RAZA AHMAD KHAN, J.-By this writ petition, Muhammad Farid petitioner has called into question the orders of respondents 1 to 3 at various stages of the litigation between him and his wife Mst. Gul Nasreen on the question of payment of the dower money amounting to Rs:50,000 and maintenance amount of the rate of Rs.500 per mcnsum from 19-4-1984 to 15--12-1984 which was finally decreed in her favour and the final order being that of the learned. Additional District Judge Abbottabad (respondent No.3) dated 6-12--1988 whereby the revision petition against the order of the executing Court was dismissed with costs.
2. We have heard Haji Ghulam Basit, Advocate the learned counsel for the petitioner at length. His main contention is that under subsection (3) of section 13 of the Family Courts Act, 196.1 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), a mode of execution of ~a money decree is prescribed in that the payment of the decretal amount, if not paid within a time specified by the Court, is to he recovered as arrears of land revenue.- In this context of the matter, the learned counsel urged that the decretal amount of the suit could be realized only under Chapter 1X of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 1962 while the learned lower Courts have adopted the mode the realization of the decretal amount under the Code of Civil 1 Procedure vide its Order 21, Rule 30. He also referred to section 17 of the Act, whereby except sections 10 and 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the other provisions of the Code, shall not apply to the proceedings before any Family Court. He, therefore, maintained that the procedure adopted by the learned Executing Court, being not in accord with section 13 of the Act, the impugned orders are without jurisdiction and of no legal effect on the rights of the petitioner: 3.It would be advantageous for the purpose of ready reference to reproduce the relevant provision of section 13 of the Family Courts Act, 1964:- 13 (1) .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
(3)Wherel.a. Decree'relates, to. The payment of money and the decretal amount is not paid within the time specified by the Court, the same shall, if the Court so direct, be recovered as arrears of land revenue and on recovery shall be paid to the decree-holder.
(4) The decree shall be executed by the Court passing it or by such other Civil Court as the District Judge may be special or general order, direct; (5)A Family Court may, if it so deems fit direct that any money to be paid under a decree passed by it be paid in such instalments as it deems fit."
A plain reading of the above quoted provisions will firstly indicate that execution of a decree, in general, is to be done by either the Family Court itself or by such other civil Court as the District Judge may direct by special or general order. Secondly a distinction is made in the matters pertaining to money decree inasmuch as the first instance the Executing Court is required to direct the judgment-debtor to pay the decretal amount within a specified time. If. He fails in doing so, then there appear to be two courses open to the Executing Court. One, to follow the course of recovery of decretal amount as arrears of land revenue and in this regard it is required to issue a direction specifically in compliance with subsection (3) of section 13 of the Act. Or, it will adopt other means to effect the recovery of the decretal amount. We are, therefore, clear in our minds that failure on the part of a decree-holder to make the payment of the decretal amount within the time specified by an execution Court shall not ipso facto make it obligatory on the Court to recover the same as arrears of land revenue but it is dependent upon its discretion and only if the Court so directs, the recovery shall he resorted to as arrears of land revenue. It will he then that the mode prescribed by Chapter IX of the West Pakistan Land Revenue Act, 19b7 as ,the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended shall be adopted for the purpose of realization of the decretal amount.
4. There may be situations and the one before us appears to be such where the Court does not deem it apt or expedient to exercise its discretion to so direct. The question then would be as to how in such a contingency the decree relating to payment of money shall be executed and what procedure will it adopt or follow.
5. A reference to the Act reveals that there is no special provisions as regards the manner or mode of execution of decrees, including the one for conjugal rights. There is no denial of the fact that the proceedings before the Family Court are in the nature of civil proceedings and, under section 13 of the Act, a Family Court itself or any other Civil Court designated by the District Judge, specially or generally, are conferred with the powers to execute the decree Thus, the inescapable conclusion is that such execution Court. In the absence of any special mode prescribed for the execution of a decree would not be violating any provision of law if it presses into service, or follows, the procedure as provided in the Code of Civil Procedure. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 17 of the Act.
6. Consequently we have no hesitation in holding that in the event of execution Court exercising its discretion to refrain from issuing direction for the recovery of the decretal amount as arrears of land revenue under subsection (3) of section 13 of the Act, it may follow the procedure as contained in the Code of the Civil Procedure.
7. The learned counsel cited a case decided by this Court, Lai Muhammad v. Niaz Parwar reported in PLD 1970 Pesh. 52 at the bar. This decision, I am afraid, will not advance the case of the petitioner inasmuch as the question before the learned Single Judge primarily related to the execution of a decree of conjugal rights and it did not necessitate to examine in depth the implication of the execution of a money decree, as in the instant case, in the perspective of subsection (3) of section 13 of the Act.
8. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that in the present case too, by adopting the procedure as contained in Order 21, rule 30 of the Code of Civil Procedure, instead of the one prescribed in subsection (3) of section 13 of the Act, in the execution of the money decree, the learned Courts below have committed no violation of the law and the impugned orders cannot but be held as lawful.
9. There is yet another aspect of the case. The litigation between the spouses commenced in 1985 as is evident from the decree passed by the learned Family Court on 29-6-1985. The petitioner has invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court. All the orders of the learned lower Courts, impugned by this writ petition, were the consequences of abortive attempts consistently and persistently made by the petitioner to deprive his wife, the respondent No.4, of the legitimate fruits of her litigation which, in fact, mainly pertain to her dower money. The present petition seems to be the last link of this chain. Let it be borne in mind that the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court cannot be exercised in aid of injustice or such inequitable acts of a petitioner as to impede the lawful course of justice. For, the Constitutional jurisdiction of the Superior Courts are always meant to come in aid of justice and equity alone.
10. In the light of the foregoing discussions, we find this writ petition devoid of any merits and dismiss the same in limine.