1. ' HAIDER ALI PIRZADA, J.--The above appeal has been filed under section 15 of Civil Procedure Code Amendment Ordinance, 1980 against the order, dated 15-5-1986 passed by the learned Single Judge.
2. ' The facts leading to the filing of the appeal are that the respondent filed a Suit No,537 of 1983 for the recovery of Rs,34,67,564.78 under Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979. On service of process the appellant made an application under Order XXXVII, Rule 3, C .P.C. On or about 25-1-1984. The learned Single Judge after taking into consideration the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties, allowed the application vide order, dated 15-5-1986. It is advantageous to reproduce the order which reads as under:- "Keeping in view the principle laid down in the case of Abdul Karim Jafreni v. United. Bank Limited 1984 SC MR 568, in the light of various pleas taken in the application for leave to defend the defendant is granted leave to appear and defend the suit subject to its furnishing security equivalent to the amount claimed in the suit to the satisfaction of the Nazir of this Court. In favour of the plaintiff already exists a security created by way of equitable mortgage which could be accepted by the Nazir as security for the purpose of this case after satisfying himself as to its sufficiency for the claim made in the suit. In case it is found that the value of the mortgaged property is less than the amount claimed in the suit the defendant shall furnish additional security to the extent of deficit amount within two months."
3. ' The appellants being aggrieved by the above order have filed the present appeal. We admitted the above appeal on 12-8-1986. We ordered issuance of notice on Miscellaneous Application No,885 of 1986. A notice was received by the respondents.
4. ' Mr. Iqbal Kazi the learned counsel for the respondents has contested this appeal and the learned counsel appearing on its behalf has raised a preliminary objection that the appeal filed by the appellants is not legally competent as the appellants have assailed an interlocutory order passed by the learned Single Judge during the pendency of proceedings in this Court under the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, which specifically provides that the order passed by the learned Single Judge shall not be called in question except by filing an appeal to the High Court but there shall be no appeal on interlocutory order which does not dispose of the entire case.
5. ' On the other hand Mr. J.H. Rahimtoola, learned counsel for the appellants, has submitted that the provisions of sections 11 and 12 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 on which the reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the respondent do not affect the High Court Appeal under section 15 of Civil Procedure Code Amendment Ordinance, 1980 and that even an interlocutory order passed by the learned Single Judge can be challenged in the Inter- Court Appeal.
6. ' Before examining the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties it is advantageous to reproduce hereinbelow sections 11 and 12 of the Ordinance, which reads as follows:- "11 .Finality of orders:-- ' Subject to the provisions for appeal in section 12, no Court, or other authority shall call or permit to be called in question any order, judgment or sentence of a Special Court or the legality or propriety of anything done or intended to be done by the Special Court under this Ordinance."
7. "12 Appeals:--
(1) Any person aggrieved by any order, judgment, decree, or sentence of a special Court may, within thirty days of such order, judgment, decree or sentence, prefer an appeal to the High Court within whose jurisdiction the order, judgment, decree or sentence is passed: ' Provided that no appeal shall lie from an interlocutory order which does not dispose of the entire case before the Special Court.
(2) An appeal under subsection (1) shall be on any one of the following grounds, namely:--
(a) The decision being contrary to law or to some usage having the force of law, or
(b) The decision having failed to determine a material issue of law or usage having the force of law, or
(e) A substantial error apparent in the procedure provided by or under this Ordinance, which may possibly have produced error in the decision on merits.
(3) An appeal may be preferred under this section from decision under ex parte.
(4) An appeal under this section shall be heard by a Bench of not less than two Judges.
(5) No appeal shall be admitted for hearing unless the appellant deposits in cash with a High Court an amount equivalent to the judgment debt or, at the discretion of the High Court, furnishes security equal in value to such amount."
8. ' Section 11 provides that subject to the provisions for appeal in section 12, any order, judgment or sentence passed by a special Court shall not be called in question, section 12 makes provision for appeal against the order, judgment, decree or sentence passed by a special Court to the High court but no appeal is competent against an interlocutory order which does not dispose of the entire case before the Court.
9. ' It may be pointed out that subsection (2) of section 12 of the Ordinance. Provides the grounds on which an appeal can be filed. Subsection (3) makes it clear that an appeal may be preferred under the above section from a decision made ex parte. A bare perusal of subsection (4) shows that an appeal under the above section shall be heard by a Bench of not less than two Judges. A bare perusal of subsection (5) shows that no appeal shall be admitted for hearing unless the appellant deposits in cash an amount equivalent to the judgment debt or at the discretion of the High Court, furnishes security equal in value to such amount.
10. ' It, may be noticed that all appeals which were pending before the Supreme Court or the High Court at the commencement of the Ordinance against the interlocutory' orders which did not dispose of the entire case, stood transferred to the special Court by virtue of the section 13 (c) of the Ordinance.
11. ' A perusal of these provisions shows that an appeal from an interlocutory order or an order which does not dispose of the entire case before the Court is not competent. This position has been conceded by the learned counsel for the appellants also. He, however, contends that the appeal in hand has not been filed under section 12 of the Ordinance, but under section 15 of the Civil Procedure Code Amendment Ordinance, 1980 and is, therefore, competent. According to him though the suit was filed under the Ordinance in the High Court, yet it would not make any difference as the Ordinance itself was not applicable to the High Court, but it would be governed by the provisions of Civil Procedure Code.
12. ' In order to deal with this contention it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions of the Ordinance. Special Court is defined in section 2 of the Ordinance. It means.
(i) In respect of a case in which the outstanding amount of the loan does not exceed one million rupees, or the trial of offence punishable under this Ordinance, a person who is or who has been a District Judge or an Additional District Judge and is appointed by the Federal, Government, by notification in the official Gazette, to be a special Court to exercise jurisdiction within such territorial limits as may be specified in the notification, and, in the absence of such appointment, the District.
13. Court, and
(ii) In respect of any other case, the High Court in the exercise of original Civil Jurisdiction.
14. The subsection is a new provision reconstituting the special Court both on the basis of pecuniary jurisdiction as well as the forum. The pecuniary jurisdiction is divided into two classes, that is, with regard to case in respect of which the outstanding amount of loan does not exceed one million rupees, and (ii) in respect of any other cases where the outstanding amount of loan exceeds one million rupees. The types of Court which may act as special Court for civil cases, that is, the special Court or the High Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction.
15. ' We are of the view that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code continue to apply to the extent that they have not been ousted by the provisions of sections 11 and 12 of the Ordinance which effectively bar appeals against interlocutory orders.
16. ' Section 3 of the Ordinance lays that the provision of this Ordinance are to be read in addition to and not in derogation of any other law for the time being in force. The Ordinance is special law.
17. Section 4 of C.P.C. Provides that in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect any special or local law now in force or any special jurisdiction or power conferred or any special form of procedure prescribed by or under any other law for the time being in force. Undoubtedly the High C Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction is a special jurisdiction and sections 11 and 12 of the Ordinance preclude the High Court from exercising its appellate jurisdiction qua the interlocutory orders of the special Court. It would, therefore, follow that in view of the provisions of sections 11 and 12 of the Ordinance read with section 4 of the C .P.C. The interlocutory orders of the special Court cannot be assailed before a Bench of not less than two judges in High Court Appeals by resorting to the provisions of section 15.
18. ' It is well-recognised principle of law that in case where a statute provides a procedure for doing a thing in a particular manner that thing should be done in that manner and in no other way or it should, not be done at all. Indeed such statute prohibits doing of a thing in any other manner particularly when this procedure is laid down for filing of appeals against the final order. Judgment or sentence.
19. ' Mr. Rahimtoola when confronted with this legal position, submitted that the provisions of sections 11 and 12 of the Ordinance do not affect the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court and that even an interlocutory order passed by the High Court in the exercise of powers conferred by the provisions of the Ordinance can be challenged under the extraordinary jurisdiction.
20. ' There is no dispute about the legal proposition that the constitutional jurisdiction of the superior Courts remains unaffected by any law made by the Federal or the Provincial legislature but it may be kept in mind that the superior Courts, while exercising constitutional jurisdiction, have always kept in view that this jurisdiction should not be invoked where it will have the effect of defeating and deflecting the legislative intent as for instance, where a remedy is provided under the law against the final order passed by a special Court or Tribunal I but finality is attached to the interlocutory orders passed in the course of proceedings before it, the superior Courts would not interfere with the interlocutory orders in the exercise of their constitutional jurisdiction unless these orders have the effect of disposing of the entire case before the special Court. In this connection, reference may be made to the view taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Ali v. Chief Administrator of Auqaf 1972 SC M R 297 wherein it was observed that the Ordinance, while providing remedy under section 7, had ousted the jurisdiction of the District Judge and High Court to issue injunction against the Chief Administrator, Auqaf to restrain him from assuming control of the property as Waqf property under section 6, which clearly demonstrated the intention of the Law-giver that the assumption and control of the property by the Chief Administrator, Auqaf under the Ordinance should continue to remain uninterrupted till the disposal of the question of title by the civil Court.
21. ' In the case of Mumtaz Hussain v. Chief Administrator, Auqaf 1976 SCMR 450, the legal position noted in the case of Muhammad Ali was clarified and it was observed as follows:- "As the said Ordinance has taken away the right of the petitioner to interim relief, learned counsel submitted that this was a ground which entitled the petitioner to prosecute a writ petition despite the pendency of the proceedings in the District Court. The argument is misconceived because the writ jurisdiction of the superior Courts cannot be invoked in aid to injustice and in order to defeat the express provisions of the statutory law."
22. ' It is thus, clear from the legal position noted above that the constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked where it would have the effect of defeating or deflecting the legislative intent. It may be noticed that the Ordinance has been promulgated for securing any repayments of Loans of Banking Companies through special Courts and are required to follow the summary procedure provided for under Order XXXVII, C.P.C. (See section 7(2) of the Ordinance), provisions relating to appeal, revision and review as contained in the Code have not been I made applicable to orders and judgments passed by such Courts under the Ordinance. It is clear, that the object of the legislature to take away the right of appeal in the case of interlocutory orders is to ensure quick disposal of cases by the special Court. This object cannot be defeated by circumventing the provisions of the Ordinance by invoking the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court which is available only where no adequate and efficacious remedy is provided by law to the aggrieved persons.
23. ' This contention of the learned counsel for the appellants is of no substance on the other ground also. The distinction between an error of jurisdiction and error within jurisdiction is too well known. In Muhammad Hasan Munir v. Sibadr and others PLD 1974 SC 139 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down that:-- "It is well-settled that where a Court or Tribunal has jurisdiction and it determines that question, it cannot be said that it acted illegally or with material irregularity merely because it came to an erroneous decision on a question of fact or even law."
24. ' It can hardly be denied that the learned Single Judge was possessed of the jurisdiction to hear the application for leave to defend. The order passed by him does not suffer from any illegality much less a jurisdictional error, to justify invocation of constitutional jurisdiction.
25. ' The upshot of the above discussion is that the present High Court appeal filed by the appellants is not competent and the same is hereby dismissed. Consequently the Miscellaneous Application is hereby dismissed.
26. ' We, however, make no order as to costs