This is a petition by Mohariimad Husiain, Noor Elahi, Manzoor Hussain, Karam Dad, petitioners, under section 38(5) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 for non-compliance of award dated 8-11-1971 of this Tribunal, so far as they are concerned.
2. The General Secretary of the West Pakistan Road Transport Workers' Union, Rawalpindi, raised an industrial dispute against Road Transport Corporation, Lahore, under section 5(5) of Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1969, after the issuing of Failure Certificate dated 24-6-1966. There were 24 demands in all.
3. The Punjab Labour Court, Northern Zone, Lahore, now called Punjab Labour Court No. 1 gave an award dated 27-7-1971 accepting some of the demands and rejecting some of them. For the purposes of the instant petition award on Demands Nos. 1 and 3 are relevant. On demand No. 1 the award of the Labour Court was that the employees except mentioned at Serial Nos. 2, 5, 7, 13, 14, 18, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26. 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35 and 36 were to be re-instated. They were, however, not given wages of the period after their dismissal to the time of their re-instatement. The petitioners were amongst the employees who were ordered to be re-instated. Under Demand No. 3 it was claimed that the Cleaners who worked on the District Routes should be raised to the status of Conductors.
This demand was rejected by the learned Labour Court. One of the petitioners, namely, Karam Dad, Cleaner, is affected by the rejection of this demand.
Appeals were filed both by the West Pakistan Road Transport Workers' Union, Rawalpindi, and the Punjab Road Transport Corporation, Lahore. This Tribunal on appeal set aside the award of the learned Labour Court on Demand No. 3 and held that there was good reason to grant this demand, The Tribunal also directed that from 21-4-1966 to 30-6-1969 the Cleaners would be entitled to receive the pay of Conductors. The award of the Labour Court on Demand No. 1 was upheld by this Tribunal with the modification that the employees concerned were entitled to back wages from the date of their dismissal to the time of their re-instatement. The respondent in the instant petition re- instated the employees concerned with demand No. 1 but instead of paying back wages from the date of their dismissal to the time of their re-instatement entered into a settlement in February 1972, with the West Pakistan Road Transport Workers' Union, Rawalpindi, to the effect that the nine workers including the petitioners would only get one-third of back wages under Demand No. 1. In the settlement regarding Demand No. 3 certain conditions were imposed regarding the promotion of Traffic Cleaners to the post of District Conductors.
5. In the instant petition the petitioners claimed that the award so far as they are concerned has not been implemented.
6. The respondent not only opposed the petition on merit; but also raised three preliminary objections, namely :-
(1) That Mr. Mushtaq Ahmed Khan, Managing Director, Punjab Road Transport Board, Lahore, respondent No. 2 was not a necessary party.
(2) That the present petitioners were not party to the previous proceedings, therefore, they had no locus standi to file the present petition.
(3) That the power to punish for contempts given under section 38(5) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 was ultra vices to Article No. 204 read with Article No. 192 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
Preliminary objection No. 1.---According to the learned counsel for the respondents, the District Manager, respondent No. 1. Alone had to implement the award and not Mr. Mushtaq Ahmad, respondent No. 2, who was only concerned with the policy matters. This contention has no force because according to the rules framed by the Punjab Road Transport Board, respondent No. 1, who no doubt has power to appoint or dismiss the employee has no power to grant arrears of pay. This power only vests in respondent No. 2. Therefore respondent No. 2 was a necessary party. This objection is accordingly overruled.
Preliminary objection No. 2.---The learned counsel for the respondent contended that since the petitioners were not party to the previous proceedings they had no locus standi to file the present petition. According to him in the previous proceedings it was the Union who had represented the petitioners, was a party and therefore it was for the Union to file the present petition. This contention has no force because the status of the petitioners is merely that of informants that the award had not been implemented and once this fact has been brought to the notice of the Tribunal it becomes a A matter entirely between the Tribunal and contemner. It is immaterial whether the informant was a party in the previous proceedings or not. Even the Tribunal could take action suo motu if it came to its knowledge that the award had not been implemented. In the result this objection is overruled.
Preliminary objection No. 3.---The learned counsel for the respondents contended that by virtue ref section 338t,5) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, the definition of the High Court as given under Article No. 192 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan has been amended so as to include this Tribunal and as such section 38;5) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 was ultra vines.
7. Article 192 of the Constitution defines the High Court. Article 204 of the Constitution gives the High Court and Supreme Court, power to punish any person who commits contempt. Section 38(5) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 lays down that this Tribunal has authority to punish for contempts of its authority, or that of any other Labour Court subject to its appellate jurisdiction as if it were a High Court. This does not, in my view, amend the definition of High Court as given under Article No. 192 of the Constitution. It only means that powers of contempt have also been given to the Tribunal as are given to the High Court. Therefore it cannot be said that section 38(5) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 is ultra vires of Article 204 read with Article No. 192 of the Constitution. The objection is also overruled.
8. On merits it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that in view of settlement arrived at in February 1972 between them and the West Pakistan Road Transport Workers' Union, Rawalpindi, the petitioners were only entitled to one-third of back wages. Now the question for determination is as to whether the said settlement is a settlement within the meaning of section 2(xxiv) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 which reads as follows :- " ---Settlement' means a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding, and includes an agreement between an employer and his workmen arrived at otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding, where such agreement is in writing, has been signed by the parties thereto in such manner as may be prescribed and a copy thereof has been sent to the Provincial Government, the conciliator, and such other person as may be prescribed."
9. It would, therefore, appear from the definition of settlement that it is not every agreement which can be called settlement. In the present case no copy of the settlement was sent to the Provincial Government, the Conciliator and such other person as may be prescribed. Therefore this settlement is not a settlement within the meaning of the definition given in the Ordinance. I am fortified in this view by the judgment of the Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal, Karachi, in Appeal No. KAR-149/73, entitled, "National and Grindlays Bank Ltd. Karachi v. National and Grbrdlays Bank Employees' Union, Karachi" (PLJ 1973 T C (Labour) 261).
10. In any case this agreement only binds the parties and not the petitioners because it was arrived at not in course of conciliation proceedings. This is laid down under section 39(2) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, which reads as follows :- "A Settlement arrived at by agreement between the employer and a Trade Union otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceeding shall be binding on the parties to the agreement."
If this settlement had been arrived at in the course of conciliation proceed--ings, then by virtue of section 39(1)(d) it would have been binding on the petitioners.
11. Thus it is clear that this settlement, in any case, has no value, so far as the petitioners are concerned. The respondents are bound to obey the award of this Tribunal irrespective of that settlement they are, therefore directed to implement the award within there weeks from today. The petition is disposed of accordingly.