' This F.R.A. Is directed against the judgment of II Senior Civil Judge and Rent Controller, Karachi Central, dated 17-1-1991, whereby he allowed the application under Section 15 (2) (vii) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979 and directed the appellant to hand over the vacant possession of the rented shop to the respondent within 60 days.
2. The respondent is the landlady of the rented shop. In October, 1985, at the request of the appellant, she had rented out the said shop to the appellant @ Rs,500 per month which was subsequently enhanced to Rs,600 p.m. The appellant had deposited Rs,5,100 as security. After the expiry of Lease Agreement dated 1-10-1988, the respondent asked the appellant to vacate the shop as he required the same for bona fide personal use. The appellant avoided to vacate the shop. The respondent, therefore, served a legal notice and on failure of the appellant to comply with the same, she filed this application.
3. The application was resisted by the appellant, who filed written-statement denying the relationship of landlady and tenant between the parties. He pleaded that Saeeduzzaman Khan, husband of the respondent and the Attorney, posing himself as owner and landlord of the shop in dispute, has given the shop to him on rent in 1980, when the rent was fixed at Rs,300 per month. It is, however, admitted that presently the rent is Rs,600 per month. The appellant denied that the respondent requires the shop for her bona fide personal use. He has alleged that this plea has been taken only in order to pressurise the. Appellant to enhance the rent.
4. The respondent filed Affidavit of her husband and Attorney Saeeduzzaman Khan in evidence and produced the relevant documents. The appellant filed his own Affidavit and produced the copy of Lease-Agreement. The above deponents were cross-examined by the respective counsel of the.
Opposite-parties. The learned Controller embarked upon the determination of the issues, as to relationship of landlady and tenant between the parties and whether the rented shop was required by the respondent for her bona fide personal use in good faith. He decided both the issues in favour of the respondent and allowed the application as shown above.
5. I have heard Mr. Shafaat Hussain, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. Mirza Waqar Hussain, learned counsel for the respondent.
6. It was pointed out by Mr. Shafaat Hussain that the shop was rented out to the appellant by Saeeduzzaman Khan, who is the husband and Attorney of the respondent, MRs, Masiha Begum. He referred to almost all the four Lease-Agreements filed in this case, none of which mentions that he was claiming himself as Attorney of the respondent. On the contrary he showed himself as 'Lessor' which, according to Mr. Shafaat Hussain, was synonymous to the word 'Owner'. Coming to the Power of Attorney which was produced in this case, he pointed out that this Power of Attorney, executed by MRs, Masiha Begum in favour of Saeeduzzaman Khan, was dated 22-1-1989 and was an after-thought. Even in the notice which was sent through Mr. Mirza Waqar Hussain, Advocate on 9-10-1989, Saeeduzzaman Khan did not claim that he was Attorney of his wife. Hence the appellant recognised Saeeduzzaman Khan only the landlord and there was no privity of contract between the respondent and the appellant and consequently no relationship of landlady and tenant mbetween the parties exists. In this connection he has placed reliance in an unreported decision in the case of Mustafa Atrinejad v. Ashiq Ali (F.RAs. Nos.1 and 18 of 1985). In this decision Jam Ashiq All had instituted a rent case against Mustafa Atrinejad for eviction from the flat on the allegation of default in payment of rent and bona fide personal requirement. Mustafa Atrinejad, in his Written- Statement, denied the relationship of landlord and tenant between him and Jam Ashiq Ali and pleaded that the premises was let out to him by one T.M. Shafi, who had held out himself as owner of the premises in a written Lease-Agreement. The learned Controller decided the issue of relationship of landlord and tenant in the affirmative on the basis of a registered sale-deed produced by Jam Ashiq Ali. In F.RA. a learned Single Judge of this Court came to the conclusion that the mere fact that Jam Ashiq Ali had shown himself to be the owner of the premises was not enough to come to the conclusion that there was relationship of landlord and tenant between him and Mustafa Atrinejad, because the rented premises were let out to him by T.M. Shafi.
7. I do not find myself in agreement with the contention of the appellant's counsel. The respondent was admittedly the wife of Saeeduzzaman Khan. He has also produced the Power of Attorney executed by the respondent in his favour which was of a date earlier to that of the filing of the application and even earlier than the legal notice for vacating the shop. Saeeduzzaman Khan nowhere in these four Lease-Deeds or the legal notice claimed himself as owner of the rented shop. He has used the word 'Lessor' which cannot be equated with the term 'Owner'. Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. VI at page 211 defines word 'Lessor' as 'one who grants lease, one who lets (property) on lease'. The word 'Lessor' can therefore, also include 'an agent or attorney of the owner'. Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act also makes it clear that the transferor of a lease is called Lessor and an owner as well as an authorised person can transfer a property by lease. I am, therefore, satisfied that the finding of the learned Controller that there is a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is correct. It is a matter of common knowledge that there is a special relationship between husband and a wife and in view of such relationship, a husband is generally acting as Manager of the property and the affairs of his wife and there is a presumption that husband is Attorney of his wife until and unless the wife herself challenges such authority. In this case the wife has never challenged such authority. On the contrary, the Power of Attorney has been produced which affirms and ratifies the status of Saeeduzzaman Khan as Attorney of the respondent. The case of Mustafa Atrinejad v. Jam Ashiq Ali (F.RAs. Nos.1 and 18/1985) is distinguishable. In that decision there was no evidence on record to show that T.M. Shafi was acting as Attorney of Jam Ashiq All, while letting out the premises to Mustafa Atrinejad. T.M. Shafi had described himself as owner of the premises. Jam Ashiq All had admitted that he was unaware of the Lease-Agreement between Mustafa Atrinejad and T.M. Shafi. T.M. Shafi did not have any special relationship with Jam Ashiq Ali whatever, that expected him to act as Attorney, while in the present case Power of Attorney has, been produced, which is executed by the respondent in favour of Saeeduzzaman Khan. In his affidavit-in-evidence, Saeeduzzaman Khan has stated that he has leased out the property to the appellant as Attorney of the respondent. He was admittedly husband of the respondent. Saeeduzzaman has nowhere, either in the Lease-Deed or in the legal notice, stated that he is the owner.
8. Coming to the issue of requirement of the premises for bona fide personal use, it will be useful to reproduce with approval, the following extract from the judgment of the learned Controller:-- "Applicant's attorney has stated in his affidavit in evidence that the demised premises is required by the applicant for use of her husband in good faith as the circumstances from 1980 as today have completely changed. He has further stated that all the applicant's sons are living abroad.
They have completely neglected them and stopped the financial help. He has further stated that amount of rent are deriving from the applicant's property, after payment of taxes and other liabilities becomes so scanty to meet their livelihood and liabilities. The applicant's attorney intends to carry on merchandise business with the demised shop by him. The requirement of the demised shops as such is genuine and bona fide."
' At the time of arguments the learned Advocate for the applicant submitted that premises is required by the applicant for use of her husband as such he submitted that application requires to be allowed. He has placed his reliance on 1990 CLC page 904 Karachi relevant page 905.
' On the other hand the learned Advocate appearing for the opponent submitted that applicant's husband who is acting as attorney in the present case is aged about 70 years and his health does not permit him to run any business, hence premises is not required to the applicant for her personal bona fide use. He has further submitted that applicant's attorney demanded exhorbitant increase in rent but on the refusal of the opponent the application under question has been filed with the mala fide intention. He has argued that application is liable to be dismissed as premises is not required to the applicant for her own personal bona fide use in good faith.
' I have very carefully gone through the evidence and arguments advanced by the Advocates for the parties. The opponent has admitted, in cross-examination that applicant's husband possesses good health and even he was present in the Court. He has further admitted that applicant does not require any assistance of any body. It has been fin ther admitted by the opponent that sons and daughters of the applicant are married and presently they are settled at abroad. The opponent, however, has denied that applicant required the premises for her personal use in good faith. From the evidence led by the parties as discussed above and the arguments advanced by the Advocates for the parties I have come to the conclusion that the premises is required to the applicant for personal bona fide use as applicant's husband intends to run a general store in the 'shop for his livelihood. The allegation of the opponent has not been proved that applicant ever demanded exhorbitant increase in a rent. Therefore, I have come to the conclusion that applicant has proved the issue and the same is accordingly answered in affirmative."
I had also an opportunity of seeing the respondent's husband Saeeduzzaman Khan and asking questions from him and my conclusion is not different from that drawn by the learned Controller. I have, therefore, no reason to disagree with the finding of the learned Controller that the respondent requires the rented shop for her bona fide personal use. I, therefore, dismiss the appeal and uphold the judgment of the learned Controller. However, I allow six months' time to the appellant to vacate the rented shop on the condition that he continues to deposit current rent before 10th of every succeeding month. If execution application is presented after six months from today, the learned Controller shall issue writ of possession without notice.