1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, C.J.---This appeal through leave of the Court is directed against the judgment dated 21-1-1990 of the Lahore High Court; whereby a Criminal Revision filed by the respondent/complainant in a pending murder case was allowed.
2. The complaint lodged by the respondent No.2 on 5-12-1973 reads as follows:-- "Rana Mahmud Ahmad son of Rana Muhammad Sadiq, caste Rajput, resident of village Rashid, Tehsil and District Lahore ---Complainant versus
1. Syed Mushtaq Hussain Shah Bokhari, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Sadar Circle, Lahore.
3. 2.Syed Latif Hussain Shah, S.H.O., Police Station, Manawan, District Lahore.
3. Bashir Ahmad, A.S.I. Police Station, Manawan, District Lahore.
4. Muhammad Younus, Foot Constable, No. 2055, Police Station Manawan, District Lahore.
5. Haji Ahmad, Foot Constable No. 2457.
6. Ghulam Qadir, Foot Constable No.532.
7. Muhammad Azeem, Foot Constable No. 4986 --Respondents "COMPLAINT UNDER SECTION 302/307/148/149, P.P.C.
4. POLICE STATION: Manawan, District Lahore.
5. "Respectfully sheweth:----- .
(1) That complainant's father, Rana Muhammad Sadiq, was a dealer in food grains and fertilizers and was an authorised agent of National Farm. Guide, Jallo More, Lahore. He was also registered as a contractor with the Agricultural Development Corporation, Lytton Road, Lahore.
(2) That in the first week of July, 1973, Respondent No.2, Syed Latif Hussain Shah, S.H.O., Police Station Manawan, insisted that the father of the complainant shall deliver to him 20 maunds of wheat free of charges for respondent No. 1, which was refused by him, on which the said respondent adopted a very oppressive attitude and publicly expressed himself that the father of the complainant will have to face the worst in the near future.
(3) That on 25th of July, 1973, since the father of the complainant had to transport 200 bags of fertilizers from Jallo More to Sheikhupura, he submitted an application before the Deputy Commissioner, Lahore, in abundant caution, since he reasonably apprehended some mischief on the part of Respondent No.2. The Additional Deputy Commissioner (General), Sheikhpura, passed an order on the said application, to the effect that there was no prohibition on the transport of fertilizers. A photostat copy of the said application is appended herewith as Annexure `A' which forms an integral part of this complaint and may kindly be read as such.
(4) That the father of the complainant hired a truck No. RTC-4295 for the aforementioned purpose but before the truck could leave for Sheikhupura, Respondent No.2 seized the same by sheer abuse of the process of law, mala fide with ulterior motive in spite of the order passed by the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner, Lahore, having been shown to him. He seized the truck and the goods aforementioned and registered a case under section 420/406, P.P.C. Against the complainant's father at Police Station Manawan, District Lahore.
(5) That Respondent No. 2 also proceeded under section 115 of the Motor Vehicles Ordinance, 1940 and on his submission of the challan, the learned Assistant Commissioner, Lahore, in summary proceedings imposed a fine of Rs. 150 but at the same time ordered that the truck and fertilizer be released and returned. Copy of the order is Annexure-B.
(6) That despite the order passed by the learned Assistant Commissioner, Respondent No.2, did not release or return the truck and the goods aforementioned. The father of the complainant filed a petition for contempt of Court in this Hon'ble Court and also a complaint against contempt and disrespect to the orders passed by the learned Additional Deputy Commissioner (General), Lahore.
6. In both the above petitions the said Respondents Nos.1 and 2 have been summoned to answer the charges.
(7) That the petitioner's father also represented before the Deputy Commissioner, Lahore and the Superintendent of Police, Lahore Cantonment, on which an inquiry was directed against Respondent No.2. Complainant's father also brought it to the notice of the said authorities that he apprehended danger to his life at the hands of Respondents Nos.1 and 2. A copy of the order passed by the Deputy Commissioner on the said application is shown as Annexure `C' which may kindly be read as an integral part of this complaint.
(8) That still another false and frivolous case under section 186, P.P.C. Was registered at Police Station Manawan against the father of the complainant at the instance of Respondent No.2.
(9) That the complainant's father filed a Writ Petition No.1623 of 1973against the registration of the abovesaid cases which is still pending.
(10) That Respondents Nos.1 and 2 were highly annoyed due to the filing of the Writ Petition and the aforementioned complaints before this Hon'ble Court and as such they decided to away with the complainant's father.
(11) That besides, during this period, the father of the complainant joined `TEHRIK-E-ISTIQLAL' which fact also annoyed the Provincial Chief Minister, Malik Meraj Khalid and his relatives, and in this way the police officials and influential members of the ruling party joined hands against the complainant's father and decided to cause his murder.
(12) That on the 30th day of September, 1973, some relatives of Malik Meraj Khalid, accompanied by the police force, attacked the father of the complainant in the early hours of the night when he was busy in checking his daily business accounts at his shop situate in Jallo More Market. The persons mentioned above having formed themselves into an unlawful assembly armed with fire-arms and deadly weapons, indulged into indiscriminate firing wherein two foot constables namely Barket Ali and Manzoor Ahmad wearing plain clothes were hit when the father of the complainant who had hidden himself in the straircases of the building, managed his escape.
(13) That a case under section 302/148/149, P.P.C. Was registered on the basis of absolutely a false and concocted story whereby they were implicated on the pretext of their having murdered the said two foot constables.
(14) That the complainant alongwith Shah Muhammad, and Faqir Muhammad were arrested and were brought to the Police Station on 30-9-1973 at 9-00 p.m. Wherefrom at 12-00 p.m. They were taken to the vicinity of village Manawan.
(15) That Respondents Nos.1 to 7 who had brought the complainant and the other persons abovementioned to the vicinity of village Manawan, began to fire shots to harass and intimidate them and on the point of pistols and rifles etc. They were required to disclose the whereabouts of Rana Muhammad Sadiq, the father of the complainant. The complainant under duress and immediate fear to his life, disclosed the whereabouts of his father on which Respondent No.1 directed respondents Nos.2, 3, 4, arid 5 to cause his immediate arrest and to produce him before him which was done by them within about an hour.
(16) That after having brought the father of the complainant to a place near P.1 Rajbah Shalamar, Jallo More Village Manawan at about 2.00 a.m. All the respondents fired at him and killed him on the spot within the view of the complainant and the persons aforementioned and still some other persons who had been attracted to the place of occurrence.
(17) That having caused murder of the father of the complainant in the aforesaid ruthless manner, the respondents concocted an absolute baseless story of police encounter and for the purposes of escaping the punishment, concealed the facts, fabricated and destroyed evidence.
(18) That the complainant, his other relatives and respectable have since made representation after representation before the superior police authorities who have, in the first instance, been putting off each one of them on one false pretext or the other and have ultimately refused to allow the law to have its own course. In the circumstances the complainant has no other equitable remedy but to invoke the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court.
(19) That the respondents have caused murder of the father of the complainant in the aforesaid manner and having done so, they have concealed, fabricated and destroyed evidence by abuse of the process of law and the authority vested in them and are as such penalty punishable.
7. It is, therefore, most respectfully prayed that they be proceeded against and punished in accordance with law."
8. The case had earlier come to this Court in 1979. It was decided in June, 1981. It is reported as Syed Mushtaq Hussain Shah Bokhari v. The State and another (PLD 1981 Supreme Court 573). The facts and circumstances upto the said stage are mentioned in detail in the said judgment.
9. Briefly re-stated the facts relevant for the present stage are that although the appellant's F.I.R.
10. About the same occurrence was registered on 1-10-1973 wherein his plea was that he alongwith other police officials was present in a Nakabandi with a view to arrest Rana Muhammad Sadiq deceased who was allegedly required in the double murder of two Constables. This occurrence had taken place a day earlier. It was also his case that at about 2.30 a.m. On the night between 30th September and Ist October, 1973 two persons were seen. They were stopped by the police party and were asked to disclose their identity. They opened fire on the police party and it was in that encounter that one of the two persons was killed and the other escaped. The one who was killed was identified as Rana Muhammad Sadiq, the father of Rana Mehmood Ahmad who subsequently filed a complaint against the appellant and several other police officials. The said complainant's case in short was that his father was in fact murdered in cold blood by the police officials.
11. The complaint remained pending before a Magistrate for several years on account of transfer application moved by the complainant in the High Court. When the matter came up before the Sessions Judge in 1976 it did not take him long to hold a preliminary inquiry as a result of which the accused were summoned in 1977. The Sessions Court took few months in completing the said stage of the proceedings. On the appearance of the accused, an application was straightaway moved under section 265-K, Cr.P.C. By the appellant as stated in his petition in this Court, for his discharge from the case. It was on the ground that he could not be tried without prior sanction of the Provincial Government as provided under section 197, Cr.P.C. It was assumed that he being a public servant was "accused of an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty". The sanction under section 197, Cr.P.C thus, according to him, was required to prosecute him. His further plea was that in a judicial inquiry conducted by a Magistrate, the appellant was found to have "acted while being on duty". (Para No.5 of the petition). This application was dismissed by the trial Court. The appellant moved a revision before the High Court which was also dismissed. He then moved the Supreme Court and his appeal was dismissed in 1981 with the observation that the prosecution should not be stifled at the outset and the parties be allowed to produce their witnesses---if in the course of proceedings it appears that the case is such that it cannot proceed without the sanction (under section 197 of the Cr.P.C.) of the appropriate Government the proceedings should be stopped and reasonable time be given to the complainant to file the sanction of the appropriate Government. The question of acquittal under section 265-K, Cr.P.C. Will arise only if the complainant fails to do so within a reasonable time. It was observed that the contrary view canvassed, (then) by the appellant (herein), before the Court that the question of sanction should be decided at the outset would mean that the defence version would have to be examined first and if the defence version is taken up at the outset and is accepted, there will be nothing left to be examined. This bare circumstance indicated the futility of this approach and this could not be intention of the observation made in Iqbal Hussain's case 1970 SCM R 726 which had been relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant. In fact Hamoodur Rehman, C.J. Clarified that the directions being issued by him were in conformity with cases of Matiar Rehman Dewan PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 21 and Syed Ahmad PLD 1958 SC
(Pak) 27 and must be understood in the light of the observations made therein.
12. The, process of frustration of the lawful proceedings did not end here, After the evidence had been recorded the trial Court heard the arguments. On the question of the sanction, the learned trial Judge in his order dated 27th November, 1983 held that "the accused persons acted in the discharge of their duties and as such the trial cannot proceed any further without complying with the requirements of section 197, Cr.P.C. I hold my hand to give detailed reasons for my opinion abovementioned because the matter will be determined finally after the trial proceeded further and the stage of delivering the final judgment is reached. I do not wish to pre-judge finally the issue in question lest it prejudice the case of either party prematurely".
13. The complainant was allowed a period of two months to approach the appropriate Government for getting necessary sanction as required under section 197, Cr.P.C. The learned Judge further observed that; "the final determination of the case will be made after the decision of appropriate Government is placed before this Court".
14. This order was challenged this time by the complainant side in the High Court in its revisional jurisdiction in the second round in a period of about a decade. In its judgment dated 17-1-1990 after another period of 6 years the High Court held that the appellant having in the meanwhile been retired from service no permission under section 197, Cr.P.C. Was required. While holding so it seems that the learned Judge when reading the relevant reported decisions of this Court, overlooked a very important condition laid down therein. The cases are:----
(i) Hamed Ghulam Sadiq v. Pakistan and others PLD 1960 SC (Pak) 351.
(ii) Ali Ahmad alias Ali Ahmad Mia v. The State PLD 1962 SC 102.
(iii) Nazir Hussain Shah v. The State PLD 1965 SC 139.
(iv) Muhammad Abbas v. The State 1974 SCM R 445.
(v) Ataur Rahman v. The State PLD 1967 SC 23.
15. The important condition as is found in the case of Nazir Hussain Shah was that if the public servant retires before the taking of the cognizance of the Court in that case sanction would not be necessary.
16. In this case both the learned counsel before us have agreed that the cognizance was taken by the trial Court when the appellant was still in service. For this technical reason there. Is no alternative but to set aside the impugned judgment.
17. Had it not been such an old case having suffered a long unnecessary delay a remand to the High Court to examine the merits of the case might have been possible.
18. The respondent had also urged in his Revision before the High Court that; "the accused persons had not acted in the discharge of their official duties but they acted purely to avenge themselves of the murders of the two Constables and due to the long-standing enmity and litigation of the main accused/appellant with Rana Muhammad Sadiq deceased and there is sufficient evidence on the record to prove that the accused persons had acted purely in their personal capacities and for their personal grievance and it was not included in their functions to take the life of a citizen as mentioned in the complaint of this case".
19. We found that at least at this stage the two learned counsel who appeared before us felt really worried as to what had happened in this case and hesitated to claim that the case should be remanded to the High Court. We also felt that what the High Court could do in this case can also be done by the Supreme Court.
20. Accordingly, further question was examined: as to what the trial Court should have done in this case at the stage it declared that the sanction was necessary under section 197, Cr.P.C. It had not given any reasons in support of the findings of fact.
21. The reluctance to give the reasons on the part of the trial Court is understandable in the context that the next stage for deciding the case finally had not yet reached; although, the trial practically had ended. What he was required to do further was to fix another date for further arguments and that would have practically ended the trial.
22. It is true that through a voluntary process of resolving the difficulties in observing the provisions of section 197, Cr.P.C. The Courts started with the need only to read the complaint and may be affidavits on the question of applicability of section 197, Cr.P.C. Seriously contested cases led to the next stage when the Courts thought that a collateral preliminary inquiry may be made. Yet another stage came when the Courts held that this might not be enough in somewhat complicated cases.
23. It may be necessary to hold the first inquiry as an independent stage itself, amongst other stages.
24. And after rendering a decision on the need or otherwise of sanction under section 197, Cr.P.C. The more vital parts of the trial might then follow. Further, in this case, another stage was visualised by the Supreme Court in the reported decision in 1981; wherein benefit was also derived from the Indian case of Matajog Bobey and others v. H.C. Bhari and others PLD 1957 SC (Ind.) 160 in addition to several decided cases by the Supreme Court (Pak.). In the Indian case it was held that the question; whether sanction for the prosecution is necessary or not may arise at any stage of the proceedings. The complainant may not disclose that the act constituted the offence was done or purported to be done in the light of a police or judicial inquiry or even in the course of the prosecution evidence at the trial may establish the necessity for sanction. It was also held that: "Whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage. The necessity may reveal itself in the course of progress of the case."
25. It is perhaps the underlined part in the Indian case as well as, the weighty observations made by this Court in Syed Ahmad v. The State PLD 1958 SC (Pak.) 27 that it was held in the previous decision by this Court (in this case) that if in the course of the proceedings it appears that the "case is such that it cannot be tried without the sanction under section 197, Cr.P.C. ... ... ... ... ... ...The proceedings should be stopped and the reasonable time be given to the complainant ... ... ...
26. This course which was undoubtedly very beneficial to improve the dispensation and put under operation the provisions of section 197, Cr.P.C., also did not work. That is why we are again at the stage where it started nearly 20 years ago. On account of all these reasons we are compelled to visualise amongst already stated stages and methods of dealing with the question of sanction under section 197, Cr.P.C; yet another just and fair method, as an evolutionary improvement, on account of the experience gained.
27. In this case it is admitted by the learned counsel that if the complainant's version is accepted as it is, section 197, Cr.P.C. Would have absolutely no attraction. On the other hand he also admits that if the accused/appellant's version is accepted he is most likely to be acquitted on the assumption that he as a public servant had acted in the performance of his duty. Not only this but also that it was a case of exercise of right of private defence. Thus, looked at from the prosecution point of view or the defence point of view, it is a case of a need for discovery of true facts even for the sake of technicality which might be involved in section 197, Cr.P.C We, therefore, are of the view, that in cases like the present one, the phrase, used in the Indian case "from stage to stage" and "in the course of the progress of the case" as well as the phrase used by this Court in this case "if in the course of proceedings", would mean the proceedings at a any stage.
28. Some stages have passed icy so far as these proceedings are concerned. The evidence has been closed and the accused have been examined. The arguments for determining: whether, the accused are guilty or not, have also been heard. A mental examination of the case with the help of the arguments has already been done. The next stage would have been the finding of guilty or not guilty. And after the finding of guilty or not guilty the next stage was one of punishment or acquittal as a result thereof. In this case both the learned counsel agreed with a supposition that in case the appellant's plea is accepted, vis-a-vis, the claim of the exercise of right of private defence, there may be another possibility; namely, whether the case falls under Exception 3 to section 300 of the P.P.C. That can arise. It reads as follows:-- "Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender being a public servant or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice, exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due discharge of his duty as such public servant and without ill-will towards the person whose death is caused."
29. If the case falls under Exception 3 then the punishment would not be under section 302 but under section 304-I, P.P.C. It is emphasized that this would be only if there is a finding of guilty. If on the other hand the finding of complete self-defence is rendered in favour of the appellant the occasion of applicability of Exception 3 would not arise. Hence, in this case and other cases of this type the stage when it would be necessary to determine the need or otherwise for sanction under section 197, Cr.P.C., has in reality not yet reached without determining as to what is the nature of act committed by the accused.
30. There is nothing in the law or principle that at such a stage if the finding of guilty is rended is some cases this very finding might negate the other finding that the sanction under section 197, Cr.P.C. Is essential element of "acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty" might then be missing. But if in the same finding of guilty there is an element of the application of Exception 3 then the finding to the effect that the accused being a public servant or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice exceeded power given to him by law, might have to be rendered. In that case also sanction might be necessary. Thus, in the first visualised case sanction might not be necessary and in the second visualised case sanction might be necessary.
31. And in case the finding of innocence or otherwise on merits or due to complete exercise of right of private defence is rendered, the next stage would be of acquittal and in that context the sanction would in any case be an exercise in futility.
32. The present is the classic example of very complex nature of the provisions contained in section 197, Cr.P.C. The learned trial Judge thus cannot be blamed much for what he did. Unable to face the dilemma which the superior Courts also often had not faced, perhaps due to simple nature of cases before them, he came out with his own solution though strange that if he discloses his mind, the party affected adversely with the disclosure of the reasons would be "prejudiced". He was forgetting that the cases reported on this subject contained the discussion on the merits (and the reasons) for applying section 197, Cr.P.C. Otherwise too there would have been a better opportunity for the party affected to deal with the decision on the plan of argument on merits. Even the appellant has not benefited from the withholding of the reasons by the trial Court. That is why, perhaps his learned counsel also in Para (e) of the petition having stated that section 197, Cr.P.C. "remained available throughout the trial felt worried that the "-------taking cognizance by the Court and passing of the order by the trial Court has all mixed up". This is the state of law for the last, if not more, at least half a century. It needs attention of the legislature.
33. The Lahore High Court in 1939 felt the difficulty of resolving the complex issue of sanction before "taking cognizance" and recording of evidence for the same purpose. Realising that "taking cognizance" is a cognitive process of mind involving perceptions and that it was very difficult to apply mind to the facts of the case and keeping it aloof from the other mental processes of intending to take action in the matter; which are constituted, in a way in taking of cognizance also, aid was sought from curative provisions contained in section 537, Cr.P.C. The two judgments in the same year are Manzur Ali v. Emperor (AIR 1939 Lahore 1) and Arjan Singh v. Emperor (AIR 1939 Lahore 479). The effort besides being incomplete was not much successful. It was thought that cognizance was a continuous process till the end. This Court also without much discussion tried to resolve this difficulty in the remarks in Saeed Ahmed's case as follows:-- "In order to come to a conclusion on this point, the evidence recorded in the case is available, as for an ancillary or collateral purpose, notwithstanding that the Court could not take cognizance of the offence without prior sanction of the prescribed authority. The record does not show whether the relevant authority has been approached to exercise its power under section 197, Cr.P.C., or whether it has done so. Yet, that does not necessarily entail evasion of the provision of that section.
34. On the view which we have taken, it is open to a Magistrate when trying a case of the relevant kind, to come to a conclusion at any stage of the case that in respect of some or, it may be all, the offences alleged, the sanction of the appropriate Government would be necessary under section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code.
35. The result might be that after such period of time as is necessary for obtaining the orders of the Government; the Magistrate could proceed to try the accused on all the charges, or alternatively on such of the charges as may be tried without the sanction of Government as well as those charges in respect of which the sanction of the Government may have been accorded. By following such a procedure, the risk of prosecution being stifled at the outset would be avoided:"
36. The expressions: "The Magistrate when trying a case"; and "could proceed to try the accused on all the charges" are very significant for the present discussion.
37. With respect a complexity as visualised by the appellant's learned counsel' does remain to be resolved. The Lahore method is a sure way out with further sophistication of modern toots in interpretation. One is of stat're deci'sis, the other that when Supreme Court declares law, it has to be followed and the seeming change in the earlier law has to be accepted as validly made even if it looks as an amendment in section 197. This is no doubt a sure clear answer. But to satisfy even a stray critic, we may look at the changed section 537. Cr.P.C. In cases like the present one it will be in aid of justice and fairplay to apply section 537, Cr.P.C: --there is no other better way; or to amend section 197 itself.
38. In the light of the foregoing discussion this appeal is partly allowed. While setting aside the impugned orders, we remand the case to the learned trial Court to proceed to the next stages of hearing the arguments again; and pass a fresh order giving all the reasons in the order itself in support thereof. No question of prejudice arises. If it comes to the conclusion that the accused were not acting "in the discharge of their official duty" when they committed the act complained of there will be no need to ask for sanction under section 197, Cr.P.C. If it is held that although they acted in the discharge of their official duty and while doing so advanced public justice but exceeded the power given to them by law then before convicting them under section 304, Part-1, P.P.C. a sanction would be necessary under section 197, Cr.P.C. Other varients vis-a-vis, each accused and each offence, are left to be decided by the trial Court in accordance with its findings to be recorded as above directed.
39. It needs to be remarked that due to development of the law so far declared and explained in the precedent branch thereof, there is faced some difficulty by the trial Courts; but there being enough guidance in the cases it should not be difficult to resolve the same with the joint efforts including of the lawyers of the parties concerned. For example the question whether giving of the reasons in the order regarding application of section 197, Cr.P.C., the practice of F the Supreme Court could have been kept in mind. It gave elaborate reasons whenever need arose for a finding one way or the other under section 197, Cr.P.C. And it was never felt that there would be prejudice caused to a party. Such prejudice (so-called and not the real one) is inherent in various adjudicatory stages during the progress of the hearing in a case. It is a necessary by-product of the exercise of the rule of law and benefits thereunder.
40. Before parting with this judgment it is remarked that the present case had taken 10 years to bring the matter for decision of the Supreme Court in the earlier round; on a purely preliminary point and the main controversy about the liability of the persons concerned still left to be determined in fresh round of litigation. That stage in the present case reached nearly 10 years ago. The next, this second round, has reached this Court in another 10 years. Although this time the Supreme Court proceedings--both the petition and appeal stages have taken much less time as it used to be, yet we cannot help noticing that what war, warned against in M.S. Khawaja's case PLD 1965 Supreme Court 287 a quarter century ago, has to be repeated again and again. The parties herein, of course, assisted by expert advice, have taken decades in procedural niceties. The main controversy about the liability of the appellant is yet to be determined.
41. This Court has often observed with anguish that fragmentary, decisions of such character are most inconvenient tending to delay administration of justice. Same has been the view of the Privy Council in Nanhelal v. Umrao Singh (AIR 1931 PC 33). This very concise and very weighty analysis- cum-observation has always been valid and is of course more valid today-- particularly as to what is happening with regard to the application of the provisions which are of technical nature.
42. Instead of making use of them for advancement of justice, in a large number of cases they are used to frustrate the same.
43. We are therefore, constrained to hold that in such like cases as is the present one, the course to be followed and the question to be asked is: whether, the matter should not be left for final decision by the trial Court. Its orders at the interlocutory stages should not be brought to the higher Courts to obtain fragmentary decisions; as it tends to harm the advancement of fairplay and justice.
44. It is a wrong or at least misstatement in our state of law, practice, procedures and proceedings in the Courts of law, that wrong orders should be corrected at the time they are passed because it would take less time for the case to conclude. This might have been true half a century to quarter century ago. Thereafter, the challenge to the interlocutory orders has brought about a deluge in the administration of criminal justice. Cases started piling up with the result that the concept of speedy justice came to a grinding halt and powers that may be, started thinking of curtailing remedies even reducing the right of appeals. Cases like the present one do justify such an angry re-action but with a little change of practice in the technical field (for example amendment, vis-a- vis, the subject in section 197, Cr.P.C.) it is hoped there would be no need to curtail the remedies as that too in the stage where we are passing, might be counter productive.