1. ' SALEEM AKHTAR, J.---The respondent No, 1 was employed on 17-1-1985 and his service was terminated with effect from 16-1-1986. Respondent No,1 served a grievance notice on 15-1-1986 which was replied by the petitioner on 26-1-1986. Thereafter respondent No,1 filed application under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. The petitioner's stand was that respondent No,1 was employed on contract basis for a period of one year for specific job and in terms of contract his service was terminated. The Labour Court on consideration of the evidence came to the conclusion that applicant was a permanent workman and the petitioner was directed to reinstate him with back benefits. The appeal filed by the petitioner against this order was dismissed. The petitioner had deposited certain amounts towards back benefits which were ordered to be paid to respondent No,1. After some time respondent No,1 filed an application under section 51 of IRO that all the back benefits to which he is entitled have not been paid and therefore same may be ordered to be. Paid. The parties led their evidence in support of their claim on the basis of which the Labour Court held that respondent No,1 was entitled to Rs,44,981 as full back benefits out of which the petitioner had paid Rs,26,087 and ordered for payment of balance amount of Rs,18,894. The petitioner filed a revision application which was dismissed. The petitioner has challenged this order in this petition.
2. ' The main ground for challenging the impugned order is that under section 51 of the I.R.O the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to determine the amount. In this regard referenCe has been made to an unreported decision in C.P. No, D-552 of 1981 Karachi Club v. Mohammad Farooq in which' it was held that "section 51 envisages recovery of any money due from an employer under the settlement or under an award or decision of the arbitrator, Labour Court or Tribunal as arrears of land revenue or as a public demand, but this section does not provide for determination of any dues claimed against employer".
3. ' This question came up for consideration in Siegfried Beacon-(Pak) Ltd. v. Pb. Labour Appellate Tribunal and 4 others 1987 PLC 650 where the following observation was made: "In the present case the order which was brought before the Appellate Tribunal for consideration had two elements. One direction reinstatement and the other payment of back wages. If the order directing reinstatement remained uncomplied with, it had, to be converted into terms of money as it could be so converted and it has been in fact so converted. The wages if they included elements other than cash as per example leave entitlement etc., then they had to be converted into cash. In either case, therefore, the assumption of jurisdiction by the Appellate Tribunal was not misconceived. The order in respect of which this exercise was undertaken had in the domain of past the back wages and in the domain of future responsibilities arising out of the reinstatement of the employees. The back wages could be determined for the period before 18-12-1976 but the effect of non-reinstatement had to be determined, converted in terms of money after 18-12-1976 and made the responsibility of the employer. It has been so done. This could be done. There is no jurisdictional defect. The proceedings were properly conducted and suffer from no infirmity on that score."
4. ' Again in Dilkusha Enterprises Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Fourth Sindh Labour Court 1983 PLC 1229 the same question was considered by me. After referring to section 51 and Rules 73 it was observed as follows: "The provisions of section 51 and rule 73 are remedial in nature and as held in PLD 1973 SC 589 such statute should be construed in manner as to advance the remedy and avoid the mischief else it would frustrate the legislative intent. The object of section 51 is to provide speedy remedy for recovery of dues and benefits to which a worker is entitled under a decision or award. The main emphasis seems to be that the Court which passed the order, decision or made the award will be competent to determine and compute the benefits in terms of money and order for its recovery. If the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted then the scope of section 51 will be restricted by rule 73 which is not permissible. By rules a person cannot be deprived of any remedy which is made available to him under the Act."
5. ' An appeal was filed against this judgment before the Supreme Court which was dismissed. In Dilkusha Enterprises Ltd. v. Abdul Rashid and others 1985 SCMR 1882 while upholding the judgment the Supreme Court also approved Seigfried Becon's case. It was observed as follows: "It was further contended that under section 51 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance proceedings can be taken for a direction in respect of a decision of a Labour Court by the appellate Tribunal alone as provided by rule 73 of the Industrial Relations (Sindh) Rules which according to the learned counsel empowered the Labour Court in respect of award and the Appellate Tribunal in respect of a decision to determine the money compensation for a benefit under such an award or decision. In the first place the bare reading of rule 73 only makes out that the Labour Court or the Appellate Tribunal each in its own turn would be competent to pass orders determining the money value of a benefit under an awed or a decision respectively passed by itself. There is therefore, no room for interpreting the provision of the said rule to hold that every decision made either by the Labour Court or the Appellate Court can only be enforced for the purposes of section 51(2) by the Appellate Tribunal. Secondly, the plain reading of section 51 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance makes it abundantly clear that the Labour Court has been vested with the power to take proceedings under section 51 in regard to the money due or benefit to be received by a worker under a settlement or under an award or decision by the Arbitrator, Labour Court or Tribunal."
6. In the face of the direct authoritative judgment of the Supreme Court on the point, the unreported judgment of the Division Bench relied upon by the learned counsel, referred above, stands overruled and cannot be followed. The petition is therefore dismissed in limine.