR 1959 Born. 520 (2) AIR 1957 Pb. 265 {{FOOT NOTE}} ' potential value of the land to be acquired if put to a different use shall only be taken into consideration if it is proved that land similarly situated and previously. In similar use has, before the date of the notification under subsection (1) of section 4, been transferred with a view to being put to the use relied upon as affecting the potential value of the land to be acquired."
Even if this explanation be ignored on account of the reason that it was added to the Act much after the acquisition of land in this case, one cannot allow one's imagination to have free rein in determining the potential value of a property. It is to be noticed that the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act are designed to pi vide fair compensations to the persons whose property is being taken over by the State. The measure of fair compensations is the value of the property in open market which a seller voluntarily entering into a transact ton of sale can reasonably demand from a purchaser. No doubt while evaluating his property a seller does take into account its exploitable capabilities but then these capabilities are usually determined with reference to the use to which the property can be put either immediately or in the near future, for no buyer will pay a price based on speculative qualities of the property. I was in this context that the Privy Council in Gajapatiraju v.
Revenue Divisional Officer (1) observed :- "No one can suppose in the case of land which is certain, or even likely, to be used in the immediate or reasonably near future for building purposes but which at the valuation date is waste land or is Bing used for agricultural purposes, that the owner, however willing a vendor, will be content to sell the land for its value as waste or agricultural land as the case may be. It is plain that in ascertaining its value, the possibility of its being used for building purposes would have to be taken into account. It is equally plain, however, that the land must not be valued as though it had already been built upon, a proposition that is embodied in section 24 (5) of the Act and is sometimes expressed by saying that it is the possibilities of the land and not its realized possibilities that must be taken into consideration.
21. There is another matter also which may be noticed at this stage. Clause fifthly of section 24 of the Land Acquisition ' Act states that while determining the market value of the property the Court should not take into account any increase to the value of the property acquired likely to accrue from the use to which it will be put when acquired. This means that vs. G have to determine the value of the land in the open market at the relevant time on the assumption that the notification of acquisition did not exist.
22. As already indicated the learned Senior Civil Judge has proceeded to determine the compensations on the assumption that the land in dispute was a potential building area. On the record there is little support for this assumption. The respondents did not allege that prior to the issuance of the notifications of acquisition any housing scheme had been prepared by any Govern mint Department, Semi-Government authority or any private organization either in respect of the area in dispute or with regard to the area falling in the immediate vicinity thereof. There is also no evidence that people were buying land at a fairly large scale for constructing houses in the village Ki Kalan. The respondents could produce record of only six mutations which could be said to be relating to sales for building purposes. These sales, too, took place after the issuance of the notification of 3-3-1960. In the circus stances it is difficult to accept the contention of the respondents that their enti and ought to be treated as a potential building area. {{FOOT NOTE}}
(1) AIR. 1939 P C 914 {{FOOT NOTE}}
23. The learned Senior Civil Judge also held that the land in dispute was "charming". We are unable to discover the basis for this observation. Admittedly, the land felt outside the Municipal limits of Lahore. The learned Senior Civil Judge apparently based his observations on the following extract from the award of the Land Acquisition Collector :- "The land of village Kir Kalan is situated between villages Kot Lakhpat Pindi and Ajodhyapur on the North, Sato Katla towards West, Chandra and Tahait towards East and Rakh Chandra towards the South. It is about two miles from the Railway Station, Kot Lakhpat and three miles from Model Town and is accessible by two Kacha Roads running from Model Town through Pindi and Mochipura as well as New BECO Road which is connected with Pindi Minor. The acquired land adjoins the Lahore Corporation Limits which extend upto the boundary of villages Ajodhyapur and Pindi. In view of its situation close to the Corporation limits near the Railway Station and its accessibility the market value of land acquired is higher than the market value of the lands in villages Sato Katla, Tahait, Chandra and Rakh Chandra but is lower than the market value of lands in villages Ajodhyapur and Pindi."
' It is difficult to describe the land of the respondents as charming on the basis of the above extract ; it is not claimed that the land has any scenic features.
24. The respondents laid great emphasis on the fact that their land was contiguous to BECO factory. It is to be noticed that the mere construction of the BECO factory in the vicinity of the respondents land would not have necessarily led to the appreciation of its value. Very often factories are built away from the cities for the reason the land is cheaply available there. There-I fore, unless there is some evidence that the construction of the BECO factory had changed the potential capabilities of the land and led to increase in its value, this fact by itself would hardly be of any significance. It is in the evidence of the respondents that the said factory was constructed 3 or 4 years before the acquisition proceedings in this case, This would be some time in 1956 or 1957.
The appellant produced a number of authorities relating to sales which took place after 1957. The price paid in these sales varied between Rs, 95 to Rs, 600 per Kanal. In this context it may also be mentioned that one of the witnesses for the respondents, namely, Muhammad Rafiq (P. W. 1) who was the son of one of the respondents was unable to refute the assertion of the appellant that his own father had sold land in the vicinity of the land in dispute soon after the issuance of the notifications of acquisition at rates varying between Rs, 350 and Rs, 500 per Kanal. In the circumstances it cannot be said that the proximity of the BECO factory had led to any appreciation of the prices of the land in the respondents' village.
25. It is also difficult to rely on the assertion of the respondents that their land was in one block and entirely contiguous to the BECO factory. It is to be noticed that of the various land owners who were affected by the acquisition only less than half had sought a reference. In the absence of any site plan indicating the areas belonging to the respondents out of a total area acquired in village Kir Kalan and its location with reference to the BECO factory we are unable to accept their bald assertion in this regard.
26. As already mentioned, the learned Senior Civil Judge had fixed the price of the land at Rs, 2,000 per Kenai. The mutations produced by the respondents do no not indicate that in village Kir Kalan the price of the land was as high as that at the relevant time. The following is the summary of the sales to which these mutations relate : {{TABLE TEXT}} ExhibitDate ofAreaPriceRate per No.MutationQualityKanal of land K. M.
Ex. P-2.25-9-19610-15.Rs 1,400 Rs. 1,868 (Banjar Qadeem).
K. M.
Ex. P-3.19-2.19624-11Rs.5,000Rs. 1,100 (chair Mumkin).
K. M Ex. P-4. 18-11-19614-00Rs.4;000Rs. 1,000 (chair Mumkin).
K. M.
Ex. P-5. 30.1-196200-19 Rs.950 Rs. 1,000 (Banjar Qadeem).
K. M.
Ex.- P-68-1-19612-WR s. 2,000Rs. 1,000 (chair Mumkin).
K. M.
Ex. P.7. 8-1-19611-00Rs. 1,000Rs. 1,000 (chair Mumkin). {{TABLE TEXT}} ' The copy (Exh. P. 5) produced by the respondents was incorrect. A photostat copy of the same has been shown to us. According to this copy the price paid was Rs, 950 and not Rs, 1,950.
It is to be noticed that the evidence is completely silent with regard to th location of the area to which these mutations related. It is common knowledge that the land in the village Abadi fetches more price than the land away from it. The areas sold in the mutations are small and were presumably purchased for residential purposes. It is possible that all these sales relat to land falling in the village Abadi. If we leave out Exh. P. 2 the price of the land would come to round about Rs, 1,000 per Kanal. The land sol through Exh. P. 2 must be possessing some extraordinary feature so as t fetch as high a price as Rs, 1,868 per Kanal. It would be unsafe to mak an estimate of the price of the entire land of village Kir Kalan on the basi of this mutation particularly when the land subsequently sold (Exh. P. 3, Exh. P. 4 and Exh. P. 5) was almost for half the price. It may be mentioned that the Land Acquisition Collector was himself cognizant of the fact that the land near the village Abadi would be more valuable than the land away from it. Accordingly he fixed higher rates for areas which were near the village Abadi. These rates varied between Rs, 760 and Rs, 1,200 per Kanal.
27. The respondents relied upon a judgment of the High Court which is Exh. P. 3/3. This case related to an area measuring 3 Kanals 11 Macias situate in village Pindi Rajpootan. Here the rate of compensation was fixed at Rs, 4,500 per Kanal. A perusal of the judgment shows that the features of the land there had no resemblance to those of the respondents' land. There the notification of acquisition was issued in May, 1963, the land was placed in the highest category, it was situate within the Township Scheme, it was surrounded by a number of factories. There was also evidence that the land in the vicinity had been sold for Rs, 8,000 per Kanal For obvious reasons the market value determined in that case could have no relevance to the value of the land of the respondents.
28. For the reasons stated above we are of the vie w that the application for reference was barred by time and that the respondents have failed to show that the compensations fixed by the Land Acquisition Collector were inadequate or illegal. Accordingly, we accept this appeal with costs, set aside the judgment of the learned Senior Civil Judge and uphold the award of the Land Acquisition Collector.