MUHAMMAD AKHTAR SHABBIR, J.--- This order will dispose of the instant Labour Appeal and Labour Appeals Nos. 57 of 2004 to 63 of 2004 filed by the appellants against one consolidated judgment dated. 24.6.2004 passed by the Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court, Rawalpindi.
2. The facts giving rise to the filing of the present appeals are to the effect that the respondent served grievance notices on the appellants M/s. Independent Newspapers Corporation (Pvt.)
Limited and another and thereafter filed grievance petitions for and on behalf of its members in the Punjab Labour Court No. 6, Rawalpindi, claiming bonus allegedly due under the agreement. Out of eight grievance petitions, Grievance Petitions Nos. 17 of 2004, 40 of 2002 and 63 of 2002 were filed under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and after the repeal of Ordinance of 1969, Grievance Petitions Nos. 80 of 2002, 17 of 2003, 119 of 2003, 180 of 2003 and 61 of 2004 were filed under Section 46 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002. The Presiding Officer of the said Court, vide his impugned judgment dated 24.6.2004 accepted seven grievance petitions as prayed for and Grievance Petition No. 17 of 2002 was partly accepted to the extent of fifty percent of the claimed bonus due on 15.10.2001.
3. Learned counsel for the appellants contended that all the above eight grievance petitions have been filed by the Union through its Secretary and President on behalf of the workers, while the cases should have been filed by an individual worker but neither any individual worker and given any grievance notice nor any worker was made as party in the cases. Further contended that so much so the grievance notice was not signed by any individual worker and in order to show the mandate, only a voter list has been annexed which was improper and cannot be a substitute of the signatures of an individual worker/member of the Union neither any authority letter or resolution passed in any meeting of General Body has been attached with the petitions. Further contended that there is no proof that the workers had given any authority to file the petitions on their behalf.
Further contended that five grievance petitions have been filed under Section 46 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002, wherein the authority to the Bargaining Agent of the Labour Union has not been conferred to take the matter to the Labour Court, therefore, the same are liable to be dismissed on this sole ground. Further contended that the Labour Court has not considered this aspect of the case, whether the settlement between the parties was validly executed in accordance with law or not and the definition of "Settlement" provided in Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, makes it clear that a copy of the same should be forwarded to the Provincial Government, the Conciliator and other persons as may be prescribed and sending of a copy under the said provisions of law, is mandatory. Further contended that the Labour Court has also not adverted to the important point, whether the alleged Settlement of 1987, which was superseded by another settlement of 1993, is in force or not or it has expired on the implementation of Sixth Wage Board Award, which was intimated through letter dated 17.2.2000. Further contended that the alleged agreement arrived at between the parties was neither through conciliator nor drawn up in the prescribed form nor copies of the same were sent to the prescribed authorities, therefore, this cannot be treated as settlement enforceable under Section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. Reliance has been placed on the case of The Workmen of Tando Jam and its Feeders Vs. Directors, Agricultural Engineer, Sindh and 8 others (1981 PLC 47) and Muhammad Hussain and 3 others Vs. Syed Ahmad Masood and another (1974 PLC 61). Further contended that the effective date of settlement shall be binding for such period as is agreed upon by the parties and if no such period is agreed upon for a period of one year from the date on which the memorandum of settlement was signed by the parties to the dispute and shall continue to be binding on the parties after the expiry of the aforesaid period until the expiry of two months from the date on which either party, informs the other party in writing of its intention no longer to be bound on the parties by the settlement. Further contended that in the alleged agreement of 1993 the clear date of expiry was mentioned and after the expiry of the stipulated date, this agreement has no binding effect as provided in Section 40 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and Section 60 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002. Further contended that the law provides that the thing should be done as is required to be done and the procedure prescribed in the relevant law has not been followed by the Labour Court as well as the respondent. Further contended that a settlement between an employer and the C.B.A. Remains operative for the period mentioned in the settlement or in absence of any agreed period, for the period provided under the relevant law. Reliance has been placed on the case of Inayatullah and another Vs. The Telephone Industries of Pakistan (1991 SCM R 13).
4. On the other hand, learned counsel 4or the respondents vehemently opposed the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants and supported the impugned judgment of the Labour Court contending that the Workers Union is a representative Body/CBA and it has been authorized by law to issue notice under Section 25-A of industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and Section 46 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002, on behalf of the members.
5. As per sub-section (4) of Section 25-A the Bargaining Agent can take the matter to the Labour Court and where the matter is taken to the Court, it shall give decision within the prescribed period.
As per Section 33 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002. Any collective bargaining agent or any employer may apply to the Labour Court for redressal of any grievance or enforcement of any right guar.Anteed or secured to it or him by or under any law or any award or settlement. In this context, reference can be made to the case of Pakistan Herlad Workers' Union through its General Secretary Vs. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and 3 others (1995 PLC 554).
6. The other objection is that the grievance notice was issued by the Secretary of the Union on his behalf and on behalf of other workers, the list of which is annexed with the grievance petition. Since the bargaining agent has itself filed the grievance petitions, therefore, the signatures of every worker on the petition is not the requirement of law and furthermore no such objection was ever raised by the employer during the continuance of the proceedings before the Labour Court.
Section 33 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002, empowers the bargaining agent to take the grievance of the members of the Union to the Labour Court. Further contended that the Labour Court has considered all the aspect of the case settled between the parties, the Court has also taken into consideration the agreements, which were executed in 1987 and 1993. Further contended that the benefits thereunder do not come to an end and the settlement made ended on the date stipulated on it. Further contended that after the service of notice by either party to the settlement, the parties are placed into the position of status quo ante to the settlement. Further contended that the recognized principle of law is that once a contract or settlement is arrived at or acted upon mere passage of time of its operation or any expression or intention unilaterally by one of the parties to the contract or settlement to terminate its binding effect does not and cannot put an end to the obligations flowing therefrom. Further contended that even if at any time the settlement had expired and had ceased to be binding on the parties under the provisions of Section 39 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, it will continue to have its effect as contract between the parties that had been made between the Collective Bargaining Agent and the Management and it will continue to be binding on the parties until another contract is made. In this context, reliance has been made to the case of South Indian Company Limited Vs. A.R. Chacko (AIR 1969 SC 1522). Further contended that the agreement settled between the parties had been acknowledged and acted' upon and unless a further settlement is not arrived at between the parties, the previous acknowledged settlement shall continue and it will not expire. Further contended that the copies to the Provincial Government and the Conciliator is simply a directory and not mandatory. Further contended that the Labour Laws have been enforced for the benefit of the workers and it cannot be invalid and the technicalities should not be allowed to stand in the way of justice and the Labour Laws be interpreted in favour of the workmen especially where the employer himself was also guilty.
7. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and have perused the record.
Subsection (4) of Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, empowers the Collective Bargaining Agent to take the matter to the Labour Court. The relevant provisions of sub-sections (1), (2) and (4) of Section 25-A are reproduced as under:-- "25-A. Redress of individual grievances. -- (1) A worker may bring his grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement for the time being in force to the notice of his employer in writing, either himself or through his shop steward or (Collective Bargaining Agent), within three months of the day on which cause of such grievance arises.
(2) Where a worker himself brings is grievance to the notice of the employer, the employer shall, within fifteen days of the grievance being brought to his notice, communicate his decision in writing to the worker.
(3) .......... (4). "If, the employer fails to communicate a decision within the period specified in subsection (2) or, as the case may be, sub-section (3) or if the worker is dissatisfied with such decision, the worker or shop steward may take the matter to his (collective bargaining agent) or the (Labour Court) or, as the case may be, the (collective bargaining agent) may take the matter to the (Labour Court) and where the matter is taken to the (Labour Court) it shall give (a decision) within (seven) days from the date of the matter being brought before it as if such matter were in an industrial dispute."
8. In all these matters, the gnevance notice was issued on behalf of all the workers by the C.b A and the matter was also taken to the Labour Court by the said authorized Bargaining Agency as per the authority conferred on it by the above-said provisions of law. Three grievance petitions filed in the Labour Court before the enforcement of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002, have been competently filed by the C.B.A. And the names of the workers were also mentioned in the notice.
The list of whom is annexed with the grievance petitions, therefore, it can be termed that the grievance notice under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, has been issued by the C.B.A. As well as the workers. So far as the other five grievance petitions are concerned, the same were presented after the implementation of the new Labour Laws i.e. Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002. Section 33 of the said Ordinance contemplates that any Collective Bargaining Agent or any employer may apply to the Labour Court for the redressal of any grievance or enforcement of any right guaranteed or secured to it or him by or under any law or any award or settlement. Sub-section (8) of Section 46 further emerges that for the purpose of this section, workers having common grievance out of a common cause of action may make a joint application to the Labour Court and if this section is read in conjunction with Section 25-A read with Section 22(12) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, envisaged that the Collective Bargaining Agent especially or Group of establishments shall be entitled to--
(a) undertake collective bargaining with the employer or employers on matters connected with employment, non-employment, the terms of employment or the conditions of work; other than the matters which relate to the enforcement of right guaranteed or secured to it or any workmen by or under any law, other than this Ordinance, or any away or settlement.
(b) represent all or any of the workman in any proceedings would show that the C.B.A. (Collective Bargaining Agent) of the workers is competent to take the matter to the Labour Court even if a specific wording as provided in sub-section (4) of Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (bargaining agent may take the matter to the Labour Court are omitted).
9. The function of the representative body of the workers can espouse the cause of workers under Sections 25 and 46 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. This point has been dealt with in the case reported as Pakistan Herlad Workers' Union through its General Secretary Vs. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and 3 others (1995 PLC 554) by the Full Bench of the Supreme Court and the Hon'ble Judges observed that the grievance petition filed by the Collective Bargaining Agent on behalf of the workers in terms of subsections (3) and (4) of Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, was competent. In para. 9 of the judgment while distinguishing Section 25-A and Section 34 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, the Hon'ble Judges observed as under:-- "There is no doubt that the Collective Bargaining Agent under Section 22(12)(b) of the Ordinance has a right to represent all or any workman in any proceedings and in fact Section 25-A(4) of the Ordinance itself also give right to the Collective Bargaining Agent to take the grievance of a worker to the Labour Court but the scope of proceedings under Sections 25-A and 34 of the Ordinance are quite different. They have also different implications. Therefore, merely because the Collective Bargaining Agent has a right to represent all or any workman would not give it a right to take matters covered under Section 25-A of the Ordinance to the Labour Court under Section 34 of the Ordinance for then the provisions of Section 25-A would become redundant and the conditions or limitations provided in Section 25-A of the Ordinance would also disappear, for under Section 34 of the Ordinance no such conditions or limitations are provided. It could not be the intention of the Legislature that when an individual takes his grievance to Labour Court he has to comply with the conditions or subject himself to the limitations provided therein but when the Collective Bargaining Agent takes the grievance to the Labour Court under Section 34 of the Ordinance, it is not subject to those conditions or limitations. Indeed as already stated sub-section (4) of Section 25-A of the Ordinance itself gives a right to the Collective Bargaining Agent to take the matter under Section 34 of the Labour Court, it can do so only after the worker or workers have fulfilled the conditions mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 25-A of the Ordinance and not otherwise."
The above-said proposition has also been discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case Karachi Pipe Mills Employees Union, Karachi Vs. Karachi Pipe Mills Ltd., Karachi (1992 SCM R 36). In this case, the grievance notice was issued by the Collective Bargaining Agent which contained the names of the workers and the said grievance had been relied upon in the petition under Section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, therefore, it became part of the above position and the Court observed that the petition before the Court filed by the workers or through their agent was competent.
10. In the instant case, the grievance notices were issued by the Collective Bargaining Agent on behalf of the workers whose names were mentioned in the list annexed with the grievance petitions meaning thereby that the conditions or limitations provided in Section 25-A were complete. In all these petitions, grievance notices were issued mentioning the names and annexing the list of workers by the Collective Bargaining Agent and under Section 33 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, the Collective Bargaining Agent under the said Ordinance is also competent to take the matter to the Labour Court. The objection of the learned counsel for the appellants being misconceived is repelled. The objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellants regarding the non-maintainability of the grievance petitions before the Labour Court being misconceived is also repelled.
11. Another aspect of the case is that the present appeals have been filed by two appellants namely Independent Newspapers Corporation (Pvt.) Limited and J & S Enterprises (Pvt.) Limited (Jang Group of Companies). These are two different Groups, though having the same share-holders but the grievance notice to the J & S Enterprises had not been issued by the workers or the Collective Bargaining Agent to the said Firm except in one case i.e. Appeal No. 61 of 2004, therefore, this appeal filed by appellant No. 2 against the judgment of the Labour Court is partly accepted and to that extent the grievance petition filed by the respondent stands dismissed.
12. The grievance petition filed by the respondent had been resisted by the employer/appellants pleading that there was no guaranteed right calling for grievance notices or the grievance petition.
It was further claimed that no independent grievance notice was served by the respondent and the alleged agreement had already expired and the relief claimed could not be granted under the said settlement. The appellants produced in Court Muhammad Suleman, Group Editor as RW-1 and Mansoor-ur-Rehman, Senior Finance and Corporate Advisor as RW-2. The Court observed that RW- 1 was a witness of the agreements Ex.P.4 and Ex.P.5 who also admitted that Sixth Wage Board Award had been implemented and further stated that he did not deny the knowledge that the daily Jang was ever in loss. RW-2 had also not been able to establish that appellant No. 1/Independent Newspaper Corporation was ever suffered loss. The agreements executed in 1987 and 1993 Ex.P.4.
And Ex.P.5 are admitted and the same had to expire on the -implementation of Sixth Wage Board Award. The recital of the same would show that the said benefits/guaranteed right would be accrued even after the implementation of the said Award. The terms of the settlement would be binding only when there was another contract between the parties. The said settlement had been acted upon and the benefit thereof was enjoyed by the workers and in such circumstances of the cases, the appellants were estopped from denying the guaranteed rights simply on some technicalities. It is well-settled principle of law that the agreement implemented partly could not be allowed to be digressed upon and it would be an stopple .On the part of the appellants and their position could not be changed to the disadvantage of the workers. From plain reading of Section 40(2) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, it is clear that if a provision has been made that during the period of settlement which has been agreed upon by the parties it will remain binding on the parties and after the expiry of the period it shall also continue to remain binding on the parties until the notice is given by either party to the settlement expressing its intention no longer to be bound by the settlement. It would mean that the binding effect of the settlement to the extent that the terms of the settlement cannot be negotiated or agitated during operation of the settlement ceases to be effective. The consequence is that after the period of notice as contemplated in Section 40(2) of the Ordinance, the terms of the settlement become negotiable and the parties to the settlement can enter into a fresh settlement if they so desire. Reliance in this context can be placed on the case Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd., Chittagong Vs. The Chairman, Second Labour Court of East Pakistan and 18 others (1972 PLC 190). In another case reported as Workers' Union CBA (Regd.) Shakarganj Mills Jhang Vs. Shakarganj Mills Limited (1990 PLC 686), it has been observed that the benefits derived from the settlement will continue till the parties enter into negotiations and reach a conclusion. Where workers receiving contractual bonus entirely free from consideration of the company making profit or incur loss, such bonus would become part of workers' wages and recoverable as a matter of contractual right. Reference can be made to the case of Messrs Khyber Tobacco Co. Ltd., Mardan Vs. Labour Union and another (1976 PLC 98).
13. As to the objection of the learned counsel for the appellants that the agreement would be liable to be invalid for want of certain technicalities that the workers have not signed the grievance notice and failed to file the grievance petitions in the individual capacity and that the notices were not issued to the Government and the Conciliator, it is well-settled principle of law that the technicalities should not be allowed to stand in the way of justice and the Labour Laws must be interpreted in favour of the workmen especially when the employer himself was also guilty in not fulfilling the technicalities.
In the instant case, the appellants were also a signatory of the agreements and it was his duty to send copies to all considered.
14. In the present case, as observed by the Labour Court, the agreement had been acknowledged and acted upon and it was before negotiations for further agreement. The case came to the Labour Court and the period of expiry fixed in Section 40 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, and the corresponding provision of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002, would not be attracted to the respondent's case. As observed in the preceding paragraph, in the instant case, the last two agreements of 1987 and 1993 had been acknowledged and acted upon till the last moment and when the implementation of Sixth Wage Board Award had nothing to do with the question of disputed bonuses, the right course for the appellants was to negotiate with the respondent for its adverse financial position. They should not have made a flat refusal especially when the payment of disputed bonuses had been once promised to be made in due course. The appellants could get the benefits of loss during the year ending on 30th June, 2001.
There is no evidence on the record that the profit of the appellants was reduced after the settlement between the parties. The witnesses of the appellants had themselves admitted that the appellants never went in loss and they made the payment of disputed bonuses even during the period of worst crisis of 1999. The late proprietor of the appellants' establishment had himself admitted the payment of disputed bonuses, though the administration of the appellants' firm had been changed but they could not deny the concession already availed by the respond4nt/workers.
15. In view of the above discussion, I do not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned judgment passed by the Punjab Labour Court. Consequently, for the foregoing reasons, all these appeals filed by Independent Newspapers Corporation, appellant No. 1 against the respondent being devoid of any merits are-dismissed with no order as to costs. .