SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.---A common question of law arising in these five appeals has come up for consideration. Leave was granted to examine whether the High Court was justified in refusing relief to the appellants even after finding that the order whose avoidance was sought had been passed without jurisdiction.
2. The circumstances in which these appeals have arisen are that the contesting parties were members of Kokan Muslim Co-operative Housing Society, respondent No,
4. A dispute had arisen on the allotment of plots. The respondent No, 2 filed an arbitration case under section 54 of the Co- operative Societies Act, 1925 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The matter was referred to a Board of three arbitrators who by a majority decision dismissed the claim of respondent No, 2 by award, dated filth of March, 1975. The respondent No, 2 challenged this award by filing an appeal which was expressed to be under section 56 of the Act. This appeal was dismissed by an order, dated 27th October, 1975 by a Deputy Registrar in terms as hereunder:-- "In terms of the decision, contained in PLD 1975 Kar. 12 case of Shaikh Rahmatullah v. Secretary of West Pakistan Lahore and 3 others decided by the Division Bench High Court of Sindh and Baluchistan at Karachi, the present appeal under section 56 of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 against the majority Award of the Board of Arbitrators is, therefore, not maintainable and is dismissed accordingly."
' The respondent No, 2, thereafter, filed an application under section 54-A of the Act before the same Deputy Registrar who dismissed it observing as hereunder:-- "The Petitioners have now made fresh applications under section 54-A, of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925. The facts and grounds mentioned in the Memo of appeals already dismissed and in the fresh applications under section 54-A are the same. I had considered the arguments of the learned Advocates for Petitioners and Respondents Nos. 2 to 9 on 13-4-1975 and pronounced my order dismissing the applications under section 54-A. The prayer in the applications is not in accordance with section 54-A of Co-operative Societies Act, 1925. The Petitioners have chosen to prefer appeal under section 56 which was dismissed by me as stated hereinabove. Now they cannot apply for the same matter under section 54-A when their appeals already stand dismissed.
Moreover, they cannot be allowed to take benefit by misusing and misinterpreting the law. They should have preferred appeals or revisions to the higher authorities against my order and should not have come under section 54-A agitating the same point before me. I find no substance and no new grounds in the present applications urged before me. Hence the applications under section 54-A of the Petitioners are dismissed."
' Finally, the respondent No, 2 filed a Revision Petition before the Registrar, Cooperative Societies.
The claim of the appellants is that they were not informed of the proceedings before the Registrar who passed the following order on 7-8-1987:-- "I have heard the parties and perused the contents of the order dated 20-6-1976 passed by the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Karachi.
' It appears that the petitioner had preferred an appeal under section 56 of the Co-operative Societies Act before Deputy Registrar against the Award passed by the Board of Arbitrators which was heard by him and rejected. Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application under section 54-A before the Deputy Registrar, Karachi which was also dismissed by him vide his order dated 20-6- 1976 on the same facts brought in an appeal filed under section 56 of the Co-operative Societies Act and already dismissed.
' Perusal of the order passed by the Deputy Registrar reveals that he has neither discussed the legal issues nor touched the facts of the case. He has simply passed order on the basis of his past decision taken on the application filed under section 56 of the Co-operative Societies Act, thus the Deputy Registrar has not applied his mind while deciding the matter.
' In view of the above position I set aside the order of the Deputy Registrar, Karachi dated 20-6-1976 and remand the case to him with the direction to hear the application afresh and dispose of the same keeping in view the legal aspects and merits of the case."
3. The appellants invoked the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court and challenged the order of the Registrar on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to set aside the order as the Deputy Registrar had passed the order rejecting the application under section 54-A as Registrar and not as a Deputy Registrar. They also attacked the merits of the claim and also on the ground that the decision adverse to them was given without notice to them. The High Court took notice of the submissions of the appellants and disposed them of as hereunder:-- "The argument was that the Deputy Registrar acts as nominee or delegatee of the Registrar while disposing of an application under section 54-A and, therefore, the Registrar cannot, what would in effect amount to revise his own order under section 64-A of the Act. There is substance in this argument. However, the larger question that arises for our consideration in this case is whether in the circumstances of the present case we will be justified in interfering with the impugned order though apparently made without jurisdiction. Mr. S.H. Rizvi rightly pointed out that in so far as the appeal of respondent No, 2 was concernd it was not maintainable under section 56 of the Act, under which appeal lies against decision of Registrar's nominee under section 54 and not against an award by a Board of Arbitrators made under section 54 of the Act. The learned counsel further pointed out that an award by a Board of Arbitrators, could be challenged by an application under section 54-A of the Act and the net effect of the impugned order is that the Deputy Registrar will hear on merits the application filed by respondent No, 2 under section 54-A against the majority award dated 11-3-1975. It was further argued that the Deputy Registrar instead of dismissing the appeal filed by respondent No, 2 under section 56 against majority award ought to have treated the appeal as an application under section 54-A and disposed it of on merits. Now, it is clear that the Deputy Registrar instead of hearing and deciding on merits the application made by respondent No, 2 in January, 1976, under section 54-A of the Act, to set aside the majority award dated 11-3-1975 dismissed it on the short ground that earlier an appeal had been preferred against this award under section 56 which had been dismissed by him as not maintainable. As the application under section 54-A against the majority award was clearly maintainable the Deputy Registrar ought to have heard it on merits and disposed it of as such. The effect of the impugned order is that the Deputy Registrar will be enabled to exercise his jurisdiction under section 54-A of the Act and since this will serve both the ends of justice as well as the law, we will be justified in not exercising our discretionary jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution.
' These petitions are, therefore, dismissed but in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs."
4. None has appeared to contest these appeals and, therefore, the hearing has taken place ex parte against the respondents.
5. Mr. Khalid M. Ishaque, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellants has contended before us that once the High Court found that a jurisdiction not possessed had been exercised, there was no equitable factor which could have justified it in denying the relief to the appellants. In any case, no such equitable factor or principle has been mentioned or taken note of in the judgment to justify the denial of the relief. On merits it has been contended that the Deputy Registrar while disposing of the application under section 54-A of the Act was acting as delegatee or nominee of the Registrar and only the Provincial Government was competent under section 64-A to interfere with that order. The Registrar being an Officer of co-ordinate jurisdiction, could not have set it aside. It is further contended that the appellants who are the beneficiaries under the Award had been adversely affected by the reopening of the question after such prolonged delay. Besides, according to the learned counsel for the appellants, the respondent No, 2 for whose benefit the reconsideration of the whole matter is taking place, was guilty of gross laches and incompetence in the matter of pursuing the legal remedies available to him and an order without jurisdiction could not have been protected for his benefit. In any case, according to the learned counsel for the appellants, the equitable principles, if any, that weighed with the High Court, should have been indicated or mentioned to justify the denial of the relief otherwise so eminently deserved by the appellants. In this context, he has referred to the circumstances which were indicated or found established in the judgments where such denial of relief had taken place. He has cited the cases of Pir Muhammad Farid Jan v. Colonization Officer, Sukkur Barrage, Hyderabad and others PLD 1965 SC 399, Khawaja Muhammad Sharif v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary Cabinet Division, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad and 18 others PLD 1988 Lah 725, Yousaf Ali v. Muhammad Aslam Zia and 2 others PLD 1958 SC 104, Mansab Ali v. Amir and 3 others PLD 1971 SC 124, S. Sharif Ahmad Hashmi v. Chairman, Screening Committee and another 1978 SCMR 367 and Pakistan Post Office v. Settlement ommissioner and others 1987 SCMR 1119.
6. We find that on the question of jurisdiction a very specific determinative finding has not been recorded. To demonstrate this, the operative part of the judgment of the High Court has been reproduced. While recording that there was substance in the argument, it was observed that the question posed was whether "we will be justified in interfering with the impugned order though apparently made without jurisdiction". The equitable factor mentioned after referring to the provisions was that the denial of relief will serve both the ends of justice as well as the law.
7. As we have not in appeal before us the proper assistance on the jurisdictional aspect of the case and do not find the finding of the High Court to be recorded in clear words and after full discussion, we are not deciding that question. Our first impression, however, is that under section 4 of the Act the Provincial Government is authorised to "appoint a person to be Registrar of Cooperative Societies for the Province or any portion of it, and may appoint a person or persons to assist such Registrar, and may, by general or special order, confer on any such person or persons all or any of the powers of a Registrar under this Act". The Registrar has been defined under section 3 clause (f) as "a person appointed to perform the duties of a Registrar of Co-operative Societies under this Act". Powers under section 64-A of the Act have been conferred on the Registrars to "examine the record of any inquiry or the proceedings of any officer subordinate to them". In such a situation, whether a power exercised and a duty performed as Registrar by an Officer subordinate to Registrar will remain immune from the jurisdiction of the Registrar under section 64-A, will require further consideration and a more authoritative pronouncement. It is probably in this background that further determinative finding was not given by the High Court itself, on the question of jurisdiction. The ends of justice and the ends of law were indicated by the High Court by going over the entire proceedings and holding that the law provided a remedy against the Award given by Board of Arbitrators, that the remedy was competently sought before an officer who was designated and empowered to deal with the matter and the refusal of that authority or officer was on grounds technical and not fully justified. In the circumstances, the disposal of the grievance required proper attention of the statutory authorities and had to be attended to and if the end result of the proceedings had been to provide an opportunity for proper disposal of the grievance, certainly it would be in furtherance of the ends of justice.
8. The learned counsel for the appellants is correct in saving that it cannot be laid down as a proposition of law of universal application that a statutory authority is bound to convert a proceeding incompetently filed before him so as to bring it within his competence by having recourse to all the powers that may be a power in the statutory authority, that is the Deputy Registrar, not to entertain as revision an appeal under section 56 of the Act against the majority decision of the Board of Arbitrators. However, we do not find the slightest justification in law for the same Deputy Registrar to reject what was competently preferred before him as a revision under section 54-A of the Act on the ground and the sole ground that he had earlier dismissed an appeal on the same facts holding it to be incompetent. That order of the Deputy Registrar amounts to a refusal to exercise a jurisdiction possessed by him on a ground not available to him. If the Constitution Petition had been allowed that illegal order of the Deputy Registrar would have been perpetuated on the record disallowing to the respondent No, 2 relief to which he was entitled in law, namely, to have his matter or grievance considered by the designated statutory authority. It is a recognized principle of the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction that this discretionary remedy shall not be exercised in a manner to perpetuate an illegality. To that extent High Court was justified in refusing relief. We find no merit in these appeals and dismiss them with no order as to costs.