' This is an application made under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. For quashment of proceedings pending against the applicant under section 110, Cr.P.C. In the Court of Assistant Commissioner and S.D.M.
City (South) Karachi.
2. The facts in brief are that applicant was arrested by S.H.O. Baghdadi Police Station, and was then produced before Assistant Commissioner and S.D.M. City (South) Karachi, with a report that he was quarrelsome, a narcotic peddlar and was so desperate and dangerous that no person from the locality was prepared to give evidence against him. It was further mentioned in the report that the applicant was facing trial in the following cases:-- {{TABLE TEXT}} S.No, Crime No, Offence 331 of 1980 Article 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979.
474 of 1981 Article 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979.
349 of 1983 Article 3 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979.
377 of 1983 Article 3/4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979.
241 of 1985 Article 3/4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979.
651 of 1986 Article 4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979.
361 of 1987 Article 3/4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979.
543 of 1987 Article 3/4 of the Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979. {{TABLE TEXT}}
3. On the same day the learned S.D.M. Passed an order under section 112, Cr.P.C. Calling upon the applicant to show cause as to why he should not execute a bond in the sum of Rs,10,000 with two sureties in the like amount for maintaining good behaviour.
4. Section 110, Cr.P.C. Lays down as follows:-- "Whenever a District Magistrate, or Sub-Divisional Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the Provincial Government received information that any person within the local limits of his jurisdiction;
(a) is by habit a robber, house-breaker, thief, or forger, or
(b) is by habit a receiver of stolen property knowing the same to have been stolen; or
(c) habitually protects or harbours thieves or aids, in the concealment or disposal of stolen property, or
(d) habitually commits, or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of the offence of kidnapping, abduction, extortion, cheating or mischief, or any offence punishable under Chapter XII of the Pakistan Penal Code, or under section 489-A, section 489-B, section 489-C, or section 489-D of that Code, or
(e) habitually commits, or attempts to commit, or abets the commission of, offences involving a breach of the peace, or
(f) is so desperate and dangerous as to render his being at large without security hazardous to the community. ' such Magistrate may, in manner hereinafter provided, require such person to show cause why he should not be ordered to execute a bond, with sureties, for his good behaviour for such peirod, not exceeding three years as the Magistrate thinks fit to fix."
5. The object of section 110, Cr.P.C. Is preventive and not punitive. As observed in Emperor v.
Vijaydatta Jha Naraindatta, reported in AIR 1948 Nag. 28, the very terms of the section show, that it is intended to control the activities of persons who are by habit robbers, house-breakers, thieves, or forgers, receivers of stolen property or those who habitually protect or harbour thieves or aid in the concealment or disposal of stolen property, or those who habitually commit or attempt to commit, or abet the commission of the offence of kidnapping, abduction, extortion, cheating or mischief, or who are in the habit of committing or getting involved in the commission of offence involving a breach of peace, or generally those who are so desperate and dangerous as to render their being at large without security hazardous to the community. It will be seen from the wordings of section 110, Cr.P.C. That the persons who are by habit drug peddlars do not fall under any of the categories mentioned therein.
6. The order passed under section 112, Cr.P.C., however, shows that there are allegations against the applicant that he habitually commits or attempt to commit offences involving breach of peace.
There are, however, vague allegations against the applicant with no specific instances bringing the case within the mischief of category (e) of section 110, Cr.P.C. The case reported as Noor Muhammad alias Nooral v. The State 1975 P Cr. L J 1025 is relevant.
7. The order under section 112, Cr.P.C. Also recites that the applicant was so desperate and dangerous as to render his being at large without security hazardous to the community. An attempt was made to bring his case within the purview of clause (f) of section 110, Cr.P.C. A person of desperate character or dangerous character means a person who shows such a reckless disregard of the safety of the person or the property of his neighbours that his being at large without security would be detrimental to the community. The fact that a person is by his temperament quarrelsome and that he occasionally gives threat does not make him a desperate character or one who is dangerous to community refer Emperor v. Vijaidatta Jha Naraindatta, reported in AIR 1948 Nag.
28. While examining this aspect of the- case in Noor Muhammad alias Noorul v. The State reported in 1975 P Cr. L J 1025, Mushtak Ali Kazi, J (as he then was) observed as I follows:-- "The liberty of a subject cannot be jeopardized merely on a report of this nature presented by the S.H.O. That in his opinion the person was a dangerous criminal. Strictly speaking such cases do not fall within the provisions of section 110, Cr.P.C."
8. A point which was touched upon during arguments may now be dealt with. It is contended on behalf of applicant that period of one year from the date of passing order under section 112, Cr.P.C.
Has already elapsed and since under section 118, Cr.P.C. The final order could not be for a period longer than the one specified in the order made under section 12, Cr.P.C., the proceedings are liable to be quashed on this score alone. The cases reported as Jamal Khan v. State PLD 1958 Kar. 646, State v Shafi Muhammad and others PLD 1961 Kar. 118, and State v. Hyder PLD 1963 Kar. 673 are relevant in this behalf. All these cases were examined in Criminal Reference No, 51 of 1973, decided on 15-2-1974 by late Tufail Ali Abdul Rehman, Chief Justice who was pleased to observe as follows:- - "Inclined as I myself am to holding that the period referred to in section 118 must be regarded as a period equivalent in length to the one stated in the order under section 112 and to commence from the date of that order, yet I find it impossible finally so to hold in view of the language of section 120, Criminal Procedure Code, which I have already reproduced. Subsection (1) of that section, as I have already stated, applies in a very special set of circumstances but there can be no question but that subsection (2) applies in all other cases and the language of this subsection is plain and unambiguous and requires that the period shall commence on the date of 'such order', meaning the order under section 118. This might be illogical but it is not for the Courts to ascribe meaning to expressions used by the legislature which they do not bear merely on the ground that it would be unreasonable so to do if the meaning of the legislature is expressed in plain language incapable of being misunderstood. I feel constrained by reason of the language in this subsection to hold that the order under section 118 is for a length of time no longer than the one mentioned in the order under section 112 but that length of time is to commence from the date of the order under section 118 and not the order under section 112, Criminal Procedure Code. In these circumstances I am compelled to reject this reference.
' I am conscious of the fact that in some cases I have myself, while setting aside orders under section 117(3) of the Code directed the quashment of the entire proceedings on the ground that the period mentioned in the order under section 112 had already elapsed but these were based upon the understanding of the expression 'period' in the sense in which I would have been inclined to interpret it, had it not been for section 120.
' In none of these cases was the question argued before me nor was section 120 considered."
' I respectfully follow this view.
9. However, in view of my observations made in paras. Nos. 5 to 7 above, the proceedings pending against the applicant under section 110, Cr.P.C. In the Court of Assistant Commissioner and S.D.M.
City (South), Karachi cannot be sustained and are hereby quashed. In the result the application made under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. Is allowed. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.