IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHARY, J.---This common judgment shall constitute the reasons of our short order, dated 26th May, 1992, passed in High Court Appeals Nos.13 to 16 of 1992, whereby the appeals against separate orders, dated 27th September, 1992 passed by the Chairman/Judge Banking Tribunal appointed under the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984 (hereinafter referred as the Ordinance) Balochistan, Quetta, in each case, have been dismissed.
Briefly stated the facts necessary for the decision of instant proceedings are that Habib Bank Limited filed suit for the recovery of various outstanding amounts against the appellants as well as Muhammad Nasir son of Ahmad Din, whose name is not appearing in the memo. Of appeal. For sake of brevity, particulars of each suit are mentioned hereinbelow:--- S.No.H.C.
AppealCivil Suit No.Suit amount Rs.
1. 13/92 29/92 52,94,343.00
2. 14/92 27/92 14,35,916.00
3. 15/92 30/93 31,77,537.00
4. 16/92 28/92 27,06,579.00 The appellants as well as Muhammad Nasir filed reply of the notices issued by the Banking Tribunal whereby they denied the claim asserting being not liable to make the payment of the outstanding amount. The tribunal on hearing the parties and consulting the record passed the impugned order/decree in each suit severely and jointly against the appellants and Muhammad Nasir, for the suit amounts mentioned hereinabove, along with the payment of mark-up at the agreed rate, on the decretal amount from the date of institution of the suit till the realization of the decretal amount, besides directing the attachment of mortgaged property in favour of the Bank, with costs of the suits.
The appellants preferred appeals, along with an application, in each case, under section 151, C.P.C.
Read with section 9 of the Ordinance, with following prayer:--- "It is accordingly respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to allow the appellants to submit the appeal against movable/immovable property held by plaintiff-Bank and treat those securities as security within the meaning of section 9 of Banking Tribunals Ordinance."
At the preliminary hearing it revealed that the appeals are not entertainable, for want of the deposit of the suit amount or the decretal amount, with the Banking Tribunal as it is contemplated under section 9 of the Ordinance. Thus the appellant's counsel were asked to address the Court, firstly on this aspect of the case.
Messrs Tariq Mehmood, Ehsanul Hag, Shakeel Ahmed and Basharatuilah, Advocates appeared on behalf of appellant No,2 Ahmad Din and addressed that this Court has the discretion to direct the judgment-debtor either to deposit the suit amount/decretal amount or to furnish security equivalent of the amount which is the subject-matter of the proceedings and as the property owned by appellants Nos.3 to 4 stands mortgaged with the bank, therefore, they be exempted from the strict compliance of section 9 of the Ordinance. Mr. Basharatullah further canvassed that in the instant case, the liability can only be fixed upon the appellants 3-4 mortgagors, to the extent of amount for which they have bound down themselves by executing the mortgage deeds in favour of the bank, because sufficiently an exhorbitant amount is being claimed by the respondent from them, which, they are not liable to pay, if the facts of the cases are gone deeply.
We have heard the learned counsel at length. At this stage it would be expedient to reproduce the text of section 9 of the Ordinance: "Appeal.--(1) Any person aggrieved by any order of the Banking Tribunal passed under subsection
(4) or subsection (5) of section 6 or a decree or sentence passed under this Ordinance may, within thirty days of such order, decree or sentence, prefer an appeal to the High Court: Provided that no appeal filed by the defendant against a decree shall be entertained unless the defendant has deposited with the Banking Tribunal the amount claimed in the suit under subsection (6) of section 6 or the decretal amount: Provided further that where the claim of the banking company is based on the default of the defendant in payment of agreed instalments the deposit shall be to the extent of the amount of instalments in default."
It is the golden rule of Interpretation of Statutes, that the words used by the legislation are to be read and understood in plain and ordinary grammatical meanings. The bare reading of section 9 visualizes that the statute has conferred a right of appeal, subject to the condition of depositing the suit amount or decretal amount which has been awarded in the terms of section 6(6) of the Ordinance with the Banking Tribunal before presenting the appeal and non-depositing of the amount shall be construed to bypass the mandatory command of section 9 of the Ordinance.
Further the plain reading of section 9 suggests that the Appellate Court has no lawful authority to add or delete any provisions by putting different constructions on this section for the purpose of achieving the object that a decree-holder could be exempted from depositing the suit-decretal amount because valuable properties have already been mortgaged with the bank. In this context the maxim `expressum facit cessare taciturn(when a deed or statute contains express covenants or specific mention of things and contigencies, no implication of any covenant or contingency on the same subject-matter can be raised) shall govern the interpretation of section 9 of the Ordinance.
It may be observed that the object for the promulgating of Ordinance was to provide a machinery for expeditious recovery of money due to financial institutions and any departure, from its provisions by interpreting its various provisions, contrary to its intention and the purpose for which this law was enacted would amount to rendering the law inexpedient. It is also settled that while interpreting the statute dealing in the recovery of money no equitable construction can be placed on it basing on presumptions or assumptions and it is the obligation of the Court to look squarely into the words/connotations/expressions, implied by the law-givers and interpret in such a manner that it should have consistency with the object and purpose for which the law is promulgated, therefore, the contention raised by the learned counsel in this behalf has no substance, as such, it is held that the provisions of section 9 of the Ordinance relating to the deposit of the suit amount or the decretal amount is plenary in its nature and appeals shall not be entertainable, unless this condition is not adhered to, strictly.
Mr. Basharatullah, Advocate during course of arguments moved two applications, in one of which request was made that as appellants Nos.3 and 4 have neither signed the memo. Of appeals nor they have given power to the Advocates, because Ahmad Din appellant No,2 was their attorney- holder for the purpose of mortgaging the property owned by them with the Bank therefore in good faith he also filed the appeals on their behalf, along with signing the Vakalatnama of the counsel and appellants Nos.3 and 4 ratify his this action and prayed that the memorandum of appeals be treated on their behalf as well. Second application was submitted on behalf of Muhammad Nasir son of Ahmad Din, in terms of Order 41, rule 20 read with Order 40 rule 4, C.P.C. With the prayer that he be allowed to be joined as respondent.
As we have determined that the appeals are not entertainable for want of compliance of section 9 of the Ordinance therefore, no order is required to be passed on these applications.
As a result of above discussion the appeals arc dismissed in limine.