1. ' NAZIM HUSSAIN SIDDIQUI, J.---This appeal under Order 43, rule 1, C.P.C. Is directed against the order dated 10-12-1992, passed in Suit No, 359/85; by a learned Single Judge, of this Court, whereby he directed the appellants to deposit a sum of Rs, 29.5 million in Court within fifteen days from the date of said order. The facts relevant for decision of this appeal as are follows: ' On 30-5-1985 the respondent No, 1 Emirates Bank International Ltd. Filed the above suit against respondent No,2 Adamjee Industries Limited and others for recovery of Rs, 393,945,601.41. Alongwith the suit, the respondent No,1 also filed an application under Order 39, rules 1 and 2 read with sec- tion 151 C.P.C. Against the other respondents for restraining them from removing, selling, or dealing with the property namely, factory, situated in the Landhi Industrial Area, Karachi, together with structures/installations, machinery, fittings, fixtures, goods stocks and other articles lying in the factory. The respondent No,1 claimed a lien by way of first charge as mortgagee thereof. Then notice of said application was issued to the respondents and, meanwhile, they were restrained from removing or selling, or in any manner creating any charge or liability on the properties mentioned in the application. On 12-6-1992 Nazir of this Court and Mr. Jalaluddin Baloch, Advocate were deputed to prepare the inventory. On 13-8-1985, the appellants as intervenors filed C.M.A.
2. 2277/85, under Order 38, rule 8 read with section 151, C.F.C., praying to release from attachment the pledged goods/stocks/spares and stores in the seized godown, situated, in the premises of the factory and the same being under their lock and key the appellants as intervenors also prayed for permitting them to take delivery of the same. On 21-10-1985, when the application of intervenors came up for hearing it was ordered that a representative of the intervenors may visit the premises for the purpose of making inquiries about the goods, which according to the intervenors were hypothecated in their favour by respondent No, 2 and to find out whether such goods were actually under lock and key. On 31-10-1985 CMA 3736/85, under section 151 read with Order 39, Rules 1 and 4, C.P.C., was jointly filed by respondents Nos,1 and 2. It was brought to the notice of the Court that substantial amount was payable to the factory labourers and law and order situation was likely to arise. Therefore, it was prayed that the respondent No,1 be permitted to sell the factory together with machinery, fittings, fixtures, stocks and goods at the price to be mutually agreed upon between the respondent No, 1 and respondent No, 2 which shall not be less than Rs,150,000,000 (Rupees one hundred fifty million), and sale proceeds be credited in the account of respondent No, 2 with respondent No, 1 and out of the same the labour dues of Rs,2,45,00,000 be paid. The respondent No,1 was also required to furnish a bank guarantee for balance amount of sale proceeds, which was to be operative till the suit was finally disposed of. On 3-11-1985, a joint statement was submitted by the respondent No,1 and the intervenors to the effect that intervenors had no objection to contents of C.M.A. 3736/85, except that the stocks and goods claimed by the intervenors to be under their lock and key by way of pledge, as in C.M.A. 2277/85, should not be sold, pending disposal of the C.M.A. Last mentioned, but such was to be without prejudice to the rights of the intervenors to file proper proceedings, if necessary, against the respondent No, 2, its guarantors, and otheRs, Subsequently, it appears that, as per decision of the executing board of the intervenors the goods were sold by them (intervenors). Consequently, the CMA 241/88 was filed by the respondent No, 1 for punitive action. Later on, the intervenors filed CMA 3234/86 for withdrawal of their earlier CMA 2277/85. CMA 3234/86 was opposed by the respondent No, 1, on the ground, that the intervenors had committed contempt by selling the goods and stocks, which were the subject-matter of CMA 2277/85. CMA 2277/85 was permitted to be withdrawn with an observation that, if contempt was committed, such would not be wiped off merely by withdrawing CMA 2277/85. Further, it was observed that the breach appeared to have been committed by the officials of the intervenors, whose names were disclosed as Abdul Jabbar, Mehar A. Barlas, Amjad Ali and Humayoon Akhtar Adil. On CMAs. Nos, 241/88, 484/90 and 437/90 learned Single Judge passed the order, which has been impugned in this appeal, wherein the following was observed:- "Accordingly, as a first step and by way of an independent order, since the goods have already been sold and cannot be restituted, I would direct the NBP and its abovenamed officers to deposit the sale proceeds thereof namely a sum of Rs, 29.5 million or thereabout in this Court within 15 days whereupon the amount would be invested by the Nazir in Government securities bearing six monthly returns, the returns being likewise investable. This being done, it will be examined what further action, if any, may be taken. Extenuating circumstances, including apologies, or absence thereof, would then be considered only, if necessary, contempt proceedings would be drawn up. In due course, it will also be determined as to whom the money, to be deposited, really belongs.
3. Meanwhile the above application would remain pending."
4. ' The stand of the alleged contemnors is reflected in the affidavits and is as follows:- "As stated above, the meeting of the Executive Board on 3-6-1986 dealt with the matter of sale but I attended the meeting as it is usually my duty to do so. I had no knowledge of any injunction order which would be binding on NBP and might have been prior to 3-6-1986 and that it was still operative on that date. In any case having seen certain papers now, I would say that NBP or myself did not violate any order of this Hon'ble Court."
5. ' Before learned Single Judge it was contended that Order 39, rule 2(1) (2), C.P.C., is confined to parties and sub-rule (3) in the Order and Rule, envisaging penal action, does not extend to disregard of orders passed in terms of Order 39, rule 1, which alone may extend to non-parties. In support of this proposition, reliance was placed on the case reported in Hayat Ahmad Khan v.
6. Bashir Sadiq, PLD 1952 Lah. 48, wherein it was held that sub-rule 2(3) in Order 39, C.P.C. Was limited to transgression of Order 39, rule 2 and if orders passed under rule 1 of Order 39, C.P.C. Were violated punishment in the way of Order 39, rule 2(3) could not be visited even by virtue of section 151, C.P.C. Learned Single Judge did not subscribe to above view and relying upon the authorities of Indian Jurisdiction quoted in the order, passed the impugned order, the operative portion of which has been quoted above.
7. ' We have heard Mr. Abu Bakar Chundrigar for appellants and Mr. Sajid Zahid for respondents and latter vehemently argued that appeal is not maintainable. Therefore, we proceed first to examine the point of maintainability of the appeal.
8. ' It is contended on behalf of the appellants that if a decree or order adversely affects a person/stranger he shall be permitted to impugn it even if he was not a party to the original suit or proceedings. This argument is based upon the dictum laid down in PLD 1969 SC 65 H.M. Saya & Co. v. Wazir Ali Industries Ltd., wherein it has been held that the Court ought not to act on the principle that every procedure is to be taken as prohibited unless it is expressly provided for, as, to give such a meaning to the omission would result in grave injustice, and on the contrary the Court should proceed on the principle that every procedure whcih furthers administration of justice is permissible even if there is no express provision permitting the same. Above proposition is not in dispute and nor it could be disputed for the reason that the object of all judicial proceedings is to foster justice and right a wrong according to the established judicial norms. The rule laid down in the above-quoted case is not attracted to the circumstances of this case. The suit in question has been filed under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter called the Ordinance) which is a special law. It is a well-settled principle of law that special law overrides the provisions of general law. Though the appeal has been filed under Order 43, rule 1, C.P.C., but its maintainability would be examined, keeping in view the provisions of the Ordinance. Sections 11 and 12 of the Ordinance speak about the 'finality of the orders' and 'appeal', respectively. Section 11 says that subject to the provision of appeal under section 12 no Court or other authority shall call or permit to be called in question any order, judgment, or sentence of a Special Court or the legality or propriety of anything done or intended by the Special Court under the Ordinance. Under the proviso of sub-section (1) of section 12 of the Ordinance, no appeal shall lie from an interlocutory order, which does not dispose of the entire case before the Special Court.
9. ' The fundamental rule of interpretation of statutory construction is that the Statute is to be interpreted in a way that it helps in understanding the real intention of the legislature for which it was enacted. It should be so interpreted that it should have validity rather than the effect of perishing it. New law is not created by the Rules of Interpretation and cannon of construction nor a far fetched strained interpretation is permissible. There is always a strong presumption that the legislature does not make mistakes. The wisdom behind barring appeal against an interlocutory order, which does not dispose of the entire case before the Special Court, is that the Ordinance has been promulgated with the object of expeditious disposal of suits and recovery of loans, and this object can only be achieved by following the procedure laid down in section 7 of the Ordinance and curtailing the right of appeal against interlocutory ordeRs, The phrase 'entire case' used in the proviso of subsection 1 of section 12 of the Ordinance contemplates final disposal of the matter.
10. ' Mr. Sajid Zahid learned counsel for respondents challenging the maintainability of appeal cited (1)
11. PLD 1981 SC 359, Muhammad Ayub Butt v. Allied Bank Ltd., Peshawar and others, (2) 1986 MLD 2941 Khokhar Engineering Co. And 2 others v. Habib Bank Limited (This judgment was written by my learned brother Haider All Pirzada, J.), 1987 CLC 1422 Venu G. Advani and others v. Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. And 6 others and an unreported judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in Civil Appeals 27-K of 1987, 31-K of 1988, 39-K of 1989, 286-K of 1990, 304-K to 306-K of 1990, announced on 29-11-1992. In Muhammad Ayub Butt's case the Hon'ble Supreme Court after taking into consideration the provisions of sections 7, 8, 11 and 12 of the Ordinance and section 151, C.P.C. At page 361 observed as follows:-- "It seems to us that with a view to securing expeditious disposal of cases by a Special Court the framers of the Ordinance had purposely saved the interlocutory orders of said Court from attack before High Court in revision or appeal as they wanted that only the final decisions of the Special Court should be open to appeal before the High Court. This is evident from subsection (1) of section 7, subsection (1) of section 8 and section 11 of the Ordinance. The cumulative effect of these provisions is that the interlocutory order of the Special Court cannot be questioned before any Court including the High Court. Thus, on consideration of the provisions of the Ordinance itself, the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court in regard to such orders is excluded."
12. ' In Khokhar Engineering Co.'s case also it was held that appeal against interlocutory order, which does not dispose the entire case, is not competent. In Venu G. Advani's case the provisions of section 12(1) of the Ordinance and the words "case decided" employed in section 115 of C.P.C. Were taken into consideration and it was observed that these words cannot be pressed into service for the purpose of interpretation of section 12(1) of the Ordinance. In case of appeals decided by Supreme Court on 29-11-1992, the question of appeal against interlocutory order was examined and the view taken in Muhammad Ayub Butt's case was affirmed. Also, the following was observed:-- "The case may also be examined from another angle. The object of enacting the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, is to provide speedy measures for recovery of outstanding loans of Banking Companies as their recovery suits remained pending in the Civil Courts for years together. If the orders in the nature of interlocutory orders are brought under challenge before the High Court, the object for which the enactment was made would be frustrated. The appellate power conferred on the High Court is only to the extent of entertaining appeal against the final order and judgment of the Special Court and that too subject to the condition precedent prescribed by section 12 that the appellant deposits in the High Court an amount equivalent to the decretal amount or with the leave of the Court furnishes security equal in value to such amount."
13. ' Reverting back to the facts of the case in hand it is noted that impugned order is an interlocutory order and it does not dispose of the 'entire case' before the Special Court. A person, who intervenes in a suit either of his own behalf, or on behalf of public (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, pp. 1674-75) is an intervenor. The record shows that appellants as interveners have filed applications/statement in the proceedings before the Special Court, as such they are subject to these proceedings. The controversy emanated from the act of commission of the appellants. Besides, irrespective of the fact that that have been joined as a party or not, the fact remains that the appeal has been preferred against an interlocutory order, which is not maintainable.
14. ' In consequence, the objection of learned counsel for the respondents is upheld and the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.