This petition under Section 115 C.P.C. Calls in question the order dated 13-3-1989 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Sialkot who while reversing the order of the trial Court granted temporary injunction to respondents Nos.1 and 2 during the pendency of a suit filed by them.
2. The facts necessary for the disposal of this petition are that respondent No.1 was elected as Chairman and respondent No.2 as Vice-Chairman of Union Council Buttar, Tehsil and District, Sialkot. There is no dispute that the total membership of this .Union Council is twenty. On 15th of January, 1989, a requisition for convening a meeting to consider a motion of no-Confidence was submitted to the Assistant Commissioner Sialkot by the petitioners who arc 12 in number. On this application the Assistant Commissioner on 15-1-1989 summoned the meeting on 19-1-1989 but the order was withdrawn on 16-1-1989 and instead the meeting was called on 24-1-1989. The meeting held on 24-1-1989 was presided over by Mr. Liaqat Ali, Magistrate Ist Class, Sialkot and was attended by 18 members out of whom 14 voted in favour of the motion. The Presiding Officer declared the motion of no-Confidence as successful as 2/3rd of the total members had voted in its favour.
3. On the next day i.e. 25-1-1989, respondents Nos.1 and 2 filed a suit for declaration in the Civil Court at Sialkot in which they challenged the validity of the proceedings held on 24-1-1989 on various grounds, inter alia, that seven days notice as required by rule 3 (2) of the Punjab Local Councils (Vote of no --Confidence against Chairman or Vice-Chairman) Rules, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as Rules) was not given to respondents Nos.1 and 2: that the motion for no-Confidence was not moved in the meeting and, therefore, it stood defeated in view of rule ,8 and also that they were not allowed a right of personal explanation contrary to the rules. Alongwith this suit, an application for temporary injunction under Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 and Section 151 C.P.C. Was filed praying that the defendants be restrained from acting upon the impugned proceedings and from interfering in the performance of functions by the respondents as Chairman and vice-Chairman. This application was rejected by the trial Court on 13-3-1989 by well-reasoned and detailed order, while relying upon a judgment of this Court in Ch. Abdul Ghani v. Deputy Commissioner and others (1987 CLC 2401), it was observed that the requirement of seven days notice was not mandatory and as sufficient notice had been given to respondents Nos.1 and 2, no prejudice was caused to them. The trial Court found, no prima facie case in favour of respondents Nos.1 and 2 and dismissed the application.
Aggrieved by this decision, respondents Nos.1 and 2 filed an appeal which was accepted by Mr. Mujtahid Hussain Sheikh, Additional District Judge, Sialkot, who took the view that seven days notice as contemplated by rule 3 (2) of the Rules was mandatory. It was further observed that the record of proceedings held on 24-1-1989 did not show that the motion of no-confidence was moved or was seconded nor was it apparent as to whether respondents had been given an opportunity to give their personal explanations. On these basis, it was held that respondents Nos.1 and 2 had a strong prima facie case. The objection as to the bar of jurisdiction in view of Section 35 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 was repelled. The Additional District Judge, proceeded to grant temporary injunction as prayed for in the application filed by respondents Nos.1 and 2. This order of the Additional District Judge has been assailed by the petitioners in this revision petition.
4. The first question which arises for consideration is as to whether the Additional District Judge could have granted the temporary injunction in the terms prayed for by the respondents. There is no dispute between the parties that on 24-1-1989, a meeting was held in which 14 members voted in favour of the resolution for removal of the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman. It is provided by Section 31 (1) of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 that Chairman or Vice-Chairman shall vacate the office if a vote of no-Confidence has been passed against them in the manner prescribed by 2/3 majority of the total membership of the Local Council. According to rule 9 of the Punjab Local Council (Vote of no-Confidence against Chairman or Vice-Chairman) Rules, 1980, when a motion of no-Confidence has been passed against a Chairman or Vice-Chairman, as the case may be, he shall cease to hold his office forthwith. It is thus obvious that by operation of section 35 and rule 9, the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman, respondents Nos.1 and 2, had ceased to hold their offices on 24-1-1989. In these circumstances, they could not have been reinstated to their offices by the Additional District Judge by issuing a temporary injunction under order 39 rules 1 and 2 during the pendency of the suit filed by them. I need no gain saying that the object in granting temporary injunction is generally to maintain status-quo as prevailing on the date of filing of the suit. Consequently, the persons who stood removed from their offices before filing of the suit, could not be put back in the offices by issuing temporary injunction. The Addl. District Judge clearly acted in excess of his jurisdiction in so directing. In Sahibzada Muhammad Umar Beg v. Sultan Muhammad Khan and another (PLD 1970 SC 139 it was observed: "Under Order 39 rule 1 C.P.C. Status quo be maintained between the parties in accordance with the situation as it obtained at the time of institution of the suit and not to a point of time prior thereto."
The impugned order is thus not sustainable.
5. Even on merits, it appears that the Additional District Judge acted illegally in setting aside the order of the trial Court. One of the grounds which prevailed with the Addl. District Judge was that the respondents had not been allowed full 7 days period of notice as required by the Rules.
Unfortunately while coming to this conclusion the Additional District Judge completely omitted to notice the authority of this Court on the basis of which the trial Court had opined that this requirement was not mandatory in nature. This judgment was binding on the Addl. District Judge, Sialkot, who was under an obligation to have given it due consideration while deciding the appeal.
The learned counsel for the respondents has, however, relied upon Abdul Hafeez v. Six Members, Presiding Officer Union Council No.13 Multan and 4 others (1983 CLC 1525) and Mian Muhammad Masood Ahmad v. Assistant Commissioner Kharian and 8 others (PLD 1983 Lah. 92) to contend that the requirement of seven days notice was mandatory in character. These cases are, however, distinguishable on facts. Even otherwise, the contention of the learned counsel cannot be accepted in view of the pronouncement in Ch. Abdul Ghani v. Deputy Commissioner & others (1987 CLC 2401) (D.B.) (though wrongly shown in the report as a single Bench case) wherein the earlier judgment in Masood Ahmad's case was noted and distinguished. Similarly, a Division Bench of this Court, comprising of Mr. Justice A.S. Salam, the learned Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Fazal Karim, in Ch. Muhammad Younis and others v. Deputy Commissioner Lahore and others (W.P. No.4655/89 decided on 16-9-1989) while relying upon the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Allah Bachaya v. The Controlling Authority (Collector) D.G. Khan and another (1969 SCM R 127) held that the provision of rule 3 was not mandatory. Similarly, the contention that no motion was moved in the meeting nor any opportunity was granted to respondents Nos.1 and 2 to offer any explanation, prima facie, appears to be without much force. From the proceedings recorded on 24-1-1989, it was clearly understood that the meeting was being held for considering the motion for the removal of the Chairman and the Vice-Chairman. No objection whatsoever to these proceedings was raised at that time by respondents Nos.1 and 2, who as a matter of fact, have themsleves signed the same. The hypertechnical view taken by the Additional District Judge cannot be upheld.
6. Similarly, the treatment meted out by the Additional District Judge to the objection regarding the jurisdiction is far from satisfactory. Apart from the general bar contained in section 160 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, section 34 specifically provides that no Civil Court can entertain, hear or adjudicate upon any suit, appeal or other proceedings nor can any injunction be granted in relation to anything done or intended to be done under the provision of Chapter IV, which inter alia, provides for no-confidence and the rules made thereunder. It was contended by the learned counsel for respondents Nos.1 and 2 that since the proceedings were illegal and unlawful the bar of jurisdiction was not applicable.
The allegations of respondents Nos.1 and 2 that some illegalities or irregularities have been committed are yet to be established and for the purpose of temporary injunction at least the bar appears to be applicable especially when the grant of injunction is specifically prohibited.
For all these reasons, the revision petition is accepted, the order of the Additional District Judge dated 13-6-1989 is set aside and that of the trial Court restored. No order as to costs.