Pakistan Case Lawโ† Search
1975 PLC 214

MOHAMMAD RAMZAN And 80 Other vs POWER-LOOM WORKERS' UNION

Citation1975 PLC 214
CourtLabour Appellate Tribunal
Judge(s)Muhammad Jamil Asghar
ResultN/A

JUDGMENT AII these are separate petitions under section 50 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 for the interpretation of the order dated 31-7-74 of Labour Court No. 3, passed under section 34 read with section 45 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. Since the question of fact and law involved in all these petitions is common, they will be disposed of together by one judgment.

2. All the petitioners are the owners of small power-loom units located in Mohallas Qadirabad and Rehmanabad Colony, Lyallpur who own 2 or 4 power-looms in their respective units and have employed karigars for attending to their respective power-looms which are electrically operated.

Respondents Nos. 1 and 4 are the registered bodies of the karigars and respondents Nos. 2, 3, 5 and 6 are the office-bearers of different offices of registered bodies.

3. Some time back a dispute arose between the employers and the karigars of Mohallah Faizabad of Ghulam Muhammadabad Colony, Lyallpur on the question of making payment to the latter for different kinds of leaves. The karigars of the small power-looms units, who are paid their wages as piece-rated workers, put up demands before their respective employers that they should also be paid for the leaves etc. but the employers did not accede to this demand on the ground that since they were piecerated workers, the West Pakistan Shops and Establishments Ordinance, 1969 and the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 were not applicable to them and they were not entitled to any payment in lieu of the leaves etc. The matter was referred to the Provincial Labour Department and through the intervention of the Secretary to the Punjab Government, Labour Department and the Joint Director, Labour Welfare, it was settled and an award was made on the 3rd of April 1974, whereby the parties were informed that the karigars of small power-loom units were governed by the aforesaid two statutes and were, therefore, entitled to payment in lieu of different kinds of leaves. This settlement, it may be pointed out, related only to the employers and the karigars of Mohallah Faizabad of Ghulam Muhammadabad Colony, Lyallpur and had nothing to do with the parties to these petitions.

4. Meanwhile a similar dispute arose between Babu Muhammad Tufajl, the owner of a power-loom unit in Mohallah Rehmanabad of Ghulam Muhammadabad Colony, Lyallpur and his karigars. This dispute was also referred to the Joint Director, Labour, Welfare, Sargodha Region, Lyallpur, who by his order dated 6-2-74 declared that West Pakistan Shops and Establishments Ordinance 1969, was applicable to the karigars of the power-loom units. Muhammad Tufail and another owner of power-loom unit, namely, Wali Muhammad son of Ali Sher filed writ petitions in the High Court challenging the validity of the aforesaid order dated 6-2-74 of the Joint Director, Labour Welfare but the petitions were dismissed on 31-5-74 by a Single Bench of the Lahore High Court. Only Muhammad Tufail filed a Letters Patent Appeal, which was admitted to a regular hearing and the operation of the aforesaid order of the Joint Director was suspended.

5. In the meantime the Federal Government had also allowed the Government servants as well as the employees of Commercial and Industrial Establishments Rs. 35 p.m. as cost of living allowance and Rs. 50 as dearness allowance. In addition to these allowances, the award dated 3-4-74 of the Joint Director, Labour Welfare, required the owners of the small power-loom units of Mohallah Faizabad of Ghulam Muhammadabad Colony, Lyallpur to pay as an ears Rs. 200 to the karigars who had put in one year's service, Rs. 150 to those who had put in 9 months' service and Rs. I0O to those who had put in 6 months' service.

6. Inspired by the aforesaid directions of the Federal Government and the award dated 3-4-74 of the Joint Director, the karigars of the small power-loom units in Mohallahs Qadirabad and Rehmanabad of Ghulam Muhammadabad Colony, Lyallpur also pressed their respective employers including the petitioners to pay Rs. 85 as desired by the Federal Government and Rs. 200 etc. as arrears in lieu of leaves as directed in the said award. The petitioners refused to accede to this demand on the ground that neither the West Pakistan Shops and Establishments Ordidance, 1969, and the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, were applicable to them nor were they bound to obey the award of the Joint Director, Labour Welfare because they were not party to it. While this dispute was still pending, it is alleged that the karigars of small power-loom units of Mohallahs Qadirabad and Rehmanabad went on strike on about 20-6-74 at different times. The petitioners who were the owners of the power-loom units, filed 130 separate petitions under section 34 read with section 45 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, praying for a direction to the respondents and the karigars to call off the strike and to resume duty. The learned Labour Court No. 3 passed ad interim order directing the karigars to resume duty within 24 hours. In obedience of these orders majority of the karigars except 133 karigars resumed duty. The learned Labour Court passed final order on 31-7-74 directing the karigars who had not turned up to resume duty within three days and directed the petitioners to give them the same emoluments which they were getting before.

7. In the body of the judgment the learned Labour Court made the following observations :-- "So far as question of illegal strike is concerned, if there was a strike then it definitely was illegal for the reason that it is nowhere in the evidence that any demand notice or strike notice was given by the workers for a strike. If we look towards definition of strike it means cessation of work by body of persons employed in any establishment acting in combination and under common understanding. If we consider every unit separately, then we can say that different units might have gone on illegal strike at different times and dates, but from the evidence of the petitioners it is very much clear that the workers of different Mohallahs of Ghulam Muhammadabad Colony did not go on illegal strike in combination of all the workers of Ghulam Muhammadabad with the common understanding as whole. It is nowhere in evidence to show their common understanding that all the workers of Ghulam Muhammadabad, under leadership of the respondent-Unions, held a meeting to go on illegal strike. As against it, it is in evidence that workers of 2 units close to each other never went on strike at one time. Rather workers of one unit struck work by Maghrab prayer and the other unit closed by 2 00 p m. and > et another at 4.00 p m. and this drama is alleged to have been staged for one week in Ghulam Muhammadabad. The fact of coming back to duty after prohibition order again supports the view of the workers might have gone on illegal strike through force and coercion by the aggressive elements of the workers of Ghulam Muhammadabad Power-loom Units as a whole."

8. The instant petitions have been filed because of the aforementioned observations.

9. Under section 50 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, the Tribunal is required to interpret an award or settlement, if any difficulty or doubt arises as to the interpretation of any of its provisions. Now the point which requires determination is as to whether the aforementioned order of Labour Court is an award or a settlement. It is obviously not a settlement. The learned counsel for the petitioners, however contended that it is an award. Award is defined under section 2(ii) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, which reads as follows :-- "Award means determination by a Labour Court, Arbitrator or Appellate Tribunal of any industrial dispute or any matter relating thereto and includes an interim award,"

10. Industrial dispute is for adjudicating industrial rights which are not in existence but are raised as demands, whereas section 34 is for the] enforcement of any right already guaranteed or secured by or under any law, or any award or settlement. In other words the scope of section 34A is very limited. From the record I find that petitions under section 34 read with section 45 were filed by the petitioners before the Labour Court for the prohibition of the strike. The learned counsel for the petitioners, however, contended that the petitions were in fact under section 32(1-A) and not under section 34 of Industrial Relations Ordinance. This contention has no force because a petition under section 45 is only competent if there is a petition under section 34 already pending before a Labour Court. Thus it is clear that the petitions were rightly filed under section 34, otherwise the petitioners could not have obtained the order from the Labour Court prohibiting the strike.

11. The learned counsel for the petitioners further contended that order under section 34 is an award because it is given in respect of an industrial dispute. In support of his contention he relied on the judgment of Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal in the case, Workers' Union v. Indus Chemicals and Alkalis Ltd., Karachi (1) wherein it was held : -- "According to the definition of "Industrial dispute" in section 2(xiii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, it would appear that the scope of section 34 of the Ordinance is very limited. It is not in respect of all industrial disputes that the Collective Bargaining Agent can make an application under section 34 of the Ordinance. It is only in respect of a limited kind of industrial dispute, namely, which is guaranteed or secured to workmen by or under any law for the time being in force or an award or settlement." It follows, therefore, that the application which can be made under section 34 of the Ordinance is not in respect of an industrial dispute as envisaged by section 43 of the Ordinance, but in respect of relief which the workmen are entitled under any law or award or settlement. The Collective Bargaining Agent, for instance, cannot raise an industrial dispute under section 34 of the Ordinance for bonus, house rent or uniform. These disputes can be raised only as industrial disputes.'* (1) 1972 PLC 220 This judgment does not help the petitioners. In fact it supports my view already expressed above. In the case, Employee's Union and others v.

Punjab Road Transport Corporation, Lahore (1)1 have already held that a decision.- under section 34 is not an award. Sind & Baluchistan High Court in thq case, Muhammad Aqil v. Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal, Pakistan Paper Products Company Ltd. (2) held :-- "Award has been defined in the Industrial Relations Ordinance as meaning determination by a Labour Court of any industrial dispute or any matter relating thereto. Can it be said that in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 34 of the Ordinance the Labour Court is determining an industrial dispute? From the language of section 34 it would appear that the Court does not under it either determine or adjudicate upon an industrial dispute. It certainly does not determine or adjudicate upon rights of the parties. The section merely provides for enforcement of pre-existing right and not determination or adjudication of right between the parties. In this view of the matter the decision of the industrial Court under section 34 would not fall within the meaning of the award as defined in Industrial Relations Ordinance, for award is determination of an industrial dispute or any matter relating thereto and not enforcement of a recognised right guaranteed to a workman under any law, settlement or award. The result is that an order under section 34 made by the Industrial Court in this case was not an award but a decision and, therefore, it was not appealable under section 37 of the said Ordinance."

12. In view of the above I hold that the impugned order of the Labour Court dated 31-7-74, whose interpretation is being sought, is not an award.

13. In the result the instant petitions are not competent and are, accordingly, dismissed as such. (1) 1972 PLC 484 (2) 1974 PLC 194

For educational and research use only โ€” not legal advice. Verify against the official report before relying on it. See our Disclaimer.
DisclaimerยทPrivacyยทTermsยทSearch