1. ' SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, C.J.---This appeal has been directed against the judgment of the High Court dated 14-10-1991, whereby the writ petition filed by the appellants, herein was rejected.
2. ' Brief facts giving rise to the present appear are that the land measuring 72 Kanals, comprising Survey No,228 min and Survey No,231, situate in village Nairian, Tehsil Pallandri, District Poonch, was allotted to appellant Not on 7-8-1961. Subsequently, proprietary rights of the evacuee land measuring 64 Kanals were granted to appellant No,1 including the disputed land measuring 21 Kanals 19 Marlas on the basis of entitlement certificate issued .By the Rehabilitation Commissioner.
3. The appellant No,1 transferred the whole of the land of which he had obtained the proprietary rights through a registered sale-deed dated 10-11-1984 to appellant No,2 in whose favour the mutation was also attested. Respondent No,2 ,filed a review petition with the Rehabilitation Commissioner seeking cancellation of the entitlement certificate to the extent of 21 Kanals 19 Marlas but the same was dismissed. Thereafter he preferred a review petition to the Custodian on 27-10-1988 against the transfer of proprietary rights granted to appellant No,1, herein, which was accepted and his proprietary rights were cancelled to the extent of land measuring 21 Kanals 19 Marlas, comprising Survey No,231 on the ground that as the allotment of the land measuring 21 Kanals and 19 Marlas to the appellant No,1 had been cancelled by the Rehabilitation Authorities, he was not entitled to obtain proprietary rights to that extent. Consequently, the present appellants filed a writ petition in the High Court which was dismissed on the ground that as the allotment of appellant No,1 had been cancelled to the extent indicated above, he was not entitled to obtain the proprietary rights of the land to that extent and consequently, he was also not competent to transfer the same to appellant No,2.
4. ' We have heard the arguments and gone through the file. It has been contended by Sardar Rafique Mahmood Khan, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellants, that the High Court has committed an error in dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellants, herein. He has argued with vehemence that as the final proprietary rights were granted to appellant No,1 by the Custodian on the basis of the entitlement certificate issued by the Rehabilitation Commissioner by which he was bound the Custodian could not set the same at naught in exercise of review jurisdiction vested in him under section 18-A`(6) of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act. He has argued that at that time the powers of review enjoyed by the Custodian were of limited nature and the review jurisdiction previously available to him under subsection (6) of section 43 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act would be deemed to have been repealed by implication in view of review powers given to him by the Legislature under section 18-A
(6) of the Pakistan (Aministration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957 through amendment; because the Legislature could not be deemed to have given the powers to the Custodian both under section 18- A (6) and section 43 (6) of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act. Thus, he maintained that after the said amendment, the Custodian would be deemed to have been deprived of his powers of review under subsection (6) of section 43 of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act. He has also referred to section 56-C of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974 and section 6 of the General Clauses Act in support of his contention that the review powers could be exercised by the Custodian only under section 18-A (6) of the Act.
5. He has also referred to a case reported as Mst. Aziz Begum v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1990 SC 899) in support of his contention that repeal of an Act does not revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal took place.
6. ' In reply, Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan, the learned counsel for the respondents, has argued that the point regarding the jurisdiction of Custodian under section 43 (6) of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, 1957 was not agitated in the High Court nor before this Court in the memorandum of appeal and the concise statement; as such, it cannot be allowed to be raised at this belated stage, especially so when no permission had been sought in that regard.
7. He has further argued that the general powers of review could not be deemed to have been repealed because there is always presumption against the repeal by implication; until and unless two provisions on the statute book cannot stand together on the statute book inference of repeal by implication is not legally justified. The learned counsel has also argued that even otherwise the appellant No,1 has misrepresented the facts before the Rehabilitation Commissioner and claimed himself as an allottee of the whole of the land measuring 64 Kanals, whereas he knew that his allotment to the tune of 21 Kanals 19 Marlas had been cancelled by the competent authorities. Thus, he contended that the discretionary jurisdiction of writ cannot be exercised in his favour because he has not come to the Court with clean hands and intends to retain disputed property of which he was not an allottee.
8. ' We have given our due consideration to the arguments raised at the Bar. The first question which is to be determined is as to whether the review powers which were available to the Custodian under section 43 (6) of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act would be deemed to have been repealed by the powers of review given to him under section 18-A (6) of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act through the amendment. It may be stated that the review powers of the Custodian under section 18-A (6) were of limited nature and cannot be regarded to have repealed the general powers of review of the Custodian which vested in him under section 43
(6) of the said Act. Thus, the limited powers of review given to the Custodian under section 18-A (6) cannot be interpreted to take away his general powers of review under section 43 (6) of the Act.
9. The two provisions were not destructive of each other and could stand together on the statute book. The special review powers were available to the Custodian in the cases of orders granting the proprietary rights whereas the provisions under section 43 (6) were wide and of general nature; these were meant for two different eventualities. However, by virtue of an amendment, the powers of the Custodian in cases of grant of proprietary rights were enhanced and he was no more bound by the certificate of the Rehabilitation Commissioner. Consequently, the review powers of the Custodian under section 18-A (6) were taken away which enabled him to exercise his general powers of review under section 18-A (6). Thus, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the limited powers of review which were given to the Custodian under section 18-A
(6) by amendment impliedly repealed his general powers of review under section 43 (6) is not sustainable. Even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that any such intention could be attributed to the Legislature that would also not help the case of the appellants because when the limited powers of review given under section 18-A (6) were taken away from the Custodian by temporary statute, i.e, Ordinance, the general powers available to him under the permanent legislature under section 43 (6) would revive; it is settled principle of law that if temporary statute repeals a permanent statute, that would revive after the repeal of the temporary statute or if the same lapses by efflux of time. A reference may be made to a case reported as Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir v. M/s. Kashmir Tobacco Industries Ltd. (1992 S.C.R. 20), wherein the proposition has been dealt at some length. It was opined in the aforesaid case that section 7 of the General Clauses Act is not applicable where permanent statute is repealed by a temporary legislation.
10. ' So far as the case reported as Mst. Aziz Begum v. Federation of Pakistan (PLD 1990 SC 899) cited by the learned counsel for the appellants is concerned, that is also distinguishable because in that case the matter pertained to the continuance of the right of pre-emption as a result of decision of the Shariat Court of Pakistan. It was contended that the effect should be given to the provisions of newly-promulgated Punjab Pre-emption Law of 1990, whereby section 34 of the said Ordinance repealed the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. It was argued that the normal incidents of the repeal contained in section 6 of the General Clauses Act would. Apply with the result that pending cases should be decided in accordance with the repealed law, i,e, the Preemption Act, 1913. The learned Judge repelled the contention and it was observed asunder:-- "This plea too is of no avail to the petitioners/appellants as under the judgment of the Shariat Appellate Bench their suits abated on 31-7-1986 and clause (a) of section 6 of the General Clauses Act itself provided that the repeal of the Act does not revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal took effect. As no part of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 was in force on 28-3-1990 the fact that the said Act has been repealed does not improve matteRs,"
11. ' It is evident from the above observations that the question in that case was as to whether the pre- emption suits which had already abated in view of the decision of the Shariat Appellate Bench, section 6 of the General Clauses Act can be pressed into service for deciding those cases under the provisions of old law; it was held that as no part of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 was in force on 28-3-1990, the argument was of no avail to the case of the appellant. It may be stated that in the instant case when the learned Custodian exercised the jurisdiction of review, he had the powers of review under section 43 (6) of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act, as indicated above, and those contained in section 18-A(6) had been repealed. Thus, it cannot be said that review jurisdiction under the aforesaid provisions should have been resorted to.
12. ' So far as the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondents, Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan, that the point was raised at the belated stage is concerned, we are of the view that as we permitted the counsel for the appellants to argue the same, it is desirable to dispose of the same on merits rather than to stifle it on the ground that the same cannot be agitated at this stage.
13. ' So far as section 6 of the General Clauses Act is concerned, it is not applicable to the matters relating to procedure. Thus, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the case should have been decided in view of the provisions contained in section 18-A (6) of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act is not tenable. It is well-settled principle of law that section 6 does not apply to the procedural matteRs, It only protects the rights which are of the substantive nature. While dealing with the proposition, in a case reported as Muhammad Bashir v.
14. Province of West Pakistan (PLD 1958 Lah. 853), Mr. Justice Kaikaus observed as under:-- "Section 6 has no application to procedural provisions and it is a procedural provision with which we are dealing. Section 6 only saves rights created and liabilities incurred on account of a statute that has been repealed, but no person has any vested right in any procedure and procedural provisions do not create rights or liabilities referred to in this section. A substantive right or liability created by an Act acquires an existence independent of the Act which created it so that even after the Act is repealed it continues. But a procedural provision, even though we may call the authority or power granted by it to a person a 'right' does not create a right which may exist independently of the continuance of the provision creating it. The procedural 'right' continues only as long as the procedural provision exists and does not survive it. While a person can claim that a substantive right which he pussesses should he enforced he cannot claim that the procedure for the enforcement of his right which was in force when the proceedings commenced must be taken to its very end."The aforesaid proposition has also been affirmed in a case reported as Khushiram Atmaram Jaisinghani v. Custodian of Evacuee Property, West Pakistan (PLD 1965 SC 453).
15. ' It may be observed that no party has vested right in a particular procedure and thus, the argument that the review petition should have been dealt with under section 18-A (6) of the Pakistan (Administration of Evacuee Property) Act despite the fact that the same had been deleted by amendment, has no substance and is hereby repelled.
16. ' It may be stated that irrespective of the fact as to whether the appellants cannot be deemed to be aggrieved persons within the meaning of section 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act or not, the fact is that the findings of the Custodian and the High Court are that the appellant No,1 had no subsisting allotment of the land to the extent of 21 Kanals 19 Marlas because that had been cancelled from his name by the Rehabilitation Authorities. It is evident that the fact was suppressed by the appellant while obtaining the entitlement certificate from the Rehabilitation Commissioner because in the relevant 'Form' which has to be filled by an allottce he has to show the extent of land which stands allotted to him at the time of filing the same. Therefore, it is evident that appellant No,1 has wilfully suppressed the actual state of facts at the relevant time and, thus, committed fraud upon the Rehabilitation Authorities to get an illegal gain. Thus, even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the powers of review were not exercisable by the Custodian in the instant case, the High Court or for that matter this Court would stay its hands to help the appellants in exercise of the writ jurisdiction to protect their illegal gain. The matter has been dealt with by this Court in an unreported case entitled Bashir Ahmad Khan v. Custodain of Evacuee Property (Civil Appeal No, 4 of 1991, decided on 8-3-1992), wherein the proposition has been dealt at some length. In that case reliance was placed on Raunaq Ali v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner (PLD 1973 SC 236) and Wali Muhammad v. Sakhi Muhammad (PLD 1974 SC 106).
17. ' In the light of what has been stated above finding no force in this appeal, it is hereby dismissed.
18. No order is made as to the costs.