1. The petitioner is a private limited Company and alleges to have had two separate establishment in its premises situated at S. I. T. E., Karachi. One establishment consisted of Silk Division which employed 17 workers and the other establishment was known as Tannery Division with three workers. The respondents Nos. 2 and 3 were employees. Of the Silk Division. The petitioners terminated service of, ail the workers of the Silk Division including the Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 and offered them one month's notice pay and closed down the Silk Division on 10th June, 1974 due to commercial reasons. All the workers whose services were terminated filed application under section 25-A,
1. R. O. Before the First Junior Labour Court at Karachi, which was allowed on 15th August, 1974. All the workers were ordered to be re-instated in service with half wages for the unemployed period. All the workers except respondents Nos. 2 and 3 compromised with the petitioner. The respondents Nos. 2 and 3 filed appeals against the order of the Junior Labour Court . The peti--tioners also filed appeal against the said order. The appeals were heard by the HIM Sind Labour Court and by order dated 14th April, 1974 the petitioners' appeal was dismissed and the appeal filed by respondents Nos. 2 and 3 was allowed and it was held that besides re-instatement they were to be paid by the . Petitioner all back benefits in full. During the pendency of the appeal the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 also filed a criminal complaint under sections 36-B and 54/55 of Industrial Relations Ordinance against the Director and Manager of the petitioner for non.
2. Implementation of the aforesaid Order of the Labour Court . The Director was convicted and sentenced to suffer imprisonment till rising of the Court and a fine of Its. 1,000 or in default to suffer R. I. For three months. After the disposal of the appeal the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 made separate applications under section 51 of I. R. O. To the IIIrd Sind Labour Court Karachi , for recovery of Rs. 31,460 to each of the respondents and also for recovery of payment of salary every month and benefits till the order, dated 14th April, 1974 was implemented. It has been alleged by the petitioner that on 23rd January, 1978 the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 accepted Its. 9,500 each in full and final settlement of their claim which was denied by respondents Nos. 2 and 3. The application under section 15 was allowed and the petitioner was directed to pay to respondents Nos. 2 and 3 Its. 31,460 each within 15 days. This order dated 10th April, 1980 has been challenged in this petition.
3. Mr. Shibli the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the impugned order is based on orders dated 15th August, 1974 and 14th12.32 October, 1974 which are void and illegal, - and, therefore, all subsequent orders passed on that basis are also void. The learned counsel in effect is challenging the validity of the order, dated 15th August, 1974 and 14th October, 1974 which were passed by the Junior Labour Court and Labour Court . This objection seems to have been raised in L. P. No. 1537/74 which was dismissed, and therefore, at this stage such objections cannot be permitted to be agitated again. Although the petition had been filed against the order passed in the criminal proceedings which the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 had instituted against the petitioner, the entire argument was based on the validity of the orders dated 15th August, 1974 and 14th August, 1974. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that from the judgment in C. P. No. 1537/74 it is not clear that such point was raised or even considered. However, since a prayer bad been made to declare the said orders invalid and illegal and as the petition has been dismissed it should be presumed that all the contentions raised in the petition challenging the said orders did not find favour with the learned judge while deciding Petition No. 1537174. Mr. S. Hamid Ali has referred to P - L D 1966 Kar.
31. I am in respectful agreement with the observation made in this authority and find no substance in this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. It may be mentioned that the learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to PLD 1965 SC 650, p L D 1964 SC 97 and PLD 1966 Kar. 597 mainly to the effect that where an order is illegal and void it is the duty of the Court to give effect to the law and no notice should be taken of such an order. I respect--fully agree with the rule laid down, but in the facts and circumstances of the case as stated above this rule cannot be pressed in service by the petitioner.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that the-- impugned order is not proper and is in excess of exercise of jurisdiction under section 51 of the I. R. O. His contention is that under section 51, subsection (2) a workman is entitled to the benefits accruing till the date of the order of the Labour Court , and therefore, only back benefits till that date can be granted whereas by the impugned order the Labour Court has granted the benefits beyond that date. This contention of the learned counsel can be more clearly understood with reference to the facts which may be repeated again. The respondents Nos.
5. 2 and 3 had claimed salary and benefits from first June, 1974 to 31st May, 1977. The learned counsel has contended that the benefits claimed by the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 flow from order of re- instatement and, therefore, it should be computed only upto 14th October, 1974 and not 31st. May, 1977. Section 51 (1) provide that if a workman is entitled to claim any money from the employer under a settlement or under an Awad or decision of Arbitrator, Labour Court or Tribunal, it may be recovered as arrears of Land Revenue. Subsec--tion (2) reads as follows :- Section 51 (2).
6. "Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit, under a settlement or under an. Award or decision of the Arbitrator, Labour Court or Tribunal which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the amount at which such benefit shall be computed may, subject to the rules made under this Ordinance, be determined and recovered as provided for in subsection
(1) and paid to the workman 'concerted within a specified date."
7. Therefore, section 51 deals with two situations ;
(1) Where any amount is due to the workman under an award, a decision, or settlement.
(2) Where benefits are conferred under, a settlement, award, or decision.
8. Labour Court had not been complied with. So far the back benefits till the date of the order are concerned, there is no dispute. The other benefit conferred was that the defendants Nos. 2 and 3 shall continue to be in service. As the petitioner failed to re-instate them, the Labour Court was entitles under section 51 (2) to compute such benefit in terms of money. This benefit could be nothing else, but the salary which the Respondents Nos. 2 and 3 would have earned during the period of employment. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel that the learned Labour Court was empowered only to compute benefits in terms of money upto the date of the order or the decision under which the benefit has been conferred is devoid of any force. If this interpretation is accepted. Then the orders passed in such cases will be completely nullified and the workers will deprived of the benefits of re-instatement.
9. Mr. Shibli, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the respondent No. 2 has admitted that he was employed in. Union, Textile Mills for 4 to .4 months in the year 1975. The learned counsel , contended that the learned Labour Court should have deducted the '., amount earned by the respondent No. 2 from the amount awarded to him and as it has failed to do so, the order is illegal.
10. On the other hand, Mr. S. Hamid Ali the learned counsel for the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 has contended that except the admission that the respondent No. 2 was employed for 4/5 months there is nothing, on record to show the -amount earned, by the respondent No. 2 during this period-. The Petitioner had raised this plea therefore it should have produced sufficient evidence on record before the learned Labour Court to establish the amount earned by the respondent No. 2, No such attempt was made by the petitioner, nor in cross-examination such question was asked from the respondent No. 2 and, therefore, in these circumstances there was no material oh record on the basis of which the learned Labour Court could determine the amount earned by the respondent No. 2. In such circumstances, the order passed by the learned Labour Court cannot be challenged on this ground.
11. The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that during the pendency of the proceedings before the. Labour Court the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 accepted Rs. 9,500 each in full and final settlement of their respective claims and executed vouchers and, therefore, their claim was not maintainable. The respondents Nos. 2 and 3 have denied the execution of these vouchers.
12. The question whether payment was made or not is a disputed question of fact and can neither be investigated in these proceedings, nor any finding can be given in exer--cise of the Constitutional Jurisdiction. On the basis of the evidence brought on record, the learned Labour Court came to the conclusion that these amounts were not paid. This is a finding of fact based o0 0 evidence. It is not the case of the petitioner that the finding is based on no evidence, or it is a misreading of evidence. Mr. Shibli contended that as the respondents Nos. 2 and 3 had denied the signature and thumb --impression, an application had been made for referring the matter to the handwriting expert, but from the documents filed by the petitioner it cannot be ascertained whether this application was at all pressed. However, the fact that an application for submitting the documents for the opinion of handwriting expert was not taken into ''consideration cannot lead to the conclusion that in the presence of sufficient material and evidence on record necessary for determination of this question, the learned Labour Court has committed any illegality which vitiates the impugned order. The learned Labour Court has held that this application was not pressed.
13. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that in view of rule 73 of I. R. O. (Sind) Rules the Labour Court has no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order. Under rule 73 it is provided that "where any workman is entitled to receive from the employers any benefit under an award or decision he may apply to the Labour Court which gave the award or to the Labour Appellate Tribunal which gave the decision for computation of benefits in terms of money." The learned counsel has contended that where an award is made the workman has to apply to the Labour Court , and where a decision is made it is the Appellate Labour Tribunal which is to be approached. He has further contended the order of the Labour Court dated 14th October, 1974 not being an award, the impugned order could not be passed by the learned Labour Court, section 51, subsection (2) clearly provides that a workman entitled to any benefit under settlement, award or decision of the Arbitrator, Labour Court, and Tribunal can apply for the computation of such benefit in terms of money and its payment to him. Rule 73 provides that such application for computation of benefit under an award or decision can be filed to the Labour Court or to the Labour Appellate Tribunal which gave the decision. Award has been defined by section 2(ii), I.R.O, as the "determination by Labour Court, Arbitrator or Labour Appellate Tribunal or any industrial dispute of or any matter relating thereto and includes an interim award. The words "or any matter relating thereto" in the definition of the award should cover controversies with regard to the appointment o non-appointment or the terms of employment or the conditions of work of any workman. The order passed by the Labour Court may be covered by the word "award" and the Labour Court which passed the order was competent to adjudicate upon application under section 51, subsection (2). The provisions of section 51 and rule 73 are remedial in nature and as held -in PLD 1973 SC 589 such statute should -be construed in' the manner as to advance the remedy and avoid the mischief else; it would frustrate the legislative intent. The object o section 51 is to provide speedy remedy for recovery of dues and benefit to which a worker is entitled under a decision or award. The main emphasis seems to be that the Court which passed the order, decision or made the award will be competent to determine and compute they benefits in terms of money and order for its recovery. If the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is accepted then the scope of section 51 will be restricted by rule 73 which is no permissible. By rules a person cannot be deprived of any remedy which is made available to him under the Act. For these reasons the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner has no force.
14. The petition is, therefore, dismissed with no order as to costs.