' This petition has been filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 for declaration that the orders dated 8-5-1991 and 5-9-1991, passed by the IVth Civil and Family Judge (Central), Karachi, in Execution Application No, 15 of 1988 are without jurisdiction.
' The above orders were passed under Order XXI, Rule 30, C.P.C., in execution application filed by respondent No,2 to enforce the decree for recovery of dower amount of Rs,35,000 passed in the suit filed by her against the petitioner.
' In the first order writ of attachment was ordered to be issued for attachment of the property of the petitioner and the second order reads, "Issue Writ of attachment against J.D".
2. I have heard Mr. Khaliq Humayun for the petitioner and Mr. Muhammad Anwar Tariq for the respondent and Mr. Abdul Ghafoor Mangi, AA.-G. On Court Notice which was ordered to be issued by my learned brother Wajihuddin Ahmed, J. At the time of admission of the petition, as serious question of law was involved.
3. The learned Advocate for the petitioner has contended that the Family Court constituted under Family Courts Act, 1964 is not competent to order attachment of the properties of the Judgment- debtor pursuant to money decree, as such decrees can be executed only in the manner prescribed in section 13(3) of the said Act, under which the Family Court is obliged to prescribe a period for payment of decretal amount and it is only when the payment is not made within the time prescribed that the decretal amount can be recovered as arrears of land revenue and in no other manner, including those prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure can be resorted to.
' He has relied on Lal Muhammad v. Mst. Niaz Parwara PLD 1990 Lah. 71 and Parvaiz Ahmed v. District Judge, Karachi and 2 others 1987 CLC 1277.
4. On the other hand the learned counsel for respondent No,2 has contended that the restricted construction on section 13 (3) is not warranted, as it overlooks subsection (4) of section 13 of the Act, which provides that decrees passed under the said Act can be executed even by Civil Courts, if so directed by District Judge by special or general order. His submission is that the Court has vast powers to execute decree in any manner, including the one prescribed in the Code of Civil Procedure by following principles thereof, in such cases, where section 13(3) of the Act is not followed by the execution Court. He placed reliance upon the cases of (i) Muhammad Ramzan v.
Mst. Afshan Kanwal and 2 others 1991 CLC 1823 and (ii) Muhammad Farid Khan v. The Civil Judge, Abbottabad 1989 CLC 1630.
5. Mr. Abdul Ghafoor Mangi, the learned AA.-G. Supported the view that the Family Court has unlimited powers, in addition to section 13(3) of the Act, in the matter of execution of money decrees and no exception can be taken to the orders passed by the Family Court.
6. The issue raised pertains to interpretation of sections 13 and 17 of the Family Courts Act, 1964.
They are reproduced hereunder for convenience:-- "Section 13. Enforcement of decrees.---(1) The Family Court shall pass a decree in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, and shall enter its particulars in the prescribed register.
(2) If any money is paid or any property is delivered in the presence of the Family Court, in satisfaction of the decree, it shall enter the fact of payment or the delivery of property, as the case may be, in the aforesaid register.
(3) Where a decree relates to the payment of money and the decretal amount is not paid within the time specified by the Court, the same shall, if the Court so directs, be recovered as arrears of land revenue, and on recovery shall be paid to the decree-holder.
(4) The decree shall be executed by the Court passing it or by such other Civil Court as the District Judge may, by special or general order, direct.
(5) A Family Court may, if it so deems fit, direct that any money to be paid under a decree passed by it be paid in such instalments as it deems fit.
' Section 17. Provisions of Evidence Act and Code of Civil Procedure not to apply.- --(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided by or under this Act, the provisions of the Evidence Act, 1872, and the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 except sections 10 and 11 shall not apply to proceedings before any Family Court.
(2) Sections 8 to 11 of the Oaths Act, 1873 shall apply to all proceedings before the Family Courts."
7. In the case-law, relied upon by the learned Advocates of the parties divergent views have been expressed.
' It would, therefore, be appropriate to first refer to the said cases:--
(i) In the case of Lal Muhammad and another, the decree-holder applied for execution of the decree for restitution of conjugal rights by attachment of the amount belonging to the judgment- debtor which was lying in Court and the Family Court passed the order for attachment thereof. The said order was set aside in appeal on the ground that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure did not apply to the proceedings before the Family Court and, therefore, the order of attachment was illegal. Reliance was placed on section 17 of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act which provides that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (except sections 10 and 11), shall not apply to proceedings before any Family Court. The order passed by the appellate Court was assailed before the High Court and was set aside. The learned Judge observed as under:- ' Now according to subsection (4) above the decree is to be executed by the Family Court or by such other Civil Court as the District Judge may direct. Special procedure for the execution of money decrees has been provided for in subsection (3) above, but no special procedure has been provided for the execution of other type of decrees and the only logical conclusion in view of the provisions of subsection (4) above is that such decrees are to be executed in the manner provided for in the C.P.C. There is no other provision for the execution of decrees of a Family Court either in the Act or in the rules framed thereunder and it does not stand to reason that the decrees of a Family Court other than those for money were not to be executed and had to remain dead letters. I, therefore, hold that the decrees for restitution of conjugal rights and for possession of movable and immovable properties etc., excluding money decrees passed by a Family Court are to be executed according to the provisions of the C.P.C.'
(ii) The same issue came up before a learned Judge of this Court in the case of Parvaiz Ahmed v.
District Judge, Karachi and 2 others 1987 CLC 1277, wherein it is observed that the legislature having provided special procedure for execution of money decrees, that is, realisation of the decretal amount as arrears of land revenue, the intention clearly appears to be that money decrees should be executed in the said manner. With regard to the discretion spelt out on reading of subsection
(3) of section 13, the learned Judge observed:- ' Consequently, it appears, that the discretion given to the executing Court does not relate to the mode of execution but to other incidental matters. For example, the Court may postpone the recovery of the decretal amount from the judgment-debtor or it may allow him further time to pay the decretal.,amount as contemplated under subsection (3). In my opinion, beyond such matters, the discretion vesting in the Family Court does not extend further. I am also fortified in my view to a great extent by the authorities just referred to by me above and consequently I am of the view that both the impugned orders are erroneous and need to be set aside."
' The learned Judge had referred to the cases of Nasir Khan v. Tahira Rasheed 1988 CLC 2381 and Lal Muhammad and another (supra).
' In the aforesaid case of Nasir Khan, the order passed by the Family Judge committing the petitioner to civil prison in execution of money decree under section 13(3) of the West Pakistan Family Courts Act, 1964, came up for consideration. The learned Judge observed that the procedure, prescribed for execution of money decree as provided under the aforesaid subsection of the said Act, was not resorted to, that is to say, the Court had not specified time for payment of decretal amount and, therefore, the order was declared to be of no legal consequence.
(iii) Reference may be made to the case of Samia Akbar v. Muhammad Zubair (PLD 1990 Lah 71), wherein the decree for dissolution of the marriage was granted on the ground of Khula` and the Court directed the wife to return golden ornaments received by her from husband at the time of marriage. The husband filed execution application for recovery of the said ornaments or price thereof. The question whether the direction regarding the return of benefits can be enforced through the process of execution by the Family Court came up for consideration before the High Court, which has been answered affirmatively and it has been further observed that there is no reason as to why this provision, i,e, section 13(3) of the Act, should be given restricted and narrow interpretation so as to confine its applicability only to decrees passed in suits for recovery of money.
8. (i) In Muhammad Ramzan's case contention was that the decree in execution being for recovery of money, it could only be executed by the Collector, under section 13(3) of the Act, as the amount is to be recovered as arrears of land revenue. The learned Judge observed that subsection (3) of section 13 of the Act is in the nature of enabling provision and provides an additional procedure which can be adopted for enforcing the decree under specific order of the Court directing the recovery as arrears of land revenue. It was further observed that subsection (3) does not in any manner, affect the general provision in subsection (4) for execution of the decrees passed by the Family Courts. If subsection (3) and subsection (4) are read together, the inevitable conclusion is that all decrees passed by the Family Court are to be executed by it or by such other Civil Courts as the District Judge may by special or general order direct. In matters where the decree relates to recovery of money an additional power is vested in Court to direct the recovery as arrears of land revenue. There is no warrant, however, for construing subsection (3) as ousting the jurisdiction of the Family Court to execute the decree.
' Referring to the case of Nasir Khan (supra), it is observed:-- "There is nothing in that judgment to suggest that the execution petition cannot be filed before the Family Court or that even in the absence of a specific direction to recover the money as arrears of land revenue, decree cannot be enforced in any other manner by the Family Court."
(ii) In the case of Muhammad Farid Khan v. The Civil Judge, Abbottabad 1989 CLC 1630, the Family Court proceeded to execute the decree under Order XXI, Rule 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In the petition filed before the Division Bench of the Peshawar High Court, the said order was assailed.
The submission was that section 13(3) of the Act prescribes a mode of execution of a money decree. In case the payment of the decretal amount is not made within time specified by the Court, the decretal amount is to be recovered only as arrears of land revenue and the provisions of Civil Procedure Code cannot be resorted to. Reliance was placed on section 17 of the Act, which provides that the Code of Civil Procedure, as stated above, is not applicable to proceedings before the Family Court. After detailed analysis, the Court has held as under:-- "There may be situations and the one before us appears to be such where the Court does not deem it apt or expedient to exercise its discretion to so direct, The question then would he as to how in Rnch contingency the decree relating to payment of money shall be executed and what procedure will it adopt or follow.
' A reference to the Act reveals that there is no special provision as regards the manner or mode of execution of decrees, including the one for conjugal rights. There is no denial of the fact that the proceedings before the Family Court are in the nature of civil proceedings and, under section 13 of the Act, a Family Court itself or any other Civil Court designated by the District Judge, specially or generally, are conferred with the powers to execute the decree.
' Consequently we have no hesitation in holding that in the event of execution Court exercising its discretion to refrain from issuing direction for the recovery of the decretal amount as arrears of land revenue under subsection (3) of section 13 of the Act, it may follow the procedure as contained in the Code of Civil Procedure."
9. The cases of Lal Muhammad and another and Parvaiz Ahmed lay down that all the decrees granted by the Family Courts, except the money decree, can be executed in the manner prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure, notwithstanding the bar contained in section 17 of the Act.
' In the cases of Muhammad Ramzan and Muhammad Fareed, the Courts have taken wider view in laying down that even the money decrees can be executed in the manner prescribed by the Code.
In the first case section 13(3) is interpreted as providing additional power in the matter of execution of money decree and the second case lays down that where the Court has declined to exercise the discretion vested in it under section 13(3) to recover the decretal amount as arrears of land revenue, the decree can be executed in the manner prescribed by the Code.
' Additionally, while construing section 13(3), it has been held that the said provision cannot be given restricted and narrow interpretation so as to confine its applicability only to decrees passed in family suits for recovery of money. In the case of Samia Akbar, the said provision has been extended to recovery of the benefits received by the wife in the cases where divorce has been granted by way of Khula` and in the case of Lal Muhammad and another, where the decree for restitution of conjugal rights was sought to be enforced.
' The views expressed by the said learned Courts, if considered in their totality, are in favour of acceding wide powers in the matter of execution of decrees passed by the Family Courts.
10. Section 13 provides for passing of a decree in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed but no rules have been framed in this regard.
' Thus, the Act does not specify any manner in which decrees are to be executed except that subsections (3) and (5) make certain provisions in respect of money decrees. In so far as the other decrees are concerned, no provisions have been made for execution thereof. Section 17 has excluded application of the Code of Civil Procedure to the proceedings before the Family Court, with the exception of sections 10 and 11 thereof. Therefore, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, I say so with great respect, in terms cannot be applied to the proceedings before the Family Court.
' But under subsection (4) of section 13, it is specifically provided that the decree shall be executed by the Court passing it or by such other Civil Court as the District Judge may, by special or general order, direct.
' When no procedure has been prescribed, it is to be inferred that the legislature has left it to the discretion of the Court to execute decree in apy manner it deems fit, looking at the peculiar circumstances of each case, that is to say, either to follow the principles underlying the said Code or to evolve its own procedure, within reasonable limits, in consonance with recognised judicial norms. However, divergent views have been expressed by the learned Judges in this regard.
' One view, as expressed in the case of Parvaiz Ahmad, is that the money decrees, are to be executed as specifically provided for in subsections (3) and (5) of section 13 of the Act.
' Other view is that section 13(3) is an enabling provision, whereby it has been left to the discretion of the Court, by vesting additional powers in the Court, to recover the decretal amount as arreas of land revenue under Chapters VIII and IX of the Land Revenue Act, 1967.
11. It may be stressed that the Family Courts Act, 1964 is a remedial statute. Its enactment was actuated, with beneficial object behind it, for expediting the matrimonial and family disputes by simplifying the procedure and curtailing the technicalities of the procedural law.
' Until the enactment of the said Act, all family disputes were cognizable under section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Increasing number of family causes and the procedural cobwebs, put the litigants in deplorable plight, particularly, the weaker limb of the Society, in juxtaposition of our social and socio-economic conditions.
It is established principle of interpretation of statutes that the remedial laws are to be liberally construed. Section 13 of the Act also, therfore, demands such liberal construction and is to be given widest operation, without distorting what is conveyed by its phraseology and in so far as the liberal construction necessarily flows from it and can be assigned to it without being presumptuous.
The other principle, that is to be kept in view, is that each word used in the statute, is to be read, as integral part thereof, and no word is to be rendered surplus, meaningless or redundant.
' Section 13(3), analytically, reads that (a) where a decree relates to the payment of money and (b) the decretal amount is not paid within the time specified by the Court, (c) the same shall, (d) if the Court so directs, be recovered as arrears of land revenue, and (e) on recovery shall be paid to the decree-holder.
' The clause "if the Court so directs" is of great importance in the said subsection.
' If the legislature intended that in money decrees the decretal amount shall be recovered only as arrears of land revenue, this purpose would have been achieved by avoiding the clause, "if the Court so directs".
' If the first view detailed above is accepted, the clause "if the Court so directs" will become surplus, meaningless and redundant. In view of the aforesaid well-established principles of interpretation of statutes such construction is not possible. Therefore, on reading of section 13 as a whole the proper construction would be that the legislature intended to confer wide powers on the Court for enforcement of all the decrees including money decrees and that in addition to the generality of the powers conferred on the execution Court, the legislature has vested a discretion in the Court, to realise the decretal amount as arrears of land revenue which powers ordinarily are not available to Civil Courts or even to the Collector when money decree is to be executed by him under the Third Schedule to the Code, on transfer of decree to him.
' It is not ipso facto that under the money decree granted by the Family Court, the sum recoverable is to be recovered as arrears of land revenue. The discretion can be exercised only when a decree relates to the payment of money, the decretal amount is not paid within the time specified by the Court and the Court directs recovery of such amount as arrears of land revenue.
' The above words, "if the Court so directs", vest discretion in the Family Court to adopt the extremely coercive method for recovery of the decretal amount as arrears of land revenue. The above discretion cannot be limited to ancillary matters and I say so with great respect, as such powers are always inherent in execution Court, like postponement of the recovery of decretal amount or granting further time for payment. Such authority, as is not inherent in execution Court, has been specifically provided for under subsections (3) and (5) of section 13, i,e, power to recover the decretal amount as arrears of land revenue or payment of decretal amount in instalments.
' The powers of the Family Court cannot be restricted to recover the decretal amount only as arrears of land revenue in money decrees, but the wide power conferred on the Court in the matter of execution of the other decrees of the Family Courts, in my humble view is to be extended to money decrees also in the context of what has been stated above.
Therefore, no exception can be taken to the orders dated 8-5-1991 and 5-9-1991. However, so far as the latter order is concerned, it is a vague order. The purport of the said order appears to be attachment of the property of the petitioner as ordered earlier on 8-5-1991.
' The learned Advocate for the petitioner submitted that the property attached pursuant to order dated 8-5-1991 does not belong to the petitioner. The above submission is beyond the scope of the present petition and if it is correct, is to be canvassed before the execution Court.
' As a resutl the petition is dismissed. Keeping in view the fact that the intricate question of law was involved in the petition, no order is passed as to costs.