' ABDUL HAYEE KURESHI, J.-The present appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act read with section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been filed by the appellants Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited to challenge a judgment and decree passed by the District Judge. Tharparkar, in land acquisition Cases No, 11/76 and Nos, 9 and 10 of 1972. The judgment (award) was recorded on 7-9- 1974 on a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") by the Collector acting under section 18 of the said Act. The reference was made at the instance of Moulvi Mohammad Saleh, Sher Mohammad and Mohammad Moosa who were entitled to compensation by reason of acquisition of the land.
2. We have heard Mr. Abdul Matin, Advocate for the appellants Mirpurkhas Sugar Mills Limited and Mr. Sadik Ali Khoja, Advocate for the respondents, namely the legal representatives of Moulvi Mohammad Saleh, Sher Mohammad and Mohammad Moosa. The Land Acquisition Officer, who is also a respondent in this appeal has neither appeared nor defended.
3. The brief facts of the case are that the respondents owned lands in Deh No, 120, Tappe Visro, Taluka Mirpurkhas. Such lands are the subject-matter of acquisition proceedings. The land was acquired for the benefit of the present appellants and a notification dated 26-5-1964 was published in the West Pakistan, Extraordinary Gazette, dated 6-6-1964. The Collector proceeded to determine the compensation and made an award of compensation at the rate of Rs, 120 per acre to which was added the further compensation of 15 per cent. The award was made on 26-5-1964 and an application was made under section 18 of the Act by Moulvi Mohammad Saleh and Sher Mohammad on 31-7-1977. The reference under section 18 of the Act was made on 14-9-1966.
4. The present appellants filed an application under Order 1, rule 10, C. P. C. Before the District Judge on 26-7-1967 seeking to be joined as a party on the ground that they were interested in the proceedings because ultimately they would be affected by the award made by the Court. On 23- 8-1967 this application was granted by the following order :- "They can appear and lead evidence if they want, as a party interested. They may be joined for that purpose."
The appellants filed objections and the District Judge framed the following three issues :-- "(1) Whether the applicants had applied for reference in time in accordance with the mandatory provisions of the subsection (8) of section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ?
(2) Whether the compensation awarded to the applicants is not adequate ?
(3) What should the order be ?"
' On behalf of the respondents Pirdan Singh, an Assistant in the Land Reforms Branch of the Deputy Commissioner Office, Mirpurkhas ; Abdur Rehman, the Legal Representative of Moulvi Mohammad Saleh ; and Mohammad Moosa were examined. On behalf of the appellants or the Land Acquisition Officer, Ranchhordas, Tapedar in the Land Acquisition Office, and Mohammad Saleem, the Office Superintendent of the appellants Mill were examined. The District Judge enhanced the compensation amount from Rs, 120 per acre to Rs, 1000 per acre with usual costs and interest.
5. Mr. Abdul Matin for the appellants has raised two-fold contentions, namely that the application filed by the respondents before the Collector seeking reference to the Court was time barred and therefore the reference by the Collector and the consequent proceedings in the Court were void and without jurisdiction and that the award made by the Acquisition Officer was reasonable and just and should not have been interfered with by the District Court. On the other hand Mr. Sadik All Khoja, who has appeared for the respondents, has supported the judgment (award) of the District Judge and raised preliminary point as to maintainability of the appeal at the instance of the appellants on the ground that an appeal under section 53 and section 54 of the Act lies only at the instance of the Government: He has supported the judgment (award) of the District Judge.
6. The preliminary points that arise out of the legal contentions of the Advocates on either side are the following :-
(i) Whether the judgment of the District Judge is liable to be set aside for reason of the application made by the respondents under section 18 of the Act after the expiry of the period of limitation : and
(ii) Whether the present appeal at the instance of the appellants is competent.
7. We propose to examine the first point, first. The proviso to subsection (2) of section '18 of the Act prescribes a period of six weeks within which the person interested in the award could make an application before the Collector for a reference under section 18 of the Act, in case he was present or represented before the Collector ; and in other case when he was not present or represented or did not get a notice from the Collector under subsection (2) of section 12 of the Act, the time extends to six weeks from the date of receipt of notice or six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever is earlier. Sections 20 to 28 of the Act again provide for the conduct of proceedings before the District Court on a reference being made to it. In these sections which relate to conduct of the proceedings no time limit is prescribed. The High Courts of the sub- Continent have in several cases considered the question whether the Court on being seized of the reference by the Collector can go into the question of the application of a party for making a reference being made within time. Mr. Abdul Matin referred to the case of Mst. Bibi Rehmania and 14 others v. The Government through Collector, Peshawar in which a learned Single Judge of the Peshawar High Court took the view that if a reference application had been made beyond the period of limitation, the Court was empowered to go into the question for the purpose of finding out whether it was made on a time-barred application and if found to be time barred the Court could1 refused to determine the question of compensation. The learned Single Judge had relied on the case of Mahadeo Krishna Parkar v. Mamlatdar of Alibag , A. K. Subramania Chettiar v. Collector of Coimbators and Kana Navanna Narayannappa Naidu v. Revenue Divisional Officer to base a conclusion ' that it was within the competence of the Court to consider the question of limitation relating to making of an application seeking reference. A reference was also made by the learned Single Judge to the case of Land Acquisition Collector v. Lt.-Gen. Wajid 41i Khan Burki and the judgment of the High Court of Azad Jammu & Kashmir in the case of Azad Government v. Mohammad Shafi .
In the case of A.K. Subramania Chettiar the Collector had in his reference under section 18 of the Act included the question of limitation as part of the reference and that case is completely distinguishable. In the case of Kona Navanna the learned Judges of the Madras High Court stated as follows :- "The necessary 'sine qua non' of the reference by Collector under section 18 is the basic fact that the application for such a reference must be made in accordance with the provisions of that section and within the period specified in the proviso to that section. If those provisions are not complied with, there cannot be any valid application at all and necessarily if such an application does not exist, a positive reference is incapable of existence.
' No Court can be compelled to adjudicate upon matters which do not come before it in strict conformity with the requirements of law. It is within the inherent power of the Court to find out whether. The matter that comes before it, is in the proper form and in accordance with the requirements of particular statutes. A passive attitude which the Court is compelled to adopt in case it is asked to adjudicate upon invalid reference cannot be founded on law or reasons.
' It is, thus, within the competency of the Court to which a reference is made by the Collector under section 18 to reject the reference Made to it by the Collector beyond the period of limitation laid down in proviso (a) to subsection (2) of section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act."
' In this case the Madras High Court came to the conclusion that it was within the inherent powers of the Court to find out if the matter before it was in proper form and further that the question of the limitation was basic one and if the application was beyond time the consequent reference was invalid. The learned Judges, however, did not examine the provisions of sections 20 to 28 of the Act wherein period of limitation has been provided nor does an enabling power vest in the Court to reject a reference duly made by the Collector, on the other hand the learned Single Judge of the Peshawar High Court had referred to an earlier Division Bench judgment of the predecessor Court in the case of S. Attar Singh and another v. Secretary of State in which the point was stated as follows :- "The decision on a question of limitation on an application under section 18 rests with the Collector and not with the District Judge. Section 19 also indicates that the question of limitation is to be decided by the Collector. The District Judge cannot sit as a Court of Appeal over the Collector when the latter has come to the con-illusion that the application is made within time. The function of the District Judge is confined to giving a decision on objections raised."
' There are three cases on the point of the Karachi Bench of the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan and it would be profitable to briefly refer to the same. In the case of Sind Industrial Trading Estates v. First Assistant Judge, Hyderabad a Division Bench consisting of Inamuliah and Anwarul Haq, JJ. Considered the wealth of case law on the subject and recorded the conclusion as follows :- "It would appear from the above observation that the proposition laid down by the various Courts that the Civil Court cannot go into the question of limitation after the reference has been made by the Collector has not been disapproved."
' The next case is a judgment of a learned Single Judge of the West Pakistan High Court Karachi Bench, viz. Collector of Karachi v. Hari Gola and others . The learned Judge considered the effect of2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 the proviso to subsection (2) of section 18 of the Act and recorded his conclusion in the following words :- "This proviso clears the entire ambiguity about the powers of the Court and the Collector regarding the determination of limitation. According to it, it is the Collector who has to determine this question. Even if time-barred applications are referred to the Court then objection regarding limitation cannot be raised on behalf of the Government. This view is expressed in several decisions."
' The other case from Karachi Bench of the West Pakistan High Court is that of Shaikh Mohammad Saeed and others v. Deputy Commissioner, Karachi . In this case the learned Judges considered the binding effect of section 18 and section 21 of the Act and stated as follows :- "The scheme of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as disclosed by the provisions embodied in Part III thereof leaves no doubt whatsoever, that the Court, while dealing with a reference under section 18 of the Act, does not act as a Court of general jurisdiction, but as a tribunal of special jurisdiction restricted to the matters enumerated in subsection (1) of section 18. The intention of the Legislature is made abundantly clear by the direction contained in section 21 of the Act to the effect that the scope of the inquiry in every such proceeding shall be restricted to a consideration of the interests of the persons affected by the objection. It follows, therefore, that not only was the Provincial Government not competent to raise the objection which it did but that the Court was not empowered by law to examine that objection and to remand the case back to the Collector for a fresh decision, as no such power could be spelt out from the relevant provisions of the statutes.
While dealing with a reference under section 18 of the Act, the Court must confine itself to the matters mentioned in subsection (1) of that section and the only party competent to raise such matters is "a person interested" as defined in clause (b) of section 3 of the Act. The Court is therefore not empowered to go behind the reference so as to examine either the legality of the acquisition proceedings or the legality and validity of the award except at the instance of a person interested, and that too only in respect of the matters specified in the section. It follows, therefore, that it has no power to remand the case back to the Collector for a fresh decision. Its duty is to proceed to give its own award in the light of the provisions and principles embodied in Part 111 of the Act"
' The next case on the point is also a judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan at Lahore consisting of A. R. Changez and A. R. Khan, JJ. In the case of Bashir Ahmed and others v. The Collector, Multan the learned Judges reviewed the entire case-law on the subject and recorded the conclusions as follows :- "Reading these two sections together, it is quite clear that the enquiry by the Court is restricted to a consideration of the objections raised by the interested parties in accordance with subsection (1) of section 18 of the Act. It does not contemplate the decision on the question of limitation, because that apparently is a matter for the Collector to decide. With great respect to the learned Judges of the Oudh Chief Court, we are unable to agree with the view expressed by them in the aforesaid ruling."
' The weight of the case-law on the subject has persuaded us to follow the earlier decisions of the West Pakistan High Court either from Lahore or from the Karachi Bench. We are clear in our mind that since limitation is provided only by the proviso to subsection (10) of section 18 of the Act it is the Collector who has the power to determine the question of maintainability of the application seeking reference. Conversely sections 23 and 24 of the Act enumerate the questions which the Court shall or shall not take into consideration while dealing with a reference under section 18 of the Act. Similarly section 20 of the Act lays down that on receipt of a reference the Court shall cause a notice to be issued and served on the persons who are mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and
(c) of the said section. Again section 21 restricts the scope of enquiry in proceedings before the10 11 Court to a consideration of the interest of the persons who are affected by the objections. Since the restrictions on the scope of the enquiry are explicitly stated in section 21 of the Act we are of the view that restriction by the fact of application for reference being time barred is not a relevant consideration for the Court at all. There is still another angle for consideration. It is the right and duty of the Collector to make a reference and if for any reasons he waives the right to refuse to make a reference by reason of the application for the same being time-barred, the Court would not question such action on his part, as he is the interested party. On a consideration of all the aspects of this matter we express our respectful dissent from the judgment of the learned Single Judge of Peshawar High Court in the case of Bihi Rehmania v. The Government through Collector, Peshawar. The reference before the Collector was in order.
8. The next question is about the maintainability of the present appeal. Such objection is founded on the judgment of a Division Bench of the Peshawar High Court in the case of WA PDA v.
Aurangzeb Khan and others . In that case a reference had been made by the Collector and the same was heard by an Additional District Judge, WAPDA, which as a statutory authority was interested in that litigation because by reason of subsection (I) of section 50 of the Act the cost of acquisition had to be defrayed by that authority. An appeal was filed by WAPDA before the Peshawar High Court and preliminary objection as to its maintainability was raised. Ghulam Safdar Shah, C. J. Considered the case-law on the subject as well as the dictum from the Treatises of Aggrawala and Singhal on the subject and was persuaded to disapprove the following passage appearing in the 'Treatise of the former out of the two authors :- ' No local authority or company is compelled to proceed under the Land Acquisition Act. If it can procure any land which it is desirous to acquire more cheaply by private negotiations, it is entirely at liberty to do so, but if it elects to set in motion the special powers given to Government for public subjects it can expect not higher privileges and powers than those given to Government itself. Thus the interest of the local authority must be subservient to that of Government and it would be dangerous to allow private individuals, local authorities and companies to interfere in a proceeding under Part HI of the Act. Under such circumstances if Government declines to prefer an appeal the local authority cannot be permitted to do so except in case! Of patent injustice."
' The learned Judges considered the same pre-Partition cases, namely Municipal Corporation of Pabna v. Jugandra Narain Baikut , Fakirchand v. Municipality, Hazara , Collector and Chairman v.
Hiranand and Nihalchand and others v. District Board, Mianwati. On consideration of these cases his Lordship came to the conclusion that if the Government did not prefer an appeal against the judgment (award) of the District Judge a local authority could not be permitted to call the judgment in question. It may be stated that by Ordinance XI of 1972 of the Province of North-West Frontier it had been provided that all references under section 18 of the Act were to abate and likewise all appeals by or on behalf of the Provincial Government arising out of the references under section 18 and pending in the High Court or Supreme Court also abated. The learned Judges of the Peshawar High Court, who recorded the judgment on behalf of the Division Bench, also took into consideration the provisions of the N. W. F. P. Ordinance and held that the appeal at the instance of WAPDA did not lie. The decision in that case would be distinguishable by reason of the provincial Act. But even on the state of law as exists we are not inclined to take a different view. It may well be that appeal did not lie at the instance of a company or local authority who was to benefit by the Acquisition before Ordinance XLIX of 1969 which was promuglated in West Pakistan on 17-12-1969. The impugned judgment was delivered in 1974. By the Ordinance several provisions were inserted or amended in the Land Acquisition Act. Such provisions are subsection (5) of section 9, section 11, section 20 and subsection (1-A) of section 50. These provisions respectively read as follows :--12 13 14 15 16 "(5) The Collector shall also serve notice of the enquiry to be held under section 11 (such notice not being less than fifteen days prior to the date fixed under subsection (2) for determination of claims and objections) on the Department of Government, local authority or Company, as the case may be, for which land is being acquired, and require it to depute a duly authorised representative to attend the enquiry on its behalf for the purpose of making objections (if any) to the measurement of the land, claims to any interest in the land or the amount of any compensation. Such authorised representative shall be a party to the proceedings."
"9. Amendment of section II of Act I of 1894.-In section I1 of the said Act between the words "any person interested" and the words "has stated", the words and commas "and a Department of Government, a local authority, or a company, as the case may be, shall be inserted.
14. Amendment of section 20 of Act I of 1894.-In section 20 of the said Act, in clause (c), between the word "Collector" and the full-stop at the end , the words and commas "and the Department of Government, local authority or Company, as the case may be, for which land is being acquired" shall be inserted.
(I-A) Any charges to be defrayed from the funds of a local authority or a company under subsection (1), may be recovered, in addition to any other mode of recovery provided in any other law, as arrears of land revenue."
' It would seem that after the promulgation of this Ordinance the scope of interference at the instance of a local authority or a company was widened so as to bring such body else at par with the departments of the Government. The reason underlying the amendment is not far to seek because acquisition proceedings are very often instituted for satisfaction of the needs of such local authority or company and in fact the amount of compensation is also generally paid by them. They are interested parties in every sense of the term and it would be patently unjust to keep them out of Court.
9. There is no dispute on the point that acquisition proceedings, were instituted for the benefit of the appellants and it is also not disputed that they will be affected by the payment of compensation. The appellants B had made an application before the District Judge under Order 1, rule 10, C. P. C. For being joined as a party and such application was granted. The order joining the appellants was not challenged and in fact the appellants were permitted to produce evidence. The only question for consideration is whether the present appeal is maintainable at their instance. By insertion of subsection (5) in section 9 of the Act (reproduced above) the Collector has to serve a notice of an enquiry under section 11 of the Act on the local authority or the company for whom the land is being acquired and he has to require such local authority or company to depute a duly authorised representative to attend the enquiry. Such authorised representative can again file objections be those in regard to the measurement of the land or claims to interest in the land or the amount of any compensation. Such authorised representative by operation of law becomes party to the proceedings. Section 11 also carries a consequential amendment to provide for insertion of the words "as department of the Government or local authority or company" after the words "any person interested". It would thus seem that a local authority for whose benefit the land is acquired is not merely a person interested but becomes a party to the proceedings to whom the statute requires a notice to be given. The amendment in section 20 which deals with the initiation of proceedings before the Court on obtaining a reference clearly provided that the Department of the Government or local authority or a company for whose benefit the acquisition proceedings had started was to be given a notice by the Court directing their appearance. Again by insertion of subsection (I-A) in section 50 of the Act any charges which are to be defrayed from the funds of the local authority or company could be recovered from such local authority or company. It would thus seem that the law was amended by Ordinance XLIX of 1969 to enhance the status and recognise the, interest of the local authority or company or a department of the Government vis-a- vis acquisition proceedings instituted at their behest or for their benefit.
10. At this stage the provisions of section 54 of the Act need a reference. Section 54 does not state at whose instance does an appeal fie, although it provides for appeals in the same manner as an appeal from a decree of a Court constituted under the Code of Civil Procedure. Since the W APDA was treated as a party interested and was joined in the proceedings there can be no two opinions that an appeal would lie at their instance. By a reference to section 53 and section 54 together the conclusion is inescapable that the party interested, has the same right of appeal as devolves on a party before a civil Court.
11. Even before the promulgation of amendments in Ordinance XLIX of 1969 the position does not appear to us to be much different. In the case of H. M. Saya & Company v. Wazir Ali Industries Limited the appellant had omitted to make Wazir Ali Industries Limited and their partners parties in the contest. In fact the relief claimed directly affected these parties. The Supreme Court laid down a principle based on furtherance of administration of justice so that on a decree or order being appealed against such persons who are likely to be affected be permitted to challenge the same. Their Lordships stated as follows :- "The Court should proceed on the principle that every procedure which furthers administration of justice is permissible even if there is no express provision permitting the same. Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code deals with appeals from decrees and section 104 deals with appeals from orders. The provisions do not in terms say, who is entitled to prefer an appeal. The Court, however, lays down that it is the decree or the order that has to be appealed against. If the decree or order appealed from adversely affects a person he should be permitted to challenge the same in appeal even if he was not made a party to the original suit or proceedings."
Since the appellants were parties before the District Court and are interested in the result of the litigation they were entitled to maintain C the present appeal. We therefore hold that the present appeal is maintainable.
12. Coming to the merits of the case we are satisfied that the learned District Judge has adequately considered the evidence that had been led before him. Some land that had been surrendered in pursuance of the Land Reforms Regulation and resumed by the Government was sold by the Government to the appellants at the rate of Rs, 3,000 per acre. The appellants had not objected to that price. Documents had been placed before the District Judge showing that on 20-6-1964 one piece of land in the same Deh admeasuring 10-3 acres was sold by a willing vendor to a willing vendee in the sum of Rs, 10,075 and on the same day by another transaction between different persons land admeasuring 9-37 acres was sold for Rs, 9,925. Documents relating to a third transaction showed that one survey number admeasuring 1/8 of an acre was sold for Rs, 1,000. On the other hand evidence on behalf of the Collector had proved that some land in the locality had been sold at a cheaper rate of Rs, 150 or Rs, 220 per acre. These sales pertain to 1967 and 1968, viz. After the acquisition of this land.
13. The land in question had been used for construction of buildings and the same would show that it had the potential for such use. The appellants had themselves purchased resumed land from the Government at the rate of Rs, 3,000 per acre. The value was assessed in accordance with some circular issued by one Mr. Baker, but such circular has not been placed on the record and we have good reason to think that this circular must be a pre-Partition document. The compensation was worked out on "batai" system but we have no means of knowing what that system is. The land in question is situated at a distance of five miles from the District Headquarter of Mirpur K has. We are, therefore, of the view that the compensation awarded is just and proper. Nothing has been pointed out to show that the same was excessive.
14. For all the above reasons we dismiss this appeal but there shall be no order as to costs.17 PLD 1971 Pesh. 191 AIR 1944 Born. 200 AIR 1946 Mad. 184 AIR 1955 Mad. 23 PLD 1960 Lah. 469 PLD 1971 Azad J & K 33 AIR 1940 Pesh. 35 PLD 1960 Kar. 826 PLD 1965 Kar. 413 P L D1969 Kar. 314 PLD 1962 Lah. 295 PLD 1975 Pesh. 1 4 I C 382 47 P R 225 AIR. 1929 Lah. 10 AIR 1936 Lah. 564 PLD 1969 SC 65