Zahoor-ud-Din Butt, respondent No.3 was appointed as a Reporter by the Associated Press of Pakistan (A.P.P.) but was later transferred from Reporting Section to the News Desk. An order (Annexure "B") was accordingly passed by the Manager (Admn. And Personnel), A.P.P., Islamabad on 20th December, 1987 stating that since the nature of the duties of the respondent will involve no local travelling, "he is not entitled to the payment of Local Travelling Allowance of Rs.600 per month with effect from 1-8-1987. Instead he will be entitled to the payment of Desk Allowance of Rs.150 per month from the same date i.e. 1-8-1987." Aggrieved of this order, the respondent/employee filed a grievance petition under section 25-A of: the Industrial Relations Ordinance before the Punjab Labour Court No.2, Lahore. Petitioner on receiving the notice of the grievance petition moved an application before the Labour Court questioning its territorial jurisdiction on the ground that the order impugned before it was passed and issued at Islamabad and the sole respondent impleaded in the grievance petition, too, was "also situate in Islamabad". A request was accordingly made for rejection of the grievance petition or return thereof to the respondent for presentation to the proper Court. The respondent/employee, on the other hand, contended that since he was posted at Lahore and the impugned order was also served upon him at Lahore, the Labour Court at Lahore had the jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon his grievance petition.
The Labour Court repelled the respondent's contention with the observation that "the principle of concurrent jurisdiction of the Courts is invokable only when the cause of action has arisen at both the places and the respondent against whom the relief is sought is also located there. The said principle is not applicable to the present case as such the cause of action has not arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court": The Labour Court accepted the plea of the petitioner and held that since the employment of the respondent was controlled by the Head Office situate at Islamabad; the impugned order was also passed at Islamabad and the relief, too, was claimed against the petitioner located at Islamabad, the grievance petition could not be competently filed at Lahore which was accordingly returned to the respondent/employee for filing it before a Court of competent jurisdiction. This was vide order, dated 13-12-1990.
2. Dissatisfied with the afore-referred order of the Labour Court, the respondent took the matter in revision before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal took the view that the order impugned in the grievance petition no doubt issued from Islamabad but since it was addressed to the respondent at Lahore who also received it at Lahore, a part of cause of action accrued to him at Lahore. The learned Tribunal, therefore, following the view expressed in the case, reported in 1985 SCMR 758 held that the "Labour Court at Islamabad as well as the Labour Court at Lahore both have concurrent jurisdiction and the petitioner had rightly brought his grievance petition to the latter Court." The revision petition was accordingly accepted by the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal vide order, dated 17-2-1991 and the case sent back to Labour Court No.2, Lahore "for decision of the remaining controversy between the parties".
3. Feeling aggrieved with the order of the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal, petitioner approached this Court through this Constitutional petition which was admitted to regular hearing to examine the question "whether cause of action partly arose in Lahore and consequently the Labour Court at Lahore has the jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the grievance petition filed by the respondent".
4. Learned counsel appearing in support of this petition assailed the validity of the impugned order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal by contending that the learned Tribunal was wrong in taking the view that since the impugned order' of the departmental authority was addressed to and received by the employee at Lahore, part of cause of action accrued at Lahore. In the submission of the learned counsel, the mere fact that the order impugned in the grievance petition was received by respondent No.3 at Lahore did not give rise to any cause of action at Lahore so as to give jurisdiction to Labour Court No.2 at Lahore. Learned counsel reiterated the view taken by the Labour Court and contended that the Head Office of the petitioner (APP) was situate at Islamabad from where the service of the respondent/employee was controlled and regulated and that the order which gave cause of grievance to the respondent also issued from the Head Office. Not only that, even the solo respondent impleaded in the grievance petition was also situate at Islamabad. In the circumstances, the Labour Court having territorial jurisdiction over Islamabad alone could entertain and adjudicate upon the grievance petition of the respondent. In support of his submissions, learned counsel relied upon the following cases:-- (1)Asghar Hussain v. The Election Commission of Pakistan and 2 others PLD 1968 SC 387, (2)Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore v. Raja Muhammad Fazil Khan and others PLD 1975 SC 331, (3)Sindh Employees' Social Security Institution v. Dr. Mumtaz Ali Taj and another PLD 1975 SC 450, (4)Sabir Din v. Government of Pakistan and others 1979 SCMR 555, (5)Messrs Al-Iblagh Ltd., Lahore v. The Copyright Board, Karachi and others 1985 SCMR 758, (6)Messrs Nadia Ghee Mill (Pvt.) Limited v. The Federation of Pakistan and 4 others 1992 MLD 2154, (7)Subhan Beg and 18 others v. Pakistan State Oil Co. Ltd., Rawalpindi PLD 1980 Pesh. 113, (8)Syed Shah v. Political Agent, Bajaur Agency and 3 others PLD 1981 Pesh. 57, (9)Latafat Karim Siddiqui v. National Construction Ltd. 1982 PLC 102,
(10) Messrs Sandoz (Pak.) Ltd. v. Saeed Butt and another 1983 PLC 769,
(11) Messrs Baluchistan Laminates v. Muhammad Ehtishamuddin 1984 PLC 783,
(12) Muhammad Akram v. Secretary to Government of Punjab Irrigation and Power Department and 2 others 1988 PLC 589.
Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.3 supported the impugned order of the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal and relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in 1985 SCMR 758 reliance on which was also placed by the learned Appellate Tribunal.
5. I have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the case-law cited by them. I will first take up the. Cases decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunals. In the three cases from the Sindh Tribunal, objection to the territorial jurisdiction of the Labour Courts was raised oh the sole ground that the workmen who had agitated their grievance before them were employed/posted outside their territorial jurisdiction and, therefore, they had no jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the grievance petitions brought before them. The learned Tribunal, Sindh held in each case that since the head office of the employer company which effectively controlled the employment of the aggrieved, workmen and which also issued the impugned orders was situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the Labour Court concerned, it could entertain and hear the grievance petition filed before it. In none of these three cases, question of concurrent jurisdiction of two Labour Courts with reference to the accrual of cause of action therein was raised and decided. These cases, therefore, are of no help to the petitioner because there can be no cavil with the proposition that an aggrieved workman wherever posted or working can institute his grievance petition before a Labour Court having territorial jurisdiction at a place where the head office of the employer is located particularly when the employment of the workman is effectively controlled and regulated by the head office and even the impugned order is issued therefrom. Case of Muhammad Akram 1988 PLC 589 decided by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, is also of no help to the petitioner. It, in fact, negates the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and supports the view expressed in the impugned order as therein, too, it was held with reference to the territorial jurisdiction of the Labour Court that the grievance petition could be brought not only at a place where the employer held the office and his establishment was situate but also where the cause of grievance occurred to the workman. Other cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner also do not advance his case. Most of these cases dealt with the question of territorial jurisdiction of the High Courts in the context of their writ jurisdiction. In the case of Asghar. Hussain v. The Election Commission, High Court of East Pakistan gave a decision that it had no jurisdiction to issue a writ to the Election Commission, of Pakistan presumably for the reason that the office of the Election Commission was not located in the Province of East Pakistan. Supreme Court of Pakistan set aside this decision holding with reference to the provision contained in Article 98(2)(a)(i) of the Constitution of 1962 viz. "a person performing in the Province functions in connection with the affairs of the Centre" that the Election Commission was "a person" or "authority" which exercised in the Province of East Pakistan functions in connection with the affairs of the Centre and, therefore, it was subject to the writ jurisdiction of the East Pakistan High Court notwithstanding that its main office and Secretariat were located in the Province of West Pakistan. The case of Messrs Al-Balagh Ltd. (supra) also proceeded on the same premises and it was held therein that the Copyright Board "performs functions in relation to the affairs of the Federation in all the Provinces. Hence any order passed by it or proceedings taken by it in relation to any person in any of the four Provinces of Pakistan would give the High Court of the Province, in whose territory the order would affect such a person, jurisdiction to hear the case". In the case of Sabir Din v. Government of Pakistan, order of the petitioner's reversion was passed at Rawalpindi but he challenged it in the Peshawar High Court as he at the relevant time was posted at Muzaffarabad (AJ&K) which office, according to him, fell within the administrative circle of Hazara Office. Peshawar High Court dismissed the writ on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction. Supreme Court held that as the cause of action arose partly at Muzaffarabad and partly at Rawalpindi and the respondent-authority whose order was brought under challenge was also at Rawalpindi, Peshawar High Court would have no territorial jurisdiction. It was further held by the Supreme Court: "The question having arisen in the context of a writ petition the Peshawar High Court was justified in refusing to exercise jurisdiction on another ground as well. As provided in Article 199(1)(a) of the Constitution the impugned action or the authority taking the same should be within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, for exercise of jurisdiction thereunder. None of these conditions is satisfied herein. Therefore, the refusal by the Peshawar High Court to exercise jurisdiction is unexceptionable". Again in the case of Nadia Ghee Mill referred to above, Constitutional petition filed in this Court to challenge the action taken by the Collector of Customs, Karachi was dismissed as not maintainable and it was held that in view of the language of Article 199 of the Constitution, High Court could not issue any direction to any person who was not performing any functions within its territorial jurisdiction nor could it declare any action or proceedings to be without lawful authority unless the action or the proceedings complained of had been taken within its local limits. Similar view was expressed in PLD 1980 Pesh.
113. In the other case from Peshawar High Court PLD 1981 Pesh. 57, the order impugned was passed in Tribal territory to which the jurisdiction of Peshawar High Court did not extend. It was held that the mere fact that the impugned order was conveyed to the person residing within the territorial limits of the High Court would not confer jurisdiction upon the High Court to interfere with the impugned order as the High Court could not do indirectly what it had no power to do directly. The case reported in PLD 1975 SC 331 is wholly irrelevant as it does not deal with the question of territorial jurisdiction at all. In the case of Sindh Employees' Social Security Institution afore--referred, the objection regarding the lack of territorial jurisdiction of 2nd Sindh Labour Court was upheld on the short ground that according to the relevant Notification, the territorial jurisdiction of the said Court was confined to Hyderabad and Khairpur Divisions and its jurisdiction, therefore, did not extend to Karachi.
6. None of the cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, as shown above, is of any avail to the petitioner. Judgments of the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal proceeded on their own facts, and in any case, the view expressed in those cases if applied to the facts of the present case would at the most mean that the Labour Court At Islamabad would also have jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon the grievance of the respondent-employee but this proposition is not in dispute.
In facts, it has been so held in the impugned order of the Appellate Tribunal. Case of Muhammad Akram as noticed above rather supports the view expressed in the impugned order as in that case also, it is held that the grievance petition can be brought where the office/head office of the employer is situate as also at a place where the cause of action accrues to the aggrieved workman. All other cases cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner (except for two cases reported in PLD 1975 SC at pages 331 and 450) dealt with the question of territorial jurisdiction of the High Court in the context of its writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution or its corresponding provision in 1962 Constitution and the broad principle laid down in all those cases was that a person or authority would be amenable to writ jurisdiction of a High Court if he was performing functions within its territorial limits irrespective of his residence or location. In the case of Sabir Din reference was also made to the normal considerations of "residence" and "cause of action" for deciding the question of territorial jurisdiction.
7. Question of territorial jurisdiction of a Labour Court can more appropriately be examined with reference to section 35 of I.R.O. And section 20, C.P.C. Section 35 of I.R.O. Empowers the Provincial Government to establish as many Labour Courts as it considers necessary and to specify the territorial limits within which each one of them shall exercise jurisdiction but there is no express provision in the I.R.O. Enacting the rule as to the forum/place of suing like the provisions contained in sections 16 to 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Resort can, therefore, be had to the relevant provisions of C.P.C. To determine the issue of territorial jurisdiction of the Labour Courts involved in the present case. It may pertinently be observed that under section 36(2) of I.R.O., a Labour Court is deemed to be a Civil Court having the same powers as are vested in such Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 20, C.P.C. Which incorporates a general provision embracing all personal actions being the most relevant on the issue under examination is reproduced hereunder:-- "20.Other suits to be instituted where defendants reside or cause of action arises. Subject to the limitation aforesaid, every suit shall be instituted in a Court within local limits of whose jurisdiction- -- (a)the defendant, or each of the defendants where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain; or (b)any of the defendants, where there are more than one, at the time of the commencement of the suit, actually and voluntarily resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, provided that in such case either the leave of the Court is given, or the defendants who do not reside, or carry on business or personally work for gain, as aforesaid, acquiesce in such institution; or (c)the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises.
Explanation I.--- Where a person has a permanent dwelling at one place and also a temporary residence at another place, he shall be deemed to reside at both places in respect of any cause of action arising at the place where he has such temporary residence.
Explanation II.--- A corporation shall be deemed to carry on business at its sole or principal office in Pakistan or, in respect of any cause of action arising at any place where it has also a subordinate office, at such place."
8. Section 20, C.P.C. As is manifest from its provisions afore quoted lays down various tests for the purpose of determining the territorial jurisdiction of a Court. According to these provisions, the cause or grievance can be brought before a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction, the defendant resides, or carries on business, or personally works for gain, or the cause of action wholly or in part arises. In the case under examination, the admitted facts relevant for the purpose of territorial jurisdiction are that the Head Office of the petitioner/A.P.P. Is located at Islamabad and the order reducing the allowance of the respondent/employee was also issued from Islamabad but it was served on the employee at Lahore where he was posted in the Bureau Office of A.P.P. On these facts, there can be no doubt that the aggrieved employee could bring his grievance petition before the Labour Court having territorial jurisdiction over Islamabad as the law is well-settled that when the defendant is a Corporation, it is deemed to be carrying on business at its Principal Office irrespective of whether the cause of action has arisen there. Refer Messrs Rehmania Trading Company v. Messrs Eagle Star Insurance Company Ltd. PLD 1960 SC (Pak.) 202. In the instant case, even the cause of action certainly arose at Islamabad as the order adversely affecting the employee was passed there. Question which requires determination, however, is whether a part of the cause of action can also be said to have arisen at Lahore so as to give jurisdiction to the Labour Court at Lahore in view of clause (c) of section 20, C.P.C. Whereunder a Court gets jurisdiction over a matter if part of cause of action arises within the local limits of its jurisdiction. As noted above, the respondent was posted in the petitioner's Bureau office at Lahore where he was getting the local travelling allowance and the order saying that he was no more entitled to that allowance though passed at Islamabad was conveyed to him at Lahore and it naturally took effect at Lahore. In these circumstances, the respondent undoubtedly suffered the grievance at Lahore and, therefore, cause of action partly accrued to him at Lahore. In my view, cause of action arises not only where it is commenced or initiated but also where its consequences ensue. In a case from Indian jurisdiction.
Reported in 1981 Lab. IC 833 (All.) it was held that where the order of dismissal of a Government employee was served on him at his home address in Protabgarh, a suit to challenge the order will be maintainable at Protabgarh as a part of cause of action arose there. Refer AIR Commentaries on the Code of Civil Procedure by V.R. Manohar and W.W. Chitaley Vol.1 (10th Edition), page 379.
Viewed from yet another angle, the grievance petition of the respondent would be maintainable at Lahore. By virtue of Explanation II added to section 20, C.P.C., a Corporation can be deemed to carry on its business at the place of its subordinate office provided the cause of action arises at such place. Refer PLD 1977 Lah. 481 and 1981 SCMR 494. Petitioner has its Bureau office at Lahore and the cause of action as held above has also arisen at Lahore. In the circumstances, the Labour Court at Lahore would have the jurisdiction in terms of clause (a) of section 20, C.P.C. To entertain and adjudicate upon the grievance of the respondent.
9. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the Labour Court at Islamabad as also the Labour Court at Lahore would have the jurisdiction to entertain and decide the grievance petition of the respondent. Needless to observe that where two Courts at different places have concurrent jurisdiction, the proceedings can be instituted at either place and the defendant cannot raise an objection as the choice of forum in the case of alternative forums lies with the plaintiff. Refer AIR 1970 Cal. 342.
Upshot of the above discussion is that the impugned order of the learned Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal is unexceptionable, writ petition has no merit and the same is accordingly dismissed but with no order as to costs.