' Briefly stated facts of the case out of which this writ petition has arisen are that at the behest of Anjum Farooq Paracha, the Petitioner No,1 before this Court, a case F.I.R. No,488 dated 11-11-1991 was registered at Police Station Civil Line, Rawalpindi under section 324/148/149, P.P.C. Against Manzoorul Haq, respondent No,1, Ikramul Haq, Nawazul Haq, Inam Zafar, Muhammad Asif and Waqar alias Wali for attacking the complainant side, armed with pistols and revolvers, as a result of which attack, Altaf Hussain a remote cousin of the complainant-petitioner was murdered whereas Fida Hussain Peracha and Muhammad Siddiq Peracha were injured. Subsequently due to the death of Muhammad Altaf Hussain Peracha who was injured during the course of that encounter, offence under section 302, P.P.C. Was also added in the F.I.R. The occurrence had taken place at 1- 45 p.m. Within the District Court premises Rawalpindi in front of the Court of learned Senior Civil Judge. The report was lodged at 2-40 p.m. The respondent No,1 as well as the other co-accused, except Muhammad Asif accused who had been arrested at the spot, applied for grant of pre- arrest bail before the Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi which application was dismissed on 22-12-1991. In spite of dismissal of the bail application of the accused, police did not arrest them nor did they surrender themselves. On 7-1-1992 dissatisfied by the investigation being conducted by "he police allegedly due to the influence of respondent No,1 who is a retired Superintendent of Police a complaint was lodged by the petitioner before the Illaqa Magistrate on the basis of same allegations whereon the F.I.R. Had been got registered which was transmitted to the Court of Mr. Ata Rasool Joya, Additional Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi by the learned Ilaqa Magistrate. Preliminary evidence was recorded and all the accused persons were summoned in the case by the Additional Sessions Judge vide order, dated 20-4-1992 under section 302/148/149, P.P.C. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, however, accepted the bail bonds of the accused persons on 7-5-1992.
This order of acceptance of bail bonds was challenged by the petitioner in this Court in Criminal Miscellaneous No,285-B of 1992 which was accepted by this Court vide order, dated 30-5-1992 and cancelled the bail granted to the accused persons and conduct of the police was seriously commented upon by this Court while passing the order of cancellation of bail of the accused. The accused filed Criminal Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No, 64 of 1992 before the 'Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan. Initially the accused were admitted to interim bail, however, ultimately the petition was dismissed on 24-6-1992 but in spite of the dismissal of the petition neither the police arrested them nor the accused did surrender and rather filed a review petition on 29-6-1992 before the Honourable Supreme Court which was not entertained on the ground that first the accused should surrender. Consequently the accused persons surrendered on 2-7-1992 and the review petition was ultimately withdrawn from the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan on 8-7- 1992. On 2-7-1992 i,e. The day of surrender and arrest of the accused, Manzoorul Haq, respondent No,1 applied for grant of bail after arrest before the trial Court but did not mention in the application, the factum of filing of the review petition in the Honourable Supreme Court of Pakistan.
Hence, the application was withdrawn on 22-7-1992. Thereafter a fresh bail application was filed and was allowed by the learned Sessions Court, vide order, dated 23-7-1992. The petitioners again filed an application seeking cancellation of the bail granted to the respondent No,1 in this Court re: "Criminal Miscellaneous No,549/B/C of 1992. The bail was again cancelled by this Court but the Honourable Supreme Court granted bail to the respondent No,1 on medical ground in re: "Criminal Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No,111/L of 1992. Other co-accused are still in the lock-up.
2. On 14-11-1991 at the behest of respondent No,1 a case F.I.R. No,495 under section 324/148/149, P.P.C.
Was registered at Police Station, Civil Line, Rawalpindi wherein a counter-version which is in fact in the nature of a defence version to the one on the basis whereof case F.I.R. No,488 was registered on 11-11-1991 against the complainant as well as his co-accused, was got recorded and the petitioners in this writ petition were cited as accused persons on the basis of allegation that in fact it is the petitioners who attacked and as a result of this attack, Nasir, who was present in the Court premises in connection with own case received fire-arm injuries whereas Inam Zafar accused received injuries by a stone blows. A perusal of the version given in the F.I.R. Clearly shows that it is the same version which has been put up by the respondent No,1 and his co-accused by way of defence in the murder case registered against them vide F.I.R. No,488 dated 11-11-1991 which is under investigation with the same police. After the registration of this case, respondent No,1 on 5-8- 1992 filed a complaint in the Court of Ilaqa Magistrate against the petitioners on the basis of the same allegations which form the subject-matter of the F.I.R. No,495 referred to above. Learned Ilaqa Magistrate recorded the statements of the doctor as well as six witnesses produced by the complainant and vide order, dated 23-8-1992 dismissed the complaint holding that it is a false complaint and has been lodged by way of counterblast to the murder case registered against the complainant party. The operative part of the order passed by the Ilaqa Magistrate is reproduced as under:-- "I have heard the learned counsel for the complainant and examined the evidence alongwith M.L.R.O. Attached. The complainant has deposed that Anjum Peracha, Malik Fida Altaf Hussain, Naeem Peracha, Malik Mahmood, Shakeel Peracha and Aqeel Peracha were armed with pistols.
They fired at the complainant party after planning but could not cause any injury to the complainant party which on the face of it is not believable. Persons coming prepared and armed with fire-arms could not cause any injury to the complainant party creates doubt. The Chaudhary group remained intact and passersby and unknown persons recevied injuries from the hand of fully prepared respondents is not believable. There should have been many casualties because Court premises are always jam-packed with litigants. The injury on the stomach Naseer bore blackening which shows that it was caused from the close range but Ikramul Haq who was standing nearby with whom altercation took place was spared is not believed. The assailants reached such a close range and spared unarmed Ikram unhurt is out of exception. The M.L.R. Belie the ocular evidence. This complaint is mere counterblast against the murder case registered against the complainant party. The complaint is rejected."
' Aggrieved of this order the respondent No,1 who was complainant filed a review petition in the Sessions Court which was initially pending before the Additional Sessions Judge and was ultimately transferred to the Court of Sessions Judge in re: 5-T of 1993 vide order, dated 7-2-1993 passed by this Court with consent of the parties. This revision petition was dismissed vide order, dated 3-3-1993 passed by the learned Sessions Judge on the ground that the accused persons named in the complaint before the Ilaqa Magistrate were not impleaded as parties hence the petition is incompetent as being not properly constituted. Another revision petition is stated to have been filed against the order of dismissal of complaint dated 23-8-1992 by the respondent No,] which is pending in the Court of learned Sessions Judge, Rawalpindi and is fixed for hearing on 15-3-1993 for appearance of the respondents.
3. The case registered vide F.I.R. No,495, dated 14-11-1991 remained under investigation with various police agencies and ultimately as per order passed by the I.-G.P., the investigation of the case was transferred to be conducted by the Crime Branch Lahore by a panel consisting of two persons namely Col. Retd. Muhammad Ashraf, Chairman, Anti-Terrorist Cell, Lahore who is not an official of the Police Department and Rana Wasay Khan, Superintendent of Police, Crimes Branch, Lahore. The said panel has submitted its recommendation according to which it is held that the petitioners are guilty of the crime as narrated in the F.I.R. Referred to above. The file has been sent to the Police Station Civil Line, Rawalpindi for further investigation. Sibtain Shah S.I. Is now investigating the case and it has been stated at the Bar that the challan is not as yet complete and the matter is still under investigation with the said S.I. After the receipt of the recommendation from the Crime Branch/Investigating. Panel referred to above, the Investigating Officer requested Ilaqa Magistrate, Rawalpindi to issue warrants of arrest of the petitioners and grant permission to arrest them, but the request was refused by the Ilaqa Magistrate vide order, dated 2-9-1992.
4. Through this Constitutional petition, the petitioners who are the complainant party in case F.I.R.
No,488, dated 11-11-1991 and are accused in case F.I.R. No,495, dated 14-11-1991 referred to above have sought quashment of the said F.I.R. As well as the consequential investigation proceedings on the basis thereof.
5. Sardar Abdul Latif Khan Khosa, Advocate and Mr. Fayyaz Ahmed Khawaja, Advocate have appeared on behalf of the petitioners whereas Kh. Sultan Ahmed, Advocate as well as Mr. Muhammad Ilyas Siddiqui, Advocate have appeared on behalf of the respondents. Syed Sajjad Hussain Shah, AA.-G. Has appeared on behalf of the State.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners have raised the following contentions:-- "(1) That the F.I.R. In question on the basis whereof the police is now investigating the case against the petitioners and intends to submit a challan against them has been got registered three days after the registration of F.I.R. No,488, dated 11-11-1991 and in fact is in the nature of defence-version in the said F.I.R. Therefore, it could not have been registered and, hence, the registration of the F.I.R.
Being without a lawful authority, it is liable to be quashed. In support of this argument reliance is placed on cases of Kaura v. The State and others 1983 SCMR 436, Ghulam Siddique v. Station House Officer, Saddar Dera Ghazi Khan and 8 others PLD 1979 Lah. 263 and Yousif v. The State PLD 1988 Kar.
521.
(2) That under the law if a criminal case is registered with the police and a complaint is filed on the basis of the same facts before Court of competent jurisdiction it is the complaint which is to be tried first and in this case the complaint having been taken cognizance of, tried and dismissed by the Ilaqa Magistrate wherein it has been held that the facts and the version as mentioned in the impugned F.I.R. Is false, the proceedings on the basis of F.I.R. In question cannot continue and on the basis thereof, the petitioners cannot be challaned and tried inasmuch as it will be a case of double jeopardy as no one can be vexed twice for the same offence. In support of this proposition learned counsel has placed reliance on Umar Hayat v. The State PLD 1966 SC 602, Asghar Ali v. The State 1983 P Cr. L J 2187, Muhammad Akbar v. The State 1985 P Cr. L J 338.
(3) That the registration of the case is mala fide and is a counterblast to the murder case registered. Against the complainant party vide F.I.R. No,488 which is earlier in time and that the F.I.R.
Has been registered in a mala fide manner due to influence of the respondent No,1 who is a retired police official and who is trying to hush up the murder case which has been registered against him and other co-accused and the counter-F.I.R. In fact is an effort to pressurise the petitioners not to prosecute the said criminal case and, therefore, registration of second F.I.R. As well as the proceedings on the basis thereon are clearly abuse of the process of law and, hence, are liable to be quashed. Reliance is placed in this behalf on cases of Abdul Rashid v. Islamud-Din and another 1987 P Cr. L J 534, Khadim Hussain v. The State and 8 others 1970 P Cr. L J 56 and Raja Haq Nawaz v.
Muhammad Afzal and 4 others 1971 SCMR 698.
(4) The Ilaqa Magistrate having once taken cognizance in a complaint and having dismissed the complaint, no proceedings on the basis of the same facts can be taken and, therefore, the whole proceedings are liable to be quashed. Reliance is placed on case of Muhammad Akbar v. The State 1985 P Cr. L J 338.
6. Replying to the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the petitioners, learned counsel for the respondents has raised the following contentions:--
(1) That although F.I.R. In question was registered on 14-11-1991 yet the application on the basis whereof the F.I.R. Has been registered was filed the same day as is clear from daily diary No,32 and case diary F.I.R. No,488 dated 11-11-1991 and therefore, there is no delay in lodging of the subsequent F.I.R. Which is based upon altogether a different cause of action and different version and cannot be said to be a counter-version defence. Hence second F.I.R. Could have been registered.
(2) That the writ petition is barred by the principle of laches inasmuch as the F.I.R. Registered on 14- 11-1991 is being sought to be quashed in the year 1993. Reliance is placed by the learned counsel on cases of Mushtaq Ahmad v. The S.H.O., Police Station Munawan 1984 P Cr. L J 1454 and Muhammad Ibrahim v. S.H.O., Police Station, Mansehra and another PLD 1983 Pesh.
229.
(3) That the F.I.R. In question is not by way of counterblast inasmuch as the same has been registered on the basis of an independent cause of action which has accrued due to the injuries caused to Naseer alias Jeeru who was present in the Court premises in connection with his own case and who was injured by the accused persons and further that in the first F.I.R. Initially the case having been registered under section 324, P.P.C. And Altaf Hussain having died after 19 days, it cannot be said to be an F.I.R. By way of counterblast inasmuch as in the beginning no murder case was registered against the complainant party, therefore, the second F.I.R. Wasi competently registered. Reliance is placed on cases of Allah Ditta and 3 others v. S.H.O., Police Station Basirpur, District Okara and 3 others PLD 1987 Lah. 300, Jamshed Ahmad v. Muhammad Akram Khan and another 1975 SCMR 149 and Ghulam Hussain v. Sirajul Haque and others 1987 P Cr. L J 1214.
(4) That in fact it is a quashment of the investigation which is being sought in this petition which is not possible inasmuch as the police has collected incriminating material and unless and until the evidence is recorded, the F.I.R. Cannot be quashed in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court.
(5) That dismissal of the complaint is not a bar to the registration of F.I.R. On the basis of the same occurrence, investigation thereof and submission of challan by the police inasmuch as the order dismissal passed by the Ilaqa Magistrate shall be deemed to be order passed under section 203 of Cr.P.C. Which order is subjudice in revision before Sessions Court, hence, continuance of the proceedings in the State case are not barred under the provision of section 403, Cr.P.C. And the writ petition is premature. Reliance is placed on cases of Anwar Ali Khan and others v. Wahid Bux and others 1991 SCMR 1608 and Shahnaz Begum v. The Honourable Judge of the High Court of Sindh and Balochistan and another PLD 1971 SC 677.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioners in reply has reiterated his arguments addressed, as noted earlier and has further argued that principle of laches will not be a bar to this writ petition inasmuch as the petitioners have been agitating their grievances throughout before the police authorities and the petition has been filing as a last resort even before the submission of challan.
8. Syed Sajjad Hussain Shah learned AA.-G. Has opposed the writ petition and adopting the arguments addressed by Kh. Sultan Ahmad, Advocate learned counsel for respondent No,1 has vehemently argued that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.
9. I have considered the arguments addressed by the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record. Admittedly a case under section 302/324/148/149, P.P.C. Has been registered against the respondent No,1 and his co-accused vide F.I.R. No,488, dated 11-11-1991 at Police Station Civil Line, Rawalpindi. The venue, time of occurrence and the incident is the same regarding which a counter-version has been got recorded by the respondent No,1 vide F.I.R. No,495, dated 1411-1991. Record shows that this version is the defence of the complainant party in F.I.R.
No,488, in the murder case registered against him, therefore, it stands established beyond doubt that the second F.I.R. Is nothing but a counterblast and in fact a defence version of the accused persons in case F.I.R. No 488, dated 11-11-1991. As per law declared in the judgments cited from both sides the established legal position emerges is that if the second F.I.R. Is based upon an independent incident and version other than one which is the subject-matter of the previously registered F.I.R. It can be registered. However, in case where the second F.I.R. Is a counterblast and in fact a counter-defence version of the accused persons of the previously registered F.I.R., a second F.I.R. Cannot be registered. In the case in hand after going through the record and perusal of the two F.I.Rs, as well as the case of the parties, I am of the view that the second F.I.R. No,495 registered on 14-11-1991 at the behest of the respondent is nothing but a counterblast and a defence version of the accused persons of F.I.R. No,488, dated 11-11-1991, therefore, the police authorities had no jurisdiction to register the second F.I.R. The police authorities should have investigated the case registered vide F.I.R. No,488 and have examined the versions put forward by the respondent No,1 and co-accused and to have put up the challan of the persons who would have been found guilty during the cause of investigation in that case.
10. Admittedly on the basis of the same facts, the complaint had been filed by the respondent No,1 before the Ilaqa Magistrate on the basis whereof F.I.R. Has been registered and has been investigated. After recording of evidence whichever was produced by the respondent No,1, learned Ilaqa Magistrate has dismissed the complaint by passing of a judicial order holding that the facts as narrated in the plaint are false and the complaint has been filed as a counterblast. The findings recorded by the Ilaqa Magistrate still hold the field as revision petition filed against this order was initially dismissed by the Sessions Judge for technical reasons and again respondent No:1 has filed a revision against the said order, which is still pending adjudication. It is an established principle of law that filing of appeal or revision petition against an order does not vacate the order and so long as the order is set aside or is suspended, it remains in field. Consequently the present position is that an order of dismissal of the complaint filed by respondent No,1 on same facts holds the field and as such a judicial finding to the effect that facts narrated in the complaint are false which is a counterblast. Impugned F.1.R. Is also based upon same facts which have been held to be false.
Hence to allow the police authorities or any other Court of equal jurisdiction to redetermine the correctness or otherwise of same allegations will definitely amount to a case of double jeopardy. It has been held in case of Aziz Ahmad and others v. Mst. Hajran Bibi and another 1987 SCMR 527 at page 529 of the report as under:-- "It is then contended on behalf of the appellants that before' the suit at Bahawalpur was dismissed the suit at Faisalabad had already been instituted; that being so, Rule 9 of Order IX was not in terms applicable as this rule only prevented a plaintiff from instituting a fresh suit but had no effect on a suit which had already been filed. The contention in so far as the construction of Rule 9 is concerned is correct but that does not mean that the second suit is not barred and can be tried on merit. There is well-established principle that no one is to be twice vexed for the same cause of action. Reference in this context is invited to a Division Bench judgment of the Lahore High Court in Amir Din Shahab Din v. Shiv Dev SingWA I R 1947 Lah. 102 where the maintainability of the second suit brought before the dismissal in default of the first suit was considered and it was held that the second suit was hit by the above-mentioned principle and it was also liable to be dismissed on the ground that its institution and trial amounted to the abuse of the process of the Court.
' It was then argued by the learned counsel that the causes of action in the two suits were different as the suit filed at Bahawalpur was in respect of the property, situate in Bahawalpur alone whereas the suit instituted at Faisalabad covered properties both at Bahawalpur and Faisalabad; consequently, the dismissal of the first suit could not have any effect on the second suit. This contention is again without any merit. The causes of action in the two suits were precisely the same, that is, the Wrongful allocation of a share in the property left by Sultan Muhammad to respondent No,2. The mere fact that in the first suit the appellants did not seek relief in respect of the property at Faisalabad would not make the cause of action in the second suit a different one. In fact by not seeking any relief in respect of the property situate in Faisalabad in the suit filed at Bahawalpur the appellants would be taken to have given up their claim to the said property, and the second suit would be hit by the bar contained in Rule 2(2) of Order II of the Code of Civil Procedure."
Respectfully following law declared in the said judgment I hold that the proceedings on the basis of impugned F.I.R. Cannot be allowed to continue and C inasmuch as the continuance thereof is clearly a case of double jeopardy and hence abuse of process of law.
11. So far as the objection of the learned counsel regarding laches is concerned it is also without any lawful basis. The principle of laches has recently been explained by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in case of Pakistan Post Office v. Settlement Commissioner and others 1987 SCMR 1119. At page 1123 to 1125 of the report it has been held as under:-- "It needs to be emphasised that there is absolutely no justification to equate laches with statutory bar of limitation. While the former operates as a bar in equity, the latter operates as a legal bar to the grant of remedy. Thus, in the former, all the dictates of justice and equity and balance of legitimate rights are to be weighed; in the latter, subject to statutory relaxations in this behalf, nothing is left to the discretion of the Court-- it is a harsh law. Thus, passage of time per se brings the statute of limitation in operation, but the bar of laches does not deny the grant of right or slice the remedy unless the grant of relief, in addition to being delayed, must also perpetuate injustice to another party. It is also in this very context that the condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act will be on different harder considerations than those in a case of laches. For example, while it is essential to explain and condone the delay of each day vis-a-vis statutory limitation, there is no such strict requirement in cases of laches.
' It is necessary to mention here a peculiar feature of Government litigation. No doubt, it was observed in Province of East Pakistan v. Abdul Hamid Darji 1970 SCMR 558 that in matter of condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act the Government will not be shown extra indulgence than an ordinary litigant and if so desired only an amendment of law was the way oat.
The further experience of nearly two decades after that judgment shows that the inability on the part of the Government to get such an amendment made, has been treated as an accepted and inviolable rule to refuse condonation of delay whenever the plea is raised of departmental delays; which are inherent in the procedures even if culpable negligence is not involved. A just and proper approach which has not been prohibited by the rule in Abdul Hamid Darrji's case, is to treat the request for condonation on its own merits like that of any other litigant; and not to shut out the plea on simple formula that it is mere departmental delay negligence, because the decision itself, does not lay down such an inflexible rule. The facts of that case and the condition that each case is to be seen on its own circumstances, cannot at all be ignored. It is well-known that indiscriminate application of this decision has caused immense loss to the public exchequer wherein an innocent third party, namely, the taxpayer in ultimate analysis, suffers the loss. This is besides those cases where delays are collusive so as to avoid dictates of justice and law. Hence, a departmental delay whenever put forward as a ground for condonation of delay requires consideration on its merits and rejected or accepted accordingly, as the case may be.
' In the case of laches, however, the principles of condonation would be totally different. It being in the field of equity, it will not be denied: where either the negligence is not culpable vis-a-vis the merits of the case; or, when there is no equity in favour of the party who would be the gainer in case the condonation is denied.
' It is also for the very same reason that bar of. Laches in equitable jurisdiction has rightly been equated with principle of estoppel and not the statutory bar of limitation. See Mst. Noor Jehan Begum v. Abdul Majid Shaida and another Law Notes 1967 (NUC) SC 15 -- Civil Review Petition No,K- 3 of 1967 in Civil Appeal No,K-39 of 1965, decided on 14-4-1967. In the present case no question of estoppel arises. The change of position by the transferee was pendente lite. He cannot take any advantage of this principle either. And the writ petition could not be dismissed except on grounds of merits.
' The next aspect relates to the nature of the order impugned before the High Court in its writ jurisdiction. We agree that the mere fact that the order is void would not necessarily displace the bar of laches in equitable jurisdiction. The rule is that if it is a just and proper order then notwithstanding it being otherwise void, it need not be set aside in writ jurisdiction, if the same was filed after inordinate delay. See S. Sharif Ahmad Hashmi v. Chairman, Screening Committee, Lahore and another 1978 SCMR 367. On the other hand, if it is a void order and is also unjust and improper besides being illegal, the High Court will have no hesitation in setting it aside despite the objection regarding laches. It is so because the High Court would then be acting on a still higher principle than that of laches that; injustice is not perpetuated with the blessing of the Court in its discretionary jurisdiction, as the discretion to dismiss a writ petition cannot be exercised in aid of injustice.
' In this case, if the High Court would have examined the foregoing features in the subject-matter of the writ petition the results would have been different. As a necessary corollary, therefore, it has to be laid down that a writ petition cannot be dismissed on ground of laches, without examining the dictates of justice in the claim of each party. This, of course, is in addition to examination of law and jurisdictional points involved in the case.
' Before parting with this judgment it needs to be observed that although the question of applicability of the Article 181 of the Limitation Act to the filing of writ petition has not been argued at the Bar, it might nevertheless require examination in a proper case. It has been held by this Court in Hussain Bakhsh v. Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi and others PLD 1970 SC 1, that such proceedings before the High Court are of civil nature and C.P.C. Applies except when excluded. Whether similar argument cannot be raised regarding limitation might need examination.
12. After registration of F.I.R. The police did not proceed against the petitioners inasmuch as the complainant party could not prove its case. The complaint was filed by respondent No,1 and was dismissed. The order was challenged in revision. The investigation was transferred to the Crime Branch, Lahore. The plea was raised that as the complaint has been dismissed on the same facts, therefore, the proceedings on the basis of the F.I.R. Cannot continue but in spite that of police authorities continued with the proceedings. It is only in the recent past that the investigation panel constituted by the I.-G.P., Lahore has given its recommendation for proceedings against the petitioners. The learned Ilaqa Magistrate refused to allow the arrest of the petitioners but in spite of that, the police wanted to arrest the petitioners and to proceed against them. Even today the Police Officer who is present in the Court states that the investigation is still in process and the challan has not been completed as yet. Learned A.A.-G. Has also supported the continuance and completion of the investigation in the impugned F.I.R., therefore, it stands established that the proceedings are mala fide and unjust. It cannot be said that there is an inordinate delay on the part of the petitioners to challenge the legality, propriety and vires of the F.I.R. As well as the proceedings being conducted on the basis thereof. Consequently I hold that the writ petition is not barred by the principle of laches in the light of the law declared in case of Pakistan Post Office (supra). Objection of the learned counsel for the respondents to the effect that investigation cannot be quashed inasmuch as it involves the determination of disputed questions of fact which can only be resolved after recording of evidence by the Court of competent jurisdiction is also without any merit. There is no cavil with the proposition that ordinarily investigation is not interfered with and quashed, however in case of Shahnaz Begum v. The Honourable Judges of Hight Court of Sindh and Balochistan and another PLD 1971 SC 677 relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent himself two exceptions have been laid down and they are that the Court can interfere at the investigation stage if the proceedings are mala fide and without jurisdiction. In the case in hand I have already held that the registration of F.I.R. And the subsequent proceedings being conducted by the investigating authority are clearly without jurisdiction and mala fide and, hence, clear abuse of the process of law. The petitioners who have once being exhonerated by a Court of competent jurisdiction by passing of judicial order cannot be allowed to remain on the mercy of the police authorities for indefinite period. Consequently this is a fit case for exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court as per law declared in case of Shahnaz Begum (supra) as well as the case falls within the exceptions laid down in the said judgment.
13. Resultantly, I accept this writ petition, the impugned case F.I.R. No, 495 registered on 1411-1991 at Police Station Civil Line, Rawalpindi and the and the consequent investigation proceedings on the basis thereof being conducted by the police authorities are declared to be illegal and, without a lawful authority and hence are quashed. Parties are left to bear their own costs.