NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.---The petitioner was elected unopposed for the un-expired term of office of Mr. Mohsin Siddiqui, on his demise, to a Senate seat from Sindh Province on 16-6-1990. The notification of his having been so elected was issued by the Election Commission of Pakistan on 27-6-1990. The session of the Senate convened after his election being on 5-8-1990, the petitioner went to take oath on that date but on account of lack of quorum, no formal proceedings could take place. The session of the Senate was, accordingly, adjourned.
1n the meanwhile, respondent No. 1. (Mr. Tariq Chaudhry) who is also a Member of the Senate filed a Writ Petition (W.P.No.681/90) in the Lahore High Court alleging that the petitioner was inherently disqualified from being a Member of the Parliament under the provisions of various clauses of Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution. Alongwith the Writ Petition (W.P.No:681/1990) a Civil Miscellaneous Application.(C.M.No.1061/90) was also submitted wherein it was prayed that the Chairman of the Senate (respondent No.2) be restrained from administering the oath to the petitioner herein till the final disposal of the writ petition. This Civil Misc. Application came up for hearing before a Division Bench of the High Court on 15-8-1990 and the learned Judges in the High Court, after hearing the parties expressed the view that the writ petitioner had muck out a prima facie case and directed that oath of office of Senator shall not be administered to the petitioner herein till further orders. Since then, although the writ petition has been posted for hearing on several occasions it has not, however been heard so far, for one reason or another. In these circumstances, the petitioner has moved this Court against the order dated 15-8-1990 restraining respondent No.2 from administering oath to him.
Raja Mohammad Anwar, learned counsel for the petitioner, has, in his elaborate address, raised several contentions but the most important of these seem to be: (i) that as ordained in Article 225 of the Constitution no election to a House of the Parliament can be called in question except by an election petition, hence the writ petition filed by Senator Tariq Chaudhry was not maintainable; (ii) that a writ in the nature of quo warranto can be addressed only to a person "holding or purporting to hold a public office" to show under what authority of taw he claims to hold that office. In this case, the petitioner not yet having taken oath as Senator neither held a public office nor was purporting to do so, and (iii) in any case, no order to restrain a person to hold a public office can be issued. Such an order can be issued only when a person is holding or purporting to hold a public office in praesenti.
The stand of Ch. Muhammad Farooq, the learned Deputy Attorney General and Mr. A.K. Dogar, learned Counsel for the Senator Mr. Tariq Chaudhry, in reply to the contentions, is (i) that in the writ petition the election of the petitioner is not being called in question. What is being questioned is his title to be a Member of the Senate because, according to than, he is inherently disqualified from being a Member thereof and that such a challenge, by a writ of quo warranto is not barred by Article 225 of the Constitution; (ii) that on the issuance of the notification by the Election Commission of Pakistan declaring the petitioner to be the returned candidate as a Senator in the scat of Mr. Mohsin Siddiqui for the un-expired term of his office the petitioner could be said to be holding a public office, notwithstanding that he was still to take oath of a Member of that House, and (iii) the question whether an order restraining the administration of oath to a returned candidate can be issued or should issue depends upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of each particular case and no hard and fast, rule can be laid down in this respect.
It is manifest that questions arising are of a legal nature and of considerable public importance.
But the issue before us is whether this Court should address them at this stage?
We observe that the writ petition is still pending in the High Court and, in fact, has not yet even been admitted to regular hearing. The order impugned before us is only an ad interim restraint order. The writ petition, we understand, was fixed for hearing even yesterday (17-12-1990) but could not be heard. In case, the petitioner herein is successful in satisfying the High Court that it cannot or should not interfere in the matter in exercise of its writ jurisdiction, the writ petition will be dismissed and the ad interim restraint order fall along therewith. In any case, it is the High Court which must decide this question in the first instance.
I am conscious that the petitioner has been elected only for the un-expired period of the term of Senator Mohsin Siddiqui which expires on 20th March, 1991 and that more than half of his term has already been consumed in the proceedings before the High Court. This is indeed most regrettable.
In my opinion, the High Court should take up this case forthwith and dispose of the writ petition without any further delay. The writ petition, which was instituted in August, 1990, has still to come up for consideration of the question of admission but on account of an ad interim order of stay, an elected Senator is being denied his seat. The High Court should, in these circumstances, give priority to this matter and decide it by 15th January, 1991.
I would dispose of this petition with these observations.
ABDUL SHAKURUL SALAM, J.---I would have liked to agree with the proposed order of my learned brother but regret that would leave the impugned order in the field as a precedent to be followed and I do not think that is correct on principles governing interim injunction and is not contrary to the intention and express provisions of the Constitution.
Relevent facts are that the petitioner on 26-6-1990 was elected by the Members of the Provincial Assembly of Sindh to a seat allocated to that Assembly in the Senate which had fallen vacant on account of the demise of a member from that Constituency. Vide Notification of the Election Commissioner of Pakistan, Islamabad dated 27-6-1990, the Chief Election Commissioner published the name of the petitioner as a "returned candidate" in the bye-election "to the Senate from Sindh Province" against the un-expired term of the deceased member which was due to expire on March 20,1991 " A member of the Provincial Assembly of Sindh filed a Constitutional petition on 11-7-1990 in the High Court of Sindh challenging the election of the petitioner on the grounds that he was not qualified and disqualified under Articles 62 and 63 of the Constitution. When it came up for hearing on 17-7-1990 pre-admission notice was issued to the petitioner for 26-7-1990. He having not been served substituted service was ordered for 6-8-1990. It was pasted on his door. On 5-8-1990, a Constitutional petition bearing W.P.No. 681/1990, was filed in the Lahore High Court against the petitioner challenging his election on the same grounds, along with C.M. No.1061 of 1990 for restraining administration of oath to the petitioner till the disposal of the petition. Session of the Senate stood convened for 5-8-1990 on which date the petitioner was to take oath as a Member of the Senate. There being no quorum, the session could not be held and so the petitioner could not take oath. The Constitutional petition filed in the High Court of Sindh was admitted on 6-8-1990 by a learned Division Bench of that Court but the application for stay restraining the respondent from taking oath was not pressed and dismissed. On 13-8-1990, the Constitutional petition filed in the Lahore High Court came up for hearing and notice was issued to the petitioner for 15-8-1990. When he appeared before the learned Division Bench of the Lahore High Court at 10 A.M. He said that he had received notice only a day back and had come on the first flight. He may be allowed time to contest the petition and application for stay. Case was, ordered to come up at 12.00 noon. After hearing the parties, the learned Bench issued a direction that "oath of office of Senator shall not be administered" to the petitioner. This is vide order dated 15-8-1990. It is challenged through the afore-titled petition, Contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner are that the petitioner was elected by the Members of the Provincial Assembly of Sindh and he is to represent the Sindh Province in the Senate of Pakistan. The Lahore High Court had no territorial jurisdiction in the matter. Moreso when a Constitutional petition or the same subject for the same relief had already been filed in the Sindh High Court on 11-7-1990 and admitted on 6-8-1990, stay application was withdrawn and dismissed, the Lahore High Court had no jurisdiction to issue interim injunction on 15-8-1990 vide the impugned order.
Secondly, election of the petitioner could not be challenged under Article 191.9 of the Constitution as the Article is "subject to Constitution" and Article 22.5 of the Constitution provides that "too election can be questioned except through an election petition filed in accordance with law", for which provisions have been male in Charter V of the Senate (Election) Act, 1975. He relied upon Election Commission of Pak. v. Java; d Hashmi PLD 1989 SC 396). Article 63 (2) also provides a means of challenging the right of an elected Member to sit in the House. Therefore, Article 199 being "subject to Constitution" and alternate remedied being available this provision of the Constitution could not be utilized be the Lahore High Court to deprive the petitioner of his right and to annul the effect of various Articles of the Constitution. Thirdly, that it was prayed in the miscellaneous application that respondent No.2 (Chairman Senate) may very kindly be restrained from administering the oath "to the petitioner till the final disposal of the writ petition". The learned Court in the impugned order has "directed that. Oath of the office of Senator shall not be administered" to the petitioner "till further orders" Learned counsel submitted that Article 69(2) of the Constitution provides that:--- "No officer or member of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) in whom powers are vested by or under the Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business, or for maintaining order in the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any Court in respect of the exercise by him of these powers:"
It -as submitted that direction issued in the impugned order is in direct conflict with the Constitutional provision and the Court had no jurisdiction. Fourthly, the application has been filed and proceeded under Article 199(b)(ii) of the Constitution but the provision has no application to the facts of the case. The provision is that on such an application, the High Court may make an order:
(ii) requiring a person within the territorial jurisdiction of the Court holding or purporting to hold a public office to show under what authority of law he claims to hold that office."
The precise contention is that the petitioner is neither holding nor purporting to hold any public office. Only his name has been notified as a returned candidate. The petitioner will hold office when he has taken oath as required by Article 65 of the Constitution. He is by no means purporting to hold public office. He has done nothing so as to say that he is purporting to hold public office. It is nobody's case that the petitioner has done anything which will amount to his purporting to hold public office. Lastly, the learned counsel submitted that false propaganda material could not be used against the petitioner. Where there were more and worse allegations against a member of the House those were found to be of no avail for unseating the Member. He submitted that the only conviction against the petitioner is of making a speech against Martial Law for which he was convicted under Martial Law Regulation 13 for a year and 10 stripes. But this happened in 1977.
Article 63(1)(h) disqualifies a person who is convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude for not less than two years and five years period has not elapsed. None of the conditions are applicable to the petitioner. He relied to Muhammad Afzal v. Muhammad Altaf Hussain 1986 SCM R 1736. Fifthly, no interim injunction is issued to an elected office-holder not to perform his duties. Not only he is deprived but the Constituency is also deprived of its representation.
The learned Deputy Attorney-General representing the Federation and Senate as well, and the learned counsel for the writ petitioner submitted that the Lahore High Court had the jurisdiction as the petition-r was notified having beer elected as a member of the Senate by the Election Commission at Islamabad and Senate is also located there. The writ petitioner in the Lahore High Court is a Member of the Senate from Punjab and he has no other remedy to question the qualification and disqualification except through a Constitutional petition in the nature of quo warranto. The petitioner having been declared electric is purporting to hold the public office of a Senator. They relied on Farzand Ali v. Province of West Pakistan PLD 1970 SC 98. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner has faed a chart showing that the petitioner is not a qualified and is a disqualified person to hold the office of a Senator.
We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the precedents quoted by them. Obviously the contentions raised require interpretation of Constitutional provisions having far-reaching effect. Therefore, leave to appeal is granted.
As regards the interim injunction impugned, I am of the view that it is to be vacated. My reasons are that interim injunctions are not issued against elected members of the highest legislative bodies as that not only deprives the member but the constituency goes un-represented. Non- grant affects nobody. The basic principle governing grant of interim injunction is balance of convenience. Secondly, without full adjudication interference in the composition of national Legislative houses is contrary to democratic norms which are the basis of the Constitution. Thirdly, in view of the Constitutional bar contained in Article 225 that "no election to a House ...Shall be called in question except by an election petition ...." And Article 199 invoked in the High Court being "Subject to the Constitution " and in its own terms there being alternate remedies, the Lahore High Court did not have prima facie jurisdiction to issue the interim injunction. Fourthly, Article 69(2) of the Constitution provides that "No officer or member of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) in whom powers are vested by or under the Constitution for the conduct of the business shall be subject to jurisdiction of any Court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers." If the Chairman of the Senate or other officers of the Parliament were not to be subject to the jurisdiction of the Court in respect of the exercise of powers vesting in them, no injunction prima facie could be issued to them not to give oath to the petitioner. Lastly, and most importantly is the consideration whether the Lahore High Court had the jurisdiction or could exercise it lawfully in respect of the dispute brought before it. In this connection we must remember that Pakistan is a "Federal Republic". Article
1. To the Senate of Pakistan each of the four Provincial Assemblies elects fourteen members. (Article 59). Question arises whether a member elected to the Senate by a Provincial Assembly to represent the Province can be asked by the Lahore High Court for the Province of Punjab to show under what authority he was holding office of having been elected by the Provincial Assembly of his Province? If that be so, all the members elected by the three Provincial Assemblies would be amenable to the jurisdiction of the Lahore High Court for the Province of Punjab. Therefore, when a Constitutional petition on the same ground and for the same relief was pending in the High Court of Sindh, without final adjudication the Lahore High Court had no right to issue direction that the petitioner who was elected by the Provincial Assembly of Sindh shall not be administered oath.
In view of what has been stated above, I am of clear view that the impugned order was not called for. It is, therefore, set aside.
RUSTAM S. SIDHWA, J.---The question that arises for consideration is whether an ad interim order issued by a learned Division Bench of the Lahore High Court on 15-8-1990 on a miscellaneous application C.M.No.1061 of 1990, directing that the oath of office of Senator shall not be administered to Syed Masroor Ahsan, the present petitioner, as a member of the Senate of Pakistan, till further orders, can be sustained.
2. It appears that Syed Masroor Ahsan, petitioner, was awarded a ticket by the Pakistan Peoples Party to contest the election to a seat of the Senate which had fallen vacant on the death of Senator Mohsin Siddiqui on 16-6-1990.
3. The petitioner and four others filed their nomination forms. The other candidates withdrew their nomination papers on 23-6-1990. The petitioner was accordingly elected Senator on 26-6-1990.
The Election Commission of Pakistan accordingly by notification dated 27-6-1990 notified his being elected unopposed to the Senate seat from Sindh Province.
4. On 11-7-1990 one Shamsul Arifeen, M.P.A. (Sindh), filed Constitution Petition No. E-675 of 1990 in the Sindh High Court against the petitioner challenging his election and seeking relief in the form of a writ of quo warranto, alleging that the petitioner was disqualified from being elected as a Senator. With the said petition, a miscellaneous application for debarring the petitioner from being administered the oath of his office was also filed. Pre-admission notices were issued to the petitioner.
5. On 5-8-1990 the session of the Senate was convened, but due to lack of quorum the session was not held and the petitioner who had gone there to take oath, could not be so administered oath.
However, the session of the Senate was adjourned to 8-8-1990.
6. The same day Senator Muhammad Tariq Chaudhry, the present respondent No.1, filed Writ Petition W.P.No.681 of 1990 in the nature of quo warranto in the Lahore High Court to call upon the petitioner to show under what authority he held the office. With the said petition, a miscellaneous application C.M.N0.1061 of 1990 for an interim relief, as stated in para 1 above, was filed. The case was adjourned on two dates and ultimately fixed for 13-8-1990.
7. On 6-8-1990 the Constitution petition filed by Shamsul Arifeen M.PA. Came up for hearing before the Sindh High Court, which was admitted. As regards the miscellaneous petition for interim relief, the same was not pressed and therefore was dismissed as withdrawn.
8. On 8-8-1990 the petitioner presented himself at the Senate to receive the oath of his office, It is alleged that the Senators staged a walk out, to show their disgust, with the result that he could not be administered oath.
9. On .13-8-1990 the writ petition filed by Senator Muhammad Tariq Chaudhry, respondent No.1 came up before the Lahore High Court for hearing. Before this date the petition had come up on two earlier dates on which the counsel for respondent No.1 had sought adjournment. However, on 13-8-1990 the learned Judges summoned the learned Deputy Attorney-General and issued notices to the petitioner for 15-8-1990 both in the main petition and on the Miscellaneous Application C.M.No.1061 of 1990. Notices were also ordered to issue by registered post acknowledgement due and telegraphically.
10. It is the case of the petitioner that he received notice of the hearing through telegram on 14-8- 1990 in the evening at Karachi, that he flew into Lahore on 15-8-1990 by the early morning flight, that he reached the Lahore High Court at about 10.00 a.m., that he appeared with his two counsel before the learned Judges of the Division Bench at 10.00 a.m., when the case was called, that his learned counsel requested for adjournment on the ground that he had received notice only the day before and that he had no knowledge of the contents of the writ petition, that the learned Judges gave no accommodation but adjourned the case to 12.00 noon the same day, that neither he nor his counsel had time to prepare the written statements z--- the main petition and the miscellaneous application or the affidavits in support thereof or to prepare the case or look up the law on the subject and that after arguments were hard, of a fully prepared counsel, on one side, and two unprepared counsel, on the other, the learned Judges of the Division Bench passed the interim order the same day directing that the oath of office of Senator should not be administered till further orders.
11. The writ petition then was fixed for a number of dates, but nothing material took place. The writ petition does not even stand admitted. The ad interim order still holds the field.
12. The circumstances in which the interim order was passed on 15-8-1990 by two learned Judges of the High Court in some apparent haste leaves much to be desired. Initially on 13-8-1990 the first notices through telegram and registered acknowledgement due post were issued to the petitioner for 15-8-1990. He appeared in Court on 15-8-1990. Since he had received the telegram on 14-8-1990 and post haste presented himself before the Court on 15-8-1990, it was too much to expect that his counsel would be prepared for full fledged arguments that day, or also be ready to present their client's written statement to the main petition and the miscellancous application, together with accompanying documents and affidavits. Notwithstanding a genuine request for adjournment, which was reasonable and most appropriate in the circumstances, the petitioner ex facie a responsible citizen holding one of the highest offices i.e., of a Senator, of a sovereign Islamic country-- found himself at the mercy of the highest Court in the Province begging for adjournment, which was not granted, and compelled to meet the onslaught of his prepared adversary, without being granted a fair opportunity to prepare and defend himself, It is the solemn duty of Courts to see that defendants or persons against whom causes have been instituted against whom learned "fields are claimed, get a fair-- even though short-- amount of time, which they consider reasonable and proper in, the circumstances, to enable them to meet the cases of their adversaries regarding interim relief. Where the Court considers that a party, notwithstanding receipt of notice, has not turned up or is trying to delay the case, the Court can squeeze the time, but however short it may it must be such that in the given circumstances and taking all facts into consideration, it is neither unfair nor unreasonable. In interlocutory matters the right to defend includes a fair opportunity to the person concerned to present his defence in writing, in the manner required by law or rule governing the relevant case, and to present his oral arguments, where the same is permissible. Where such an opportunity is not fairly granted, it cannot be said that the person concerned was given a right to defend. In constitutional cases, a fair amount of time is allowed, depending upon the facts of each case, to a respondent to present his written statement to the writ petition and to the miscellaneous application for interim relief and to present arguments relating to interim relief. The instant case clearly shows that a fair opportunity was not granted to the petitioner to defend his adversary's claim to interim relief, but that in circumstances somewhat unfortunate, the learned Judges acted with undue haste. A fair opportunity to defend is a right and not an indulgence and where a party is not allowed adequate time to prepare, plead and argue his case, the proceedings stand vitiated. With profound respect to the learned Judges who have passed the order, I would only say that the order relating to interim relief suffers from inherent vice and deserves to be set aside on that account.
13. Another peculiar feature of the case is the somewhat unusual order passed by the Court. The learned Judges first set out in some detail and with precision the arguments of the learned counsel for respondent No.1 and that of the counsel for the petitioner in reply. The Judges then opined that they would refrain from commenting on the merits of the arguments, lest it may prejudice the case of either party at any subsequent stage of the proceedings. They then observed that the contentions raised were likely to raise propositions of law which would call for an authentic and proper adjudication. They then observed that the allegations made in the petition, as supported by annexures and charts, had not yet been denied ever, by an affidavit and that the answer to question No. 14 in the nomination form filed by the petitioner bad not orgy been not denied by him through any affidavit, but prima facie stood negated by an annexed charge sheet pertaining to the ease inter alia against the petitioner in which he was allegedly declared absconder. In view of this discussion, the learned Judges then proceeded to pass the ad interim order. It may be observed that the learned Judges first refrained from commenting on the legal arguments of the petitioner, lest it prejudice the case of either party at any subsequent stage and for fear that they raised propositions of law which ultimately called for an authentic and proper adjudication. The legal submissions therefore raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and which constituted whole legal basis of his defence, were totally not considered. How the learned Judges could have avoided taking note of the four legal objections raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner in their arguments, and which have been referred to by the Judges in para 3 of the impugned order, is not understood. The legal objections go to the root of the case, namely, whether the writ of quo warranto was not maintainable in view of the petitioner not having taken oath of office, whether the writ petition was not I competent, in view of another writ petition which had earlier been filed in the Sindh High Court, was still pending there, whether the writ petition was not competent, in view of the exclusive jurisdiction being available with the Senate itself to deseat a member and whether the writ petition was not competent, as grounds for disqualification contained in Article 63 of the Constitution referred to present acts and not to past acts. Till the learned Judges had considered these legal objections and prima facie found that they neither affected the competency'; of the writ to proceed or their own jurisdiction to deal with the case, they could' not have proceeded to hold that prima facie respondent No.1's writ petition was legally maintainable and competent.
Without clearing this hurdle, the Court could not have passed the interim order on merits alone. In view of this vital legal flaw, the order stands vitiated.
14. It is the case of the respondents that the past and present character and criminal record of the petitioner as evidenced by the material appended with the writ petition, are such that he is a reprehensible person who does not at all deserve to be a member of the Senate and that he stands inherently disqualified to be a member of this august assembly. I have read all the annexures and charts appended with the writ petition and the respondents' present reply to the petition for leave to appeal. If all what is stated therein is true, the petitioner would neither be entitled to be qualified nor deserve to be a member of the Senate. However, what is alleged and what ultimately can fairly be found to be legally proved, in a case such as the present, where allegations of fact can only be supported by affidavits, are two different things. In one case before the Election Tribunal, where a long string of allegations of a similar nature were found to be proved, the Supreme Court set aside the findings and laid down stricter tests for the establishment of such allegations. See Muhammad Afzal v. Muhammad Altaf Hussain (1986 SCM R 1736). To hold that almost all facts stood proved, because they were not denied on affidavit, because-- as stated earlier-- no fair opportunity to defend the petition was allowed to the petitioner, would be an unfair inference.
15. My learned brother Dr. Nasim Hasan Shah, J, has referred to the unfortunate circumstances in which the case has been allowed to drag on, with the writ petition not even being admitted to hearing since the last four months. My learned brother Abdul Shakoorul Salam, J., has referred to the dangers attending the issue of interim orders restraining members of the superior legislatures from performing their functions on the ground that they not only deprive the members from performing their duties, but leave the constituencies un-represented and that therefore such interim orders-- on principle-- should not be issued and in any case without a full adjudication of the case, for otherwise interference in the composition of the superior legislative bodies would be violative of basic democratic norms. I am also of similar mind. The circumstances in which the interim order was issued restraining a member of the superior legislature to take oath and thus perform his functions "till further orders" of the Court, but the writ petition was not admitted, which prima facie suggests that that day at least the learned Judges were in some doubt as to whether they hadjurisdiction to deal with the case or whether the writ was competent or whether there was a prima facie case which could otherwise proceed, clearly leads to the inference that the interim order was passed against a background of facts which the Judges feared did not support its issue.
Supporting the observations of my learned brother Abdul Shakurul Salam, J., I would hold that Courts should be somewhat reluctant in freely issuing stay orders preventing members of superior legislatures from performing their functions, till a more closer, if not full, adjudication is made, which would exclude all possibilities of such an order being set aside, both on legal or factual grounds. It is of the utmost importance that members of elective bodies should be allowed to fully perform their functions, so that the interests of their constituencies are protected and do not suffer, and till the full adjudication of the case-- restraint orders should as far as possible be avoided, unless during preliminary hearing the Court is completely satisfied that such an interim order can safely be passed, against the weight of all legal and factual objections raised by the party affected, and the requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure slating to the issue of interim orders are clearly satisfied.
16. My learned brother Abdul Shakurul Salam, J. Has referred to the fact that the High Court was not competent to deal with the writ petition as the matter was an election dispute and that the petitioner was neither holding nor purporting to hold a public office and that its action would trench on the principle of federalism, as the petitioner who was a Senator elected from the Sindh Province could not be arraigned before the High Court of another province to show under what authority he held his office. Since these and all other legal matters are still sub judice before the High Court, I would not like to express myself on these points, but would leave these matters open for the High Court to decide.
17. Agreeing with my learned brother Abdul Shakrul Salam, J., I would grant leave to appeal. Notices having already issued to the respondents in this case and arguments having been heard in full, the foregoing reasons and, in the light of the above submissions, I would set aside the impugned order dated 15-8-1990 passed in C.M.No.1061 of 1990. Supporting the observations of my learned brother Dr. Nasim Hasan Shah, J., I would request the learned Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court to ensure that the main writ petition is taken up day to day, subject to all just exceptions, and finally decided one way or the other by 15th January, 1991.
ORDER OF THE COURT By the opinion of the majority, leave to appeal is granted and the interim order dated 15-8-1990 passed in Civil Miscellaneous No.1061 of 1990 in Writ Petition No.681 of 1990 is set aside. The High Court should hear the Writ Petition (W.P. No. 681/1990) expeditiously and dispose it of by 15th January, 1991.