' Through the instant revision petition Sanaullah defendant-petitioner has challenged the judgment and decree of the learned Additional District Judge Kohat, dated 5-7-1997 whereby he accepted the appeal of the plaintiff-respondent and set aside the judgment and decree of the learned Civil Judge, Kohat, dated 26-3-1997.
2. Facts of the case giving rise to the present revision petition are that one Mst. Bibi Shahnaz Akhtar instituted a suit in the Court of Civil Judge, Kohat for ejectment of the defendant-petitioner Sanaullah from the suit shop. She claimed in her suit firstly, that the defendant-petitioner was a defaulter of rent and secondly, that she requires the suit shop for the personal use of her nephew.
The suit was contested by the defendant-petitioner and the learned Civil Judge after recording evidence in the case and hearing both the parties dismissed the suit of the plaintiff-respondent vide his judgment and decree dated 26-3-1997.
3. Aggrieved by the said order the plaintiff-respondent went in appeal before the learned District Judge who vide his judgment and decree, dated 5-7-1997 accepted the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree, dated 26-3-1997 of the learned Civil Judge.
4. Feeling dissatisfied from the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge the defendant- petitioner approached this Court through the revision petition in hand.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The evidence on record suggests that Mst. Shahnaz Akhtar plaintiff-respondent was issueless and she claimed the possession of the suit shop for the use of her nephew, namely, Iftikhar who had been adopted by her, interestingly the said Iftikhar was not produced before the trial Court to prove the bona fide need of personal use. As regards the question of default in payment of rent is concerned, the suit property is situated in a rural area and under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act a lease of immovable property for any other purpose shall be deemed to be a lease from month to month, terminable, on the part of either lessor or lessee, by fifteen days' notice expiring with the end of a month of the tenancy. The record suggests that the defendant-petitioner had paid the last rent in October, 1995 meaning thereby that he was a defaulter in payment of rent as the present suit was instituted on 3-1-1996. The plaintiff-respondent had refused to extend the lease of the suit shop to the defendant-petitioner by not accepting the defaulted rent. In such a situation the tenant who remains in possession of the lease property after the expiration of the term in defiance of the authority of the lessor is not entitled to a notice to quit under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. In the instant case, the defendant-petitioner had committed default in October, 1995, therefore, he could not escape from the aforementioned statutory provisions of law. Reliance is placed on a judgment reported as Messrs Rehman Cotton Factory v. Messrs Nichimen Co. Ltd., Karachi PLD 1970 Lah.
455.
' With the above observations I see no merit in this revision petition which is dismissed with no order as to costs.
Revision .