1. This petition has been directed against the judgment of the High Court whereby the appeal filed by the petitioner, herein, was dismissed as being incompetent.
2. The brief facts giving rise to the present petition are that evacuee land measuring 51 Kanals 3 Marlas, comprising Survey No, 1840, was allotted to non-petitioner Muhammad Salim Khan. Out of the aforesaid land, land measuring 20 Kanals and 12 Marlas was acquired by the Government for army under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, and thus a notice was issued under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter shall be called as the Act). After completing the proceedings the amount of compensation was fixed at the rate of Rs,15,000 per Kanal vide award of the Collector Land Acquisition dated 3-11-1988. Feeling dissatisfied with the aforesaid award the contesting respondent made an application before the Collector Land Acquisition praying for a reference to the District Judge. Consequently a reference was made to the District Judge who made over the same to the Additional District Judge for hearing and disposal. The Additional District Judge modified the award and enhanced the amount of compensation to Rs,25,000 per Kanal. An appeal was preferred by the petitioner, herein, to the High Court which was dismissed on the preliminary ground that under section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act the local authority or the Company etc. for whose benefit the land is acquired is not competent to seek a reference against the award or appeal against the order passed by the Reference Judge.
3. I have heard the arguments and perused the record. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Raja Muhammad Hand Khan has argued that the point regarding the competency of the order or otherwise of the appeal was not heard by the High Court and thus the petitioner was condemned unheard. The learned counsel for the respondent, Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Mughal, has controverted the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner and has argued that the point was argued in the High Court and he had also submitted authorities at the time of the arguments which have been discussed in the impugned order. A perusal of the judgment of the High Court shows that the appearance of the learned counsel for the petitioner has been recorded. It is also not the case of the petitioner that he was not present in the Court at the time of arguments rather his case is that the point on which the appeal was dismissed was not thoroughly argued.
4. After giving my due consideration to the matter I have no hesitation in holding that the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the point at issue was not argued in the High Court is not tenable, especially in view of the contents of the judgment and the stand taken by the learned counsel for the non-petitioner. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also argued that the High Court has committed an error in holding that the appeal by the petitioner, herein was barred under section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act. He has contended that if the petitioner or for that matter the Organization for whose benefit the property is acquired is entitled to appear before the Court in reference and to lead evidence, there is no logic as to why he is not entitled to prefer an appeal against the order passed by the Reference Judge. In reply the learned counsel for the respondent has cited a number of authorities wherein the superior Courts of Pakistan and India, while interpreting section 50 of the Land Acquisition Act, have consistently held that a Company, Establishment, Department or any other Organization for whose benefit the land is acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act has no locus standi to seek the reference against the award or to prefer an appeal against the order of a Reference Judge. The Supreme Court of Pakistan has observed in a case reported as Pir Khan v. Military Estate Officer PLD 1987 SC (Pak.) 485 as under:-- "From a perusal of the above provisions, it is manifest that section 50(2) expressly and in terms controls section 18 and takes away the right from the local authority or company for whom the land is being acquired to demand a reference under section 18. According to subsection (2) of section 50 a local authority or a company is only conferred the right to appear in proceedings before the Collector or the Court and adduce evidence for the purpose of determining the amount of compensation but a reference under section 18 by them is barred (vide the proviso to subsection (2) of section 50). It is, therefore, manifest that whatever may have been the object of the law, in view of plain language of section 50(2), there is no alternative but to give effect to it.
5. Hence, so far as a local authority or a company is concerned, the award by the Land Acquisition Collector becomes final; it has neither the right to ask for a reference under section 18, nor on a parity of reasoning, a right to prefer an appeal against a decision made upon a reference under section 18 of the Act by the Court."
6. The matter has also come up for consideration in case reported as Province of Punjab, Lahore and another v. Shah Rasool and 3 others 1992 CLC 67 wherein the view taken was affirmed and reliance was placed on the following authorities:-- Pakistan Steel Mills Corporation Limited and others v. Deputy Commissioner (East), Karachi and others 1988 SCMR 812, WAPDA v. Muhammad Farid and others 1990 SCM R 98, Behram Khan and 54 others v. Military Estate Officer and 2 others 1988 SCM R 1160, Municipal Corporation of Pabna v.
7. Jogendra Narain Baikut 41 C.382, Faqir Chand v. Municipal Committee, Hazro (1913) 47 PR 225, Collector and Chairman, District Board, Gujranwala v. Hira Nand AIR 1929 Lah. 10, Nihal Chand and others v. District Board, Mianwali AIR 1936 Lah. 564, Pabna Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. Kaliprashad Bhattacharyya and another PLD 1960 Dacca 461, Municipal Corporation of Pabna v. Jogendra Narain Baikut and others 13 CWN 116, Commitla Electric Supply Ltd. v. Messrs East Bengal Ltd. and others 43 CWN 973; Sindh Industrial Trading Estates Ltd. v. First Assistant Judge, Hyderabad, West Pakistan and 4 others PLD 1960 (W.P.) Kar. 826, Kasimbhai and another v. Deputy Commissioner, Dadu and others PLD. 1968 Kar. 126, WAPDA through its Chairman, Lahore v. Aurangzeb Khan and 17 others PLD 1975 Pesh. 1, Brigade No, 1 Chattar Domel and Garhi Dopatta through Military Estate, Hazara v. Custodian, Evacuee Property and 7 others 1986 M LD 2077 and Mirpur Khas Sugar Mills Limited, Karachi v. Moulvi Muhammad Saleh and 3 others 1979 CLC 7.
8. It may be stated that even the superior Courts of India have also taken the same view. A reference may be made to a case reported as R.S. Deoji Dharsi and Sons v. Ghisulal and another All 1953 Nagpur 256 wherein it was observed that in a reference made by the Collector, the company or the local authority has no locus standi except for the purpose of watching and assisting the Collector. It was observed that they are not the real parties to the dispute before the District Judge and thus cannot file an appeal against the decree passed by the District Judge. It was observed that such an appeal could only be preferred by Collector or the Provincial Government. A number of authorities were relied upon in this case in support of the aforesaid view. It follows from what has been stated above that a Company, Local Authority or any other Organization for whose benefit the land is acquired is not entitled to seek a reference or to prefer an appeal against the order passed on reference by the District Judge. It may be stated here that the Collector was also one of the appellants in the High Court but he has not preferred any petition for leave to appeal to this Court. Had the Collector also sought the petition for leave to appeal the result of the petition probably might have been different. The learned counsel for the petitioner, Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan, has also contended that even if it is assumed that no appeal was competent before the High Court, the High Court had the powers to go into the merits of the case under its revisional jurisdiction vested in it under section 35 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Courts and Laws Code Act, 1949. Irrespective of the validity of the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, as no such request was made by the petitioner in the High Court to treat the memo. of appeal as a revision petition, it is too late in the day for the petitioner to urge in this Court that the appeal should have been treated as revision by the High Court and disposed of as such.
9. In the light of what has been stated above finding no force in this petition it is hereby dismissed.