MUHAMMAD FAZAL-E-GHANI KHAN, J.--The relevant facts giving rise to the first appeal against the judgment and decree of Administrative Civil Judge dated the 6th of July 1962, are the following:-
2. Messrs Japan Cotton & General Trading Company, Osaka, Japan, were the owners of the Cotton Factory in Mandi Babauddin, Gujrat, when, during World War II, it was taken over by the former Government of India as an alien enemy property. After Independence it fell into the hands of the Custodian of Evacuee Property and was allotted to someone by the Rehabilitation Authorities. In 1953, on the representation of the plaintiff-respondent, the factory was released by the Government vide Notification No. 381/201/52, dated the 27th of November 1953, and its possession was directed to be delivered to the respondent vile Government letter No. 10941/RB, dated the 5th of December 1953. Subsequently in 1953 the factory was obtained on 2 years' lease, ending 30th of June 1956, by the appellant and a proper lease-deed was executed between the parties which was signed by Mr. T. Miyoke on behalf of the respondent while Mr. Jamilur Rehman signed on behalf of the appellant.
3. Before the above term of three years could expire Jamilur Rehman wrote to the respondent in Japan for the extension of the lease but his jequest was not acceded to and he was informed that the company wanted to take over its Management for its own business. On the 23rd of June 1956, Jamilur Rahman addressed another communication and offered some other terms to the company. This time too his offer was turned down and he was told in clear terms that the company was not prepared to extend the lease beyond the 30th of June 1956, and he should hand over the possession of the factory on the expiry of its term. The appellant remained in possession of the factory and the respondent was compelled to file a suit on the 27th of July 1957, for possession of the factory and also prayed for damages, for its wrongful use and occupation, amounting to Rs.
45,000 from the 1st of July 1956, till the institution of the suit. A prayer for future damages from the date of the suit till delivery of possession was also made in the suit by the respondent. It is admitted case of the parties that the respondent was successful in taking back the possession of the factory from the appellant on the 29th of July 1957, therefore, the prayer in suit for delivery of its possession was rendered infructuous. The suit, however, proceeded for determining quantum of damages for illegal use and occupation from the 1st of July 1956 to the 28th of September 1957. This amount has been found by the trial Court as Rs. 40,000 per year, double the amount of lease money and the respondent's suit was decreed for Rs. 49,666 by its judgment under appeal.
4. The first contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that different Rent Restriction Laws were in force in West Pakistan from time to time and, therefore, the relation--ship of the parties was governed by those laws and the trial Court was wrong to hold that the possession of the appellant became wrongful after the 30th of June 1956. He was, however, unable to point out which particular Rent Restriction Act or Ordinance was in force at the time when the lease-deed was executed between the parties in 1953 and what were its pro--visions which were attracted to the appellant's case. The learned counsel mace a reliance before us upon the provisions of West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1956. This Ordinance was enforced on the 12th of September 1956, by the Governor of West Pakistan under Article 102 of the Constitution of 1956, under previous instructions of the President and the tenancy of the appellant came to an end on the 30th of June 1956. The Ordinance not being retrospective will have no application to the appellant's case. Moreover, the Ordinance being a temporary legislation, must have come to an end by efflux of time. Under Article 102 of the Constitution of 1956 an Ordinance promul--gated by the Governor of a Province ceased to operate at the expiry of six weeks from the next meeting of the Assembly, or if a resolution disapproving it was passed by the Assembly, then, upon the passing of that resolution. It was not shown to us that the Ordinance was placed before the Provincial Assembly in its first Ses--sion after it was promulgated. We are further fortified in our view that the Ordinance of 1956 had duly expired in accordance with the provisions of Constitution of 1956 from the subsequent enact--ment made in this behalf by the Central Legislature on the 6th of July 1957, (President's Act IX of 1957). Subsection (1) of section 21 of this Act deals with the repeal and savings but the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1 956, finds no mention in it as one of those enactments which have been repealed. On the other band in subsection (2) of section 21 it is provided that notwithstanding the expiry of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1956, all proceedings which were pending before any Controller etc., shall stand transferred and to be continued before the Rent Controller etc. These provisions leave no doubt in our mind that the Ordinance of 1956 being a temporary Statute expired sometimes in 1956 in accordance with clause (2) of Article 102 of the Constitution of 1956.
5. So far as the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1957, and the Ordinance of 1959 are concerned, they are also not applicable to the proceedings of the present suit not being retrospective in their operation. The rights and liabilities accrued and suffered by the parties came into being prior to the coming into force of these laws as the lease was executed iii 1953 which expired in 1956 and the cause of action in favour of the respondent arose on the 1st of July 1956, when the appellant illegally refused to deliver the possession of the factory on the expiry of the term of the lease.
6. The Rent Laws of West Pakistan were invoked in his aid by the learned counsel for the appellant in order to contend that the tenancy being governed by these laws the respondent was not entitled to charge anything beyond the rent which was fixed according to the terms of the lease. In order to appreciate this contention of the learned counsel it will be necessary to examine the various provisions of the Rent Laws to find out whether the premises of an industrial concern or a factory can be said to be governed by the Rent Restriction Laws. The object and reasons of the Ordinance of 1956, have been given in the beginning of the statute as to restrict the increase of rent of a "certain premises" situated within the limits of urban areas and eviction of tenants therefrom. The "words "certain premise" as used in the object and reasons of the Ordinance, have, therefore, to be interpreted with the definition clause of the Ordinance where premises to which the Ordinance was to extend have been expressly mentioned. Under section 2 (a) of the Ordinance a building has been defined as a building or part of a building let for any purpose whether being actually used for that purpose including any land, godown, outhouses etc., but does not include a room in a hotel, hostel or a boarding house. The definition of "building" has been further classified under clauses (d) and (g) of section 2 into residential and non-residential buildings and under clause (h) as scheduled buildings and there are no other buildings or premises defined or enumerated in the Ordinance. Besides these three categories of buildings the Ordinance brings within its ambit another type of property i.e. Rented land as defined in its clause (f) meaning any land let separately for the purpose of being used principally for business or trade. Reading these definitions for the purpose of finding out "certain premises" to which the Ordinance was intended to apply we are clearly of the view that the inten--petition of the Legislature was to extend the operation of the law to the four types of properties mentioned above and the other properties whether buildings or industrial concerns etc., which fall outside the definitive clause of the Ordinance are not covered by the provisions of the Ordinance of 1956.
7. A further support for the construction placed by us above can be found in the definition of words "landlord and tenant" as defined under section 2 (e) and (i) which respectively mean a person for the time being entitled to receive rent or on whose account rent is payable for a `building' or `rented land'. These clauses have their direct reference to the definitions of the buildings and rented lands as defined under section 2 of the Ordinance. These definitions read with the aim, object and reasons of the Ordinance are sufficient indication to give an exact conception of the intention of the Legislature. The cardinal rule of construction of the statute is that the words and $ phrases used in it have to be given their ordinary meaning and are to be construed according to the rules of grammar. Since the words "building" and "rented land" as defined are not susceptible to more than one meaning we are unable to agree with the learned counsel that they extend to any other premises except residential, non-residential and scheduled buildings and the rented land in an urban area. For these reasons a factory or an industrial concern given on rent for the purpose of carrying on a ginning industry cannot be said to be either a building or a rented land as its premises will not fall in one of the cate--gories of certain premises as defined under section 2 of the Ordinance.
8. The provisions of the Act of 1957 and that of Ordinance of 1959, so far as they relate to the object and reasons of those laws as well as the definition of buildings and rented land are identical in term and, therefore, the criticism advanced by us about the non-applicability of the Ordinance of 1956, to an industrial concern will be equally applicable to these latter provisions of the law also.
The Rent Laws not being applicable for the various reasons given above the ordinary law of the land, namely, the principles of Transfer of Property Act were to govern all questions arising between the parties about their respective rights and liabilities. The respondent had, therefore, rightly instituted its suit in the civil Court as the Rent Laws are not at all applicable.
9. The next contention was that the appellant cannot be held to be either a trespasser or a tenant by sufferance and in fact his possession was that of a tenant holding over. Therefore, the decree of damages for alleged wrongful use and occupation of the factory was not sustainable in law. In support of this contention learned counsel for the appellant relied on Abdul Ghaffar Khan v. Gullah Jan (PLD 1952 Pesh. 50) where a learned Single Judge has held that he knew of no law under which after the expiry of the lease of the tenant who continues to be in possession of a premises without surrendering its possession to the person from whom he took the property on lease ceases to be a tenant. We have no hesitation to accept the proposition laid down by the learned Single Judge because once the admission of a person upon a premises is found to be permissive his status in law is that of a tenant for all times to come unless he surrenders the possession to the person from whom he had obtained it or committed certain other acts of open hostility adversely to the title of the landlord. The question, however, which falls for our determination is whether the appellant's liability for wrong--full use and occupation of the factory after the termination of the lease has been correctly decided, or the appellant was a tenant holding over within the meaning of section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, and continued to hold the factory on the terms and conditions of the original lease. In order to prove that the appellant was a tenant holding over it was the duty of the appellant to establish by evidence on record that he remained in possession of the factory with the expressed or implied assent of the landlord. In the absence of any proof on record that the landlord or any person authorised L by him in this behalf had received any rent from the appellant or otherwise assented to his remaining in possession, no tacit renovation of the tenancy as envisaged by section 116 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 takes place.
10. Learned counsel for the appellant did not assail before us the evidence which had been produced on behalf of the plaintiff.
PLD 1954 Lah. 796) where the assent of the landlord was inferred by the learned Judges from the fact that he had filed a suit for the recovery of the rent against the tenant, will not be applicable to the present case as we were pointed out no circumstance by the learned counsel from which the assent of the respondent, ex--pressed or implied, can be spelled out.
11. It was next contended that the appellant was not liable to pay damages in the absence of a notice from the respondent to quit the factory. This contention is also devoid of force. It is in evidence that the appellant was informed on the 2nd of May 1956 (vide Exh. P. 5) that the respondent had made no, decision to extend the lease. On the 28th of June 1956, when the appellant made certain proposals in his letter Exh. P. 6, so, that he may be able to continue in possession, his offer was rejected and he was informed by the respondent on the 10th of July 1956 (vide Exh. P. 7) that they had decided to give the factory to Nichimen Company for the next year.
The evidence on record, therefore, leaves no doubt in our mind that there was no desire on the part of the respondent to allow the appellant to continue in possession of the factory on the termination of the lease and there was sufficient notice for the appellant to quit the factory after the 30th of June 1956. No further notice to quit was necessary. Moreover as we have held that the appellant possession of the factory after the 30th of June 1956, was that of a tenant by sufferance the tenancy was liable to termination without notice or demand on the part of the respondent. A tenancy at sufferance is merely a fiction of law and the term is used to dis--tinguish a possession rightful in its inception but wrongful in its continuance. Therefore, when a tenant remains in possession of leased premises after the expiration of the term in defiance of the authority of the lessor he is not entitled to a notice to quit under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. There is no dearth of authority that a notice to quit is not necessary for such a tenant and in this context reference can be made to Gokul Chand v. Shib Charan (13 I C 59) and Ch. Bansidhar v. Ram Charan and another (AIR 1940 Oudh 401).
12. Mr. Abdur Rashid Sheikh pointed out that the plaintiff had asked for a decree for a sum of Rs.
45,000 for wrongful use and occupation from the 1st of July 1956, and the trial Court was, therefore, not justified to grant a decree of Rs. 49,666.00. We were not impressed by this argument of the learned counsel because a relief was added in the plaint that a decree for future damages from the date of the plaint should also be given to the plaintiff. It was under this head that the trial Court calculated the future damages and came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to damages double the amount of rent at Rs. 40,000 00 per annum from the 1st of July 1956, till the 28th of September 1957. The figure of Rs. 49,666.00 thus arrived at is correct to the last peny.
13. The decree of the trial Court was objected on another ground also. It was contended that the plaintiff had paid court---fee on Rs. 45,000.00 only but the trial Court has granted a decree of Rs.
49,666.00 without calling upon the plaintiff to pay additional court-fee on the enhanced amount.
We find that there is some force in the argument of the learned counsel but this is a mistake which is capable of rectification under section 149 P of the Code of Civil Procedure. We, therefore, direct that the respondent should be called upon to pay the balance of court---fee on Rs. 4,666.00 within three months and no execution will issue against the appellant for the balance amount if the difference is not paid within this period. The amount of court-fee so realised from the respondent will be the cost in suit and will also be borne by the appellant.
14. The quantum of damages double the amount of rent was not challenged before us on any other grounds except those G mentioned above. Since the imposition of the damages on that rate by the trial Court is well supported by the decision of Lahore High Court in Narain Das v. Dharam Das (AIR 1932 Lah. 275) and Sundar, Singh and others v. Ram Saran Das (AIR 1933 Lah. 61) and no other authority was cited by the learned counsel to the contrary, we will, therefore, confirm the finding of the learned trial Court on issue No. 3 also.
15. For the foregoing reasons we find no force in this appeal which is hereby dismissed with costs throughout.