1. ' This petition is directed against order dated 16th May, 1990 passed by respondent No, 1 Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and Authority under Payment of Wages Act. The facts relevant for decision of this petition are as follows:--- ' The petitioner is a company and the respondents Nos. 2 to 10 were serving in "Weaving Department" of the petitioner Textile Mill, which was closed on 14th July, 1984 and consequently their services were terminated in September, 1984. The respondents challenged the termination and learned Labour Court No,3, by order dated 27-7-1986, reinstated them in service without back benefits. It is alleged that the respondents failed to report for duty as per order referred to, above and they, resumed their duties on 7th January, 1987. The respondents, however, have maintained that they were not allowed to resume their duties. The petitioner again terminated their services w,e,f, 13th January, 1987 and learned Labour Court No, 3 by order dated 17-2-1988 'allowed the applications of the respondents and directed the petitioner to reinstate them with back benefits.
2. The petitioner preferred appeal against said order before learned Appellate Tribunal, which was dismissed in limine as per order dated 20-3-1988. Thereafter Constitution Petition bearing No, 784/88 was filed before this Court, which was allowed by a D.B. Of this Court, as per judgment announced on 21-4-1992. The respondents had filed applications before the authority under Payment of Wages Act, 1936, hereinafter called the Act, stating that they were entitled to wages from 6th August, 1986 to 6th January, 1987 as during that period they were not allowed to resume their duties by the petitioner. The authority by impugned order dated 16th May 1990 allowed them wages as follows:--- "In view of the above, the respondent is directed to deposit the wages of Rs, (?) in case No, 98/89
(15) Rs, 6,608, in case No, 99/89 (15) Rs,5,617, in case No, 100/89 (15) Rs, 5,807, in case No, 101/89 (15)
3. Rs, 7,044, in case No, 102/89 (15); Rs,8,904 in case No,103/89 (15). Rs, 5,807, in case No, 104/89/(15) Rs, 5,617, in case No, 105/89, Rs,8,128, in case No, 106/89 (15) Rs, 5,736 along with amount of compensation equal to ten times in each of the allowed amounts in each case within ten days time from the announcement of this order dated the 16th day of May, 1990."
4. ' Mr. Sulleman Habibullah, learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 2 to 9 has raised a preliminary objection about maintainability of this petition on the ground that section 17 of the Act provided appeal against the order passed by the authority and the petitioner, in spite of the fact that alternate remedy was available, has invoked Constitutional jurisdiction, as such, this petition is not maintainable. In support of this contention, he cited (1) 1990 PLC 357, Sultan Industries v. The Authority under Payment of Wages Act and another.
(2) 1990 PLC 316, Mechanised Construction of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation and Authority under Payment of Wages Act and another. (3) 1990 PLC 26, Ahmad Spinning Mills Ltd. v. Authority under Payment of Wages Act and others. The ratio of these cases is that purpose of Article 199 of the Constitution is not to nullify effect of legislative provisions or to make statutory provisions ineffective, and that where order was without jurisdiction but substantial justice had been done to the parties, it could not be challenged in Constitutional jurisdiction.
5. Meeting this objection, Mr. All Amjad, learned counsel for petitioner submitted that where the order, ex fade, is without lawful authority and of no legal effect, it can be challenged in Constitutional jurisdiction, despite the fact that alternate remedy was available. In support of this contention, he cited PLD 1982 Karachi 653, Shershah Industries Ltd. v. The Government of Sindh and 4 others. In this case a D.B. Of this Court, after referring the case-law on above point, observed as follows:--- "A review of the case-law referred to hereinabove shows that in certain cases the superior Courts of our country did not allow the petitioners to invoke the writ jurisdiction on the ground of availability of an alternate remedy by way of appeal or otherwise, but on the other hand, in other cases, notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal or availability of an alternate remedy, the Courts did not hesitate to exercise such writ jurisdiction and in fact granted relief to the petitioners.
6. It may be expressed as a generally accepted principle, however, that just because an alternate remedy by way of appeal or otherwise is available to a petitioner the High Courts will invariably decline to exercise their extraordinary Constitutional jurisdiction. The mere availability of an alternate remedy does not debar the High Courts from exercising such jurisdiction. But, as observed by Dorab Patel, J. In Hasan Ali v. Muhammad Ahsan Baloch 1980 CLC 412, the question whether a writ should be entertained when an alternate remedy is available is always one within the discretion of the Court. In cases of total lack or absence of jurisdiction or authority, or apparent excess of jurisdiction, the Courts generally would not hesitate much in entertaining a Constitutional petition although an alternate remedy may well be available. In other cases, the Courts, would generally direct the party to avail and exhaust the alternate remedies available first before entertaining the writ, if in the opinion of the Courts the alternate remedy is an adequate remedy."
7. ' It is evident, as will be shown in the succeeding paras. That the impugned order to the extent of granting compensation 10 times is contrary to law and it is an error apparent on the face of record resulting in manifest injustice to the petitioner. Therefore, the Constitution petition is maintainable and the preliminary objection is overruled.
8. ' This brings me to merits of the case. Under subsection (1) of set tion 15 of the Act, the authority is competent to hear and decide claims arising out of deduction from the wages or delay in the payment of wages. Under subsection (3) of section 15 of the Act, the authority is competent to direct the refund to the employed person of the amount deducted or to direct the payment of the delayed wages, together with payment of such compensation as the authority may think fit not extending 10 times the amount deducted in the former case and not exceeding 10 rupees in the latter.
9. There is a clear line of distinction between a case covered by deduction from wages and a case which relates to delay in payment of wages. In case of deduction from wages, the authority is competent to grant compensation to the extent of 10 times of the amount illegally deducted, while in case of 'delayed wages' only as a token a sum of Rs, 10 can be awarded as compensation.
10. ' The respondents have claimed wages from 6th August 1986 to 6th January, 1987 for the period they were not allowed to resume their duties. It is proved from record that during above period, they were restrained from joining their duties. They are entitled to their wages for above period and these wages would fall within the scope of 'delayed wages'. Mr. Ali Amjad, learned counsel for petitioner on this point cited 1988 PLC 648, Divisional Superintendent, Pakistan Railways, Karachi v.
11. Sindh Labour Court No, V, Karachi and 2 others. In this reported case, the petitioner had claimed running allowance and the authority had granted 'running allowance' plus 8 times additional amount as compensation. First Appellate Court modified aforesaid order and held that reasonable amount of compensation was two times only. The matter had come in Constitutional jurisdiction before this Court and it was held that it was a case of delay in payment of wages and only Rs, 10 could be granted as compensation. I fully agree with the above view and respectfully following the same hold that in the instant case 10 times compensation could not be granted to the respondents and the order of the authority to that extent is without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The respondents are, however, entitled to only wages for the aforesaid period as determined by the authority. They would also be entitled to Rs, 10 each.
12. ' In consequence, I allow the petition and declare that the order granting compensation equal to 10 times is without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The petititon stands disposed of in above terms with no order as to costs.