' MUNAWAR AHMED MIRZA, ACTG. C.J.---This Constitution Petition alongwith 46 other petitions, involve determination of identical point of facts and law, therefore are being decided by this common judgment.
2. Petitioners were granted Arms Licences by the Federal Government in respect of automatic weapons of prohibited bore. The Federal Government in exercise of powers conferred by clause (b), subsection (1) of section 12 of Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965 vide notification No,7/8/90-Arms II, dated 22nd August 1990 directed cancellation of all licences in respect of prohibited bore weapons and automatic weapons which were issued from Ist December, 1988 onwards. However, members of Parliament, Provincial Assemblies, Chairmen of District Councils or Municipal Corporations and officers or employees of the Government were excluded from its operation. Abovementioned notification, directing cancellation of licences for holding weapons of prohibited bore or automatic weapons earlier granted to petitioners has been challenged through these petitions.
' M/s. Azizullah Memon, Basharatullah, Khalid Malik, Muhammad Shafi Rakhshani, K.N. Kohli, Tariq Mahmood, Amanullah Yasinzai, Syed Ayyaz Zahoor, H. Shakil Ahmad and Ch. Ejaz Yousuf; learned Advocates representing the petitioners were heard at length. Raja Muhammad Afsar, Advocate- General and Muhammad Riaz Ahmad, Standing Counsel also addressed their arguments. Mr. S.A.M.
Quadri Advocate assisted the Court as amicus curiae. It was mainly contended on behalf of petitioners that after the grant of licence a valuable right had accrued in their favour which could not be arbitrarily withdrawn specially without providing opportunity of hearing to the petitioners.
Learned State Counsel opposing the stand of petitioners argued that Arms Licence constituted at best a privilege, therefore, it was prerogative of Federal Government to suspend or cancel the same even without affording hearing or assigning any reasons. For better appreciation of factual and legal aspects, it would be appropriate to reproduce here, section 12 of Arms Ordinance, 1965:-- ' "Cancellation and suspension of licence.--(1) Any licence may be cancelled or suspended--(a) by the officer by whom the same was granted or by any authority to which he may be subordinate or any District Magistrate within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the holder of such licence may be, and after giving the holder of licence an opportunity of showing cause against the proposed cancellation or suspension, such officer, authority or Magistrate deems it necessary for the security of the public peace to cancel or suspend such licence; or
(b) by any Judge or Magistrate before whom the holder of such licence is convicted of an offence against this Ordinance or against the rules, and Government may, by a notification in the official Gazette, cancel or suspend all or any licences throughout the Province or any part thereof;
(2) An appeal against an order of cancellation or suspension under clause (a) of subsection (1) may be made by the person whose licence has been cancelled or suspended to the immediate official superior to the authority making the order, within sixty days of the receipt by him of a copy of the order where appeal lies to Government, and where appeal lies to any other authority, within thirty days of the receipt by him of a copy of the order."
The analysis of the above 'provisions of law enumerate that specified authorities under clause (a) of subsection (1) of section 12 had jurisdiction to cancel Arms Licences after providing opportunity of showing cause against proposed cancellation or suspension after having been satisfied on reasons to be recorded that such action was for the security of public peace. Whereas first part of clause (b), subsection (1) of section 12 regulates cancellation or suspension of licences on conviction by Judge or Magistrate for violating provisions of Arms Ordinance or Rules and latter portion of this subsection separately empowers the Government to cancel or suspend all or any licence throughout the province or any part thereof by issuing a notification in official Gazette.
3. There is no doubt that under section 12(1) (a) of Arms Ordinance it is obligatory for the specified authority to provide hearing to the holder of licence before causing its cancellation. The Division Bench of Lahore High Court in case Ch. Ghulam Nabi v. Commissioner, Kohat PLD 1981 Lah. 368 considering this aspect, has observed that cancellation of licence cannot be based on subjective satisfaction of authority because withdrawal of licence is a penalty which can only legitimately be imposed on the basis of objective assessment of material available before such authority and could not be motivated by caprice or arbitrariness. Similarly Karachi Bench in case Ali Haider v. Ejaz Hussain Malik PLD 1968 Kar. 311 while dealing with question about cancellation of petitioner's licence by District Magistrate and interpreting section 12(1)(a) Arms Ordinance, impressed upon the necessity for adhering to principle of natural justice by comparing it with,. Provision of M.L.O. 64 Zone 'C'. It has been observed that opportunity of hearing prior to cancellation of licence was imperative and failure to comply with it, would defeat fundamental principle of justice. Earlier another Division Bench in similar circumstances while examining the case of Tanveer Ahmed Khan v. District Magistarte, Sanghar PLD 1979 Kar. 732 has recorded necessity of hearing before licence of any individual could be cancelled. Besides legal aspects regarding cancellation of licence without assigning any reason also discussed in case Muhammad Israel v. Azad Government of State of Jammu PLD 1982 Azad J&K 64 where action about cancellation of licence taken without affording opportunity of hearing was deemed as without lawful authority. Single Bench of Lahore High Court recently in case Syed Wasif Ali Shah v. Secretary, Interior Division, Government of Pakistan and others 1991 PCr.LJ 32 while examining validity of notification, subject-matter of these petitions, has declared the same to be without lawful authority. However operation of this order has been stayed by the Division Bench in an inter-Court Appeal No,244 of 1990. It may be seen that in all the aforequoted decisions primarily requirements concerning opportunity of hearing as contemplated by section 12(1) (a) Arms Ordinance have been taken tnto consideration. Even last-quoted judgment of Lahore High Court 1991 PCr.LJ 32 is mainly based on broad principles of natural justice.
There is hardly any doubt that show cause and opportunity of hearing is expressly provided when individual action for cancellation of licence is initiated under section 12(1) (a) Arms Ordinance.
Besides, we are fully conscious that principles of natural justice arc deemed embeded in every statute unless otherwise excluded therefrom. Reference in this behalf may also be made to cases
(i) PLD 1982 SC 410, (ii) PLD 1961 SC 537, (iii) PLD 1982 Kar.
469. In the same context it is pertinent to note that authority of Federal Government regarding cancellation or suspension of licence under clause (b) is clearly made compatible to situation where holder of the licence is convicted by the competent forum. Similarly comparison of clauses
(a) and (b) of section 12(1) Pakistan Arms Ordinance manifests that earlier clause deals with individual cases of arms licence, whereas clause (b) is suggestive of Federal Government's authority to cause cancellation of Arms licences in bulk. Such action apparently would be upon certain policy applying to some area, province or class of inhabitants. There is no doubt that Federal Government for controlling any situation of emergency, condition of insecurity, communal riot, factional dispute or disturbance of graver nature enjoys plenary power to cancel, suspend arms licence or to disarm inhabitants of particular area or group of person or class of people. In our opinion prerogative of the Federal Government in this behalf cannot be controlled, restricted or abridged by introducing service of notice to the licence holders. In certain eventualities, any lapse or delay of invoking authority may defeat and frustrate very object of exercising such prerogative.
These actions are obviously of executive nature hardly needing any adjudication. In such circumstances principles of natural justice even otherwise have no applicability as considered in Saiyyid Abul A'la Maudoodi and 2 others v. The Government of West Pakistan and another PLD 1964 SC 673 at pages 741-742 and 772-773.
' Now if we look at the issue, from another angle it is quite clear that section 12(1)(a) expressly provides opportunity of hearing; whereas this requirement is conspicuously missing in clause(b) of section 12(1) of Arms Ordinance. Bare comparison of clauses (a) and (b) leads to irresistible conclusion that legislature in the first case intended to allow opportunity of hearing before cancellation but consciously excluded said requirement from the clause (b). The perusal of plenary powers of Government for cancellation has been equated with consequences of conviction which obviously does not require notice.
4. An attempt was made by learned counsel for petitioners to argue that absolutely unfettered powers of Federal Government to cancel licence tend to snatch valuable right accrued to the parties which thus violates Constitutional guarantee regarding protection of their property. It may be seen that vires of section 12(1)(b) have not been challenged by any of the petitioners. We are quite clear in our mind that grant of Arms licence is necessarily a privilege which is bestowed to the holder in accordance with conditions specified in the licence and relevant provisions of law or rules. Since provisions of law expressly envisage authority to cancel individually and collectively the licences granted to persons, therefore in our view Constitutional guarantee has not been violated.
5. There is however one aspect that all the petitioners in pursuance of licence issued to them by competent authority of Federal Government have made investments for the purchase of respective weapons. Now by virtue of impugned notification petitioners are bound to deposit the same. Thus each petitioner would necessarily suffer loss without his fault. It has therefore to be seen whether citizens be put to loss, detriment or sufferance, if the right/privilege for purchasing the weapon was acquired by them on the basis of sanction accorded by competent State functionaries. Therefore, they should have facility to dispose it of or be paid compensation for being saved from unnecessary monetary loss. Since licences were cancelled by the Federal Government, through impugned notification on the ground of having been granted indiscriminately without verification of antecedents etc., we may observe that keeping in view policy and rules, plausibility of restoring such licences after thorough enquiry of individual cases by adopting prescribed procedure may be considered.
' For the foregoing reasons, and subject to above observations, the petitions are dismissed.
' Parties are however left to bear their own costs.