' SHEZADA MAZHAR, J.--- Through the instant petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, the petitioner has challenged the portion of the order dated 4-9-2014 passed by the learned Single Member of the National Industrial Relations Commission of Pakistan whereby the appeal of the petitioner was remanded to the Registrar without setting aside the order impugned in the appeal in the following terms:--- "The objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that serial number has been mentioned on the ballot paper on both sides i,e, on counterfoil and remaining part of the ballot paper has not been denied by the learned counsel for respondents Nos.2 and 3. This objection was not raised by the appellant before the learned RTU before passing the order dated 9-6-2014.
Without going into the merits of the case, it would be appropriate and in the interest of justice that this appeal which has been filed by the appellant shall be treated as an objection petition by the learned RTU and decide the same expeditiously in accordance with law after hearing both the parties. Any party aggrieved by the order of the learned RTU can assail the same by filing fresh appeal, if so advised. The file of the case be sent to the learned RTU after completing all the formalities". (emphasis added)
2. The above mentioned order was passed on an appeal filed by the petitioner under section 12 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 against the order dated 9-6-2014 whereby respondent No,4 was declared as CBA of Pakistan International Airlines Corporation.
3. This Court vide order dated 30-10-2014 issued notice to respondents and also suspended the operation of order dated 9-6-2014. On 31-10-2014, C.M. No,2731/2014 was filed by respondent No,4 for vacation/recalling of the order dated 30-10-2014. In this application respondent No,4 also objected on the maintainability of the writ petition.
4. The matter came up for hearing before this Court when learned counsel for the petitioner stated that he has filed a contempt application against the respondents as the order of this Court dated 30-10-2014 have not been complied with by the respondents. The learned counsel for the parties were asked to argue the application for vacation of stay order as well as on the maintainability of the writ petition.
5. The main objection of learned counsel for the respondents/ applicant was that against any order passed by the Commission a remedy of appeal is available to the petitioner and in presence of an alternate remedy no writ petition is maintainable. In this respect, learned counsel for the respondents relied upon Khairpur Textile Mills Employees' Union, Khairpur v. Registrar of Trade Unions, Karachi and 2 others (PLD 1975 Karachi 225), Syed Mansoor Ahsan v. Muhammad Tariq Chaudhry and others (1991 SCMR 668), Pakistan Steel Peoples. Workers' Union v. Registrar of Trade Unions, Karachi and 6 others (1992 PLC 715), PIASI Union through Secretary-General, P.I.A. v.
Registrar, Industrywise Trade Unions and 4 others 1993 PLC 581 (Karachi High Court), Farzand Raza Naqvi and 5 others v. Muhammad Din through Legal Heirs and others (2004 SCMR 400) Abdul Wahab r. Government of Sindh through Secretary, Home Department, Karachi and 2 others 2004 YLR 2599 (Karachi), MRs, Kausar lqbal Bhatti, Advocate High Court Bahawalpur v. Shafqat Atta and 25 others, 2010 CLC 224 Lahore), Muhammad Abbasi v. S.H.O. Bhara Kahu and 7 others (PLD 2010 SC 969), Ghulam Qadir v. Station House Officer, Police Station Cantt., Bahawalpur and 4 others 2012 MLD 1173 (Lahore), Al-Rehman Associates through Special Power of Attorney v. Province of Sindh through Secretary Land Utilization Department and 2 others 2010 CLC 1734 (Karachi) and Mehmood Medical Store through Proprietors v. Service Hospital, Lahore through Medical Superintendent and 3 others 2012 YLR 174 (Lahore).
6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the petitioner, states that there is only one appeal available under the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 and that is under section 12 of the Act, 2012.
Against impugned order no further appeal is available and therefore, writ petition is competent.
Learned counsel for the petitioner also made submissions against the impugned order. He relied upon Suo Motu Case No,4 of 2010 and Civil Aviation Authority, Islamabad and others v. Union of Civil Aviation Employees and another (PLD 1997 SC 781).
7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the case-law relied upon by the learned counsel for the parties as well as the relevant provisions of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012 (IRA, 2012).
8. A collective bargain agent is elected under section 19(2) of the IRA, 2012. The Trade Union who receives the highest votes is to be declared as collective bargaining agent by the Registrar under section 19(9)(e) of Industrial Relations Act, 2012. The said order/certificate of Registrar can be challenged under section 12 of the IRA, 2012 before Commission.
9. In the case in hand, the petitioner did challenged the order/certificate of the Registrar before the Commission under section 12 of IRA, 2012 on which the impugned order dated 4-9-2014 was passed by the single member of the Commission against which present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner on the ground that no appeal is available against said order of the Single Bench of the Commission, whereas the respondents claimed that against the order of Single member of the Commission an appeal is available under section 58(2)(d) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2012.
10. In order to appreciate the contention of the parties, section 58 of the IRA, 2012 is reproduced hereunder:--- Section 58.--- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in, this Act, or in any other law for the time being in force, any person aggrieved by an award or decision given or a sentence or order determining and certifying a collective bargaining unit passed by any Bench of the Commission, may, within thirty days of such award, decision, sentence or order prefer an appeal to the commission.
(2) An appeal preferred to the Commission under subsection (1) shall be disposed of by the Full Bench of the Commission which shall---
(a) if the appeal is from an order determining and certifying a collective bargaining unit, have the power to confirm, set aside, vary or modify such an order.
(b) if the appeal relates to any other matter, the Full Bench may, confirm, set aside, vary or modify the decision or sentence passed and shall exercise all the powers required for the disposal of an appeal.
(c) The decision of the Full Bench shall be delivered as expeditiously as possible, within a period of sixty days following the filling of the appeal, provided that such decision shall not be rendered invalid by reasons of any delay in its delivery.
(d) The Full Bench may, on its own motion at any time, call for the record of any case or proceedings under this Act in which a Bench within its jurisdiction has passed an order for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality, propriety of such order, and may pass such order in relation thereto as it thinks fit: ' Provided that no order under this subsection shall be passed revising or modifying any order adversely affecting any person without giving such person a reasonable opportunity of being heard.
' From the above clause (1) of section 58, it is clear that if an order is, passed by any Bench of the Commission said order can be challenged before Full Bench of the Commission within 30 days by any aggrieved person.
11. In the case in hand, an appeal filed by the petitioner which was heard by a single bench of the Commission who passed the impugned order. Petitioner is aggrieved of the said order to some extent and therefore under section 58(1) the Industrial Relations Act, 2012, he has a remedy before full bench of the Commission.
12. Petitioner can also approach the Full Bench of the Commission under section 58(2)(e) of the IRA, 2012 which gave Suo Motu powers to the Full Bench to examine the record of any Bench. A suo motu power can also be exercised on the basis of any grievance of any of the parties. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Limited v. Muhammad Javed Iqbal and another (1986 SCMR 1071) as under:-
7. It is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the revision application filed by respondent No,1 before the Labour Appellate Tribunal under section 38 (3-a) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance was incompetent in law as this jurisdiction was not exercise-able on motion of parties. The next submission on behalf of the petitioner was that the amendment effected in law by means of Ordinance IX of 1975, whereby suo motu revisional power was vested in the Labour Appellate Tribunal, was not retrospective so as to apply to orders passed prior to the effective date of the amendment.
' So far as the first argument 'is concerned, no principle of law or any precedent was quoted to show that the suo motu statutory power cannot be invoked by the authority vested with it on the application of a party to proceedings before the subordinate forum or authorities. On a perusal of the provisions of subsection (3-a) of section 38, we find no warrant to hold that there would be any bar on the Tribunal to exercise this jurisdiction, if the requisite information comes before it from any source including an application made by any party Apparently the jurisdiction seems to be supervisory in nature in order to enable the Tribunal which is at the apex of the hierarchy of Tribunals set up by the Industrial Relations Ordinance to examine the legality or propriety of proceedings taken or an order passed by subordinate Tribunals. We, therefore, see no reason to disagree with the view taken by the High Court on this point.
13. Somewhat similar view was taken by the Sindh High Court at Karachi in its judgment reported as Pearl Continental Hotel, Karachi v. Pearl Continental Hotel, Karachi Workers Union 2007 PLC (C.S.)
372 wherein it was held that revisional powers could only be exercised by the Court on its own motion as distinguished from "on the application of an aggrieved party" however any party could lay appropriate information before the court and only when the court is satisfied that miscarriage of D justice had taken place or proceedings in the revision would foster the cause of justice, it could exercise its suo motu powers and issue notice to the other parties. Similar view was also taken in M/s. Karachi Marriott Hotel v. Atta Hussain [2006 PLC (C.S.) 140] and Munawar A. Malik v. Abdul Salam [2006 PLC (C.S.) 122].
14. In view of the above discussion, the petitioner had an alternate remedy before the Full Bench of NIRC against the impugned order dated 4-9-2014, therefore, the present writ petition is not maintainable.
15. As I am dismissing the present writ petition on the ground of maintainability, therefore, I am restraining myself from discussing the merits of the case, so that it may not prejudice the case of any of the party in proceeding before the forum below.
16. In view of what has been discussed above, the present writ petition is dismissed as the petitioner has an alternate remedy against the impugned order, leaving the parties to bear their own cost.