AJMAL MIAN, J.-- Leave to appeal was granted from the judgment dated 21-8-1984 passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Sindh in Constitutional Petition No,S-100 of 1984 filed by the appellant, dismissing the same to consider the question, whether the workers of the appellant even after their absorption into permanent posts of the appellant were not covered by the expression 'in the administration of the State' used in subsection (3) of section 1 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, hereinafter referred to as the I.R.O.
2. The facts to be noted are that respondent No,2 was granted by respondent No,1 a certificate certifying it as a Collective Bargaining Agent under section 22 of the I.R.O. On or about 30-10-1983.
The appellant filed aforesaid constitutional petition in the High Court of Sindh at Karachi for seeking a declaration that the I.R.O. Is not applicable to the appellant. The appellant also sought direction against respondent No,2 to the effect that he be directed to proceed to cancel the registration of respondent No,2 under section 10 of the I.R.O. Stay was also sought against the operation of the aforesaid certificate. The above petition was resisted by respondent No,2 inasmuch as a counter- affidavit was filed in which it was averred that respondent No,2 was a registered trade union since 1973. It was further averred that a charter of demands was submitted in 1973 and upon failure of conciliation, respondent No,2 sought an award from the Labour Court. However, the Labour Court on 4-6-1974 declined respondent No,2's aforesaid application on the ground that the appellant was administered by the Central Government and, therefore, was exempted from the provisions of I.R.O. Thereupon, respondent No,2 filed an appeal before the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal but without any success. After that respondent No,2 filed Constitutional Petition No,1484 of 1973 in the High Court of Sindh which was allowed by a Division Bench on 11-3-1980. The operative portion of the above judgment of the Division Bench reads as follows:-- "that the expression "in the administration of State" had to be considered in a limited and narrow sense and that the petitioners workmen were employed in the department as labourers, it cannot be maintained by any stretch of the expression " in the administration of State", within the meanings of subsection (3) of section 1 of the Ordinance."
' The learned Judges of the Division Bench while arriving at the aforesaid conclusion quoted with approval the following observation of another Bench of the same Court in Constitutional Petition No,302 of 1974 which was filed by Sindh Government Workers Union:-- "The workmen employed in the respondent Press being mere clogs in the vast and expanding machinery of the State, with no administrative functions much less any directional or policy control, cannot therefore be said to be employed in the, administration of the State within the meaning of expression occurring in the aforesaid subsection (3) of section 1 of the I.R.O."
' The learned single Judge of the High Court after hearing the parties by a judgment under appeal held that the question, whether the appellant's workmen were in the administration of State stood concluded by the aforesaid judgment inter se between parties. He also held that the additional plea that the appellant's workmen were employed in connection with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan, was not sustainable. The learned single Judge while reaching the above conclusion inter alia made following observations:-- "No such material has been placed before me on the basis of which I can come to the conclusion that the activities of the petitioners labourers are designed to form an efficient Forms and Stationery Organization in peace and war for troops in the whole country. The supply of stationery to the department of defence services is an activity of the petitioner which is common for all the departments of Central Government and nothing special is alleged to be involved in the supply of Forms and Stationery to defence departments. It is an admitted position that petitioners are a subsidiary department of the Education department of the Government of Pakistan which is not connected with Armed Forces.
' Consequently on the basis of the present material before me I cannot hold the petitioner to be an organisation connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan. Therefore this petition is found to be without merit and is hereby dismissed."
' As a result of the above conclusion, the petition was dismissed as mentioned in the above-quoted portion of the judgment. Thereupon, the appellant filed a petition for leave to appeal which was allowed and leave to appeal was granted to consider the above question.
3. In support of the above appeal Mr.M.I.Shahani, learned A.S.C. Appearing for the appellant, has urged that the High Court has not placed proper construction on section 1(3) of the I.R.O. He has further submitted that though in the previous petition it was held by a Division Bench of the High Court that the appellant's workers did not come within the expressions "in the administration of the State" used in clause (b) of subsection (3) of section 1 of the I.R.O. But since the leave has been granted by this Court on the above question, it is open to this Court to adjudicate upon the same.
' On the other hand, Mr.Qarni, learned A.O.R. Appearing for respondent No,2 supported the High Court's judgment under appeal and has contended that the Defence Department is one of the hundreds of departments to which the appellant supplies printing material and, therefore, it cannot be held that the appellant's workers are employed in any of the defence services of Pakistan or any services or installations connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan including an Ordnance Factory maintained by the Federal Government.
4. Mr.Shahani in furtherance of his submissions has referred to pages 43-44 of paper book containing thirty names of the indentors belonging to the Ministry of Defence or Armed Forces to which the appellant supplies printing material. He has also relied upon the case of Canteen Stores Department, Karachi v. Sindh Labour Court No,V and 2 others (PLD 1977 Kar 314) decided by Naimuddin, J. (as his Lordship then was) of the High Court of Sindh and upheld by this Court through the judgment in the case of Canteen Stores Department Employees Welfare Union, Karachi v. Canteen Stores Department and others (1983 SCM R 1101). In order to appreciate the above contention of the learned counsel, it may be pertinent to quote hereinbelow section 1 of the I.R.O.
Which reads as follows:--
1. Short title, extent, application and commencement. --(1) This Ordinance may be called the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
(2) It extends to the whole of Pakistan.
(3) It shall not apply to any person employed-
(a) in the Police or any of the Defence Services of Pakistan or any services or installations connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan including an Ordnance Factory maintained by the Federal Government; or
(b) in the administration of the State other than those employed as workmen by the Railway, Posts, Telegraph and Telephone Departments; or
(c) as a member of the Security Staff of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation, or drawing wages in such pay group, not lower than group V, in the establishment of that Corporation as the Federal Government may, in the public interest or in the interest of security of the Airlines, by notification in the official Gazette, specify in this behalf; or
(d) by the Pakistan Television Corporation or the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation; or
(e) by the Pakistan Security Printing Corporation or the Security Papers Limited; or
(f) by an establishment maintained for the treatment or care of sick, infirm, destitute as mentally unfit persons.
(3-A) Without prejudice to the provisions of subsection (3), for a period of sixty days from the commencement of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 1976, this Ordinance shall not apply to any person employed in the establishment of the Pakistan International Airlines Corporation.
(4) It shall come into force at once."
5. A plain reading of the above-quoted subsection (3) of section 1 of the I.R.O. Indicates that it was extended to the whole of Pakistan and was to come into force at once subject to subsection (3-A) which was added by Act XLIX of 1976 which suspended the application of the provisions of the I.R.O.
To any person employed in the establishment of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation for a period of sixty days from the commencement of the Industrial Relations (Amendment) Act, 1976. It may also be noted that the above-quoted subsection (3) excluded the application of the provisions of the I.R.O. To any person employed in the police or any of the defence services of Pakistan or any services or installations connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan including an Ordnance Factory maintained by the Federal Government or in the administration of the State other than those employed as workmen by the Railway, Posts, Telegraph and Telephone Departments or as a member of the Security Staff of the P.I.A. Or drawing wages in such pay group not lower than group V in the establishment of the aforesaid Corporation as the Federal Government may in public interest or in the interest of security of the Airlines by notification in the official Gazette specify in thiS behalf or employed by the Pakistan Television Corporation or the Pakistan Broadcasting Corporation or the Pakistan Security Printing Corporation or Security Papers Limited or by an establishment maintained for the treatment or care of sick, infirm, destitute as mentally unfit persons.
6. The moot question is as to whether the appellant's employees fall in any of the categories of the excluded persons mentioned in clauses (a) to (f) of subsection (3) of section 1 of the I.R.O referred to hereinabove. At this juncture, it may be pertinent to refer to the above Karachi case, wherein inter alia following observations were made:--
13. I had heard Mr. Amanullah ()add Advocate for respondent at some length on the last date of hearing but today he is absent. His contentions were that since the finance for the running of the petitioner department did not come from the defence budget the Department could not be deemed to be connected with or being incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan. His other contention was that the civilians are also employed in the Defence Department and are also served by the petitioner therefore, the petitioner establishment is not exclusively connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces. Both these contentions are without force. The course of finance to run the establishment would not change the character of the Department if it is otherwise connected with or is incidental to the Armed Forces. The Department could not be financed by the Armed Forces at their option, it could be also financed by the Banks or the funds drawn from any source. The source of finance by itself is not sufficient for holding that the' petitioner department is not connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan. Similarly if the department rendered services to the civilians connected or employed in the defence services it would not disconnect or change the character of the department if it is otherwise connected with or is incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan. In my opinion for that reason alone it would not bring the case within the purview of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969."
7. The above judgment was upheld by this Court through the judgment reported as 1983 SCM R 1101 already referred to hereinabove. While upholding the above judgment of the High Court of Sindh, this Court made following observations:-- "After the decisions given by the Sindh High Court (Writ Petition No,332/1973) and the Peshawar High Court there remains no conflict in views on the subject. Besides the object of C.S.D. When it was a Government undertaking and even after it ceased to be so was and has been not only to supply the entitled personnel with articles of standard quality of daily use, but what is more important to "form the basis of an efficient Canteen Organization in peace and war for troops located anywhere in the country and operational area during the war'. This aspect of the purposes of C.S.D. Clearly makes it out to be an Organization connected with Armed Forces, and hence covered by exemptions prescribed in subsection (3) of section 1 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. It is in the context irrelevant whether it is a Government department or a private commercial organization, because certain categories of the employees of the Government are in fact governed by Industrial Relations Ordinance while certain other private commercial organizations stand excluded from its operation as was the case of United Builders and Associates.
' A reference may also be made to the case of United Builders & Associates v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No,1 and others (1976 P.L.C. 855) which was decided by a learned single Judge of the Lahore High Court (Shafiur Rahman, J. (as his Lordship then was) and in which the scope of the above-quoted subsection (3) of section 1 was dilated upon inter alia in the following terms:- "4. The express provisions of the law made the Ordinance inapplicable to any service connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan. If the Army is directly engaged on the construction of a road, or a building or is getting it constructed by employing a Contractor or Sub- Contractors then it is for the time being a matter connected with and incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan irrespective of the nature of the construction. As long as the construction lasts and remains the responsibility of the Armed Forces, irrespective of the use to which it will be put when completed the project remains connected with and incidental to the Armed Forces itself. A duty undertaken by the Armed Forces to have it constructed either through its own manpower or by employing others establishes this connection. The source of the finance, the ultimate use of the building are all irrelevant for determining its character while the construction is in the hand and control of the Army Authorities."
8. From the above-cited cases, it is evident that in order to bring an employee within one of the categories excluded by subsection (3) of section 1 of the I.R.O. It is not necessary that the finances or the funds should come from the Government or installations should be under the control and management of a Government department and not under the management and control of a corporate body, but what is important is, whether the person is employed inter alia in any of the Armed Forces of Pakistan or in services or installations connected with or incidental to the Armed Forces of Pakistan or in the administration of the State. Keeping in view the functions of the appellant which not only supplies the printing materials to the various organisations relating to the Armed Forces listed at pages 43 and 44 of the paper book, but also caters for the requirements of all other Government departments and other State organs/functionaries, and which are used inter alia for facilitating communications between the various Armed Forces establishments and other Government functionaries and withoth which no Government department can function, t can be concluded that the appellant's employees are covered by clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (3) of section 1 of the I.R.O. It may be pertinent to point out that in the aforesaid clause (b) of subsection
(3) the persons employed as workmen by the Railway, Posts, Telegraph and Telephone Departments, have been excluded from the expression "in the administration of the State" for the purpose of application of the provisions of the I.R.O. It can, therefore, be concluded that the Law- makers wanted to exclude the workmen of the departments specified in clause (b) and not other workmen who may be employed in the administration of the State.
9. We are, therefore, inclined to allow the above appeal and, therefore, the High Court's judgment under appeal is set aside, and the appellants's writ petition is allowed. Respondent No,1 is directed to cancel the certificate certifying respondent No,2 as a Collective Bargaining Agent as the provisions of the I.R.O. Are not applicable to the workmen employed by the appellant. However, there will be no order as to costs.