' Facts necessary for the disposal of this constitutional petition, briefly stated, are that Town Committee. Shorkot, comprised 16 members including the petitioner, who was elected as its Chairman. On 12-4-1986, a written requisition for convening a special meeting of the Town Committee to consider a motion of no-confidence against its Chairman, the petition was moved before the Deputy Commissioner, Jhang, who convened the requsite meeting for 20-4-1986, and appointed Assistant Commissioner, Shorkot, to preside over it. Notices for the meeting were issued to all the members on 13-4-1986. Petitioner received the notice allegedly on 15-4-1986 and soon thereafter filed the constitutional petition in this Court to challenge the validity of the notice on the ground. Inter alia, that it fell short of requisite period of seven days provided under rules 3(2) of the Punjab Local Councils (Vote of No-Confidence against Chairman or Vice Chairman) Rules, 1980.
Prayer made by the p8/etitioner was that the notice dated 13-4-1986 (Annex A) be declared to be without lawful authority and of no legal consequence. It was further prayed that operation of the impugned notice be suspended and the holding of the special meeting be stayed. Matter came up before a Division Bench of this Court on 19-4-1986. It was observed that the petitioner could well raise all the objections regarding the validity of the impugned notice before the presiding officer.
Holding of the meeting was thus not stayed but it was observed that "the result of the meeting it held on the due date, shall be subject to the final decision of the writ petition." It appears that the meeting was held on the scheduled date and a vote of No-Confidence was carried against the petitioner by a majority of 12 to 2. Subsequently, new Chairman of the Town Committee was also elected and he was impleaded as respondent No.3 herein.
2. We have heard the learned counsel and the learned Assistant Advocate-General. The main ground urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was not served with seven days' notice as required by rule 3(2) of the aforementioned Rules with the result that he was gravely prejudiced in approaching his fellow councillors so as to persuade them not to press the No-Confidence Motion against him. It is next contended by the learned counsel that written explanation offered by the petitioner was not circulated in the meeting which, too, caused prejudice to him. It is submitted by the learned counsel that it was mandatory requirement of rue 5
(4) that where a written explanation is offered by the Chairman against whom motion of No- Confidence has been moved it shall be circulated amongst the members. In support of his submissions, learned counsel has placed reliance on Mian Muhammad Masud Ahmad v. Assistant Commissioner, Kharian and 8 others PLD 1983 Lah.
92.
3. Proceeding on the premises that the notice given to the petitioner fell short of requisite period of seven days, as alleged by the petitioner, it was only an irregularity which did not vitiate the proceedings. Rule 3(2) which provides seven days' notice for the meeting convened for considering the motion of No-Confidence is directory in nature and its non-compliance does not result in the annulment of the proceedings unless prejudice is shown to have been caused to the party affected. Reference may be made to Ch. Sadiq Ali v. Collector Gujranwala and another PLD 1964 (W.P.) Lah. 255 and. Abdul Majid v. Province of West Pakistan and 2 others PLD 1964 (WP) Lah.
531. Now, in the facts of the present case, petitioner on his own showing undoubtedly had five days' notice of the meeting. He also attended the meeting and joined the proceedings. We also find on perusal of the original proceedings of the meeting produced in Court that the explanation in writing tendered by the petitioner was read out to the members at the meeting and the Presiding Officer repelled the petitioner's objections taken therein. In the circumstances, we are satisfied that no prejudice was caused to the petitioner on account of short notice. Petitioner's grievance based on the provisions of rule 5(4) has also no substance as the minutes of the proceedings clearly show that the explanation of the petitioner was read out to all the members in the meeting. We would also like to observe that the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the case of "Mian Muhammad Masud Ahmad" is of no help to him as it proceeded on its own peculiar facts.
The precedent case was also referred to in a Division Bench judgment of this Court in W.P. No 912 of 1986 and it was held therein that the provisions of rule 3 (2) are directory in nature.
4. Yet another point canvassed before us by the learned counsel for the petitioner in a rather lukewarm manner is that the notices were issued under the signatures of the Deputy Commissioner whereas they should have been issued by the Presiding Officer Learned Assistant Advocate-General submits that rules had been amended and it is permissible for the Deputy Commissioner to issue notice. Even if it be assumed that the Presiding Officer and not the Deputy Commissioner ought to have issued the notices, the objection is not fatal as it relates to a matter of mere formality. This by itself, in our view, cannot be destructive of entire proceedings. It may be noted that under the Rules, requisition has to be moved before the Deputy Commissioner. That being so, he is not a stranger to the proceedings or the Statute. Therefore, nothing really turns on the point raised by the learned counsel.
' In view of the foregoing discussion, we find no merit in this writ petition which is accordingly dismissed but with no order as to costs. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.