1. ' ARSHAD NOOR KHAN, J.---By this common order, we intend to dispose of High Court Appeal Nos.304 of 2008 and 305 of 2008, as both the appeals have arisen out against the common order and the facts and law involved in both the appeals are identical. These High Court Appeals have been filed under section 15 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1980 by the appellant against the order dated 17-11-2008 passed by the Learned Single Judge on C.M.A. Nos.653 of 2008 and .654 of 2008 in Suit Nos.127 and 128 of 2008 whereby the injunction applications filed by the appellant against the respondent it's have been dismissed.
2. ' The facts relevant for the purpose of disposal of the" present appeals, in brief are that the respondent No,1 executed agency agreement with the appellant on 1-11-1982 whereby the appellant was appointed as agent of respondent No,1 to promote and look after. The business of cargo shipping of respondent No,1 in Pakistan and the appellant started functioning as agent of respondent No,1 in pursuance of the aforesaid agency agreement which continued till 1-12-1996 when another standard agency agreement was executed in between the parties and by virtue of the said agreement it dated 1-12-1996, the commission of respondent No,1 over the services rendered by him to respondent No,1 etc. We're also specified. It is further stated in the plaint that the appellant continued the business under the authority of responded at No,1 and attended the meeting held by respondent No,1 at Singapore and Hong Kong and in the last meeting at Singapore, the respondent No,1 appreciated the zealous and honest efforts of appellant and offered him for joint venture in Pakistan and asked him to send working paper for establishment of joint venture. The appellant also sent the working paper but the respondent No,1 became deaf ear and did not respond the working paper sent to him in the month of March, 2007 and to the utter surprise of the appellant, he received E-mail whereby the agreement in between the parties was rescinded and appellant was directed to hand over the record etc. To respondent No,2. According to the appellant, the said notice was issued in utter disregard with the terms and conditions of the standard agency agreement dated 1-12-1996 whereby three months prior notice was the requirement from the either side to terminate the agreement but the authority of the appellant has been terminated by respondent No,1 without observing the notice period as such the termination of the agreement, itself is void and not in accordance with the law and filed a suit seeking declaration against the termination of his agreement and injunction to the effect that the respondents be restrained not to act upon the termination letter dated 19-12-2007. Along with the suit, the appellant filed both the present applications seeking temporary injunction against the respondents. The notice of the suit as well as miscellaneous applications were served on the respondents and respondent No,1 emphatically refuted the allegations contained in the plaint and has raised the plea regarding maintainability of the suit coupled with the other legal pleas in his written statement and the counter-affidavit filed against the Miscellaneous. Application, stating therein that neither prima fade case exists in favour of the appellant nor balance of inconvenience lies in his favour nor he will suffer any irreparable loss or injury in case, if the injunction is refused.
3. ' The respondent No,2 also filed separate written statement as well as counter-affidavit stating therein that he has been lawfully appointed as agent by respondent No,1 and he has suffered irreparable loss because of the injunction operating against the respondents.
4. ' The learned Single Judge after hearing the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties, has dismissed both C.M.As thereby refusing to grant the injunction in favour of the appellant, hence these appeals.
5. ' We have heard Mr. M. Farogh Naseem, Advocate, for the appellant, Mr. A. Rahman Malik, Advocate, for respondent No,1 and Mr. Shakeel Pervez Bhatti, Advocate, for respondent No,2.
6. ' Mr. Muhammad Farogh Naseem, learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the appellant has interest in the agency and his interest could not be withheld by terminating the agency agreement and since the appellant was working as agent of respondent No,1 since last 40 years and he has created the circle of customers by his tireless efforts and the clientage of the appellant will be diverted towards respondent No,2, in case, if the termination is not declared as illegal, inoperative and void ab initio. He further contended that the appellant has spent much more amount for purchase of trailer, container, heavy machinery and the investment of the appellant in purchasing of equipment, machinery etc. Has created interest in the agency which could not be taken away leniently by the respondent No,
1. He further contended that while appreciating the efforts and functioning of the appellant, the respondent No,1 in its meeting held in the month of November, 2007 at Singapore offered to convert the standard agency into a joint venture and the appellant was asked by respondent No,1 to send working paper which the appellant sent, which shows that the appellant has interest in the agency, which interest could not be snatched or denied by the respondents. He further vehemently contended that the right of the appellant has been protected and safeguarded under section 202 of the Contract Act and respondent No,1 has violated the provision of section 202 of Contract Act while terminating the authority of the appellant without assigning any reason or hearing him. According to him the learned Single Judge did not consider the material available on record and that the appellant shall suffer irreparable loss and injury and will lose his customers which he has made out because of his efficient and honest efforts, nor the relevant law on the subject has been properly appreciated as such the order passed by the learned Single Judge suffers from mis-reading of the material available on record as well as the relevant law on the subject and liable to be set aside. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the case of Pakistan Automobiles Corporation Ltd. v. General Motors Overseas Distribution Corporation and other reported in PLD 1982 Kar.796; the case of Jamal Ahmed v. Zakaria, reported in 1987 MLD 295; the case of Molasses Export Co. Ltd v. Consolidated Sugar Mills Ltd., reported in 1990 CLC 609; the case of Pir Bux and others v. Ghulam Rasool and others, reported in PLD 1997 Kar.113; the case of Messrs Universal Trading Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. v.
7. Messrs Beecham Group PLC and another, reported in 1994 CLC 726; the case of Nooruddin and others v. Messrs Sindh Industrial Trading Estate Ltd. And others, reported in 1993 CLC 2204; the case of Roomi Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd v. Stafford Miller Ltd and others reported in 2005 CUD 1805; the case of Bolan Beverages Ltd. v. Pepsico Inc. And others, reported in PLD 2004 SC 860; the case of Messrs Business Computing International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. IBM World Trade Corporation, reported in 1997 CLC 1903; the case of Puri Terminal Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan, reported in 2004 SCMR 1092; the case of Hazara Chill Tract v. Mst. Qaisra Elahi and others, reported in 2005 SCMR 678; the case of Mian Muhammad Iqbal v. Mir Mukhtar Hussain and others, reported in 1996 SCMR 1047; the case of Messrs Om Prokash Paiwal and another v. Union of India and others, reported in AIR 1988 Calcutta 143; the case of State of Punjab v. Inder Singh, reported in AIR 1998 SC 07; the case of Shaw Wallace and Co., reported in AIR 31 Calcutta 676; the case of Bright Bros. (Pvt.) Ltd. Bombay v. J.K. Sayani, reported in AIR 1976 Madras 55; the case of J.J. Sayani v. Bright Brothers (Pvt.) Ltd., reported in AIR 1980 Madras (sic); the case of Sohrabaji Dhunjibhoy v. Oriental Government Security Life Assurance Co., reported in AIR 1944 Bombay 166; the case of Cooperative Hindustan Bank v. Surandra Nath Dey, reported in AIR 1952 Calcutta 524; and the case of Nandlal v Dharamdeo Singh and others, reported in AIR 1925 Patna 299.
8. ' Mr. Abdul Rehman Malik, Advocate, for respondent No,1 vehemently refuted the contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and has contended that the agreement amongst the parties did not provide any interest in agency in between them so as to say that the agency agreement or standard agency agreement executed in between the parties creates any interest in favour of the appellant which could not be revoked or terminated by the respondent No,
1. He further contended that by virtue of standard agency agreement dated 1-12-1996 the commission of the appellant is specified in the agreement itself, as such, the status of the appellant is no more than the commission agent and he vaguely and falsely claiming the interest in the agency which never agreed expressly or impliedly in between the parties. He further contended that by virtue of agency agreement dated 1-11-1982, the container, trailer and machinery etc. Was the responsibility of respondent No,1 which he supplied to him therefore it could not be said that the appellant invested much more amount in his business. According to him neither there was joint venture in between the parties nor there was any proposal from the respondent No,1 to create joint venture agency with the appellant. He further contended that the provisions of section 202 of Contract Act are inapplicable and has vehemently contended that the respondent No,1 has all the rights and powers by virtue of agency agreement as well as standard agency agreement to terminate the authority and powers of the agent, create under such agreements and the respondent No,1 rightly did so by terminating the agency and appointed respondent No,2 as his agent in place of appellant and the fact of appointment of respondent No,2 was well within the knowledge of the appellant prior to filing of the suit which fact has been concealed by the appellant for certain extraneous considerations. According to him the appellant will not suffer any irreparable loss or injury because he was the agent of respondent No,1 and has received the commission as per agreement executed in between the parties. According to him the learned Single Judge rightly appraised the whole material available before her, while passing the impugned order and no illegality, abnormality or discrepancy is available on record to interfere in it. In support of his contentions, he has relied upon the case of Pakistan Paper Corporation v.
9. National Trading Company reported in 1983 CLC 1965; the case of Union of India v. Motilal Kamalia and others reported in AIR 1962 Patna 384; the case of Chandi Prasad Singh v. The State of Uttar Pradesh reported in AIR 1956 SC 149; the case of Lakshminarayan Ram Gopal and sons Ltd. v.
10. Government of Hyderabad reported in AIR 1954 SC 364; the case of Arndt Lal C. Shah-. Ram Kumar, reported in AIR 1962 Punjab 325; the case of Firm Murlidhar Banwarilal v. Kishorelal Jagannath Pradad and others, reported in AIR 1960 Rajasthan 296; the case of Muhammad Yousuf v. Messrs Urooj (Pvt.) Ltd., reported in PLD 2003 Kar.16; the case of Messrs Universal Trading Corporation v.
11. Messrs Beecham Group PLC and another, reported in 1994 CLC 726; the case of Messrs Farooq & Co. v. Federation of Pakistan, reported in 1996 CLC 2030; the case of Sunshine Corporation Ltd. v. V.E.I.
12. Du Pont, reported in SBLR 2001 Kar.387; the case of ABN Amro Bank v. Wasim Dar, reported in 2004 PLC 69; the case of West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation v. Aziz Qureshi, reported in PLD 1973 SC 222; the case of Messrs Nasir Traders and others v. Habib Bank Ltd, reported in PLD 1993 Quetta 94; the case of Mst. Azeemun Nisa Begum v. Ali Muhammad, reported in PLD 1990 SC 382; the case of Hafiz Sharafatullah v. Federation of Pakistan, reported in 1995 CLC 1790; the case of Abdul Habib Rajwani v. Messrs Industries Ltd. And others, reported in 2007 YLR 590; the case of Messrs Business Computing International (Pvt.) Ltd. v. IBM World Trade Corporation, reported in 1997 CLC 1903; the case of Muhammad Aref Effendi v. Egypt Air, reported in 1980 SCMR 588; the case of Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Mian Ghulam Jilani v. The Federal Government, reported in PLD 1975 Lah. 65; the case of Pakistan Chest Foundation v. Government of Pakistan and others, reported in 1997 CLC 1379; the case of Khairpur Textile Mills v. National Bank of Pakistan, reported in 2003 CLD 326; the case of Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem, reported in 1994 SCMR 2213; the case of Asif Jah Siddiqi v. Government of Sindh, reported in PLD 1983 SC 46; the case of Phalippine Airlines Inc. v.
13. Paramount Aviation (Pvt.) Ltd. Reported in PLD 1999 Kar.227; the case of Bolan Beverages (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Pepsico Inc. And others, reported in PLD 2004 SC 860; the case of Roomi Enterprises (Pvt.) Ltd. v.
14. Stafford Miller Ltd., reported in 2005 CLD 1805; the case of Tauseef Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Lahore Development Authority and others, reported in 2002 SCMR 1269; the case of Shakil Waqas and Co. v. General Manager, Pakistan Railways and others, reported in PLD 2001 Kar.185; the case of Puri Terminal Ltd. v. Government of Pakistan and others, reported in 2004 SCMR 1092; the case of Messrs Petrocommodities (Pvt.) Ltd v. Rice Corporation of Pakistan, reported in PLD 1998 Kar.1; the case of Messrs Pakistan Associated Construction Ltd. v. Asif H. Kazi and another, reported in 1986 SCMR 820; the case of Boulton Bros and Co. Ltd. (India) v New Victoria Mills Co. Ltd, reported in AIR 1929 Allahabad 87; the case of Thimmarayappa v. Narayanappa and others reported in AIR 1854 Mysore 88; the case of Adam Limited v. Messrs Mitsui and Co., reported in 1997 MLD 2712; the case of S.M.
15. Shafi Ahmed Zaidi v. Malik Hassan All Khan, reported in 2002 SCMR 338; and the case of Rashid Khan alias Muhammad Rafiq Khan v. Haji Muhammad Yousuf and another reported in 1987 SCMR 392.
16. ' Mr. Shakeel Pervez Bhatti, Advocate, for respondent No,2 while adopting the arguments advanced by Mr. A. Rahman Malik, learned counsel for respondent No,1 has contended that the agency agreement has been executed in between both the respondents and legitimate right has been accrued in favour of the respondent No,2 and by the foul tactics of appellant, respondent No,2 is being deprived off from the fruit of agreement executed in between respondent No,1 and respondent No,2 as such the learned Single Judge rightly refused the injunction as prayed by the appellant and the same is not liable to be reversed by this Court.
17. ' We have considered the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties and have gone through the entire material available before us.
18. Needless to say that for the purposes of grant of interim injunction, Court has to consider the existence of good prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff and balance of inconvenience lies in his favour and he will suffer irreparable loss and injury if d the injunction is refused. In the present case the appellant is heavily relying upon the agency agreement dated 1-11-1982 and standard agency agreement dated 1-12-1996 and by virtue of agency agreement dated 1-11-1982, the 4% commission of the appellant was agreed on cargo booked by him including brokerage and 2-1/2% commission on cargo booked by principal or their agent at their ports or inland places as well as 1% inward commission on cargo discharge and other calculation of commission freight will include basic freight and CAF only and will not include BAF and any other specific surcharge whereas BAF has been incorporated into freight rates or where FAK/Lumpsum rates are in use, commission will be calculated at the freight rate less 20%. Whereas in standard agency agreement dated 1-12-1996 a schedule regarding commission of the appellant being agent is provided and by virtue of these agreements, it is abundantly clear that the agreement in between the parties has been executed as that of principal and agent and nowhere any condition exists in both of B these agreements to show that there was interest of the appellant in the agency by virtue of agreements. It is therefore, not borne out from the record that the agency agreement and standard agency agreement executed in between them do not speak about the status of the appellant having any interest in the agency except the commission agent. So far as the arrangements of the container, equipment's etc. Are concerned, clause 5 of the standard agency agreement dated 1-12-1996 provides that where the equipment is referred to in the agreement, it shall comprise container, flat racks, trailers or similar cargo carrying devices owned, leased or otherwise controlled by the principal. As regards the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that appellant has interest in the agency business, in our humble opinion, is devoid of any force as the status of the appellant in execution of both these agreements is not more than a commission agent.
19. ' Mr. Abdul Rahman Malik, learned counsel for respondent No,1 while refuting the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant has interest in the agency, has also relied upon the Law of Agency, Third Edition, revised by Prof. SC Srivastava, who at page 765 after reviewing of the case of Subhash Chandra J.M. v. Feroze Khan, from Indian jurisdiction reported in AIR 1982 Dehli 114 has stated, as under-- "Thus, where the plaintiff according to his own case, was to get commission after the accrual of the collection, cannot, prima facie, be said to have any interest in the prints of the picture. As such, he is not agent and, therefore, not entitled, on cause of action of termination of his agency, to restrain, by injunction, the principal from exploiting or exhibiting the picture."
20. The contention advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that the appellant invested heavy amount for arrangement of the container, trailers, heavy machinery etc. Besides the other staff to manage the affairs of the business which investment of the appellant will be ruined, if the injunction is not allowed has equally no force as referred to above, the container, trailers, machinery etc. Is the assets of the principal and also by virtue of clause 2.04 of the standard agency agreement, the staff of the appellant was the responsibility of respondent No,1 and the appellant by consent of the respondent No,1 was authorized to appoint staff and agreement also provide the payment of salaries to the staff from the income of the business, therefore it is hardly enough to say that the appellant arranged the heavy container/machinery as well as staff to promote the shipping business. The appellant has therefore not established on the basis of the material available on record that he arranged the container, trailer, machinery, staff etc. On his own funds to promote the business of respondent No,
1. The learned Single Judge has also taken note of all these facts while considering the injunction applications filed by the appellant.
21. The agreement admittedly provide the conditions regarding termination of the authority of the appellant viz. Clause 8 of the agency agreement dated 1-11-1982 and clause 9.01 of standard agency agreement dated 1-12-1996 and by virtue of both the said clauses of the agreements, 90 days' time has been agreed in between the parties to terminate the agreement by serving a notice in writing. The respondent No,1 admittedly terminated agreement vide termination letter dated 19- 12-2007 which was sent to the appellant through E-mail which followed the service of same notice through courier. The authority of the appellant has therefore been cancelled/terminated by respondent No,
1. The principal admittedly have authority to terminate the authority of an agent in the following circumstances:-
(i) by the principal revoking his authority;
(ii) by the agent renouncing the business of the agency;
(iii) by the business of the agency being completed; by neither the principal or agent dying or becoming of unsound mind;
(v) by either the principal or agent being adjudicated an insolvent under the provisions of any Act for the time being in force for the relief of insolvent debtors;
(vi) by expiry of the period of agency, if any;
(vii) by the destruction of a material part of the subject matter of the agency;
(viii) the happening of any event which renders the agency unlawful or upon the happening of which, it is agreed between the principal and the agent that, the authority shall determine; or
(ix) by dissolution of the principal, where the principal is a firm or a company or other corporation.
22. ' Thus there could be no cavil to the proposition that the principal has always ample power to rescind, revoke or alter the authority of agent provided any one or more of afore-stated conditions are available to the principal to amend, alter, rescind, vary or cancel the authority of the agent.
23. Prof. SC Srivastava, in his book Law of Agency, III Edition at page 757 while discussing the nature of authority of the agent coupled with the interest, has observed, as under:- "Where the agent's authority is by deed, or for valuable consideration, or for the purpose of effectuating any security, or of protecting or securing any interest of the agent, it is irrevocable during the subsistence of any, such security or interest. This is known as agency coupled with interest. But it is not irrevocable merely because the agent has an interest in the exercise of it."
24. ' The learned counsel for the appellant has heavily relied upon the section 202 of the Contract Act, which for the sake of convenience is reproduced herein below:- "202. Termination of agency where agent has an interest in subject matter.--Where the agent has himself an interest in the property which forms the subject matter of the agency, the agency cannot, in the absence of any express contract, be terminated to the prejudice of such interest."
25. A perusal of section, 202, ibid provides that the authority of the agent could not be terminated or cancelled or revoked, if it provides any interest in the agreement except by way of specific mention in the said agreement. As discussed above, it can only be said that the agent has any interest in the agreement when it is specifically provided in the agreement executed in between the parties and in case, if such interest amongst the parties have, if provided in the agreement only then, it could be said that the agent has interest in the agency and in that case, the provisions of section 202 of Contract Act are applicable, but in our humble opinion, the contents of both the agreements executed in between the parties do not provide any clause containing the interest of the agent in the agency, therefore, the provisions of section 202 of the Contract Act are inapplicable.
26. The learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently contended that the interest of the parties in the agency could be gathered from the intention of the principal and for that purpose he referred to the meetings held in the office of respondent No,1 at Singapore, where respondent No,1 allegedly appreciated the efficient efforts and functioning of the appellant and offered joint venture in the agency and for that purpose, the appellant was asked to provide necessary working paper and has drawn our attention to the profile dated 9th March, 2007 sent by respondent No,1 through E mail vide Annexure `D' which shows that the respondent No,1 asked to the appellant to provide joint venture J/C proposal ASAD. The said profile was acknowledged by the appellant and the appellant sent working paper to respondent No,1 through E mail dated 10-3-2007 vide Annexure thereafter as per case of the appellant, respondent remained silent and did not respond. It is, therefore, admitted position that simply the respondent No,1 asked to the appellant to provide working paper for joint venture which he provided thereafter there was status quo amongst the parties over the further development in the matter as such it could not be said that there was joint venture amongst the parties, which creates interest of the appellant in the agency. The record available before us, is therefore, completely silent to show that there was any express or implied conduct of the parties to convert the agency agreement into the interest in the agency in favour of the appellant. The learned Single Judge while considering the applications for injunction has taken into consideration all the facts and developments borne out during the course of subsistence of the agency agreement and standard agency agreement till its termination by respondent No,1.
27. Admittedly the agreements provide the termination of agreement by service of 90 days' notice on either side but the termination letter was abruptly issued by respondent No,1 on 17th December, 2007 received by appellant through E mail on 19-12-2007 which shows that advance notice of 90 days has not been served by respondent No,1 on the appellant nor the appellant was heard by respondent No,1 prior to termination of agency agreement which could be treated as illegal but the said point requires evidence before the learned Single Judge and the said sole ground could not be considered as sufficient to grant injunction in favour of the appellant. In case, if the authority of the appellant has been revoked, cancelled or terminated by respondent No,1 the appropriate remedy available to him to claim damages against respondents which may be appropriate and efficacious remedy available to him.
28. ' Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on the case of State of Punjab v. Inder Singh, (supra), wherein the petition for promotion as officiating Sub-Inspector on ad hoc basis during the probationary period was under consideration before the Honourable Supreme Court of India, which is not a point involved in the case in hand.
29. ' In the case of Messrs. Om Prokash Paiwal and another, (supra), Learned Single Judge of Calcutta High Court while dealing with the provisions of sections 201 to 204 of the Indian Contract Act was pleased to observe that the termination of the agreement in that case was illegal for the reasons that most of the terms and conditions of the agreement were unreasonable and irrational and one sided, which is not the case in hand for the reasons that standard agency agreement and agency agreement were executed in between the parties by their mutual consent.
30. ' In the case of J.K. Sayani, (supra), the learned D.B. Of Madras High Court, while dealing in the similar circumstances was pleased to observe that when the contract of agency does not speak about the fixed period of agency, the termination or revocation of agency by the principal without notice renders him liable to pay compensation. The said observations are completely against the case of the appellant and support the case of respondents.
31. ' In the case of Pakistan Automobile Corporation Ltd., (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court was pleased to observe that, in case, if the agency agreement is coupled with the interest, the Court is obliged to grant interim injunction but the dictum laid down in the aforesaid case of Pakistan Automobiles Corporation, in our humble opinion are not attracted for the reason that the agency agreement or standard agency agreement amongst the parties in the present case does not speak about the interest the agency. The other case-law relied upon the learned counsel for the appellant, in our humble opinion are also distinguishable to the circumstances of the present case and are inapplicable.
32. ' Learned counsel for respondent No,1 has heavily relied upon the case of Bolan Beverages (Pvt.)
33. Ltd., (supra), wherein the Honourable Supreme Court while considering the effect of section 21-G of Contract Act was pleased to observe that where the contract between the parties involving continuous duty extending over a period longer than three years cannot be specifically enforced, therefore the issuance of injunction would not be in the interest of justice simply because of non- issuance thereof would cause inconvenience. In the present case admittedly standard agency agreement has been executed by the parties for an indefinite period therefore the dictum laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Bolan Beverages (Pvt.) Ltd. (supra) is applicable.
34. ' Learned counsel for respondent No,1 has also relied upon the case of Muhammad Aref Effendi, (supra), wherein, the Honourable Supreme Court while considering the scope of section 202 of Contract Act in juxtaposition with Order IX, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. Was pleased to observe that these are substantial questions of law and facts and since they involved a careful study and scrutiny after leading of appropriate evidence, therefore, the High Court was not justified to refuse grant of temporary injunction. With these observations, the Honourable Supreme Court was pleased to set aside the order thereby refusing injunction in favour of the respondents. The observation made by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Muhammad Aref Effendi, (supra), is also applicable to the circumstances of the present case.
35. ' In the case of Pakistan Paper Corporation Ltd., (supra), it has been observed that the mandatory injunction cannot be issued as an interim relief under Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2 read with section 151, C.P.C. Which could only be allowed by recording evidence of the parties. The case-law relied upon by the learned counsel for respondent No,1 also supports his case.
36. After appraisal of whole material available before us and case-law on the subject, we are of the considered opinion that neither the prima facie case has been made out by the appellant nor balance of inconvenience lies in his favour nor he will suffer irreparable loss or injury, in case, if injunction is refused, as he can claim compensation or damages in the final event.
37. Before parting with the judgment, we may point out that the appellant has filed the present appeal against the dismissal of his injunction application and it is the requirement of the appeal to file the true copy of impugned order along with appeal but we find that the appellant has not filed true copies of impugned order and has filed photocopy of the impugned order, which, in our humble opinion is an inherent defect in appeal itself, as such the appeal is also not maintainable on this score.
38. For the aforesaid reasons, we find that the order impugned does not suffer from any illegality so as to interfere in it. The appeals have, therefore, no merit and the same are hereby dismissed in limine.