' IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, C.J.--- Appellant is aggrieved from the judgment dated 14th March, 2003 of the Lahore High Court, Lahore passed in S.A.O. No,62 of 2001, therefore, succeeded in getting leave to appeal to examine whether in view of deliberate omission of word "husband" in section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as "the Ordinance") the eviction orders could be passed for his benefit in the facts of the present case.
2. Proceedings before the Controller, commenced in instant case on 18th May. 1998, when respondent landlady filed an ejectment application against appellant, seeking direction to him from Controller to hand over vacant possession of two shops situated in Urdu Nagar, Morr Samanabad Multan Road, Lahore, on the following averments:-- "(5) That the petitioner's husband, who was the contractor, after suffering heavy loss, was without any business and wanted to run his independent business in the shop in question , therefore, the respondent was repeatedly requested to vacate the shop in question to enable the petitioner to redesign/reshape it so that a passage is opened and the petitioner's husband is able to run his business at the shop in question, initially the respondent kept on promises the petitioner and undertook to vacate the same during the month of June, 1997 but subsequently, again orally requested for some more time and promised to vacate the shop in question during the month of March, 1998 but instead of vacating the same fulfilling his promises he has flatly refused to vacate the shop and he further started extending threat to the petitioner, he has even not paid the monthly rent in accordance with law and therefore, is a defaulter."
3. In written statement, the claim of the respondent was denied by the appellant and pleadings relating to it were replied as follows:-- "Incorrect and denied. The respondent has never made any promise with petitioner for vacating the shops. The respondent has never met the petitioner till today. Maqsooda Mirza is receiving the rent from respondent regularly."
4. Learned Controller framed five issues for determination including the one, "whether the petitioner requires the demised shops for the personal use and occupation of her husband, in good faith, bona fide? (OPA)". Evidence led for and against was duly evaluated to conclude, vide order dated 24th October, 2000, that in view of settled principle of law, as mentioned above, the personal need of husband is as good a ground for vacation as petitioner has other grounds for eviction, which stand proved. Appeals of the appellant against this judgment failed before Additional District Judge vide judgment dated 19th May, 2001. Appellant could not make out a case for interference before the High Court as appeal filed on his behalf has been rejected vide impugned judgment.
Hence this appeal by leave of the Court.
5. Learned counsel appearing for appellant contended that in view of the provisions of section 13 of the Ordinance, application filed by respondent landlady for ejectment of appellant from non- residential building for requirement of her husband was not maintainable as under section' 13(3)
(a)(ii)(a) of the Ordinance, respondent landlady can seek ejectment of a tenant for her own use or for the use of any of her children, therefore, for the use or occupation of her husband, ejectment proceedings cannot be initiated. According to him the Court is bound to interpret the law as it has been legislated and if there is any omission that cannot be supplied without any cogent reason. In support of his contention, he relied upon the cases of Akbar Hussain v. Zehra Bai 2002 SCM R 789 and Noor Jehan Bi v. Muhammad Yousaf 2002 SCM R 1933. He further contended that during the course of recording her statement, respondent landlady attempted to improve upon her case by offering an explanation that the shops in question will be used by her through her husband for the purpose of running of business. According to him, as this was not the case, set up in the pleadings, therefore, departure from a specific stand for the purpose of setting up altogether a new case, is not permissible; hence it could have alone made a ground to decline ejectment of the appellant from the premises in question.
6. On the other hand learned counsel appearing for respondent landlady stated that Civil Procedure Code, is not applicable on the proceedings under the Ordinance, therefore, failure of respondent landlady to mention in pleading that the premises is required for her own occupation, where she intends to run the business through her husband could not be fatal. Alternatively, he stated that the definition of the words "for own use" also covers the case of husband, who wanted to set up business in the premises owned by his wife. Reliance in this behalf was placed by him on Ghulam Mohyuddin v. Mst. Nazir Bibi 1983 SCM R 715 and Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishor Behal PLJ 2003 SC (India) 102.
7. We have heard the learned counsel and have also gone through the relevant provision of law. It would be appropriate to reproduce hereinbelow section 13(3)(a)(ii)(a) of the Ordinance:-- "(a) he requires it in good faith for his own use or for the use of any of his (..) children. Word 'male' omitted by the Punjab Rent Restriction (Amendment Ordinance, XXII of 1984)."
' Undoubtedly a plain reading of the above provision indicates that eviction of a tenant in possession of a non-residential building can be sought by the landlady (landlord) for her(his) own or for the use of any of his children and the word "husband" does not find mentioned therein. This Court has examined somehow the same proposition in the case of Ghulam Mohyuddin(ibid). In this case respondent being landlady filed an application seeking direction for the eviction of petitioner Ghulam Mohyuddin on the ground that it was needed for the spouse/husband for his personal requirement, etc. This Court maintained the judgment of the High Court in pursuance whereof eviction application was allowed, as a result whereof ejectment of the tenant from the premises was directed as the same was required in good faith and for the use of husband of the respondent landlady. Subsequent thereto, in the case of Firdous Sabir v. Mushtaq Ahmed Pervaiz 1994 SCM R 355, this Court interpreted the term "own use" and held that it could not be restricted to mean that landlady could not do business through her husband and other relatives.
Similarly in the case of Muhammad Zaman v. Hasb-un-Nisa 1991 SCM R 1307, petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, approving the judgment in the case of Messrs Bombay Corporation v. Mst.
Amna Begum 1980 CLC 1628, wherein it has been held that landlady could seek the ejectment of the tenant from a commercial premises if her husband wants to use the rented premises or where the landlady wants to use the premises jointly with her husband. This view is being consistently followed since long as it is indicated from the ratio decidendi in Adamali-Hassanali v. Rubab Bai PLD 1967 Kar. 437; Ghulam Mustafa v. Sharifan Bibi 1982 CLC 1012; Muhammad Fariq v. Shahenshah Jehan Begum PLD 1987 Kar. 180; Firdous Begum v. M. Siraj and Brothers 1988 CLC 802; Dr. S. Hussain v. Masiha Begum 1992 CLC 1292; Waheeda Khanum v. Ghulam Hussain PLD 1993 Kar. 171; Feroz Ahmed v. Kaley Khan 1995 M LD 827; Zuhra Begum v. Pakistan State Oil Co. Ltd. PLD 1995 Kar. 237 and K.H. Hiramanek v. Shafqat Aslam 1997 M LD 1800.
8. The Indian Supreme Court in the case of Joginder Pal (ibid) interpreted the words "for his own residence" or "for his own business" and highlighted the following for its definitions to meet different situation, arising from time to time:--
(i) The Courts have to adopt a reasonable and balanced approach while interpreting Rent Controller/Legislations starting with an assumption that an equal treatment has been meted out to both the sections of the society. In spite of the overall balance tilting in favor of the tenants, while interpreting such of the provisions as take care of the interest of landlord the Court should not hesitate in leaning in favor of the landlords. Such provisions are engrafted in rent control legislations to take care of those situations where the landlords are weak and feeble and feel humble.
(ii) The word "own occupation" contemplates the actual possession of the landlord whether for his own residence or for his business. Furthermore, the provision is wide enough to include the necessity of not only the landlord but also of the persons who are living with him as members of the same. Family.
(iii) The words "own occupation" cannot be so narrowly interpreted as to indicate actual physical possession of the landlord personally and nothing more than that.
' On the same principle in the case of Balabhadra Beharilal v. Premchand Lalchand and others AIR 1953 Nag. 144 the need of a widowed daughter and her children was held to be "his own" need of the landlord.
9. Learned counsel appearing for appellants, in support of his contention relied upon the judgment in the case of Noor Jehan Bi (ibid) and Akbar Hussain (ibid). It may be noted that under section 13(3) (a)(ii)(a) of the Ordinance, the word "husband" has not been used but as far as omission in not using the term "husband" is concerned, it could not be supplied, as in Noor Jehan Bi's case
(ibid) as well, the ejectment application on behalf of landlady for the use and occupation of her husband was found not maintainable because the term "husband" has not been used in section 17(4)(b)(i) of the Ordinance. Similarly it was observed that though such strict interpretation of the expression "for own use" can cause difficulty in some exceptional cases but Court is bound to interpret, the law as it has been legislated and if there is any omission, that could not be supplied without any cogent reason. Interestingly, in reported case landlady has not entered into witness- box to improve upon her case by contending that she will be running the business in the premises through her husband, whereas in the case in hand respondent landlady in her statement on oath not only said that the business shall be run by her through her husband but also explained the circumstances, which have necessitated her to seek ejectment of the appellant i,e, for the survival of the family. Therefore; for this reason as well, in view of discussion made hereinabove is distinguishable. So far as the judgment in the case of Akbar Hussain (ibid) is concerned, it is also distinguishable because landlady (therein) Zehra Bai failed to prove her bona fide to occupy the demised premises, whereas in instant case, the Controller, the First Appellate Court and the High Court had concurrently held that the respondent landlady is entitled to occupy the premises, in which she will be running business through her husband and the object is found mentioned in her statement on oath i,e, to uplift the financial condition of her family.
10. It may be noted that proceedings of the Court of Rent Controller are not regulated by the Civil Procedure Code. I Reference in this behalf can be made to Ayub Khan v. Fazal Haq PLD 1976 SC 442; Muhammad Saleh v. Muhammad Shafi 1982 SCM R 33; Abdul Majid v. Azhar Ali Shah PLD 1985 SC 191; Muhammad Yaqoob v. Additional District Judge PLD 1991 SC 1013 and Suhail Printing Press v. Aley Eba Zaidi 2005 SCM R 882. In addition to it, it is also noteworthy that the Court of Controller is not judicial forum in stricto senso and is always considered to be a quasi-judicial Tribunal. Reference in this behalf can be made to Khadim Mohyuddin v. Remat Ali PLD 1965 SC 459.
11. It is to be observed that in the pleadings respondent landlady had stated that both the premises are required for the use of her husband and in her cross-examination not a single word was put to her in respect of departure from the pleading as it has been argued by the learned counsel. Be that as it may, the appellant had not denied the claim of respondent landlady in the written statements as it is evident from the reply of para. Which has been reproduced hereinabove and during recording of evidence, respondent landlady had successfully brought her case within the purview of section 13(3)(a)(ii)(a) of the Ordinance. Furthermore, the witnesses produced by her have fully supported her case.
12. With reference to particular facts of this case, it is necessary to point out that both the premises (shops) shall be used/occupied by the respondent landlady for more than one purpose; firstly to run the business through her husband to improve her financial conditions because essentially wife and husband, due to nature of that relationship are bound to jointly look after the financial position of the family, therefore, if her case is examined from this angle as well, it would make no difference, if the husband is using/occupying the shops for running the business or landlady is in need of premises for the purpose of running the business through her husband because the object of both of them is the same i,e, to support the family, including dependents, if any; secondly same portion of the premises shall be used as passage to enter in their house as the record reveals that perhaps respondent landlady is presently using the passage belonging to some other landlord or tenant.
Though this aspect of the case has not been considered in depth as no issue was framed in this behalf but at the same time in the larger interest of justice, it could not be ignored. It is equally important to note that learned High Court as well as First Appellate Court and the Controller had not doubted the bona fides of the respondent landlady to occupy both the premises for her own use, therefore, it would not be in the interest of justice to interfere in the impugned judgment.
' Hereinabove are the reasons of our short order of even date.
' For the foregoing reasons, appeal is dismissed. Appellant/tenant is directed to hand over vacant possession of the premises forthwith to respondent, failing which ejectment warrants with police aid without notice shall be issued by the Executing Court. Appellant shall also bear the cost of proceedings throughout. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.