1. MUHAMMAD SARDAR KHAN, J.-This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution calls in question the order of Political Agent, Bajaur by which domicile certificate of the petitioner was cancelled and his nomination for admission to Ayub Medical College, Abbottabad was withdrawn. It is prayed that the action of respondent No. 1 cancelling the said certificate may be declared as without lawful authority, with direction to the respondents to admit petitioner in the said College and allow him to persue his normal studies. The circumstances in which this petition has arisen may be stated as under :- Petitioner gave an application dated 19-4-1979 to the Secretary, Govern--ment of N.-W. F. P. Home and Tribal Affairs Department (this application is not on the writ file but its photostat was subsequently obtained through the learned Additional A.-G.) saying that he had earlier applied for admission to the 1st year course in M. B., B. S. In Ayub Medical. College, Abbottabad against seats reserved for Bajaur Agency (a Federally Administered Tribal Area) but due to some objection to his domicile certificate by the rival students, Political Agent had, without any verification, cancelled his domicile certificate. Consequently he again approached the Political Agent for re-verification of his domicile certificate who was kind enough to enquire into the matter and found his domicile to be genuine and has now issued him a fresh certificate of domicile by his order dated 15-4-1979. He submitted that he figured at number two (against 4 seats reserved for Bajaur Agency) in the merit list of candidates from Bajaur Agency and therefore had a right to seat, praying that be may kindly be accommodated for admission in the said College. Copy of the Domicile Certificate dated 15-4- 1979 issued by the Political Agent, Bajaur was enclosed therewith. It showed that the petitioner belonged to subsection Taber Khel of Guljee section of the recognised tribe of Tarkhani and that his father was a bona fide resident of Tribal Area of Bajaur Agency as verified by his Sectional Malik.
2. This bears the signature of Fazle Wabid, Political Tehsildar, Tehsil Khar (dated 12-4-1979) and is verified to be correct by Political Agent, Bajaur Agency at Khar on 15-4-1979. Copy of the applica-- petition was also furnished to the Commissioner, Peshawar Division for information and necessary action. It appears that by then the list of candidates against reserved seats of F. A. T. A. Had not been completed. The application was ordered to be routed through the Commissioner and processed immediately. The petitioner amongst others was consequently nominated and a Memorandum (Annexure `C') No. 3160/65/F",R/5/103 dated 7-5-1979 on the subject "Admission of the tribal students iris Ayub Medical College, Abbottabad against the tribal reserved seats" was;, issued to all the Political Agents concerned containing the names of can4irdates of respective agencies/F. Rs. Nominated for admission, requesting them to inform all candidates to report to the Principal, Ayub Medical College, Abbottabad on or before 9th May 1979. The Memo. Shows that from Bajaur Agency only two candidates were nominated, petitioner being the second amongst them, and their were directed to furnish service bonds in triplicate to the office of Political Agent concerned before proceeding to the. College. Copies of this memo. Were also sent for information to all selected candidates at their home addresses alongwith a copy to the Section Officer, T. A.
3. Home and Tribal Affairs Department, Peshawar.
4. It is the case of the petitioner that on receiving a cop of this memorandum he appeared before the Principal on 9-5-1979 for admission but he was told that his documents had not been received 'till then, though he was permitted to attend the classes which he did. It was on 25-5-1979 that he was informed by the Principal (respondent No. 3) verbally that his domicile certificate had been cancelled by respondent No. 1 therefore, he could not be admitted in the College. On this the petitioner, it is said, approached respondent No. 1 but with no useful result, hence this petition. It was, contended before us that the action of respondent No. 1 cancelling petitioner's Domicile Certificate was wholly illegal and without jurisdiction firstly because it was taken at his back and without hearing him and secondly because once it was issued by respondent No. 1. It could' riot be cancelled by him.
5. The petition came up for bearing in limine on 11-6-1979 When comments were sent for from respondent No. 1. It was admitted to full hearing after receipt of comments on 2-7-1979 on the ground that the petitioner was not given any show-cause notice much less hearing when the domicile certificates issued to him were cancelled. The petitioner was allowed to attend classes, of course, without conferring on him any right to admission.
6. Subsequently petitioner gave another application for placing on record certain documents important amongst which include the "list of solected candidates for admission in Ayub Medical College (Annexure `D') ; petitioner's name is borne at 'Serial No. 62 of this list ; requisite; service bond and the Letter No. 5/2-AMC/SOTA-11/79 dated 26-4-1979 from the Section Officer, T. A. II Government of N.-W. F. P., Home and 'Tribal Affairs Department to Mr. Muhammad A.I, Section Officer, Government of Pakistan State and F. R. Division, Islamabad containing names o1 students of Federally Administered Tribal Area finally selected against the reserved seats in Ayub Medical College, Abbottabad for the current session, with the approval of the governor N.-W. F. P. (Annexure `G'). This contains under the heading Bajaur Agency at Serial No. 2 the name of the petitioner with the following note underneath :- "The domicile certificate: of the candidate at Serial No. 2 above was declared bogus by P. A., Bajaur at the time of the meeting of the Selection Committee, Political Agent, Bajaur on reverification has ,found the domicile genuine. The candidate selected against the quota of Bajaur has replaced Mr. Alamgir son of Jalandar Khan of Mohmand Agency who was nominated against over left (should be left over) seat on over all merit basis."
7. With this list were enclosed the documents of the selected candidates. And finally copy of an OFFICE MEMORANDUM from the Government of Pakistan, States and Frontier Regions Division, Islamabad dated 2-5-1979 on the subject "Nominations Against The Seats Reserved For The Federally Administered Tribal Areas In Ayub Medical College, Abbottabad (Annexure 'H')." This contains the name of the petitioner. There is a note under this memorandum in these words "These nominations are liable to cancellation should any case of forgery, misstatement of facts and irregularities on the part of the nominee come to our notice afterwards". Besides others, copy of this memorandum was also forwarded to the Principal, Ayub Medical College, Abbottabad. The documents so filed were allowed to be placed on record, subject to all just exceptions and notice to the respondents.
8. It will be seen that respondent No. 1 has admitted that the petitioner was selected for admission on the basis of the Certificate issued by none else than hi m. He has also not denied that the "discreet enquiry" which ultimately resulted in the order dated 14-5-1979 was held at the back of the petitioner. And thus he was condemned unheard. Consequently his order, on this score, would be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. It is quite likely that the certificate issued by respondent No. 1 himself on 1 5-4-1979 may prove to have been obtained by misrepresentation and would not therefore, be valid but then the principles of natural justice demand that petitioner should at least be associated with any enquiry which might ultimately disentitle him from selection and consequent admission to the College.
9. When this petition came up for hearing before us on 7-8-1979, learned Additional Advocate- General raised an objection that the writ petition, in view of the conduct of the petitioner, was liable to be dismissed in that he had concealed this fact from the concerned authority that he had initially applied for admission on the basis of a forged certificate. I felt that to decide this petition it would be proper to examine the record of petitioner's first application for admission, the record of second application for issuance of domicile certificate and the record of the proceedings by which the certificate issued on 15-4-1979 was cancelled. The learned Additional A.-G. Was accordingly asked to produce the said record on the next date.
10. I have gone through this record, petitioner does seem to have applied initially for selection on the basis of a domicile certificate showing him to be a resident of Village Maina Mahmund `Suleman Khel` section of the tribe of Tarkhani of Bajaur Agency. This certificate bears No. 1092 and dated 25- 6-1976. It appeals that this certificate was actually issued to some other person but the petitioner made use of it by effacing the name and parentage of the actual certificate holder and inserted therein instead his own name and parentage. On reverification albeit ex parte be was found out and his name was accordingly dropped. Later, however, he submitted an application to the Political Agent, Bajaur Agency claiming that he was a permanent resident of village Malkhana, Nawagai of Bajaur Agency and his family owned considerable property there hence a domicile certificate may be issued to him. This application bears the attestation of one Haji Abdul Qayyum Khan, presumably a notable of the area. A joint statement of several Maliks to the effect that the applicant was a permanent resident of Nawagai Malkhana and the certificate be issued to him on their personal guarantee is borne on the reverse of this application. It is attested by the Tehsildar, Khar in his own hand on 12-4-1979 and thus on this verification, signed by the Tehsildar and verified by the Political Agent, the certificate dated 15-4-1979 was issued to the petitioner, on the basis of which, he secured his selection for admission in the Ayub Medical College, Abbottabad. It is unfortunate that this certificate was issued to the petitioner after a very casual enquiry. Had the authorities been careful and held proper inquiry, strictly following law and procedure on the subject, before the issuance of the certificate, they would not have suffered the embarrassment of issuing second letter of its cancellation and that, too, in a still more careless manner by not even associating the petitioner with the inquiry held by him in this regard. I have examined the record of proceedings by which this certificate was subsequently cancelled. The same Political Tehsildar appears to have recorded some statements in the absence of the petitioner and then recommended cancellation of the certificate to the political Agent, who, in turn, passed the impugned order dated 15-4-1979.
11. I have given anxious consideration to the objection of the learned Additional A.-G. That petitioner had cancelled the factum of his first application on the basis of a forged certificate from the authority concerned and his conduct, therefore, disentitled him from any discretionary relief. It is true that in appropriate cases conduct of petitioner is a very relevant factor and when it is proved that important facts have been concealed or misrepresented or petitioner has not come to the Court with clean hands, relief in discretionary jurisdiction must not be extended to him. A narration of facts above would, however, show that in applying for admission second time petitioner did mention this fact that his earlier domicile certificate on the basis of which he had sought admission had been cancelled by respondent No. 1 though he did not specifically admit that he had forged the said certificate. Students and their parents are naturally very anxious to get admission to very limited seats in professional Colleges and they do attempt to manipulate domicile certificates by all means which one cannot appreciate but again the responsibility lies with the authorities concerned to be careful before issuance of such certificates and when it is found that an applicant is guilty of misstatement or suppression of facts, maximum punishment should be awarded to them to be a lesson for others and no amount of influence should be allowed to deter them in doing so.
12. Before parting I must refer to another objection raised by the learned Additional Advocate-General almost at the end of the day, that in view of the provisions of clause (7) of Article 247 of the Constitution, this Court cannot exercise any jurisdiction under the Constitution in relation to a Tribal Area and since the order proposed to be passed related to and would have effect in the Tribal Area, therefore, jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution was barred. I would have appreciated if this argument had been advanced in the beginning. However I cannot help examine this point as well. Clause (7) of Article 247 reads :- "Neither the Supreme Court nor a High Court shall exercise any jurisdiction under the Constitution in relation to a Tribal Area unless parliament by law otherwise provides Provided that --------------------- It is true that the impugned order was passed by the Political Agent, Bajaur which is a Federally Administered Tribal Area where constitutional jurisdiction of this Court under Article 199 does not flow but this order was then conveyed to the Office of the Commissioner, Peshawar Division at Peshawar vide letter dated 16-5-1979 requesting him that petitioner's name be deleted from the quota of Bajaur Agency. And a copy of this letter was also endorsed to the principal Ayub Medical College, Abbottabad "for information and necessary action". Commissioner in turn wrote a letter to the Section Officer, Government of Pakistan, States and Frontier Regions Division, Islamabad on 2- 7-1979 informing him that domicile certificate issued to the petitioner had been cancelled by the Political Agent Bajaur hence he was not entitled for admission against the tribal reserved seats and requesting that his form with domicile certificate be returned to him for further necessary action. It will thus be seen that though the impugned order was passed by the Political Agent in tribal area yet effect to the said order was intended to be given within the settled area, admittedly within the limits of territorial jurisdiction of this Court. No legitimate objection can, therefore, be taken to the High Court issuing a writ on the authorities concerned within its jurisdiction not to give effect to the said order. Since this order would have to be carried out within the territorial limits of the jurisdiction of this Court it can be lawfully issued and no exception can be taken to it on this score. This objection is, therefore, overruled.
13. MUHAMMAD KHURSHID KHAN, J.-I regret I am unable to concur in the judgment of my learned brother, Muhammad Sardar Khan, J. ; I regret it all the more as the questions raised by this petition are of considerable importance as they effect the writ jurisdiction of this Court in matters pertaining to a tribal territory. I have, therefore, given my most anxious consideration to the case and I am constrained to arrive at the conclusion that this petition should be dismissed for reasons to be detailed hereafter. It is necessary to state the facts with sufficient fulness in order to decide the questions of law that fall for determination in this petition. The facts are these The petitioner, Syed Shah, in order to get admission in Ayub Medical College, Abbottabad, to the 1st year course in M. B. B. S. Class, applied against seats reserved for Bajaur Agency, a Federally Administered Tribal Area. Alongwith this application, he submitted a photostat copy of a domicile certificate dated 25-6-1976 showing him to be a resident of Maina, Mahmund, a place in Bajaur Agency. The application alongwith the photostat copy was forwarded to the Divisional Commissioner, by the then Political Agent, Bajaur, under his office No. 2395-96 dated 24-3-1979 which is reproduced below for facility of reference ImmediateW/T MessageD. T. G.
14. 24-3-197922-1100 From Political Agent Bajaur.
15. To : Commissioner Peshawar (Through Bajaur. Scouts Net).
16. "Under Section (') No. 2395 (') Our Wirless Message No. 2363 of 22nd Instant Refers (') Please Include The Name Of Syed Shah Son Of Hukam Din Mamund In The Above List Of Fresh Candidates Seeking Admission In Medical College Abbottabad (') He Has Secured 512 Marks (') He Had Applied For Admission On 14-3-1979 But His Docu--ments Were Not Complete (') His Application Form Duly Complete Is Being Sent Separately (') His Domicite Certificate Is Being Reverified And Result Thereof Will Follow Shortly (')
17. (Sd.) P.I-Bajaur."
18. By his Office No. 2421-25/11/6/Edu: dated the 25th March 1979, the Political Agent, Bajaur, asked the Political Tehsildar, Mamund at Khar, to carry out an enquiry regarding the re-verification of the Domicile of Mr. Syed Shah. After recording the statements of seven Maliks of the area, the Tehsildar came to the conclusion that Syed Shah did neither belong to Maina, Mamund, nor did he or his father own any agricultural or household property there. He, therefore, informed the Political Agent, vide his Office Order No. 34/P. T. M. Dated 27-3-1979, that the domicile certificate produced by Syed Shah was bogus and liable to be cancelled. As a result of this reverification which seems to have been accepted by the Political Agent, the Selection Board constituted for the Selection of tribal students against medical reserved seats in Ayub Medical College, Abbottabad, in its meeting held under the Chairmanship of the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, Peshawar, on 28-3-1979, dropped the name of Syed Shah.
19. Having failed in his attempt to get admission on the basis of his claim of being a resident of Maina, Mamund the petitioner made another attempt and eventually succeeded in obtaining a domicile certificate from the Political Agent, Bajaur, on the recommendation of the Tehsildar concerned. This certificate was issued to him on 15th of April 1979, wherein he was shown a resident of Nawagai, a village in Bajaur Agency. A copy of the certificate so obtained was sent to the authorities concerned, in consequence whereof, the Commissioner, Peshawar Division, Peshawar, respondent No. 2, vide his Letter No. 3160-65/FR/5/103 dated 7-5-1979, informed the petitioner that he had been nominated for admission in Ayub Medical College, Abbottabad, against one of the seats reserved for Bajaur Agency. After the receipt of this letter, the petitioner was allowed by the Principal of the College to attend the classes which he did.
20. Another enquiry was conducted by the Tehsildar, under the orders of the Political Agent to find out if the petitioner was a resident of Nawagai, for which he had succeeded in obtaining the domicile certificate. After doing all that was thought necessary, the Tehsildar reported that the petitioner neither belonged to Maina, Mamund, nor to Nawagai area of Bajaur Agency ; with the result that ha was not eligible to any concession allowed by the Government to the candidates of Bajaur Agency.
21. In view of this, position, the Political Agent, Bajaur, by his order dated 14th May 1979, cancelled both the domicile certificates, one dated 25-6-1976 and the other issued on 15-4-1979. This information was conveyed to the Principal, Ayub Medical College, who, in turn, informed the petitioner on 25-5- 1979 that his domicile had been cancelled. Aggrieved by the order of cancellation of his domicile by the Political Agent, the petitioner has moved this Court under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the Constitution).
22. There is a two-fold limitation on the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 199, in its territorial aspect. These limitations are-
(a) the power is to be exercised throughout the territories in relation to which the High Court exercises jurisdiction, and
(b) the person or authority, to whom the writs are issued, must be within the territories subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court.
23. It will be seen that writ issued by the High Court cannot run beyond the territories subject to its jurisdiction nor can a writ issue to a person or authority not amenable to the jurisdiction of the High Court either by residence or location. The fact of the matter is that the High Court has jurisdiction to issue directions in regard to persons within the limits of its appellate Criminal Jurisdiction and the Article does not authorise it to deal with persons or authorities who are beyond such jurisdiction. To entitle a petitioner to a relief in writ jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court should be satisfied that the writ is in relation to the territories subject to its jurisdiction and that the persons or the authorities to whom the writ is to issue are amenable to the jurisdiction of the Court. In the instant case, the petitioner claims himself to be a resident of Nawagai in Bajaur Agency. He was issued .Domicile Certificate on 15th of April, 1979, by the Political Agent, Bajaur, wherein he was shown resident of Village Nawagai. This certificate was subsequently cancelled by the Political Agent by his order dated. 14th May, 1979, in consequence of an inquiry conducted by the Tehsildar, who, on consideration of the statements of some respectables of the area recorded by him, formed the opinion that the petitioner did not belong to Bajaur Agency. The present writ petition is directed against this order.
24. The first, and indeed the most important, question that arises for determination is whether the jurisdiction of the Peshawar High Court, runs in the tribal territory of Bajaur where the impugned order had been passed against, and the cause of action had arisen to, the petitioner. For deciding this point, it is necessary to refer to clause (7) of Article 247 of the Constitution which reads as follows:- "(7) Neither the Supreme Court nor a High Court shall exercise any jurisdiction under the Constitution in relation to a Tribal Area, unless Parliament by law otherwise provides: Provided that nothing in the clause shall affect the jurisdiction which the Supreme Court or a High Court exercised in relation to a Tribal Area immediately before the commencing day."
25. This clause on a plain reading bars the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court in relation to a Tribal Area in regard to which it did not exercise jurisdiction immediately before the commencing day, unless the Parliament, by law, provides otherwise. It is conceded that the Peshawar High Court did not exercise jurisdiction in relation to the Tribal territory of Bajaur, immediately before the commencing day. The Parliament has so far, by law, not provided for extension of jurisdiction of the High Court to Bajaur Agency. It is obvious, therefore, that the jurisdiction of this Court does not run in the tribal territory of Bajaur nor does it extend to the persons and authorities there. It has, however, been contended by Mr. Abdul Latif Yousafzai, the learned Advocate for the petitioner, that although the impugned order has been passed in the tribal area of Bajaur by the Political Agent stationed there, nevertheless it is subject to writ jurisdiction of this Court because it has to be given effect to in the territorial limits of this Court and would have the effect of ousting the petitioner from Ayub Medical College, Abbottabad. Support for this view is sought from a decision in the case of Abdur Rehman and S others v. The State and 3 others (PLD 1971 Pesh. 61).
26. At first sight, the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner may seem formidable, but closer scrutiny would incline dispassionate minds to a contrary conclusion. The authority cited does not appear to me to bear the slightest resemblance to the facts of the present case and proceeded on it own facts which are clearly distinguishable. It is conceded that the impugned order was passed, and the action was taken, in the tribal territory of Bajaur and the cause of action had arisen to the petitioner within that territory which is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. The mere fact that the impugned order had been conveyed to the Principal, Ayub Medical College, residing within the territorial limits of this Court, would not confer jurisdiction upon this Court, to interfere with the impugned order which, as already stated, was passed in the tribal territory of Bajaur which is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court and by the Political Agent of that place who is not amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court. I need do no more than refer, to the exposition of this subject in Jamal Ahmed and another v. The State and 5 others (PLD1969SC344), Hafiz Umar Gul and another v: Government of Pakistan (PLD1973SC544), and Abdur Rahim and others v. Home Secretary, Government of West Pakistan and another (PLD1974SC109).
27. It will not be out of place to point out here that the learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously contended that the impugned order was bad in law as having been passed without associating the petitioner with the inquiry on which it was based as also having been passed without a show-- cause notice to him. He argued that it was obligatory upon the Political Agent as well as the Tehsildar who conducted the inquiry to associate the petitioner with the inquiry and to issue a show-cause notice to him before passing the impugned order. He maintained that the proceedings and the decision made against the. Petitioner were in violation of the Maxim of audi alteram partem (no one can be condemned unheard) and are not sustainable in law. This argument would not hold water in the circumstances of the case. It has been held that the impugned action in the instant case is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court. That being so, this Court would have no power to examine the legality and propriety of the impugned order. Besides, in the instant case, the inquiry proceedings and the impugned decision are not to be judged by the judicial standards applicable to the Courts in Pakistan, because the laws.
28. Governing these Courts have no application to the tribal territory beyond the jurisdiction of these Courts. The proceedings and the actions in the instant case must have been taken on the basis of the local custom having the force of law in Bajaur Agency. It would rather be too much to say that by not associating the petitioner with the enquiry proceeding or by not affording him an opportunity to show cause before passing the impugned order, the proceedings and the decision made against the petitioner would not be sustainable on the ground of being in violation of the doctrine embodied in the maxim "audl alteram partem".
29. Even if it were assumed for the sake of argument that this Court, in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction, is competent to interfere with the impugned order, the appellant is confronted with a further difficulty,. And a formidable difficulty, indeed arising out of his own improper conduct. It is not denied that the petitioner applied .Initially for selection on the basis of a Domicile Certificate showing himself as being a resident of Village Maina Mahmund. This certificate bears No. 1092, and is dated 21-6-1976. It was actually issued to, and in the name of some other person but the petitioner made use of it by effacing the name and parentage of that person and substituted therein his own name and parentage. In this way, the petitioner was guilty of fraud which was undoubtedly of a very serious nature. It need not be over emphasised that the High Court, in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, is bound to proceed on the Maxim "he who seeks equity must do equity" and a person guilty of fraud is debarred from obtaining equitable relief in the exercise of writ jurisdiction of the High Court. In this connection, reference may be made to Ahmad Khan and others v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, West Pakistan and others (PLD 1963 Kar. 405), where it was h Id that Court is bound to proceed on the maxim "he who seeks equity must do equity" and a person guilty of fraud is debarred from obtaining equitable relief. On this principle, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to the equitable relief claimed by him. Apart from this, the least that can be said is that he has not come with clean hands before this Court. It is well settled by authority that a person who does not come with clean hands to the Court is not entitled to discretionary relief available front' he High Court in its writ jurisdiction. If any authority is needed in au port of this view, I would refer to three decisions in the cases of Sahibzada Abdul Hanan v. Assistant Director Immigration and Passport, Government of Pakistan, Karachi and others (PLD 1972 Kar. 101), Wali Muhammad v. The Secretary, Home Department, Government of Baluchistan at Quetta and 2 others (PLD 1972 Quetta 33) and Zahoor Ahmed v. Government of Baluchistan and 2 others (PLD 1978 Quetta 119). The rule that a person who does not come with clean hands before the Court is not entitled to discretionary relief available from the High Court in its writ jurisdiction is based on the principle that any body whose role is not above b rd cannot be allowed to invoke this discretionary jurisdiction which is not o that can be invoked by a person who is guilty of bad faith and unconscionable conduct. Although the right is in the nature of ex debito justitia, it will only be granted if the petitioner can show that his conduct has of been such as to disentitle him of such a relief. Since the role of the petitioner in this case was not above board and he was guilty of unconscionable conduct, his conduct from the outset being rather dubious, this jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be exercised in Iris favour. I have little doubt that the petitioner was putting- forward an untrue and false case before the authorities concerned when he claimed to be a resident of Bajaur Agency although in point of fact, it was not so. Moreover, the seat against which the petitioner applied for admission was reserved for a bona fide resident of Bajaur Agency. In spite of the fact that the petitioner did not belong to that Agency, h tried his utmost to lay his hands on; that seat and to deprive a lawful claimant of the Agency of his right to admission in Ayub Medical College. This conduct on his part was most unjust. The writ jurisdiction, as held in PLD 1965 SC 269, is not to be exercised in aid of injustice. The petitioner, would, therefore, be out of Court on this score alone.
30. There is yet another aspect of the matter which cannot be lost sight of. In the present petition, the petitioner did not make any reference to the first Domicile Certificate dated 2:5-6-1976 which had been forged by him, and the circumstances leading to its cancellation by the Political Agent. These were undoubtedly material facts which were either deliberately suppressed by the petitioner or were wilfully withheld by him, till the respondents came forward to disclose them. By doing so, he succeeded in obtaining an order from this Court on the 2nd of July, 1979, in the nature of a direction to the respondent, to allow the petitioner to attend the classes. It is well established rule of law that the petitioner who wants a relief in exercise of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court disentitles himself to obtain relief if he suppresses material facts or does not make complete and correct disclosure of facts within his knowledge. Reference in this behalfmay be made to Ramzan v. The Chief Settlement Rehabilitation Commissioner and others (PLD 1968 Lah. 258), and Inamur Rehman v. Federation of Pakistan and 3 others (PLD 1977 Kar. 524). Relying on these authorities, I hold that the petitioner in this case, by reason of suppressing material facts, or at least for his failure to refer to material facts, disentitled himself of -the equitable relief claimed by him from this Court.
31. With one more argument it must deal, which has been pressed before us during the course of arguments. It has been said that the question whether the petitioner was, or was not, a resident of Bajaur Agency was within the sole competence off the Political Agent to decide which he decided in the negative and against the petitioner. It has been argued that this Court should not involve itself into investigation of this disputed question of fact, firstly because it hall finally been determined by the Political Agent who was the sole Judge of the matter, and secondly because the question would necessitate taking oaf evidence. This contention, in my view, is not without force. It can hardly be doubted that in an Agency like Bajaur, the authority to issue Domicile Certificate entirely rests with the Political Agent and he is the sole Judge to decide the question of such a nature. In the instant case, the Political /Agent decided finally that the petitioner was not a resident of Bajaur Agency. This he did after taking into consideration all the relevant material placed before him. It cannot. Therefore, be said that this was a case of no evidence and as such would call for interference by this Court. The conclusion arrived at by the Political Agent is also reinforced even by the contradictory stands taken by the petitioner on two occasions. At the initial stage, tine petitioner claimed himself to be a resident of village Maina Mamand, w1hile at a subsequent stage he came forward with the plea that he belonged to village Nawagai. This single circumstance, in my view, would suffice to show that the petitioner was not at all a resident of Bajaur Agency. In the circumstances, the decision of the Political Agent that he was not a resident of Bajaur Agency was obviously well founded and cannot, therefore, be interfered with by this Court in its writ jurisdiction.
32. But even if this decision is regarded as one liable to challenge, it would make no material difference because the domicile of the petitioner being the disputed question of fact would certainly necessitate taking of evidence and in that event, this Court will not involve itself into its investigation. It may be mentioned here that in a case reported as 1968 SCMR 935 their Lordships held that- "in a proceeding in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction which is usually decided upon affidavits the superior Courts should not involve them--selves into investigations of disputed questions of fact which necessi--tate the taking of evidence. This can more appropriately be done in the ordinary civil procedure for litigation by a suit. This extraordi--nary jurisdiction is intended primarily, for providing an expeditious remedy in a case where the illegality of the impugned action of an Executive or other authority can be established without any elaborate enquiry into complicated or disputed facts."
33. PLD 1968 SC 185 their Lordships took the same view holding that disputed questions of fact and law requiring investigation are not a suitable subject for jurisdiction under the writ jurisdiction of the High Court. Following these authorities, I would hold that the question of the domicile of the petitioner being a disputed question of fact is not a suitable subject for adjudication under Article 199 of the Constitution and this Court would not, therefore, go into this question. For the reasons stated above, I would dismiss this petition with costs.
(1) Whether in view of the bar contained in Article 247 of the. Constitu--petition this Court has the jurisdiction to issue any writ in this case ?
(2) Whether suppression of facts in the writ petition as regards his domicile would disentitle the petitioner from relief in writ jurisdiction?
34. MIAN BURHANUDDIN KHAN, ACTG. C. J.-On account of difference of opinion between the two learned Judges of this Court, Mr. Muhammad Khurshid Khan, J. And Mr. Muhammad Sardar Khan, J.
35. The following questions had been referred to me for opinion:
(1) Whether in view of the bar contained in Article 247 of the Constitu--petition this Court has the jurisdiction to issue any writ-in this case?
(2) Whether the suppression of facts in the writ petition as regards his domicile would disentitle the petitioner from relief in writ jurisdiction?
2. In view of the detailed judgments .Of my two learned brothers, I need not recapitulate the facts out of which the present petition has arisen.
3. The petitioner claimed to be the resident of Nawagai village, Bajaur Agency. A domicile certificate was issued to this effect by the Political Agent and the petitioner applied for admission in the M. B., B. S. First Year in the Ayub Medical College: Abbottabad, against the seats reserved for Bajaur Agency (A Federally Administered Tribal Area) but due to some objections to his domicile certificate, raised by other students of the same Agency, and according to averment in the petition, the said certificate was cancelled. Consequently, the petitioner approached the Political Agent for reverification of his domicile certificate, who after some inquiry into the matter, found the certificate to be genuine and issued a fresh certificate by his order dated 15-4-1979. But when finally his papers came before respondent No. 3, Principal, Ayub Medical College, Abbottabad, he was verbally informed that his domicile certificate has been cancelled again by respondent No. 1, therefore, he could not be admitted to the College. On this, the petitioner approached respondent No. 1 but without any success. Aggrieved from this decision of respondent No. 1, the petitioner filed the present petition.
4. I have gone through the judgments of my two learned brothers. It is settled principle that Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, confers on High Courts powers to issue appropriate writs to any person or authority within their territorial jurisdiction, in terms absolute and unqualified. Administrative Tribunals or other authorities functioning within the territorial jurisdiction of the Courts fall within the scope of that power and if the High Courts are to admit any limitation on their powers, that must be found in some provision in the Constitution. The relevant Article which has been referred to and applied to the facts of the present case is 247 of the Constitution, which reads as under: "247.-(1) Subject to the Constitution, the executive authority of the Federation shall extend to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and the executive authority of a Province shall extend to the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas therein.
(2) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------..
(3) No act of Parliament shall apply to any Federally Administered Tribal Area or to any part thereof, unless the President so directs, and no act of Parliament or a Provincial Assembly shall apply to a Provincially Administered Area, or to any part thereof, unless the Governor of the Province in which the Tribal Area is situate, with the approval of the President, so directs; and in giving such a direction with respect to any law, the President or, as the case may be, the Governor, may direct that the law shall, in its application to a Tribal Area, or to a specified part thereof, have effect subject to such exceptions and modifications as may be specified in the direction.
(4) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------..
(5) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------..
(6) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------..
(7) Neither the Supreme Court nor a High Court shall exercise any jurisdiction under the Constitution in relation to a Tribal Area, unless Parliament by law otherwise provides: Provided that nothing in this clause shall affect the jurisdiction which the Supreme Court or a High Court exercised in relation to a Tribal Area immediately before the Commencing Day." "that if the cause of action had arisen to the appellants within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, for instance, if they had been arrested or detained within those territories without a lawful authority, the High Court would certainly have had the jurisdiction to interfere in writ jurisdiction to examine the legality and the lawful authority for that action. As this is not the position in the present appeal and all the impugned actions were taken in the tribal territory, they were not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court."
(1) For quashment and nullification of the warrants of arrest issued against them by the Assistant Political Agent, Miran Shah;
(2) for directing respondents 5 and 6, namely, the Superintendent of Police, Peshawar, and Superintendent of Police, Mardan, not to execute the warrants of arrest against them; and .
(3) for quashment of the proceedings started against them by the A. P. A., Miran Shah.
36. And the above observations were made in this context.
5. In the instant case the Political Agent, Bajaur; who after ,verification cancelled the domicile certificate, is undoubtedly beyond the jurisdiction of this Court and the action taken would not be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court, since no High Court can issue a writ which will b effected beyond the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. It, therefore, follow that no High Court can issue a writ to any official who resides beyond the jurisdiction of that Court. And the High Court cannot do indirectly what it has no power to do directly. Thus, the first question referred to me answered in the following manner, that the impugned order of the Political Agent, Bajaur, has been made at a place where the writ jurisdiction of this Court is not extended. Therefore, no writ can be issued to the official concerned. The second question would consequently become redundant in view of the fact that the jurisdiction of this Court would not run into the territory of the Federally Administered Tribal Area, and, therefore, supp--ression of any fact by the petitioner would not be material for the. Decision of the case.
37. On difference of opinion between Mr. Muhammad Khurshid Khan and Mr. Muhammad Sardar Khan, JJ. The matter was referred to me and I have given my opinion on the point of difference.. And since both the learned Judges are no longer in their office, therefore, a Division Bench is to be constituted in place of the Original Bench to deal with thematter under clause 26 of the Letters Patent.
38. Accordingly, a Division Bench consisting of Mr. Justice S. Fakhre Alam and Mr. Justice Shah Abdur Rashid is constituted for passing the order in the matter.
39. SARDAR FAKHRE ALAM, J.-In view of the majority opinion, the writ petition is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs. .