On 30-5-1990 an information was laid by S.H.O. Kalri Police Station before Assistant Commissioner and S.D.M. City (South) Karachi, to the effect that the applicant herein is by habit a drug seller and a previous convict and he is so desperate and dangerous as to render his being at large without security hazardous to the community. On the same day the learned S.D.M. Passed an order under section 112, Cr.P.C. Calling upon the applicant to show cause as to why he should not be directed to execute a bond in the sum of Rs.10,000 (Rupees ten thousand) with two sureties for good behaviour for a period of three years. These proceedings drawn against the applicant under section 110, Cr.P.C. Are the subject-matter of the present application filed under section 561-A, Cr.P.C.
2. I have heard Mr. S. Nasiruddin, Learned counsel for applicant and Mr. Jalaluddin Baloch, learned counsel for State. The latter has supported the action taken against the applicant.
3. It is contended on behalf of the applicant that out of the four cases shown against him in the report submitted by S.H.O. Kalri Police Station, he has been acquitted in a case under section 324, P.P.C., while the proceedings under section 151, Cr.P.C. Are still pending and the conviction shown against the applicant relates to a case under section 43(3) of the Sindh Abkari Act, 1878, which was registered in the year 1973, and a case under Article 3/4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd)
Order, 1979, which relates to the year 80. In other words it is the case of the applicant that the persons who are by hit drug sellers do not fall under any of the categories mentioned in section 110, Cr.P.C. And the proceedings drawn against the applicant on this score arc sold ab initio. Reliance is placed upon the case of Muhammad Qasim alias Ganja v. The State, reported in 1990 P Cr. L J 21, which applies with force to t 6 e facts of the present case.
4. The order passed under section 112, Cr.P.C. Further shows that there are allegations against the applicant that he habitually commits or attempts to commit offences involving breach of peace.
There are however, vague allegations against the applicant with no specific instances bringing the case within the mischief of category (e) of section 110, Cr.P.C. The case reported as Noor Muhammad alias Nooral v. The State 1975 P Cr. L J 1025 is relevant on this point.
5. The order under section 112, Cr.P.C, also recites that the applicant is so desperate and dangerous as to render his being at large without security hazardous to the community. An attempt was made to bring his case within the purview of clause (f) of section 110, Cr.P.C. A person of desperate or dangerous character means a person who shows such a reckless disregard of the safety of the person or the property of his neighbours that his being at large without security would be detrimental to the community. The fact that a person is by his temperament quarrelsome and that he occasionally gives threat does not make him of a desperate character or one who is dangerous to community. Refer Emperor v. Vijaidatta Jha Naraindatta, reported in AIR 1948 Nag.
28. While examining this aspect of the case in Noor Muhammad alias Nooral v. The State, reported in 1975 P Cr. L J 1025, Mushtak All Karl, J. (as he then was) observed as follows:-- "The liberty of a subject cannot be jeopardized merely on a report of this nature presented by the S.H.O. That in his opinion the person was a dangerous criminal. Strictly speaking such cases do not fall within the provisions of section 110, Cr.P.C.
6. It is also contended on behalf of applicant that the vague expression of opinion by police officials without disclosing specific instances cannot form the basis of proceedings under section 110, Cr.P.C.
Reliance is placed upon the cases of Mazan alias Mazno v. The State reported in PLD 1975 Kar. 1035, Uris v. The State reported in PLD 1981 Kar. 50, Ali Sher v. S.D.M. Meerpur Mathelo and another reported in 1982 P Cr. L J 750, Saban v. The State reported in 1984 P Cr. L J 1276 and Sodho v. The State and another reported in 1991 P Cr. L J 340. In the first cited decision the probative value of the evidence of general repute was examined and it was observed:-- "It is true that in cases under section 110, Cr.P.C. Evidence of general reputation can also be given, but reputation means, what is thought of a person by others, and the general reputation of a person, is the collective opinion of those in whose midst he lives. Evidence which discloses the existence of such collective opinion, is the evidence in proof of general reputation. This general reputation should, therefore, be distinguished from mere opinion or rumour. A man's general reputation is the reputation which he bears in a place in which he lives amongst all the villagers or townsmen. If his fellow villagers or townsmen look upon him as thief or robber or a dangerous man that would be strong evidence of bad character. This collective opinion must be distinguished from individual opinion or suspicion of a police officer. Police records of suspects or history--sheets maintained by the police or even entries in the police diaries, would all be inadmissible as evidence of general repute. Likewise mere oral word of a police officer giving his opinion that a particular person is a habitual thief would also be inadmissible as hearsay evidence."
7. After an exhaustive treatment of the above subject in the above cited authority it was held that:- - "Since it would be unsafe, and to say the least, highly unsatisfactory, to base a final order on mere evidence of general repute as deposed by the police officers, it would not be proper to allow these proceedings before the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate to continue as that would lead to unnecessary harassm ent of the applicant. Mr. Usman Ghani the learned Assistant Advocate- General, also frankly concedes that in cases of this nature where only a Sub-Inspector and his subordinate police constables arc cited, to give their opinion regarding the reputation of a particular person, then such proceedings are without proper basis and are liable to be quashed."
8. In the last cited judgment of Sodho v. The State reported in 1991 P Cr. L J 340, it was made clear that the evidence of the police officials alone, unless they have special means to know the reputation of the person proceeded against, is not sufficient to justify an action under section 110, Cr.P.C.
9. For the aforesaid reasons, I would accept the application filed by applicant under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. And quash the proceedings pending against him under section 110, Cr.P.C. In the Court of Assistant Commissioner and S.D.M. City (South) Karachi.
M.B.A./B-224/K