ABDUL SHAKURUL SALAM, J.---This is an appeal against the order of a learned Judge of the Lahore High Court, Multan Bench, dated 6-12-1983 whereby the Constitutional petition of the respondent Central Directorate of National Savings, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad was allowed vide order dated 6-12-1983.
1. Relevant facts are that Faqir Muhammad appellant appointed as a Chowkidar on 19-1-1974 by the Director, National Savings, Multan Region, Multan. He was posted at Chichawatni. After five years of service he was removed on 9-5-1979. He filed a petition under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. It was contested by the Director, National Savings on the ground that the appellant was a civil servant and not a workman. The contention was rejected and the petition was allowed. It was ordered that the appellant be reinstated in service with back benefits. This is vide order of the Punjab Labour Court No. 9, Multan, dated 30-3-1981. The Director of National Savings, Multan Region, filed an appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore. 1t was contended that the appellant was a civil servant as the Department in which he was employed was a Department of the Government. The contention was repelled by the learned Appellate Tribunal with the observation that "this argument is devoid of force". The Departments of the Government which come within the definition of Industrial or Commercial Establishments are subject to Labour Laws and the employees who come within the definition of workmen given in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 or Standing Orders Ordinance, 1908 are entitled to come to Labour Court for redress. It has not been shown that the respondent-department comes within the exception given in section 1 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 or that the respondent was employed in the Administration of State, therefore, Labour Laws are applicable to him. There is no evidence as regards the duties of the respondent. It, therefore, cannot b;~; said that he is ousted from the definition of workman. The stand taken by the appellant was not that the respondent, according to his duties, was not a workman as defined m the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 or Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 meaning that no objection was raised in this respect". The appeal was accordingly dismissed on 22-12-1981.
2. The .171reehpfate filed a Constitutional petition in the High Court which as stated above, was allowed by a learned Judge on the ground that the appellant was working as a Chowkidar/Gunman and as such his duty would be that of security staff and such staff does not fall in the category of workman. Hence this appeal.
3. Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently contended that the appellant being a Chowkidar/Gunman was a workman under the definition of "workman" as given under section 2(xxviii) of the I.R.O. And he.Placed reliance on "Organization of Karachi Port Trust Workers (A Registered Trade Union) Karachi v. Karachi Port Trust, Karachi and 2 others" (1988 SCM R 922).
Learned counsel also referred to a Notification of the Finance Department SRO-995-(1)90, dated 18-9-1990, though of a subsequent date than the dispute arose in this case, to show that certain employees of National Saving Organization were declared as `employer' so as to exclude them from the purview of the I.R.O. The contention is that the employees otherwise would have been according to the Department itself covered by the provisions of the I.R.O. Then he quoted a number of judgments of the Labour Appellate Tribunals. He relied upon "The General Secretary, Provincial Buildings Employees' Union, Hyderabad v. The Executive Engineer, Provincial Buildings Division and another 1972 PLC 285, wherein it was meld that employee of the Provincial Buildings Department like an Operator-cum-Driver was. Held to be entitled to relief under I.R.O. As regards the contention that they were excluded under section 1(3) of the I.R.O. For being employed "in the administration of State", it was observed that "there is a line of demarcation in the functions undertaken by Government which can be divided into two classes of cases, namely:
(i) the primary and inalienable function of a Government.
(ii) the function undertaken by the State but which is primary subject of private individual enterprise such as construction of houses, roads, buildings etc. It is difficult to define as to what are the primary functions of the Government. Some assistance, however can be derived from the observation of Isaacs, J., in The Federated State School Teachers Association of Australia v. The State of Victoria (1) which is reproduced by Iqbal, J. In Management of Municipal Committee, Mianwali, In re: (2). It runs as under:- "Regal functions are unescapable and inalienable. Such are the Legislature power, the administration of laws, the exercise of the judicial power. Non-regal functions may be assumed by means of legislative power. But when they are assumed the State acts simply as a huge corporation with its legislation as the charter. Its action under the legislation, so far as it is not regal execution of law is merely analogous to that of a private company similarly authorised."
In the case in hand the appellant who was a chowkidar was not performing administration functions in the sense of "governing or managing" in the Provincial Building Sub-Division, Tando Jam. This decision was followed in the case reported as "The General Secretary, Sindh Signallers & Telephone Operators' Association, Hyderabad v. The Registrar of Trade Unions" 1973 PLC 40. In the case reported as "Secretary to Government Punjab, Agriculture Department and 3 others v. Field Workers' Union EA.D.A. Lyallpur" (1976 PLC 13). It was held that the Field Workers of Agriculture Department like malis, sweepers, chowkidars, watchmen, etc. Were not persons employed in the administration of the State to be excluded from the purview of Ordinance. Dispute concerning them was not beyond jurisdiction of Labour Court, under the I.R.O. In the case reported as "Registrar, Trade Unions v. Tubewell Drivers, Water Supply and Sewerage Staff Union, L.I.T., Lahore" (1977 PLC 476) it was held that though the employees of Lahore Development Authority were declared as public servants for the limited purpose of the P.P.C., yet "the employees of the Authority like Tubewell Drivers and workers connected with water supply and sewerage can by no stretch of imagination be deemed to be the persons employed `in the administration of the State' and therefore, they are not hit by the provisions of section 1(3) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. In the case reported as "Secretary, Government of the Punjab, Communications and Works Department and another v. Muhammad Rafi" (1978 PLC 158) it was held that Workcharge Electrician in Buildings Department of Punjab Government were held not excluded from the operation of the I.R.O. Because they cannot be said to be employees in the "administration of the State" within the meaning of section 1(3) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, nor they were civil servant. In the case reported as "Employees Union, Jamia Karachi v. Regisrtrar Trade Unions Sindh and 2 others"
1981 PLC 403 a learned Division Bench of the Sindh High Court (members of which are now Judges of this Court) referred with approval an earlier decision of the aforesaid Court to the effect that the expression "administration of State" is to be interpreted in the limited and narrow sense of the practical management and direction of the executive or of the operation of, various organs of the sovereign or conducting or carrying on of the details of the Government". In the case reported as "State Bank of Pakistan v. Abdul Khaliq" NLR 1982 Labour 144, the relevant facts were that the respondent Abdul Khaliq was a Chowkidar employed by the State Bank. He having been dismissed by Manager of the Quetta Branch of the Bank and having lost his appeal before the Governor of the State Bank, filed a suit for declaration against the order of his dismissal. An objection was taken on behalf of the State Bank that the Civil Court could not entertain the suit in view of the provisions of I.R.O., 1969 which was rejected and the revision failed. The trial Court however dismissed the suit of the respondent but the latter succeeded on appeal. The State Bank filed a Second Appeal which was dismissed by the High Court of Balochistan. Leave to appeal was sought by the State Bank inter alia on the ground that the High Court was in error in holding that the respondent was a person employed in the administration of the State and hence provisions of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 were not applicable to his case. Leave to appeal was granted. From the facts it would be apparent that the case of the State Bank of Pakistan was that a Chowkidar of the Bank was not a person employed in the "administration of the State" and therefore, could not be excluded from the I.R.O. And that being so, the respondent in the case should have gone to the Labour Court rather than to the ordinary Civil Court. In the case reported as "E.O.B.I. Employees Federation v. M/s: E.O.B.I. Karachi" 1985 PLC 891 the National Industrial Relations Commission, Islamabad relied on the decision of Sindh Road Transport Corporation and others v. Staff Union and others" 1975 PLC 361 wherein it was held that "the expression of administration of S_tate_is to be interpreted in a liZ07rWricted--sense to the performance of _sovere~ regaland inalienable governmental functions of the State pertaining to the performance of the Constitutional functions of Government Federal, Provincial, Loca-T~rut~or ~y,ierformed by employees engaged by Governments in departments like justice, defence, taxation, legislature. Not all Government servants are excluded from the purview of the said Ordinance, as will appear from the fact that the persons employed in certain Government departments like the Railway; Posts, Telephone and Telegraph are excluded and even establishments run by or under the authority of the Federal Government or Provincial Governments or Local Authorities are mentioned in the definition of `employer' under section 2(viii) of the said Ordinance. Merely because Article 38(c) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan provides that it is the function and duty of the State to provide social security through Compulsory Social Insurance or other means to all persons employed in the service of Pakistan does not make employees of an independent statutory Corporation which has been established by the Government to fulfil the aforesaid constitutional duty and function, as its Agent or on his behalf as persons employed, in the "administration of the State". It maybe noticed at this stage thdt this case after having been through the High Court came up before this Court in "Employees' Old-Age Benefit Institution v. National Industrial Relations Commission" (1988 SCM R 765) wherein it was contended that "the employees of the institution were outside of the Industrial Relations Ordinance in view of the clauses (b) and (f) of section 1(3) and clause (xiv) of section 2 of the Ordinance". It was argued that "under Articles 37 and 38 of the Constitution it is the responsibility of the State to promote social justice and in particular promote social security by compulsory social insurance and to afford relief to citizens who are permanently or temporarily unable to earn their livelihood on account of infirmity, sickness or unemployment. It is in discharge of these responsibilities that the Federal Government has set up the institution. Its management is vested in a board of trustees whose members are appointed by the Government and are deemed to be public servants. As its employees perform functions which are relatable to the Constitutional responsibilities of the State they fall in the category of persons employed in the administration of State within the meaning of clause (b) of section 1(3)". Repelling the contention this Court held that "it is difficult to accept this contention". It was observed that "the State has multifarious functions to perform in different fields in discharge of its Constitutional responsibilities, affecting the citizens in almost all walks of life. For this reason it is the largest employer of manpower in the country. If all persons who are concerned with implementing Constitutional responsibilities of the State, are to be treated as employed in the administration of State within the meaning of clause (b) of section 1(3) of the Ordinance it will, as a consequence, effectively put the largest employer in the country beyond the reach of labour laws. This could hardly be the intention behind clause (b). It is to be noticed that certain categories of State employees, for example, those serving in defence forces and police, have been expressly excluded from the ambit of the Ordinance, even though they too discharge duties relatable to the Constitutional responsibilities of the State. If clause (b), ibid, was intended to cover all those who were employed in connection with the Constitutional responsibilities of the State it would have been unnecessary to specifically exclude certain categories of State employees by name. Quite obviously, the expression administration of State has been used in a limited sense in the said clause. In Sindh Road Transport Corporation v. Staff Union (1975 PLC 361) this expression came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Sindh High Court and the learned Judges took the view:- 'The expression `administration of the State' is to be interpreted in the limited and narrow sense of the practical management and direction of the excutive machinery or the operation of the various organs of the sovereign or the conducting or carrying on of the details of the Government."
We see no reason to place a different interpretation on the clause. In the case reported as "Project Director, Karkhana Alaat-e-Zari, Bahawalpur v. The Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court and others" PLD 1989 SC 152 the respondents were employees of Karkhana Alaat-e-Zari, Bahawalpur an Enterprise of the Cooperative Board. They got relief from the Labour Court.
The Project Director having lost writ petition in the High Court filed an appeal before this Court. It was contended that "by notification issued under the West Pakistan Cooperative Board (Dissolution) Act, Karkhana was declared a Project and not a Industry" and further that "the employees of the Karkhana Alaat-e-Zari fell under the definition of public servant' and as such I.R.O. Was not applicable". It was also contended that the public servants of the Agriculture Department are engaged in the "administration of the State" and as such they are excluded from the sphere of Industrial Relations Ordinance on the strength of subsection (3) of section 1 and the jurisdiction of the Junior Labour Court was barred". It was added that "the Administrator had been appointed under section 4 of the Coopertive Board (Dissolution) Act, 1966 and the employees of the said Karkhana are now to be governed by statutory rules of service framed by the Punjab Government and the provisions of Industrial Relations Ordinance will not be applicable to the respondents in all the appeals." Contentions were repelled and after survey of the case-law approving interpretation of the phrase 'the administration of the State, it was observed by the Court that the respondent "being mere clog in vast and expanding machinery of State with no administration functions much less any directional or policy control cannot be said to be employed in the `administration of State' within the meaning of section 1(3) of the Ordinance."
4. The learned Deputy Attorney-General on the other hand contended that the appellant was an employee of Central Directorate of National Savings, an attached department of the Federal Government. Therefore, the Labour Courts did not have any jurisdiction in the matter. He relied on "Canteen Stores Department Employees Welfare Union, Karachi v. Canteen Stores Department and others" 1983 SCM R 1101. A perusal of the judgment would however show that the Canteen Stores Department IJniun was de-registered and its efforts for the recognization under the I.R.O. Failed when its appeal was dismissed by this Court on the ground that "it had noL only to supply the entitled personnel with articles of standard quality of daily use, but what is more important to form the basis of an efficient Canteen Orgnisation in peace and war for troops located anywhere in the country and operational areas during the war." This aspect of the purposes of C.S.D. Clearly makes it out to be an Organization connected with Armed Forces, and hence covered by exemptions prescribed in subsection (3) of section 1 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. It is in the context irrelevant whether it is a Government department or a private commercial organisation, because certain categories of the employees of the Government are in fact commercial organization stand excluded from its operation as was the case of United Builders and Associates". Thus it will be seen that the employees fell in the category of persons concerned with Armed Forces who were expressly excluded. He then referred to "The Controller Stationery & Forms, Government of Pakistan v. The Registrar, Trade Unions, Sindh and others PLD 1991 SC 353 wherein after the survey of the relevant precedents it was observed "in order to bring an employee within one of the categories excluded by subsection (3) of section 1 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 it is not necessary that the finance or the funds should come from the Government or installations should be under the control and management of a Government department and not under the management and control of a corporate body, but what is important is whether the person is employed inter alia in any of the Armed Forces of Pakistan or in services or installations connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan or in the administration of the State. Keeping in view the functions of the appellant which not only supplies the printing materials to the various organisations relating to the Armed Forces but also caters for the requirements of all other Government departments and other State organs/functionaries, and which are used inter alia for facilitating communications between the various Armed Forces establishments and other Government functionaries and without which no Government department can function, it can be concluded that the appellant's employees are covered by clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (3) of section 1 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. It may be pertinent to point out that in the aforesaid clause (b) of subsection (3) of persons employed as workmen by the Railway, Posts, Telegraph and Telephone Departments, have been excluded from the expression in the administration of the State for the purpose of application of the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. It can, therefore, be concluded that the law-makers wanted to exclude the workmen of the departments specified in clause (b) of section 1(3) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and :not other workmen who may be employed in the administration of the State."
5. This appeal is liable to be disposed of on the short ground as to whether the respondent was a workman or not. The contention raised by the learned Deputy Attorney-General that the respondent was employed in an `attached department' of the Federal Government was disposed of by the learned Judge of the High Court with the observations that "as regards the contention that the labour laws are not attracted to the Director of National Savings no specific finding can be given in general terms because the touchstone will be the persons employed in a particular Orgnization and whether he is a workman or not. The Organization itself may or may not havc a bearing on the question of applicability of the labour laws but the work or duties assigned to the employees will. In the present case the duties of Faqir Muhammad respondent No. 3, therefore, will determine the question whether he is workman or not". The learned Judge then held the since Faqir Muhammad was working as Chowkidar/Gunman his duties were those of security staff and such staff is not treated as a workman. With respect to the learned Judge, it is no more correct law that such like persons are not workman in view of the judgment, quoted by the learned counsel for the appellant, of this Court i.e. "Organisation of Karachi Port Trust Workers (A Registered Trade Union)
Karachi v. Karachi Port Trust, Karachi and 2 others"
(1988 SCMR 922). The appeal is, therefore, liable to succeed on this score.
6. However in view of the large number of cases cited by the learned counsel for the appellant and the contention of the learned Deputy AttorneyGeneral that as the respondent was employed in an `attached department' of the Government, therefore, Labour Laws do not apply, something may be said. All employees of the Government including those of attached departments are not ipso facto employed "in the administration of the State" in terms of section (3)(b) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. To recapitulate, the phrase "administration of the State" was first explained in a Division Bench judgment of the Sindh High Court whose Judges now adorn this Court as follows:- "The expression `administration of the State' is to be interpreted in the limited and narrow sense of the practical management and direction of the executive machinery or the operation of the various organs of the soveriegn or the conducting or carrying on the details of the Government This statement was quoted with approval by this Court comprising of five learned Judges in the case of "Employees' Old-Age Benefit Institution v. National Industrial Relations Commission and others" 1988 SCM R 765, wherein it was observed that the functions of the appellant institution were "not relatable to any Soveriegn functions of the State nor are they such that there may be said as pertaining to conduct or carrying on the details of the Government. Clearly, its employees are not covered by the exclusion clause (b)". In the case of "Project Director, Karkhana Alaat-e-Zari, Bahawalpur v. The Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court and 6 others" PLD 1989 SC 152, it was held by this Court consisting of three learned Judges that the word "Administration of the State" means persons employed by the State in connection with the activities of the State in exercise of its political powers, including the action of legislative, judicial and executive wings". A State stands on three pillars, Legislature, Executive and Judiciary. Legislature legislates-does not administer.
Judiciary administers justice--does not administer the State. We are left with the Executive. Does it administer the State? It does--in respect of the sovereign functions of the State, like maintaining law and order, conducting foreign affairs, defence of the realm etc. But besides these sovereign functions, in the modern State the Executive is also entrusted with multifarious functions pertaining to the ordinary needs of the people like providing them shelter, educational facilities, medical assistance etc. Either through its own employees or other organisations. Therefore, . When the Executive is performing its sovereign function of `Administrating the State', its employees will fall in the category of persons `employed in the Administration of the State'--not otherwise. One has also to keep in view that there is a distinction of an employee being of the State or Government. State and Government are not synonymous. More need not be said and the matter can be further examined when more appropriate occasion arises. This appeal is liable to succeed on the short ground that the appellant was a Chowkidar in an attached department and by no stretch of imagination can be said to be a person employed in the "administration of the State" in terms of section 1(3)(b) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. He was granted relief by the Labour Courts but the order was set aside by a learned Judge on the ground that he was not a workman which does not hold water any more in view of the decision of this Court in "Organization of Karachi Port Trust Workers (A Registered Trade Union), Karachi v. Karachi Port Trust, Karachi and two others"
1988 SCM R 922.
7. For the reasons given above, the appeal is allowed but in view of the legal questions involved the parties are left to bear their own costs.
MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, C J.---With regret I am unable to agree that the Department of the Government concerned in this case which has been assumed as an "attached department" is not concerned "in the administration of the State. Amongst others I also do not agree that "legislature legislates and the judiciary administer justice, therefore, they do not administer the State." In my view, according to our Constitutional set up the three organs; namely the legislature, the judiciary and the executive do administer the State. I also do not agree, with respect, that "administration of the State" is only with regard to the performance of those functions by the State which are "sovereign functions". Sovereignty in our State does not reside in the executive.
The phrase "in the administration of the State" has been used in the Industrial Relations Ordinance- -Section 1(3)(b) which reads as follows: "Section 1. Short,, extent, application and commencement.
(1) ------------
(2) ------------
(3) It shall not apply to any person employed--
(a) in the Police or any of the Defence Services of Pakistan or any services or installations connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan including an Ordnance Factory maintained by the Federal Government; or
(b) in the administration of the State other than those employed as workmen by the Railway, Posts, Telegraph and Telephone Departments; or
(c) as a member of the Security Staff of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, or drawing wages in such pay group, not lower than group V, in the establishment of that Corporation as the Federal Government may, in the public interest or in the interest of security of the Airlines, by notification in the official Gazette, specify ;in this behalf; or
(d) by the Pakistan Television Corporation or the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation; or
(e) by the Pakistan Security Printing Corporation or the Security Papers Limited [; or]
(f) by an establishment maintained for the treatment or care of sick, infirm, destitute as mentally unfit persons."
The controversial question is as to whether the Department of Central Directorate of National Savings, which is an attached Department of the Federal Government, can or cannot be included in the administration of the State. The case-law surveyed by my learned brother relating to many Departments of the Government need not be re-examined as the circumstances, case-wise, are not identical and I would agree that a legitimate difference of approach might be possible from case to case. However, it will not be proper to interpret or administer the relevant law by keeping one factor as the most important one; that if a certain department is kept out or remains out of the ambit of administration of the State it will be good or beneficial to its workmen. There might be still cases in which the workman may not like to go to the Forums provided by the Labour Laws and he might seek one or more other efficacious remedies. This again will depend upon the circumstances of each case. The other factor that the appellant in this case, a poor Chowkidar, having already suffered the agony of litigation before the Labour Forum would suffer further hardship if it is held that he had no real and legal remedy before the said Forums is also not enough to deter correct declaration of law. .
The Department of National Savings, it is well-known, is now administering. The savings ,branch of the State administration. It is an attached Department of the Federal Government. Keeping in view the above feature as also the other feature; namely, that it deals with finance as attached with the Finance administration of the Central Government and is very vital otherwise for the administration of State, next only perhaps to very few Government Departments, the presumption would be that its functions are indeed "in the administration of the State:" Learned counsel for the appellant failed to point out even a single feature of this Department which might have justified any further investigation in this behalf. I, therefore, would hold that it is engaged in the administration of the State. The appellant undoubtedly is employed in the said Department as a Chowkidar likely any time to guard/protect Government money. The employees of the Supreme Court in this category or for that matter in the Ministries and Departments of the Central Government even if technically be described workmen would, by virtue of the exclusion contained in section 1(3)(b) of the I.R.O., be excluded from the application of the said law. In this behalf it is important to note that innumerable workmen in the Railway, Posts, Telegraph and Telephone Departments would have similarly been excluded from the purview of the Ordinance if they would not have been (by specific provision) made subject to the same in the same clause: namely, section 1(3), clause (b). In other words the employees including workmen in the Railway, Posts, Telegraph and Telephone Departments would not have been able to seek application of the Industrial Relations Ordinance unless they would not have been specifically declared as covered by the Ordinance.
In the light of the foregoing discussion with respect, I would not venture to hold the view expressed by my learned brother that: "The appellant was a chowkidar in an attached Department and by no stretch of imagination can be said to be a person employed in the administration of the State in terms of section 1(3)(b) of the industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969."
Therefore, I would dismiss this appeal with no order as to costs.
MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULI.AH, C J.---Difference of opinion having arisen in the subject appeal, it is referred to Hon. J(4) for hearing the same as a result of difference of opinion.
SAAD SAOOD JAN, J: --This appeal by special leave has been referred to me for hearing consequent upon a difference of opinion between the learned Chief Justice and my learned brother Abdul Shakurul Salam, J. The facts giving rise to this appeal are as follows.
2. Faqir Muhammad, appellant, was appointed as officiating Chowkidar in the National Savings Centre at Chichawatni with effect from 19-3-1974. The appointment was temporary and his services were terminable after notice for a period of not less than fourteen days. He continued to hold the post till 1979 when the strength of the establishment at the Centre was reviewed and the post of Chowkidar was declared redundant. Consequently, by an order dated 9-5-1979 his services were terminated after giving him notice for a period of fourteen days. He felt aggrieved by the order of termination of his services and filed a petition under section 25-A, Industrial Relations Ordinance before a Labour Court to call in question his retrenchment from service. The petition was resisted by the Director of the Centre, inter alia, on the plea that the appellant was not a civil servant and as such the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain his petition. The Labour Court rejected the plea and held that the appellant was neither employed in connection with the administration of the State nor was he a civil servant and that it had the competence to entertain the petition. It then went on to hold that the order of termination of his services was unlawful as it did not disclose any supporting reason. Accordingly, it directed his reinstatement in service with back benefits. From the order of the Labour Court, the Director filed an appeal before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal but it was dismissed. The Director then filed a Constitution petition in the High Court. A learned Single Judge accepted the petition solely on the ground that the Chowkidar was not a worker or workman within the meaning of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and as such he could not move the Labour Court for the redress of his grievance. From the order of the learned Single Judge the appellant has preferred the present appeal.
3. The view taken by the High Court that the chowkidar is not a workman within the meaning of clause (xxviii) of section 2, Industrial Relations Ordinance, is not sustainable. The said clause reads as follows: "`Worker' and `workman' mean any person not falling within the definition of employer who is employed (including employment (as a Supervisor or) as an apprentice) in an establishment or industry for hire or reward either directly or through a contractor whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purpose of any proceeding under this Ordinance in relation to an industrial dispute includes a person who has been dismissed, discharged, retrenched, laid-off or otherwise removed from employment in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge, retrenchment, lay-off, or removal has led to that dispute but does not include any person--
(a) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity, or
(b) who, being employed in a supervisnrv capacity draws wages exceeding rupees eight hundred per mensem or performs, either because of the nature of duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of managerial nature."
At the relevant time the appellant was in the. Lowest national pay scale and his pay did not exceed Rs.100. Admittedly, he was not an employer nor was he employed in any managerial or administrative capacity. He thus did fall within the definition of a workman as given in the Ordinance.
4. Now, the Industrial Relations Ordinance does not extend to all workers or workmen. Section 1(3) expressly excludes certain categories of employees from its purview. One of the excluded categories relates to persons employed "in the administration of the State". It is not disputed that the Central Directorate of National Savings is an attached department of the Ministry of the Finance in the Federal Government. Thus, the persons serving in the Central Directorate. Are the direct employees of the Federal Government. The learned Chief Justice was of the view that the appellant, serving as he was in one of the- regional offices of the Directorate, was a person falling within the excluded category and for that reason he could not invoke the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance to seek relief from the Labour Court. On the other hand, in the opinion of my learned brother, Abdul Shakurul Salam, J., the function performed by the appellant did not by any stretch of imagination relates to the `adminsitration of State' within the meaning of section 1(3) and as such he could take advantage of the Industrial Relations Ordinance to obtain redress against his retrenchment from service.
5. The proposition upon which the learned Chief Justice and my learned brother differed has already been examined by me in the case of Employees' Old-Age Benefit Institution v. N.I.R.C. (1988 SCM R 765). In this case I was of the view that the expression `the administration of the State' had been used in the Industrial Relations Ordinance in a limited and narrow sense. In this context I stated: ---The State has multifarious functions to perform in different fields in discharge of its Constitutional responsibilities, affecting the citizens in almost all walks of life. For this reason it is the largest employer of manpower in the country. If all persons who are concerned with implementing Constitutional responsibilities of the State, are to be treated as employed in the administration of State within the meaning of clause (b) of section 1(3) of the Ordinance it will, as a consequence, effectively put the largest employer in the country beyond the reach of labour laws. This could hardly be the intention behind clause (b). It is to be noticed that certain categories of State employees, for example, those serving in defence forces and police, have been expressly excluded from the ambit of the Ordinance, even though they discharge duties relatable to the Constitutional responsibilities of the State. If clause (b), ibid, was intended to cover all those who were employed in connection with the Constitutional responsibilities of the State it would have been unnecessary to specifically exclude certain categories of State employees by name. Quite obviously, the expression `administration of State' has been used in a limited sense in the said clause. In Sindh Road Transport Corporation v. Staff Union 1975 PLC 361 this expression came up for consideration before a Division Bench of the Sindh High Court and the learned Judges took the view: `the expression `administration of the State' is to be interpreted in a limited and narrow sense of the practical management and direction of the executive machinery or the operation of the various organs of the sovereign or the conducting or carrying on of the details of the Government.
We see no reason to place a different interpretation on the clause."
Following the test laid down in this judgment I am inclined to agree with my learned brother that the appellant, being a Chowkidar in a directorate concerned with mobilizing savings in the country, can hardly be described as a person employed in the administration of the State.
6. But then this is not the end of the matter. There is another aspect which was not brought to the notice of the Bench which heard the appeal but had a material bearing on the fate of the appeal. It is to be noticed that the Labour Court treated his grievance petition as one under Standing Order 12(3), West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, and it set aside the order of termination of his services on the sole ground that the said order did not explicitly state the reason why his services were being terminated. Now, the said Ordinance, as the first proviso to section 1(4) thereof states, does not apply to establishment carried on by or under the authority of the Federal or any Provincial Govenment where statutory rules of service, conduct or discipline are applicable to the workmen employed therein. In this case, as is very clear from his letter of appointment, the appellant was to be governed by the rules applicable to Government servants. Thus, paragraph 1(7) of the letter stated: "He will be subject to such laws, rules, orders and instructions as the Government may issue from time to time."
It need hardly be pointed out that the rules of service, conduct and discipline framed by the Government are relatable to section 25, Civil Servants Act, and are as such statutory in nature. It was not disputed on behalf of the appellant that these rules were applicable to him. That being so, he belonged to a category of employees to whom the Ordinance did not extend. Consequently, he could not take advantage of Standing Order 12(3) to challenge his removal from service before the Labour Court.
7. There is yet another aspect of the matter. As an employee of the Federal Government he held a civil post in connection with the affairs of the Federation. Thus he was a civil servant within the definition of the term as given in the Civil Servants Act, 1973. Under section 3(2), Services Tribunals Act, 1973, the Federal Service Tribunal has the-exclusive jurisdiction in respect of matters relating to the terms and conditions of a civil servant. On account of the bar contained in Article 212(2) of the Constitution, the Labour Courts were not competent to entertain the appellant's petition. In the circumstances the orders of the Labour Court and the Appellate Tribunal must be held to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. I would support the judgment of the learned Chief Justice, although on grounds of my own. Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.