Both these appeals are against the judgment passed by the Punjab Labour Court, Northern Zone, Lahore, under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance,
169. Since the main point of law involved in both these appeals is as to whether a decision given under section 34, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, is appealable, these appeals on this point will be disposed of together by this order.
2. Mr. Mahmood Zaman, the learned counsel for one of the appellants contended that a decision of Labour Court under section 34, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, is an award and not a decision and, therefore, appealable. In support of his contention he relied upon the definition of an industrial dispute as given in clause (xiii) of section 2, Industrial Relations Ordi--nance, 1969, which reads as follows:- "'Industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen or between workmen and workmen, which is concerned with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employ--ment or the conditions of work of any person."
According to the learned counsel, an industrial dispute also related to the legal rights which are concerned with the employ--ment and non-employment of a workman. Such an application under section 34, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, for the enforcement of a legal right falls within the definition of indus--trial dispute in clause (xiii) of section 2 of the Ordinance. He also alleged that if the dispute is not covered by an existing settlement or an award or any other law, then the ordinary procedure of raising dispute under section 26(2) to section 32 will have to be followed. In other cases direct access is provided to the Court under section 34. He made a reference to section 35(5)(a), Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 which reads as follows:--- "A Labour Court shall adjudicate and determine an indus--trial dispute which has been referred to or brought before it under this Ordinance."
According to the learned counsel, under old law there were to kinds of industrial disputes which could be brought before the Labour Court. One was by a reference by the Government and the other under section 35(i)(a), if both the parties agreed then they could come before the Labour Court. By a latest amend--ment even a worker can bring the industrial dispute to the Labour Court in a limited sense by virtue of section 34 of the Ordinance. For convenience, it wilt be better to reproduce section 34 before and after the amendment. Before amendment, section 34 read as follows:- "Application to Labour Court.-Any party to an industrial dispute relating to a matter arising of any right guaranteed or secured to an employer or workman by or under any law for the the being in force or an award or settlement may apply to the Labour Court for adjudication of the dispute."
After the amendment it reads as follows:- "Application to Labour Court.-Any collective bargaining agent or any employer or workman may apply to the Labour Court for the enforcement of any right guaranteed or secured to it or him by or under any law or any award or settlement."
Thus it is obvious that after the amendment even an employer or workman has been given a right to apply to the Labour Court under section 34, which right had been previously denied to them. The contentions raised by the learned counsel have no force because of the limitation imposed upon the raising of industrial disputes by section 43, which reads as follows: "Raising of industrial disputes.-No industrial dispute shall be deemed to exist unless it has been raised in the prescribed manner by a collective bargaining agent or an employer."
The learned counsel further argued that according to the defini--tion of an award as given under section 2(ii) means not only the determination of an industrial dispute but also a matter relating to an industrial dispute. Section 2(ii) reads as follows:- " `Award' means the determination by the Labour Court, Arbitrator or Appellate Tribunal of any industrial dispute or any matter relating thereto and includes an interim award."
According to the learned counsel, the matter under consideration is a matter relating to an industrial dispute and, therefore, judg--ment under section 34 becomes an award and not a decision. Hence they are appealable.
3. Mr. Nazir Ahmad Naz, who represented one of the appellants stated that he did not wish to add to the arguments advanced by Mr. Mahmood Zaman. He merely cited some judgments of Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal wherein it was taken for granted that decisions of a Labour Court under section 34 were awards and hence appealable. In these judg--ments no reasons were given for arriving at this conclusion. Hence they are of no use for the determination of the point in issue.
4. Mr. Abdul Majid Qureshi, representative of one of the respondents against whose re-instatement appeal had been filed, straightaway conceded with the proposition laid down by Mr. Mahmood Zaman. The counsel- for the other respondents Muhammad Zaman Qureshi, vehemently opposed the arguments advanced by Mr. Mahmood Zaman. He argued that an applica--tion under section 34 is in the nature of enforcement of pre--determined right in an award or settlement or any law and that section 34 comes into operation when there is no industrial dispute in relation to that right pending and that the said right has already been pre-determined under any law, award or settle-- ment. According to him an award comes into existence when ft gets finality. Therefore, before making any application under section 34, the, a must be an award, settlement or law in existence.
He went on to argue that awards and decisions only under section 25-A(4) are appealable. He, further, argued that the scheme of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 shows that there are to sets of judgments which can only be delivered by the Labour Court i,e, awards and decisions under section 25.A(4) and other decisions not falling under the above category. It is well estab--lished that only awards and decisions under section 25. A(4) are appealable, as given in section 37(3), which reads as follows:- "Any party aggrieved by an award given under subsection (1) or a decision of the Labour Court under subsection (4) of section 25-A may prefer an appeal to Labour Appellate Tribunal within 30 days of the delivery thereof and the decision of the Tribunal in such appeal shall be final."
This is also clear from section 38(3) which reads as follows:-- "The tribunal may, on appeal, confirm, set aside, vary or modify the award or decision and shall exercise all the powers conferred by this Ordinance on the Labour Court, save as otherwise provided."
Thus it would appear that all other decisions not falling under section 38(3) are not appealable as the Labour Court is the final Authority. If the intention of the Legislature was to make all the decisions of the Labour Court appealable then the Labour Court could not have been made the final authority.
5. If what the learned counsel for the appellant has argued is accepted, then section 37(3) and (4) would become a nullity. Section 37(3) has already been reproduced above. Section 37(4) which has not been reproduced, reads as follows:- "All decisions of Labour Court, other than awards and decisions referred to in subsection (3) of this section, and sentences referred to in subsection (3) of section 36, shall be final and shall not be called in question in any manner by or before any Court or other authority."
This is absolutely not only contrary to the intention of the law makers but also against the well- recognised rule of interpretation of statutes. In the case Syed Shin Gul v. Haji Abdul Majid (PLD 1968 Quetta 45) It was held:- "That it is a well-recognised rule of interpretation of statutes that every word of an enactment is meaningful and significant. The Legislature does not employ redundant words In statutes, and that effect is to be given to every word."
In the case of Mst. Rup Devi v. Matwal Chand (PLD 1968 Lah. 800) it was held :- "It is a well established canon of the construction of statutes that a construction should be placed on the language employed in a section which does not render any part of that section or the words employed in that section superfluous or negatory or wholly redundant,"
In the case of Abdul Jamil v. Registrar, Trade Unions, West Pakistan, Lahore and another (PLD 1971 Lah. 220) it was held:- "It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes that no word used in it is superfluous and that it should be so inter--preted as not to render any provision redundant or useless."
This decision was given after placing reliance on the judgments in Quebec Railways, Light Heat & Power Co. Ltd. v. Vandry, and others (AIR1920PC181) and Queen v. Bishop of Oxford ((1879)4PBD245).
In Quebec Railways, Light, Heat & Power Co. Ltd. v. Vandry and others it was held :- "Effect must be given if possible to all the words used, for the Legislature i3 deemed not to waste its words or to say any--thing in vain."
In Queen v. Bishop of Oxford it was held :- "A statue ought to be so construed that no part of it shall be superfluous, void or nugatory."
I, accordingly, accept the contentions raised by Mr. Muhammad Zaman Qureshi, counsel for one of the respondents in the appeals.
In the result, I hold that a judgment of a Labour Court under section 34, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is not an award and hence not appealable. I accordingly, dismiss both the appeals as being incompetent.
Before parting with this order, I wish to note that both counsel, Mr. Mahmood Zaman and Mr. Muhammad Zaman Qureshi, who appeared before me very ably argued their cases.