SHAHID KHAN, J. The subject consolidated judgment, propose to decide the subject writ petition coupled with the following connected writ petitions, as similar & identical question of law & fact is involved therein. i. Writ Petition No. 275-D/2022 Malik Mamdu vs Faiz ur Rehman and others ii. Writ Petition No.276-D/2022 Malik Mamdu vs Sabir Shah and others iii. Writ Petition No. 277-D/2022 Malik Mamdu vs Muhammad Hashim and others iv. Writ Petition No. 278-D/2022 Malik Mamdu vs Ikram Hussain and others v. Writ Petition No. 279-D/2022 Malik Mamdu vs Ghulam Ishaq and others
2. The common & identical facts of the subject petitions, wherein, the petitioner (landlord) has called in question order of the Rent Controller, dated 08.4.2022, whereby the written request of the petitioner, Shadi Gul for his impleadment in the subject eviction petitions under section 13, Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 filed by the petitioner/applicant Malik Mamdu was allowed.
3. The Court has carefully gone through the pleadings, submissions at the bar and the case law coupled with scrutiny of the evidence made available.
4. In view of the submission at the bar and record made available, the Court observed that without commenting upon the merit of the case, it would be appropriate to dilate upon the validity, genuineness, competency & authenticity of the impugned order of learned Rent Controller, D.I.Khan, whereby, the written request of the petitioner/respondent No. 2 for his impleadment as respondent in the eviction petitions in question was allowed. It is hard fact that impugned order of the learned Rent Controller is interlocutory in its nature. There is no denial to the proposition that order 1 rule 10 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 speaks loud and clear of not only impleadment of an aspirant of a party, having prima facie due interest in the subject matter directly or indirectly.
Surely, trial under the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, stricto senso does not accomplish under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 but shall not skip the attention of the Court that the provisions & principle do attract, as and when required, whereof, required for the dispensation of justice and to adjudicate upon the rights and liabilities of the parties.
5. The learned Rent Controller accorded to join one namely, Shadi Gul (respondent No. 2) as party on acceptance of his application under Order 1, Rule 10 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The appeal against the impugned order is prima facie not appealable on the ground that the same is not appealable under section 15(4) of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. Reference here may be made to the principle laid down in the case of Allah Ditta and another v.
Muhammad Hussain and others (PLD 1965 Lah. 29) where the Court held that an order passed for joinder of party was not appealable under section 15(4) of the said Ordinance of 1959. The principle laid down by the Court, with which the Court in respectful agreement, clearly shows that only the orders were passed under the specified provisions of the said Ordinance, are appealable, whereas, and interlocutory order of the Rent Controller, is not appealable to the High Court.
6. It is settled law that when the Statute does not provide the right of appeal against certain orders, the same cannot be challenged by invoking the Constitutional Jurisdiction of the High Court in order to gain a similar objective. Where a Statute has expressly barred a remedy which is not available to an aggrieved person (party) under the Statute, it cannot be sought indirectly by resort to the Constitutional Jurisdiction of the High Court.
7. In the present case, the intent of the Legislature to keep out interlocutory/interim orders from the scope of appeal is not difficult to understand. It is meant to curtail delays, piecemeal and fractured litigation at various fora at the same time. In our view, such orders cannot be challenged under the guise of invoking the Constitutional Jurisdiction of the High Court for the good reason that the same would tantamount to negating the provisions of the Statute itself and rendering the bar imposed by the Legislature in the interest of expeditious disposal of rent matters totally redundant.
The High Court exercising Constitutional Jurisdiction must be fully cognizant and conscious of the subject analogy & Rule and strictly adhere to the same in the interest of advancing the policy of law and delivering expeditious justice in accordance with the law and the Constitution.
8. Even otherwise, Constitutional Jurisdiction is equitable and discretionary in its nature and should not be exercise to defeat or bypass the purpose of a validity enacted statutory provision. In this regard, wisdom is also derived from the judgments of apex Court reported as Mushtaq Hussain Bukhari v. The State (1991 SCMR 2136), Mohtarma Benazir Bhutto, MNA and Leader of the Opposition, Bilawar House, Karachi v. The State (1999 SCMR 1447), Mst. Seema Begum v.
Muhammad Ishaq and others (PLD 2009 SC 45) and Muhammad Raza Hayat Hiraj v. Election Commission of Pakistan (2015 SCMR 233)
9. On perusal of the record, it transpires that the petitioner Malik Mamdu claims that he hold the ownership of suit shops on the strength of exparte decree, dated 29.10.2010 whereafter, he was handed over possession of the suit shop in execution proceeding of the decree. The record reveals that by virtue of a decree, dated 20.7.2012, passed by Civil Judge-IV, D.I.Khan, whereby, suit of the petitioner was dismissed on the pretext that he has sold out the suit shops to one Shadi Gul vide registered deed No. 2557, dated 25.10.2000, and that order was upheld by the learned Additional District Judge-III, D.I.Khan. It is pretty clear that learned Rent Controller vide its order, dated 08.4.2022, has rightly observed the above fact and thereby allowed the application of respondent No.2 for impleadment as sine qua non for the end of justice. Even otherwise, on merits too, the writ petitions are bereft of substance as the ownership of the respondent No. 2, prima facie, established on the strength of registered deed, dated 25.10.2000.
10. Quite apart from the above, the proceedings before the learned Rent Controller, under the Ordinance, are in the form of inquiry and provisions of Civil Procedure Code and Qanoon-e- Shahadat 1984, do not apply strictly. In this respect, we find support from the case of "Abdul Majeed v. Muhammad Aslam" (1981 CLC 20), relevant para is reproduced:- "It means as held by the Supreme Court the proceedings before the Rent Controller are in the form of an enquiry and C.P.C. and Evidence Act do not apply thereto in stricto senso. Further as held by the Supreme Court the Rent Controller does not act as Court while Evidence Act (section 1) applies to all judicial proceedings in or before any Court. As such the dictum of law as laid down in 1967 PLD Lahore 718 will not be applicable to the proceedings under the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959.
The appellant has applied under Order 41, rule 27, C.P.C. for bringing on record certified copy of the evidence to overcome the objection raised by the learned lower Appellate Court in the light of the judgment reported in PLD 1967 Lahore 718. In view of the above finding that Evidence Act and C.P.C. in terms are not applicable to the proceedings under the Rent Restriction Ordinance, there is no need to decide the application."
11. Looked at from every angle, the impugned order passed by the learned Rent Controller, D.I.Khan is unexceptionable and cannot be faulted on any ground whatsoever and the learned counsel for the petitioner has not been able to demonstrate any legal, procedural or jurisdictional error, defeat or flaw in the impugned order of learned Rent Controller, D.I.Khan that may furnish basis for interference by this Court by way of accepting the writ petition.
12. For the afore-stated reasons, the Court does not find any merit in the subject petitions, as such, accordingly dismissed in limine.
13. Before parting, office shall place copy of the subject order/judgment on the connected petitions accordingly.