This petition is directed against the order dated 31-5-1979, passed by District Magistrate, Shikhupura, and confirmed in appeal by the Commis--sioner, Lahore Division, on 27-6-1979, .Whereby arm licences held by the peti--tioner for a revolver and a shot-gun were cancelled.
2. The relevant facts of the case are that Superintendent, Post Offices, Gujranwala, on 22-7-1978, reported to the District Magistrate, Sheikhupura, that the petitioner's licences were renewed only upto 31-12-1973, and that he failed to get them renewed during the grace period, ending 31-3-1974.
It was further reported that his licences were renewed after the grace period for the year year 1974 without sanction of the District Magistrate, Sheikhupura, at the instance of one Muhammad Yaqoob Fani, the then Sub-Post Master, Muridke, by forging Post Office record and ante-dating the renewal.
He recommended for the cancellation of the licences held by the petitioner.
The District Magistrate, Sheikhupura, on 26-8-1978, issued notice under section 12(1)(a) of the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965, to the petitioner to .Show. Cause as to why the licences of weapons held by him be not can--celled.
4. The petitioner submitted detailed reply stating therein that he deposited the licence fee regularly upto 31-12-1979, and got renewed them accordingly. He stated that he had no connection with Muhammad Yaqoob Fani, the employee of the Postal Department. The District Magis--trate, however, cancelled the licences observing in his order that the peti--tioner did not get renewal of the licences in time and attempted in getting them renewed by fraudulent means. It was further observed that retention of the weapons after the expiry of licence was against security of public pace. The petitioner's appeal was rejected on 27-6-1979 by respondent No. 1.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the petitioner paid regular renewal fee for the licences held by him and got them renewed upto 31-12-1979. It was submitted that if the postal' employee had allegedly committed some irregularity, the petitioner cannot be penalised for his fault. It was next argued that the question of danger to public security did not arise, because the petitioner had held the weapons under licences for over four years since 1974, and otherwise for the last thirteen years without complaint from any quarter.
6. Learned Assistant Advocate-General, on the other hand, submitted that the name of the petitioner was shown in the list of defaulters and that he did not approach for renewal to the District Magistrate after the lapse of grace period. It was argued that the petitioner had no vested right for renewal of the licences for the weapons held by him. It was also pointed out that the petitioner had filed an appeal against the impugned order which is pending decision before the Provincial Government and for that matter this petition was not maintainable.
7. I have considered the arguments advanced b3--- the learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant renewal register produced by the Inspec--tor, Post Office. The entries is the register show that the licences were regu--larly renewed upto 1979. No sign of forgery, overwriting or erasing was pointed out and noticed pertaining to the relevant entries in the register. There was no allegation, nor evidence, that the petitioner committed forgery himself in April 1974, or abetted the commission thereof thereafter. The District Magistrate had no material on the record from 1974, to the date of the cancellation of the licences, viz. 31-5-1979, to show that the petitioner during that period resorted to activities endangering security of public pace. Section 12 of the West Pakistan Arms Ordinance, 1965, empowers the District Magistrate to cancel the licence for reasons relatable to the statutory purpose laid down in the aforementioned section. It reads: "12. Cancellation and suspension of licences.-(1) Any licence may be cancelled or suspended-
(a) by the officer by whom- the same was granted or by any authority to which he may be subordinate, or any District Magistrate within the local limits of whose jurisdiction the holder of such licence may be, when, for reasons to be recorded in writing, and after giving the holder of the licence an opportunity of showing cause against the proposed cancellation or suspension, such officer, authority or Magistrate deems it necessary for the security of the public peace to cancel or suspend such licence; "
It is true that grant of a licence does not create a vested right in the holde, thereof, but once the privilege of the grant of licence is conferred upon the subject, then its rescission and revocation amounts to "penalty" and imposi--petition thereof would be strictly construed. In A.I Haider v. Ijaz Hussain Malik (1). It was observed "The grant of a licence is a privilege, the conferment of which lies in the domain of. Executive authority, once the privilege is conferred by the grant of a licence, its withdrawal or revocation is a penalty which falls within the sphere of criminal jurisprudence. When a penalty is imposed on an individual, which injures his person or property, the processes of the law as laid down for the imposition of the penalty must be strictly observed."
8. In the instant case, in the absence of any material on the record, the District Magistrate's mere assumption on 31-5-1979, that by not renewal of the licence during the grace period commencing from 31-12-1973 to' 1-4-74, it was necessary for the security of the public peace to cancel the licences of the petitioner was not a reason relatable to the statutory purpose laid down in section 12 of the aforementioned Ordinance.
9. The revocation of the licence cannot be left to the subjective satisfac--petition of the authority, 'because the withdrawal of the licence is a "penalty" which can only be legitimately imposed on the basis of an objective assess--ment of the material J)y the authority and not motivated by caprice o arbitrary will. Even otherwise, the discretion vested in the District Magis--trate, Sheikhupura, for cancellation of the arm licences could not be abso--lute, but limited to the scope and object of law. In Montgomery Flour and General Mills Ltd. v. Director, Food Purchases and 2 others (2) it was observ--ed by this Court at page 920 : "It should be remembered that no discretion vested in an executive officer is an absolute and arbitrary discretion. The discretion is vested in him for a public purpose and must be exercised for the attainment of 'that purpose. Even though there be no express words in the rele--vant legal provision to that effect, the discretion is always circum--scribed by the scope and object of the law that-creates it and has atthe same time to be exercised justly, fairly and reasonably "
10. As regards the contention of the respondent's counsel that the petitioner's appeal was pending decision, suffice it to say that mere pendency of the appeal in no way precludes the exercise of the constitutional jurisdic--petition by this Court in appropriate cases, where the alternative remedy is deemed not efficacious. Learned counsel for the petitioner, on instruction from his client, stated that the proceedings in the appeal were dropped o the last date of hearing . It was, however, admitted by the opposite side[ that the decision of the appeal was held iii abeyance and the case adjourned sine die. In this view of the matter, the petitioner had no other adequate remedy except to invoke constitutional jurisdiction of this Court.
11. The upshot of the above discussion to that the impugned orders passed by the respondents Nos.
1 and 2 are declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. In the result, this petition is accepted with, no order as to costs.