SHUJAAT ALI KHAN, J.--- Through this single judgment intend to decide this petition as well as those mentioned in Schedule-A, having commonality of law and facts inasmuch as petitions mentioned in Schedule- B have been filed against orders dated 26.04.2011 passed by the Authority under Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (hereinafter to be referred as the Authority), Lahore whereas petitions mentioned in Schedule-C have been moved against orders dated 20.07.2013, passed by the Authority at Lahore. Schedule-D consists of petitions in which the petitioners (hereinafter to be referred as "Bank Authorities") have challenged orders dated 04.08.2012 passed by the Authority at Gujranwala as well as judgments dated 18.05.2013 rendered by the Punjab Labour Court No.7, Gujranwala. In petitions mentioned in Schedule- E the Bank Authorities have called in question the legality of orders dated 12.09.2014 passed by the Authority at Gujranwala. Petitions mentioned in Schedule-F have been filed against orders, dated 30.11.2012, passed by the Authority at Lahore as well as judgment dated 29.11.2014 rendered by Punjab Labour Court No.1, Lahore. Writ Petition No.22964/2015 has been instituted challenging order dated 13.07.2015 passed by the Authority at Lahore.
2. Briefly put, the facts as slept out in these petitions are that the private respondents filed claims before the Authority under section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (hereinafter to be referred as the Act). The claims of the private respondents of Writ Petitions mentioned in Schedules D and F were, accepted by the Authority against which the Bank Authorities preferred appeals before the respective Labour Courts but without any success as the same were dismissed by the Labour Courts through different orders. Being aggrieved of the order of the Authority as well as of the Labour Courts in the said matters the Bank Authorities have filed the petitions under discussion.
' Writ Petition No.22964/2015 and those encapsulated in Schedules B, C and E have arisen out of orders passed on various dates by the Authority whereby the applications filed by the Bank Authorities for rejection of the claim of the private respondents, under Order VII, rule 11, C.P.C., were dismissed. Being dissatisfied with the orders of the Authority, the Bank Authorities have instituted afore-noted petitions.
3. The legal formulations, canvassed by Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate, representing the petitioners in petitions mentioned in Schedules B and C, can be summed up in the words that the Authority had no power to deal with the matter regarding ex-gratis grant; that duties of the Authority at various stations are being performed by persons who do not qualify for the post as postulated under section 15 of the Act; that according to the law laid down in the case of Sindh Employees' Social Security Institution and another v. Dawood Cotton Mills Ltd. (PLD 1977 SC 177), ex-gratia grant does not fall within the definition of wages as defined under section 2(vi) of the Act; that prior to taking cognizance of the matter every forum is bound to decide question of its jurisdiction and in case any forum assumes jurisdiction upon a matter, which otherwise does not fall within its jurisdiction, the same is a nullity in the eye of law. Relies on Muslimabad Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. v. Mrs. Siddiqa Faiz and another (PLD 2008 SC 135), Hafiz Muhammad Siddique Anwar v. Faisalabad Development Authority and others (2007 SCMR 1126), Farzand Raza Naqvi and 5 others v.
Muhammad Din through L.Rs and others (2004 SCMR 400) and Punjab Employees' Social Security Institution v. Messrs Pakistan Engineering Co. Ltd. (1998 PLC 93).
4. The legal points, formulated by Mr. Imran Aziz Khan, representing the petitioners in W.P.
No.22964/2015 as well as petitions mentioned in Schedules D, E and F are to the effect that ex- gratia grant does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Authority as it is not a vested right rather the same is a monetary benefit paid to an employee by the employer out of grace; that section 2(vi) of the Act deals with employees who are in service whereas the private respondents having been retrenched in the year 2006 were not entitled for any emoluments; that it was specifically pleaded before the forum/fora below that not only the claims filed by the private respondents were beyond the jurisdiction of the Authority but also the same were barred by law of limitation, however, the said points have neither been attended to by the Authority nor adverted to by the Presiding Officers of the respective Labour Courts; that private respondents having accepted emoluments pursuant to a settlement arrived at between the Bank Authorities and retrenched employees had no cheeks to move for a fresh claim; that when a matter on the face of it is barred by time, there is no question of recording of evidence rather the same deserves to be dismissed straightaway in view of the law laid down by the apex Court of the country in the case reported as Noor Din and another v. Additional District Judge, Lahore and others (2014 SCMR 513); that uncalled for conduct of the private respondents is manifest from the fact that some of them have filed similar claims at different places and even in some of them they have succeeded to get relief from the Authority; that the package announced for retrenched employees was confined only to regular employees whereas the private respondents being daily wagers were not entitled for the same; that filing of claim by the private respondents after final settlement amounts to approbation and reprobate; that as a result of settlement between the parties the private respondents executed undertakings with the bereavements that they shall withdraw all the cases pending before different fora but despite having received the emoluments under the said settlement they are still hotly pursing their matters; that some of the private respondents moved for regularization of their services before the Labour Court but their Grievance Petition was dismissed, which order having not been set aside by any forum they cannot claim that they were regular employees of the Bank at the time of retrenchment. Relies on Government of Pakistan through Director General, Ministry of Interior, Islamabad and others (2011 SCMR 1), Muhammad Din and others v. Jamal Din and others (2007 SCMR 1091), Pakistan Railways v. Shaukat Ali Hamdani and others (1996 PLC 595), General Manager, Pakistan Railways and another v. Anwar Ahmed Khan and others (1995 SCMR 810), Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem (1994 SCMR 2213), Independent Newspapers Corporation (Pvt.) Ltd. And another v. Chairman, Fourth Wage Board and Implementation Tribunal for Newspaper Employees, Govt. Of Pakistan, Islamabad and 2 others (1993 SCMR 1533), Pir Bakhsh through L.Rs.- v. The Chairman, Allotment Committee and others (PLD 1987 SC 145), Sindh Employees Social Security Institution and another (Supra), Haji All Khan and Company, Abbottabad and 8 others v. Messrs Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. Abbottabad (PLD 1975 SC 362), Gouranga Mohan Sikdar v. The Controller of Import and Export and 2 others (PLD 1966 SC 357), Nagina Silk Mill, Lyallpur v. The Income Tax Officer, A-Ward Lyallpur etc. (PLD 1963 SC 322), Lt. Col. Nawabzada Muhammad Amir Khan v. The Controller of Estate Duty etc. (PLD 1961 SC 119), Telephone Industries of Pakistan (Pvt.) Ltd. Through Managing Director and another v. Commissioner Workmens' Compensation, Hazara Division at Haripur and another (2012 PLC 155), United Bank Ltd. Through Manager v. Banking Mohtasib Pakistan and another (2006 CLD 1226), 'Vial Hussain v. Zeal Pak Cement Factory through Managing Director (2006 PLC 597), Abdul Latif and 103 others v. General Manager, Pakistan Railways and 2 others (2003 PLC 297), Muhammad Aslam and another v. Commissioner, Workmen's Compensation and another (2000 PLC 268), Messrs HALCROW-ULG, Engineering Consultants, PAT Feeder Canal Rehabilitation and Improvement Project, WAPDA and others v. The "Authority" under the Payment of Wages Act, Quetta and others (1999 PLC 362), Municipal Corporation, Sialkot through the Administrator v. Younis Masih and others (1998 PLC 336), Layllpur Textile Mills Ltd. Through its Manager, Tando Muhammad Khan v. The Authority Under Payment of Wages Act, Directorate of Labour Welfare, Hyderabad and another (1996 PLC 610), M/s Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd. And others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others (PLD 1996 Lahore 672), M/s Hafiz Textile Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation and Authority under Payment of Wages Act, West Division, Amil Colony, Karachi and 9 others (PLD 1993 Karachi 709), Ziarat Gul v. Qadar Gul and 7 others (PLD .1989 Peshawar 14), Abdul Hakim Warsi v. Chief Executive, Independent Newspapers Corporation Ltd. And 3 others (1986 PLC 760 Quetta), Pakistan through Chairman, Pakistan Railway Board, Lahore v. Maqsood Ali and 82 others (1981 PLC 307), Shaukat Ali and others v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan through the General Manager, North Western Railway, Lahore (PLD 1960 (W.P.) Lahore 144), Mir Liaq Ali and others v. Syed Muhammad Jafari (PLD 1959 (W.P.) Karachi 704), Chairman Pakistan Railway v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal etc. (2001 PLC 618), Saddar-ud-Din v. Division Superintendent, Pakistan Railways (1989 PLC 508), Ch. Ghulam Muhammad v. WAPDA etc. (1984 PLC 363) and Muhammad Ikram v. Mis S. Muhammad Din and Sons Ltd. Lahore (1970 PLC 15).
5. Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate representing private respondents in some of the petitions, submits that the Bank Authorities, earlier in the year 2010, filed an application, under Order VII rule 11, C.P.C., for, rejection of claim of the private respondents, however, later on the Bank Authorities consented that the fate of the said application be decided along with the main case thus they were debarred to file the subsequent applications for the self-same relief as the same were not proceed able in view of the principle of res-subjunctive. To fortify his contention, learned counsel has referred to order, dated 03.08.2010, passed by the Authority in the case titled as Muhammad ljaz V. RCE HBL Ltd. Further submits that the private respondents have filed claims pursuant to the judgment passed by apex Court of the country reported as Imtiaz Ali and another v. Habib Bank Ltd. (2011 SCMR 259) thus it is not a case of ex-gratis grant simplicity; that many persons, whose names were not included in the list presented before the august Supreme Court of Pakistan, during the course of hearing of aforesaid Human Rights case, have been granted ex- gratia grant; that a perusal of section 2(vi) of the Act shows that wages include any amount due; that in view of the law laid down in the case reported as Syed Match Co. Ltd. Through Managing Director v. Authority Under Payment of Wages Act and others (2003 SCMR 1493) point of limitation, being mixed question of law and facts, cannot be decided without recording of evidence, hence, no illegality has been committed by the Authority while turning down request of the Bank Authorities for rejection of claims filed by the private respondents; that in some of the petitions the Bank Authorities have directly assailed order of the Authority in Constitutional petitions which are not maintainable for the reason that against an order of the Authority, remedy of appeal has been provided under section 17 of the Act; that as per Syed Match Co. Ltd. Through Managing Director (Supra) when alternate remedy is available Constitutional petition before this Court is barred; that if the petitions filed by the Bank Authorities directly before this Court challenging order of the Authority, are entertained there would be a flood gate as everybody would try to bypass the statutory remedy of appeal provided under section 17 ibid and that the applications submitted by the Bank Authorities under Order VII, rule 11, C.P.C. Were not accompanied by requisite affidavits.
Relies on Govt. Of Punjab through Secretary Education, Civil Secretariat, Lahore and others v.
Sameena Parveen and others (2009 SCMR 1).
6. Mian Muhammad Zulqarnain, Advocate representing the private respondents in number of petitions, while toeing the line of Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate submits that labour laws ensures protection of minimum wages of a workman and the same being beneficial legislation should be broadly construed; that not only the remedy of appeal, provided under section 17 ibid has been bypassed by the Bank Authorities but also they have not availed remedy of revision before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal against orders of the Labour Courts; hence these petitions are not maintainable; that as a matter of fact the Bank Authorities just to avoid deposit of rectal amount, as mandated under section 17 ibid, have chosen to invoke the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court; that while deciding applications filed under Order VII rule 11, C.P.C. The Authority had to look into the contents of the claim filed by the private respondents alone, no illegality has been committed by the Authority while turning down request of the Bank Authorities in that regard and that the judgment of apex Court of the country, referred to by Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate, being a verdict in rem was applicable to all the retrenched employees irrespective of their status. Relies on Kashif Zafar v. Postmaster General and others (2013 SCMR 726), Mehar Muhammad Nawaz v. Managing Director, Small Business Finance Corporation and 2 others (2009 SCMR 187), Mughal Surgical (Pvt.) Ltd. And others v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No.7 and others (2005 PLC 364), Syed Match Co. Ltd. Through Managing Director (Supra), Abdul Samad and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others (2002 SCMR 71), lzhar Ahmed Khan and another v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and others (2000 PLC 199), Muhammad Woe v. Ministry of Education through Secretary Education, Govt. Of Pakistan, Islamabad and others (2013 PLC (C.S.) 545), M/s Duty Free Shops Ltd. v. Irshad Butt and another (2013 PLC 313), M/s Lone China (Pvt.) Ltd. Gujranwila v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No. 7, Gujranwala and 2 others (2011 PLC 37), Muhammad Riaz v. Pakistan Railways and others (2011 PLC 214), Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. Through Attorney v. Ghulam Haider and others (2005 PLC 320), Saadi Cement Ltd. Through Chairman and another v. Fazal-e-Qadir and another (2002 PLC 253), Town Committee, Chowinda V. Arrora Mash and others (2000 PLC 181) and Punjab Employees'
Social Security Institution v. M/s Pakistan Engineering Co. Ltd. (1998 PLC 93).
7. Sardar Muhammad Iqbal Athar Khan Khitran, Advocate representing private respondents in some of the petitions, in addition to adopting the arguments advanced by M/s Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal and Mian Muhammad Zulqarnain, Advocates, argues that it was publicly announced that every retrenched employee would receive more than Rs. 10,00,000/- but afterwards the Bank Authorities did not fulfill their commitment; that on expiry of nine months a workman becomes permanent on account of operation of law and there is no question of issuance of formal order by the competent authority; that if the respondents were daily wagers there was no necessity for the Bank Authorities to issue retrenchment letters at their respective places of posting; that though it has been mandated under section 15 ibid that a person should be appointed as Authority having qualification/experience of judicial officer but different officers from the Labour Department have been appointed as Authority under the Act since its promulgation in the year 1936, thus, no exception can be taken against appointment of different officers from Labour department as Authority; that undertaking relied upon by the Bank Authorities being silent about the number of the case and the forum, same cannot be used against the respondents; that vested rights of the citizens cannot be allowed to be taken away by way of illegal contracts; that no illegality has been pointed out by the learned counsel representing the Bank Authorities on the part of fora below, thus, no exception can be taken to the impugned verdicts and that the order of the Authority having been upheld by the Labour Courts, the question regarding jurisdiction of the Authority has beceme immaterial.
8. In rebuttal, Hafiz Tariq Nasim, Advocate argues that stance of the respondents that they have not claimed anything on the basis of ingratiate grant stands negated from the contents of the Grievance Notice, available at Page No.7 of this petition; that the said fact has also been incorporated by the Bank Authorities in their applications filed under Order VII, rule 11, C.P.C.; that as case of specific class of retrenched employees was taken up by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan, the said judgment being in persona cannot be stretched unnecessarily for the benefit the private respondents and that the plea of Sardar Muhammad Iqbal Athar khan Khitran, Advocate regarding appointment of different officers from Labour Department as Authority since 1936 cannot be blessed with stamp of authenticity for the reason that when law requires a particular act to be done through a specific way the same should not be deviated.
9. While exercising his right of rebuttal, Mr. Imran Aziz Khan Advocate submits that since there were two categories of employees viz. Regular and daily wagers, there was no question of discrimination as alleged by learned counsel for the respondents; that the question of jurisdiction should be decided by the forum concerned irrespective of the fact whether the same is agitated before it or not; that the issue of limitation having not been discussed either by the Authority or the Punjab Labour Court, their verdicts cannot be allowed to hold the field even for a moment; that after execution of undertaking the respondents could not claim anything as the same amounts to blow hot and cold in the same breath; that the Bank being trans-provincial establishment is not covered under Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, rather any matter arising out of terms and conditions of its employees is to be decided under the provisions of Industrial Relations Act, 2012 (IRA, 2012), thus, the plea of the respondents that the remedy of revision has not been availed by the Bank Authorities prior to approaching this Court has no substance at all; that misuse of powers by the Authority is manifest from the fact that the respondents in W.P. No.22964/2015 succeeded to file claim before the Authority despite the fact that Writ Petition of the Bank Authorities against the same amount was admitted by this Court; that unscrupulous litigants should not be left unbridled to burden the public institutions with unnecessary litigation and that the Authority working in North Zone Lahore has already declared that it has no jurisdiction to hear a claim relating to ex-gratia grant.
10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable length and have also gone through the documents annexed with these petitions in addition to the case-law cited at the bar.
11. Firstly taking up the plea of learned counsel representing private respondents that the respondents are entitled for emoluments including ex-gratia grant on the strength of judgment of the apex Court of the country reported as Imtiaz All and another (Supra) I am of the view that to appreciate the said contention a perusal of the referred judgment is of paramount consideration; hence relevant portion thereof is reproduced herein below:- "This Human Right Case initiated on the application of Imtiaz Ali and Sabit Khan, former employees of the Habib Bank Limited, (hereinafter referred to as "Bank") pertains to the retrenchment of 2343 employees of the Bank, made pursuant to a Retrenchment Scheme for "all Manual/Non-Clerical Employees" of the Bank, dated 13-2-2006 The Bank eventually agreed to pay an additional sum of Rs.820,050 million as ex-gratia payment to the 2343 employees retrenched under the Bank's Order dated 10-3-2006 at the rate of Rs. 350,000 per retrenched employee." (emphasis provided)
A cursory glance over the afore-quoted portion of the judgment of august Supreme Court of Pakistan renders it crystal clear that the same was confined only to 2343 retrenched employees of the Bank serving against manual/non-clerical posts, thus, the same cannot unnecessarily be stretched to the private respondents. Further, as no question of law was decided by the apex Court of the country in the afore-referred judgment, the same cannot be used for the benefit of the respondents on the ground that a verdict of the apex court of the country deciding a question of law applies to all and sundry irrespective of the fact that a person was party to it or not.
12. There are three categories of petitions viz, in one set of petitions (Schedule-C) the Bank Authorities have challenged the orders of the Authority whereby it refused to decide the application of the Bank Authorities challenging its jurisdiction to entertain claims of the private respondents. In second set of petitions (Schedules B, E and W.P. No.22964/2015) the Bank Authorities have assailed the orders of the Authority whereby either the applications filed by the Bank Authorities for rejection of claims of the private respondents have been dismissed with the observation that the question of jurisdiction would be decided according to the issues framed or while dismissing the applications filed by the Bank Authorities, under Order VII, rule 11, C.P.C., for rejection of claim of the private respondents ordered for deposit of the rectal amount. The third category of petitions (Schedules D and F) has arisen out of the judgment of the Labour Courts whereby the orders of the Authority towards acceptance of the claims of the private respondents were upheld.
13. Firstly, taking up the petitions figured in Schedule-C, I have noted that though an application was moved by the Bank Authorities for rejection of the claim of the private respondents but instead of deciding the same the Authority kept it pending with the observation that the same was moved at belated stage. I am constrained to hold that it has been decided by the apex Court of the country in number of cases that prior to decision of the main us the miscellaneous applications should be decided first. Reference in this regard can safely be made to the cases reported as Muhammad Umer v. Muhammad Qasim and another (1991 SCMR 1232) and Amina Begum and others v. Mehar Ghulam Dastard (PLD 1978 SC 220). According to Article 189 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, a decision of the apex Court of the country deciding a question of law is binding on all organs of State and the Authority is no exception. Since the orders passed by the Authority offend against the clear cut law declared by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan they deserve to be sacked irrespective of any objection regarding maintainability of these petitions by the private respondents.
14. Now coming to second category of petitions (Schedules B, E and W.P. No.22964/2015), I am of the view that the same can be sub categorized in two categories viz. In Writ Petitions mentioned in Schedule-B, Bank Authorities have challenged orders of the Authority dismissing their applications filed under Order VII, rule 11, C.P.C. On the ground that since issue regarding jurisdiction of the Authority was already there those were not maintainable. In second category of cases (Writ Petition No.22964/2015 and those mentioned in Schedule-E) the Bank Authorities have called in question the vires of orders of the Authority whereby while dismissing the applications filed by the Bank Authorities under Order VII, rule 11, C.P.C. They have been directed to deposit the decretal amount. The crucial objection raised by the private respondents against these petitions is that these are not maintainable as the Bank Authorities have alternate remedy of appeal under section 17 ibid against the orders impugned in these petitions. In this regard, I am of the view that in ordinary course when an alternate remedy is available to a person he cannot approach this Court through a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, however, at the same time this Court is fully competent to take care of any order passed by a forum below especially in respect of its jurisdiction as held in the case of M/s Akhtar Textile Industries Ltd. v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and 4 others (2014 PLC 319) irrespective of the bar of alternate remedy. Even otherwise, according to the cases referred to by Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate the Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court cannot be abridged on the ground of availability of alternate remedy. If for the sake of arguments it is presumed that this Court while deciding fate of the petitions filed against order of the Labour Courts comes to the conclusion that the Authority had no jurisdiction to entertain claim of the private respondents then fate of petitions comprising Schedules D and F would automatically stand decided, thus, it is not appropriate to dismiss petitions comprising Schedules B, E and W.P. No.22964/2015 while entertaining those consisting Schedules D and F especially when in pith and substance moot question in all these petitions is identical.
' Further, a perusal of section 17 ibid renders it clear that an appeal has only been provided against decision of the Authority under section 15(3) or 15(4) of the Act. To me, the decision on applications of the Bank .Authorities filed under Order VII, rule 11, C.P.C., being not final in nature, does not fall within the category of orders that can be challenged in an appeal under section 17 ibid. In this regard my view ID stands fortified with judgments reported as M/s Inter trade v. Faisal and 2 others (2011 PLC 208) and ARAG Industries Ltd. v. Payment of Wages Act Authority etc. (1982 PLC 567). In the former case it has inter-alia been observed as under:- "However as far as order dated 27-6-2009 is concerned, it is not an order under section 15(3) or 15(4). It was order on an application for recalling order for which the provision is made in Rule 8 of the Payment of Wages (Procedure) Rules, 1937. It is nowhere provided in section 17 or in the Rules that if an application for recalling order is decided by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, it would be appealable before the Labour Court. The Legislature has not provided any appeal against allowing or rejection of application for recalling and order, therefore if application for recalling is decided by the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act, such decision cannot be challenged in appeal under section 17 because it is not a decision under section 15(3) or 15(4) and since no remedy is provided against such a decision on application for recalling the order writ petition would be maintainable." (emphasis provided)
15. Now adverting to third category of cases (Schedules D and F), I have observed that though the Bank Authorities agitated the question regarding limitation before the Authority as well as the Labour Court but the same has not been dilated upon by the fora below. The Authority mainly accepted the claim of the private respondents while treating them as regular employees. It has been settled by now that a disputed question regarding status of an employee cannot be determined by the Authority rather for the purpose the employee has to approach the forum concerned. There is no cavil with the preposition that a person who serves against a permanent post for nine months, he assumes the status of a permanent workman but at the same time when the employees admitted that on the date of retrenchment they were serving on daily wages, the Authority traveled beyond its jurisdiction while holding the private respondents as permanent workmen. The said point has also not been considered by the fora below, thus, their verdicts cannot be blessed with blanket of authenticity.
' So far as objection of learned counsel representing private respondents qua availability of remedy of revision before Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal against orders passed by the respective Labour Courts is concerned, firstly after repeal of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, the said remedy is no more available and secondly the Bank Authorities being a trans-provincial establishment could not approach Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal as its jurisdiction was ousted in terms of section 57(2)(b) of IRA, 2012 which has further been elaborated by apex Court of the country in case reported as Pakistan Telecommunication Company Ltd. v. Member NIRC and others (2014 SCMR 535).
16. The next question which requires determination by this Court is as to whether ex-gratia payment falls within the definition of wages as defined under section 2(vi) of the Act. In my humble opinion for determination of this question a perusal of said provision would be conducive which for facility of reference is reproduced herein below:-- "2. Definitions.-- In this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,- (i).............................................................................................................................................................................
(vi) "wages" means all remuneration, capable of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable, whether conditionally upon the regular attendance, good work or conduct or other behavior of the person employed, or otherwise, to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment, and includes any bonus or other additional remuneration of the nature aforesaid which would be so payable and any sum payable to such person by reason of the termination of his employment, but does not include
(a) the value of any house accommodation, supply of light, water, medical attendance or other amenity, or of any service excluded by general or special order of the Provincial Government;
(b) any contribution paid by the employer to any pension fund or provident fund;
(c) any travelling allowance or the value of travelling concession;
(d) any sum paid to the person employed to defray special expenses entailed on him by the nature of his employment; or
(e) any gratuity payable on discharge."
According to the afore-quoted provision the amount of ex-gratis grant is not included in wages, however, the learned counsel representing private respondents has argued that the said amount is covered under "any sum payable". To resolve this issue definition of word "ex-gratis" in different lexicons is of vital importance which for convenience of reference is reproduced herein below:-- ' Black's Law Dictionary 10th Edition: "Made as a favour or gift, and not because of any legal duly; not legally necessary."
' P Ramanatha Aiyar's Advanced Law Lesicon, 4th Edition, Volume 2, LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa, Nagpur: "A phrase used to describe a payment made not because the payer is legally obliged to make it; but because of considerations of equity.
' Out of grace; as a matter of grace, favour, or indulgence; gratuitous. A term applied to anything accorded as a favour; as distinguished from that which may be demanded ex debito, as a matter of right.
' As a matter of grace or favour.
' Describing a payment made in thanks, such as a tip or golden handshake payment to a retiring employee. Most ex-gratia payments are tax free.
' The word "ex gratia" in a promise to pay do not carry a necessary or even probable implication that the agreement is to be without legal effect."
' The Chambers Dictionary, 12th Edition, Page 540 "As an act of grace; given or made as a favour, not out of obligation, and with not acceptance of liability, as ex gratia payment."
' Encyclopaedia Law Dictionary By Dr. A R Biswas 3rd Edition 2008 At Page 632 "Out of grace; gratuitous; as a matter of favour."
"The term "ex gratia" is defined as a favour rather than from an obligation (especially legal) obligation".
' Collins English Dictionary 12th Edition 2014 At Page 688 "Given as a favour or gratuitously where no legal obligation exists; an ex gratis payment [New Latin, literally: out of kindness."
' Further, the term ex-gratia came under discussion before the apex Court of the country in the case of Sindh Employees' Social Security Institution and another (Supra) wherein the same has been defined as under:- "For the foregoing reasons, we are in agreement with the view taken by the High Court that the ex gratis payments made during the days of the stoppage of work in June and July 1972 did not fall within the definition of the term 'wages' as contained in the Ordinance. Accordingly, the employers were under no obligation to pay social security contributions in respect of these payments."
' A perusal of afore-quoted definitions coupled with the judgment of apex Court of the country makes it abundantly clear that ex-gratis grant is an amount paid by the employer out of grace or good will. Though the learned counsel representing the private respondents has tried to argue that the definition of ex-gratis as contained in the afore-quoted judgment is not applicable in the present matters for the reason that the same was discussed in context with the provisions of the West Pakistan Employees Social Security Ordinance, 1966 but I do not find myself in agreement with them for the reason that when the ex-gratia grant cannot be claimed as of right, it carries the same meaning even in a matter filed under the provisions of the Act. Moreover, afore-quoted provision of section 2(vi) ibid clarifies that wages include all remuneration which would, if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable, whether conditionally upon the regular attendance, good work or conduct or other behavior of the person employed.
There is nothing on record to show that there was any express or implied contract between the Bank Authorities and the private respondents that a particular amout
17. A cursory survey of the orders impugned in the petitions mentioned in Schedule-B shows that the applications on would be paid to the employees of the Bank as ingratiate grant, same cannot considered as part of wages.
' It is also important to observe over here that amount payable means anything which was due on account of any legal /vested right expressed or implied but ex-gratia grant being discretionary in nature cannot be claimed as of right.f the Bank Authorities, filed under Order VII, rule 11, C.P.C., were dismissed for the reason that the private respondents did not file their claim on the basis of ex- gratia grant. The said observation of the Authority stands nullified from the contents of the Grievance Notices on the basis whereof the private respondents filed their claims wherein while admitting that they were serving as daily wagers on the date of retrenchment, the private respondents laid their claim on the basis of ex-gratis grant. In this situation, the reasons advanced by the Authority are not sustainable.
' The learned counsel representing the private respondents in the petitions mentioned in Schedule- E have argued that their claims were based on unpaid dues and they have nothing to do with the ex-gratia grant. To appreciate the said contention, a perusal of the following few lines from the operative part of order dated 12.09.2014, passed by the Labour Court, are worth consideration:-- "As a sequel to afore-mentioned facts, discussion and relying upon the judgment passed by the worthy Punjab Labour Court No.2, Lahore titled Hafiz Shah Nawaz V. HBL, dated 17-03-2011, it is adduced that respondent/petitioner's is entitled to his claim as per orders of the Apex court.
Hence, a decree of Rs. 350000/- is awarded in favour of the respondent/ applicant.
Applicant/respondent is hereby directed to deposit the decree amount in this court within 30 days so that the same is transmitted to the respondent/applicant. File is consigned to record room after necessary completion. "(emphasis provided)
' A bare reading of the afore-quoted portion of the order of the Authority shows that the claim of the, private respondents in the said category of cases was accepted on the basis of judgment of the apex Court of the country rendered in the case of Imtiaz All and another (Supra). As discussed in the earlier paragraphs, 2343 retrenched employees of the Bank, excluding the private respondents in these petitions, were held entitled for grant of Rs.3,50,000/- each as ex-gratia grant on account of a compromise arrived at between the parties. It is indubitably clear that the amount awarded by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan was exgratia grant and the claim decreed in favour of private respondents by the AuthorAuthority under section 15 ibid.
18. So far as the objection of private respondents regarding filing of an earlier application under Order VII, rule 11, C.P.C. By the Bank Authorities and their subsequent consent for its decision along with the main case is concerned, I am of the view that any consent given by the Bank Authorities did not confer jurisdiction upon the Authority as even consent of parties does not bestow jurisdiction upon a court, authority or tribunal especially when the same otherwise is not available to it. In this regard, I stand guided by the verdicts of the august Supreme Court of Pakistan rendered in the case of Najm Koreshi v. Chase Manhattan Bank Now Muslim Commercial Limited, Lahore and others (2015 SCMR 1461) wherein it has inter-aity cannot be considered anything else but ex-gratia grant which in my opinion being not part of the wages as contemplated under section 2(vi) ibid was not amenable to the jurisdiction of the lia been observed as under:- ""' Indeed consent of parties alone cannot reopen closed proceedings nor satisfy legal conditions predicating the exercise of jurisdiction by a Court of law..."
' Moreover, though the Bank Authorities made a statement before the Authority for decision of their application along with the main case but in presence of afore-quoted judgments of the apex court of the country the Authority was bound to decide the miscellaneous application of the Bank Authorities prior to deciding the main us irrespective of any ardly justifies dismissal of the applications filed by the Bank Authorities.
20. Insofar as contention of Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate that the application filed by the Bank Authorities for rejection of claim of the prconsent.
19. Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate has argued that in presence of the earlier applications of the Bank Authorities on the same subject, the applications, out of which the present petitions have emanated, were not maintainable. In this regard, I am of the view that if for the sake arguments it is presumed that the subsequent application of the Bank Authorities was not maintainable, at the most the private respondents could get the proceedings stayed by filing proper application under Section 10, C.P.C. But the said fact hivate respondents was not accompanied by requisite affidavit is concerned, suffice it to note that the application of the Bank Authorities having not been dismissed on the said ground, the said objection is of little importance here.
21. All the three counsel representing private respondents have unanimously adopted the plea that as the Bank Authorities has paid ingratiate grant to certain persons whose names were not included in the list of 2343 retrenched employees presented before the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan, they have been discriminated.#TS### In this regard, I am of the view that the said fact hardly makes a case of discrimination inasmuch as in view of discussion contained in afore- quoted paragraphs ex-gratia grant cannot be claimed as a matter of right rather it is an amount to be paid by the employer as a gift or grace. When the Bank Authorities were not obligated to pay ex-gratia to all the employees, payment of the same to the persons whose names were not included in the list presented before the apex court of country, does not provide any cause of action to the private respondents to file their claims before the Authority. Further, the question of discrimination can only be pressed into service when similarly placed persons are treated differently and reasonable classification permissible under the ambit of law does not constitute discrimination.
22. Sardar Muhammad Iqbal Athar Khan Khitran Advocate, representing some of the private respondents, while producing certain press clippings, has argued that the private respondents are entitled to receive. Rs.10,00,000/- each as promised by the Bank. Though press clippings are valid piece of evidence but when the same are not supported by any order of the competent authority it is not safe to rely on them. Despite repeated queries, learned counsel for the private respondents has failed to refer to any document where-under the Bank Authorities promised to pay certain amount to retrenched employees especially those who were working on daily wages. Thus, the said assertion cannot be taken as a gospel truth.
23. It is imperative to note that in most of the cases, the private respondents in lieu of a settlement received certain amounts. After receiving the amounts under the said settlement the private respondents were debarred to lodge any subsequent claim. Though it has been contended on behalf of the private respondents that the amounts subject matter of the claims from the Authority were other than those received by the private respondents under the settlement but have not specifically denied the said settlement. Further, the learned counsel representing the private respondents have argued that a contract taking away the guaranteed rights of a person cannot be given any weight age. The said plea of the private respondents is worthless for the reason that after acceptance of monetary benefits under the same settlement without any observation, they have no cheeks to question its validity at this juncture. There is nothing on record to show that the private respondents promptly moved the quarter concerned agitating that either the undertakings were result of undue influence or the same were got executed against their vested rights.
24. Learned counsel representing private respondents in petitions which have been filed against order of the Authority, mentioned in Schedules B, C and E and W.P. No.22964/2015, submits that since the point of limitation is mixed question of law and fact the same cannot be decided without recording evidence hence the order of the Authority is immune from interference by this Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction. In this regard, I do not find myself in agreement with the learned counsel for the reason that in routine when the question of limitation involves appreciation of certain facts recording of evidence can be ventured upon by the Court, however, when a lis on the face of it is barred by law of limitation same deserves to be dismissed straight-away. Reliance in this regard can safely be made to the case reported as Noor Din and another (Supra) wherein the apex Court of the country has interalia observed as under:- "In view of the above facts the suit of the plaintiffs/respondents challenging the gift mutation was on the face of the record barred by time and there was no need for recording of evidence."
25. During the course of hearing Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate has drawn attention of this Court to the fact that the persons being appointed as "the Authority" do not possess the prescribed qualification. Sardar Muhammad Iqbal Athar Khan Khitran Advocate, while replying to the said contention has argued that since the promulgation of the Act in the year 1936 different persons serving in Labour department have been appointed as "the Authority" thus no exception can be taken against the present incumbent of the post merely for the reason that he does not qualify the eligibility criteria as envisaged under the Act. In this regard, I am constrained to hold that a practice cannot be used to nullify a clear cut provision of law.There is no denying the fact that when there is no law on the subject practice or custom, being followed by the masses from time immemorial, can assume the role of law but when a specific provision of law is available on the subject practice cannot be allowed to continue, just to render the relevant provision of law as redundant.
Admittedly, persons serving as Labour Officers or Labour Inspectors have been appointed as Authority in clear cut violation of the provisions of the Act which speaks volumes about mala fide and inefficiency on the part of the competent authority.
26. Now coming -to the case law referred to by learned counsel for the private respondents, I am of the view that the same is not applicable to these cases. Firstly taking up the cases of Kashif Zafar, Abdul Samad and others and Mehar Muhammad Nawaz (Supra) the question of law determined by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan is that a judgment in rem is applicable to the persons who are not even party to the proceedings before the apex Court of the country whereas in the cases in hand it has been admitted by the private respondents that the judgment passed by the apex Court of the Country was confined to only the category of employees whose names were presented before the apex Court of the country. As far as the case of Mughal Surgical (Pvt.) Ltd. And others (Supra) is concerned, that case instead of lending any support to the case of private respondents favours the plea of the Bank Authorities that an order passed under section 15 of the Act is only appeal able under section 17 ibid but the said remedy is not available against the orders passed in miscellaneous applications. Though in the case of Syed Match Co. Ltd. Through Managing Director (Supra), it has been observed by apex Court of the country that no person can directly approach this Court without availing remedy available to him, however, in the same judgment it has been observed that this Court can directly entertain a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. In this regard, the observation of the apex Court of the country reproduced below is of worth consideration:-- ' It is, however, true that in certain cases resort to Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court instead of availing remedy provided under the statute, may be just...........
' So far as the case of Izhar Ahmed Khan and another (upra) is concerned, there is nothing on record to show that the private respondents were working against permanent post and having approached the Labour Court for regularization of their services they have rendered their case dubious. Coming to the case of Muhammad Rafique (Supra) I am of the view that there is no cavil with the preposition that the question of law decided by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan has binding force on all the organs of the State in terms of Article 189 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, but the order rendered by the apex Court of the country in the case of Imtiaz Ali and another (Supra) being confined only to 2343 retrenched employees cannot be stretched too far to benefit the private respondents. So far as the cases of M/s. Duty Free Shops Ltd.
And Saadi Cement Ltd. Through Chairman and another (Supra) are concerned, the petitions were dismissed being not maintainable on the ground that order of the Authority passed under section 15 of the Act was appeal able whereas in these cases the situation is entirely different as in one category of cases the Bank Authorities availed the remedy of appeal whereas in two other category of cases, as the order was passed in miscellaneous applications, the same were not appeal able in terms of section 17 ibid. In the case of M/s Lone China (Pvt.) Ltd. Guiranwala (Supra) it has been decided by this Court that an employee who had been serving as daily wager continuously for more than nine months becomes permanent but the same is not applicable to the cases of the private respondents for the reason that they themselves admitted that at the time of retrenchment there were serving on daily wages. The cases of Muhammad Riaz and Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. Through Attorney (Supra) are also not applicable to the case of private respondents as proceedings in the said cases were initiated under the provisions of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002, whereas the question in these matters is regarding jurisdiction of the Authority. The case of Town Committee, Chowinda (Supra) is also of no help to the private respondents as it has been held that order passed by the Labour Court on appeal, in terms of section 17 of the Act, is revisable before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, for the reason that in some of the petitions orders of the Authority have directly been challenged before this Court and the Bank Authorities being a trans-provincial establishment, the jurisdiction of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal is ousted in terms of section 57(2)(b) ibid. In the case of Punjab Employees'
Social Security Institution (Supra) though it has been held by this Court that conveyance allowance constitutes part of wages but at the same time while dealing with the question of ex-gratia it has been observed that it is a grant without support of any law or settlement and the employer had right to withdraw the same at any time and employees had no right to demand the same as right before any court of law. In my humble view, this case instead of lending any support to the case of private respondents supports the view of the Bank Authorities.
27. As a necessary corollary to the discussion made in the foregoing paragraphs I have no hesitation to hold that the Authority was bound to decide the applications filed by the Bank Authorities for rejection of claims of the private respondents prior to deciding the main us. Likewise, the questions of jurisdiction and limitation having not been discussed either by the Authority or by the Labour Court in their true perspective, the verdicts of the Courts below impugned in petitions mentioned in Schedules D and F deserves to be set at naught. Similarly, the ex-gratia grant being not part of the wages, the Authority has no jurisdiction to hear any matter. Consequently, all these petitions are accepted. As a result the orders impugned in these petitions are set aside and the claims (subject matter of Writ Petition forming Schedules B and E) filed by the private respondents before the Authority shall stand dismissed whereas the matters involved in the petitioners constituting Schedule-C are remanded back to the Authority with the observation that prior to deciding the main us, the miscellaneous applications filed by the Bank Authorities shall be decided.
Identically, the matters involved in Writ Petitions mentioned in Schedules D and F are also remanded back to the Labour Courts concerned for decision afresh after taking into account the question of jurisdiction as well as limitation raised by the Bank Authorities. Insofar as W. P.
No.22964/2015 is concerned, the same is remanded to the Authority for decision afresh after taking into consideration the earlier order passed in favour of the private respondents in W. P.
No.27085/2014. Parties shall bear their respective costs.
28. Before parting with this judgment, Office is directed to immediately send a copy of this judgment to the Secretary, Government of the Punjab, Labour Department, Lahore through ordinary mode as well as through fax with a direction to ensure appointments of persons as Authorities under the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 for various regions according to the eligibility criteria provided under section 15 ibid and the discussion made in paragraph No.25 supra within six months from the receipt of certified copy of this judgment under intimation to this Court through Additional Registrar (Judicial).
Schedule-A W.P. No.13792 of 2011.
(Habib Bank Ltd. Etc. v. The Authority under Payment of Wages Act etc.)
Sr.#W.P. No. Petitioners'
CounselRespondents' counsel
1. 13793 of 2011.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Sardar Muhammad Iqbal Athar Khan Khitran, Advocate 2.13794 of 2011.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Sardar Muhammad Iqbal Athar Khan Khitran, Advocate
3. 13795 of 2011.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Sardar Muhammad Iqbal Athar Khan Khitran, Advocate 4.13796 of 2011.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Mian Muhammad Zulqarnain Advocate Sardar Muhammad Iqbal Athar Khan Khitran, Advocate 5.13797 of 2011. Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Sardar Muhammad Iqbal Athar Khan Khitran, Advocate 6.13798 of 2011.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Sardar Muhammad Iqbal Athar Khan Khitran, Advocate 7.13799 of 2011.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Sardar Muhammad Iqbal Athar Khan Khitran, Advocate 8.138000f 2011.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Sardar Muhammad Iqbal Athar Khan Khitran, Advocate 9.13801 of 2011.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Sardar Muhammad Iqbal Athar Khan Khitran, Advocate 10.13802 of 2011.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Mian Muhammad Zulqarnain Advocate.
11.13804 of 2011.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Mian Muhammad Zulqarnain Advocate.
12.13805 of 2011.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Sardar Muhammad Iqbal Athar Khan Khitran, Advocate 13.13806 of 2011.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Mian Muhammad Zulqarnain Advocate.
14.13807 of 2011.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Mian Muhammad Zulqarnain Advocate.
15.13808 of 2011.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Mian Muhammad Zulqarnain Advocate.
16 13809 of 2011.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Sardar Muhammad Iqbal Athar Khan Khitran, Advocate 17.13810 of 2011.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Mian Muhammad Zulqarnain Advocate.
18.13811 of 2011.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Sardar Muhammad Iqbal Athar Khan Khitran, Advocate.
19.14539 of 2013.Mr. Imran Aziz Khan, Advocate.Mimi Muhammad Zu1qarnain Advocate 20.14540 of 2013.Mr. Imran Aziz Khan, Advocate.Mian Muhammad Zulqarnain Advocate 21.14541 of 2013.Mr. Imran Aziz Khan, Advocate.Mian Muhammad Zulqarnain Advocate 22.14542 of 2013.Mr. Imran Aziz Khan, Advocate.Mian Muhammad Zulqarnain Advocate 23.14543 of 2013.-Mr. Imran Aziz Khan, Advocate.Mian Muhammad Zu1qarnain Advocate 24.18681 of 2013.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Mian Muhammad Zulqarnain Advocate Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
25.18685 of 2013.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate. 'Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
26.18686 of 2013.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
27.18687 of 2013.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Mr. Khurram Raza 'Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
28.18688 of 2013.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
29.18689 of 2013Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
30.18690 of 2013.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
31.18691 of 2013.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
32.18692 of 2013.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
33.18693 of 2013.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Mian Muhammad Zulqarnain Advocate 34.18694 of 2013.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
35.18695 of 2013.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
36.18696 of 2013.Hafiz Tariq Nasim Advocate.Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
37.27068 of 2014.Mr. Imran Aziz Khan, Advocate.Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
38.27070 of 2014.Mr. Imran Aziz Khan, Advocate.Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
39.27071 of 2014.Mr. Imran Aziz Khan, Advocate.Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
40.27072 of 2014.Mr. Imran Aziz Khan, Advocate.Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
41.27076 of 2014.Mr. Imran Aziz Khad, Advocate.Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate 42.27078 of 2014.Mr. Imran Aziz Khan, Advocate.Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
43.27079 of 2014.Mr. Imran Aziz Khan, Advocate.Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
44.27081 of 2014.Mr. Imran Aziz Khan, Advocate.Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
45.27083 of 2014.Mr. Imran Aziz Khan, Advocate.Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
46.27084 of 2014.Mr. Imran Aziz Khan, Advocate.Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
47.27085 of 2014.Mr. Imran Aziz Khan, Advocate.Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
48.27092 of 2014.Mr. Imran Advocate.AzizKhan,Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
49.27093 of 2014.Mr. Imran Advocate.AzizKhan,Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
50.27094 of 2014.Mr. Imran Advocate.AzizKhan,Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
51.27095 of 2014.Mr. Imran Advocate.AzizKhan,Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
52.27107 of 2014.Mr. Imran Advocate.AzizKhan,Mr. Khurram Raza Khan Bhidwal, Advocate.
53.1638 of 2015Mr. Imran Advocate.AzizKhan,Mian Muhammad Zulqarnaiii Advocate.
54.1641 of 2015.Mr. Imran Advocate.AzizKhan,Mian Muhammad Zulqarnain Advocate 55.1648 of 2015.Mr. Imran Advocate.AzizKhan,Sardar Muhammad Iqbal Athar Khan Khitran, Advocate 56.1657 of 2015.Mr. Imran Advocate.AzizKhan,Sardar Muhammad Iqbal Athar Khan Khitran, Advocate 57.22964 of 2015.Mr. Imran Advocate.AzizKhan,Mian Muhammad Zulqarnain Advocate.
Schedule-B W.P. No.13792 of 2011.
(Habib Bank Ltd. Etc. v.
Authority under Payment of Wages Act etc.)
(List of cases filed against order dated 26.04.2011 passed by the Authority under Payment of Wages Act, Lahore).
Sr. No. Writ Petition No.
1. 13792/2011
2. 13793/2011
3. 13794/2011.
4. 13795/2011.
5. 13796/2011.
6. 13797/2011.
7. 13798/2011.
8 . 13799/2011.
9. 13800/2011.
10. 13801/2011.
11. 13802/2011.
12. 13804/2011.
13. 13805/2011.
14. 13806/2011.
15. 13807/2011.
16. 13808/2011.
17. 13809/2011.
18. 13810/2011.
19. 13811/2011.
Schedule-C W.P. No.13792 of 2011. (Habib Bank Ltd. Etc. v.
Authority under Payment of Wages Act etc.)
(List of cases filed against order dated 20.07.2013 passed by the Authority under Payment of Wages Act, Lahore).
Sr. No. Writ Petition No.
1. 18681/2013.
2. 18685/2013.
3. 18686/2013.
4. 18687/2013.
5. 18688/2013.
6. 18689/2013.
7. 18690/2013.
8. 18691/2013.
9. 18692/2013.
10. 18643/2013.
11. 18694/2013.
12. 18695/2013.
13. 18696/2013.
Schedule-D W.P. No.13792 of 2011.
(Habib Bank Ltd. Etc. v.
Authority under Payment of Wages Act etc.)
(List of cases filed against order dated 04.08.2012 passed by the Authority under Payment of Wages Act, Gujranwala, and judgment dated 18.05.2013 rendered by Punjab Labour Court No.7, Gujranwala).
Sr.# Writ Petition No.
1. 14539/2013.
2. 14540/2013.
3 . 14541/2013.
4. 14542/2013.
5. 14543/2013.
Schedule-E W.P. No.13792 of 2011.
(Habib Bank Ltd. Etc. v.
Authority under Payment of Wages Act etc.)
(List of cases filed against order dated 12.09.2014 passed by the Authority under Payment of Wages Act, Gujranwala).
Sr.# Writ Petition No.
1. 27068/2014.
2. 27070/2014.
3. 27071/2014.
4. 27072/2014.
5. 27076/2014.
6. 27078/2014.
7. 27079/2014.
8. 27081/2014.
9. 27083/2014.
10. 27084/2014.
11. 27085/2014.
12. 27092/2014.
13. 27093/2014.
14. 27094/2014.
15. 27095/2014.
16. 27107/2014.
Schedule-F W.P. No.13792 of 2011.
(Habib Bank Ltd. Etc. v.
Authority under Payment of Wages Act etc.)
(List of cases filed against order dated 30.11.2012 passed by the Authority under Payment of Wages Act, Lahore, and judgment dated 29.11.2014 rendered by Punjab Labour Court No.1, Lahore). Sr. # Writ Petition No
1. 1638/2015
2. 1641/2015
3. 1648/2015
4. 1657/2015