' MIR HAZAR KI-IAN KHOSO, C.J.---I had the privilege to go through the draft judgment written by my brother Mr. Justice Amir-ul-Mulk Mengal.
2. As far as C.P.No, 179 of 1989, is concerned, I concur with his decision, but I disagree with his decision in C.P.Nos. 176, 181, 180 and 187 of 1989.
3. It is admitted position that sale of liquor in Islamic State of Pakistan is totally banned. Its profession could be adopted only on basis of a licence issued by a competent authority under certain conditions. Definition of word 'licence' finds its place in case of Government of Pakistan v.
Zamir Ahmed and others reported in PLD 1975 SC 667. It reads as under:-- "In its specific sense, to licence means to confer on a person the right to do something which otherwise he would not have right to do. A licence is in the nature of a special privilege, rather than a right common to all, and is often required as a condition precedent to the right to carry on business or to hold certain classes of property within the jurisdiction. A licence is not, however, a contract with the sovereignty issuing it, not property in any constitutional sense."
' Issuance of a licence for sale of liquor is purely a privilege. It does not create any right in a licensee. Therefore, no fundamental rights are violated by its cancellation. A licence simpliciter can, therefore, be withdrawn at any time, and such order is not justifiable in extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court.
4. Besides, in Islamic State of Pakistan sale/use of liquor is against Injunctions of Islam. I am, therefore, not inclined to exercise my discretion in favour of the petitioners on the principle enunciated in case of Federation of Pakistan v. Haji Muhammad Saifullah Khan reported in PLD 1989 SC 166 'relevant page 194). The same is reproduced below:-- "The writ jurisdiction is discretionary in nature and even if the Court finds that a party has a good case, it may refrain from giving him the relief if greater harm is likely to be caused thereby than the one sought to be remedied. It is well-settled that individual interest just be subordinated to the collective good. Therefore, we refrain from granting consquential reliefs, inter alia, the restoration of the National Assembly and dissolved Federal Cabinet."
' For the foregoing reasons, the petitions stands, dismissed.
' AMIR-UL-MULK MENGAL, J.---The facts and circumstances as well as legal points involved in the following five petitions are identical and common, therefore, we propose to dispose of the same by this common judgment:--
(1) Constitutional Petition No, 176 of 1989.
(2) Constitutional Petition No, 179 of 1989.
(3) Constitutional Petition No, 180 of 1989.
(4) Constitutional Petition No, 181 of 1989.
(5) Constitutional Petition No, 187 of 1989.
2. To put the facts in a nutshell, the following story emerges:-- ' Petitioners in C.P. No, 176 of 1989, Zoroastrian by faith are licensed vendors for sale of liquor to the permit holders who are non-Muslim Pakistani citizens and non-Muslim foreigners. The business of the petitioners is run under the name and style of Sousa's Wine and General Stores, Jinnah Road, Quetta. The petitioners were granted licences on Form L-1 and L-2 both for wholesale and retail vend for foreign liquor. Such licences have been regularly renewed on annual basis and the said licences were admittedly renewed up to 30th of June, 1980. However, vide Order No, 2394/189/DE & T, dated 7-9-1989 the respondents cancelled said licences without any notice to the petitioners under purported exercise of powers under Article 19 of Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the "Hadd Order").
3. In C.P. No, 179 of 1989, petitioner is a Hotel Establishment and is being owned by Tourism Promotion Services (Pak.) Limited which has a chain of hotels in various parts of Pakistan. This hotel started working in Quetta City in the year 1988. It is the case of the petitioner that in order to provide facilities to its foreigner non-Muslim guests, the petitioner applied for grant of licence for sale of liquor which was sanctioned and a licence on 1-2 Form for retail sale of liquour was issued by respondent No,
2. This liquor was to be provided to non-Muslim foreigner residents. This licence was initially for one year and it is alleged by the petitioner that the same was renewed upto June, 1990 but learned Advocate-General seriously challenged this position and drew our attention to Annexure "A" of the petition which is the licence on 1-2 Form and was valid till 30-6-1989. Renewed licence could not be produced by the petitioner. However, it is alleged that the respondent No, 2 cancelled said licence without any notice to the petitioner.
4. The petitioner in C.P. No, 180 of 1989, Mr. J.J.K. Tajjak is a Christian by faith who applied for grant of licence for sale of liquor and such licence was firstly granted to him in the year 1978. With the promulgation of the Hadd Order licence on L-W Form for retail sale of intoxicating liquor was issued to the petitioner and same was renewed year to year. Lastly the said licence was renewed upto 30- 6-1990. The petitioner used to supply liquor to those minority citizens of the country who had valid permits by the Excise and Taxation Officers and also to the non-Muslim foreigners having such permits. It is pointed out further that intoxicating liquor was sold on the occasion of religious festivals of the minorities. The petitioner has got the total supply on the basis of licence issued to him. Without any notice the respondent Government cancelled his licence.
5. C.P. No, 181 of 1989, has been filed by nine petitioners belonging to different minority sections and different faiths including Hindus, Christian and Parsi citizens of Pakistan. Their plea is that being non-Muslim minorities and citizens of the country they have been allowed to be issued permits for liquor on the occasion of their respective festivals. They have given the list of their festivals which is detailed in the memo of petition. It is their case that their right to use liquor on the occasion of religious festivals had been protected by the Constitution of the country and the law. With the cancellation of the licences to the licensed vendors the petitioners have been deprived of their such right as they cannot purchase liquor for consumption on their religious festivals. Thus, they challenged the order of cancellation of the licences.
6. In C.P. No, 187 of 1989, the petitioner is a private limited company registered under the Companies Ordinance having its registered office at MA. Jinnah Road, Quetta Cantt. The Company was granted licence of Form L-1 and L-2 which are meant for wholesale and retail vend of foreign liquor to Trade and Clubs holding licences. The petitioners have been applying for renewel of licences every year and the respondent No,2 has been renewing such licences regularly on annual basis.
The licences issued to the petitioner were renewed till 30th June, 1990 which was cancelled without any notice by respondent No,2.
' The petitioners being aggrieved of the cancellation of licences as mentioned hereinabove have challenged the action of respondent No,2 on various grounds.
' Heard the counsel of the parties and Advocate-General Balochistan at great length.
7. Full-fledged arguments were addressed and the matter was reserved for judgment when the then Chief Justice of Balochistan Mr. Justice Abdul Qadeer Chaudhary, was elevated to the Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, thus the judgment could not be pronounced. Notices were issued for fresh arguments and the learned counsel for the parties were heard again in detail.
8. The main attack which was common in all the petitions was that the respondents action in cancelling the licences was against the canons of natural justice, as without any notice to the petitioners their licences were cancelled with one stroke of pen. Mala fides were also alleged. It was also contended that the action of the respondent No,2 in fact tantamounts to infringement of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the minority citizens of the country and it was lastly urged that respondent No,2 did not apply his own mind but acted in a stereotyped manner on the directions of the Chief Minister of Balochistan. It is nowhere alleged that any of the petitioners ever contravened any of the conditions of the licences.
9. On the contrary learned Advocate-General Balochistan strenuously urged that this Court may not exercise discretion in favour of the petitioners as it would be against the public morality because the use of liquor is detrimental to the society and the religious feelings of the people-at- large. On legal grounds it was urged that a licence simpliciter is a privilege and not a right and, therefore, is not justiceable. Reliance was placed on the case of Government of Pakistan, through Secretary Ministry of Commerce and another v. Zamir Ahmed Khan as reported in PLD 1975 SC 667, MA. Naser v. Chairman, Pakistan Eastern Railway and others PLD 1966 Dacca 69 and Muhammad Himayoon v. The Director of Industries and Mineral Development Department and another 1986 CLC
454. It was also contended that the purpose for which the licence was granted ceased to exist within the meaning of Article 19(2)(b) of Hadd Order and, therefore, the cancellation has caused no prejudice to the right of the petitioners.
10. I have given my anxious thought to the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the parties.
11. Firstly, I would like to determine the Authority, who is competent to grant or cancel licences and the procedure to be followed by such authority. Licences are granted under Article 17 of the Hadd Order which reads as under:-- "17. Licences for bona fide medicinal or other purposes.--The Provincial Government or subject to the control of the Provincial Government, the Collector, may issue licences to any person in respect of any institution, whether under the management of Government or not:--
(a) for the manufacturer, import, transport, sale or possession of any intoxicant or article containing introxicating liquor on the ground that such intoxicant or article is required by such person in respect of such institution for a bona fide medicinal, scientific, industrial or similar other purpose or for consumption by a non-Muslim citizen of Pakistan as a part of a religious ceremony or by a non-Muslim foreigner; or
(b) for the export of any intoxicant or article containing intoxicating liquor."
' However, in the case of Federation of Pakistan v. Nosher Rustam Sidhwa as reported in 1988 SCMR 1417 the Shariat Appellate Bench declared that portion of the section 17 to be against injunctions of Islam which leaves a scope for the Government or a Muslim licensee to manufacture, import, transport, sell or possess any intoxicating liquor meant for human consumption by a non-Muslim citizen of Pakistan as a part of religious ceremonies or by a non-Muslim foreigner. But such an act of manufacture, import, sale or transport shall not be against the injunctions of Islam if the material is for bona fide medicinal, scientific, industrial or other similar purpose as provided by section 17 of the Hadd Order. In the light of the judgment as quoted hereinabove it is clear that a non-Muslim citizen of Pakistan may be granted a licence to manufacture and possess intoxicating liquor for sale on religious ceremonies to those non-Muslim citizens of Pakistan or foreigners who hold valid permits for use and consumption of intoxicating liquor on such occasions.
12. The Provincial Government, or subject to the control of the said Government, the Collector, is competent to issue such licences on such forms and conditions as prescribed under Rult 18 and the Balochistan Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Rules, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as "Hadd Rules"). Article 19 prescribes the power to suspend or cancel such licences. For the sake of convenience Article 19 is reproduced below:-- "19. Power to cancel or suspend licences.--(1) The Collector may cancel or suspend a licence:--
(a) if any fee payable by the holder thereof be not duly paid; or
(b) in the event of any breach by the holder thereof or by his servant or by any one acting with his express or implied permission on his behalf of any of the terms or conditions of the licence.
(2) The Collector shall cancel a licence if:--
(a) the holder thereof is convicted of any offence under this Order; or
(b) the purpose for which the licence is granted ceases to exist: ' As and when any licence is cancelled under clause (1) or clause (2) the holder thereof shall at once declare to the Collector the stock of intoxicating liquor or articles containing such liquor lying with him and dispose of such stock to such authorised person as the Collector may specify."
' This being position of law we now advert to the provisions of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as the "Constitution") as referred to by the counsel for the parties. Article 4, Article 25, Article 36 and Article 37(h) of the Constitution are the provisions regarding which much was said during arguments.
' Article 4, speaks of right of individuals to be dealt with in accordance with law and particularly Article 4(c) where it is laid down that no person shall be compelled to do that which the law does not require him to do would be relevant. Likewise Article 25 speaks equality of citizens that all the citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law. Article 36 is a specific article for protection of minorities rights wherein it is envisaged that the State shall safeguard the legitimate rights and interest of minorities including representation in the Federal and Provincial services. Article 37(h), contemplates that the State shall prevent the consumption of Alcoholic liquour otherwise than medicinal, scientific, industrial and in the case of non-Muslim religious purposes.
13. Thus, after having a cursory glance at the provisions of law and the Constitution, it may be observed that there is no prohibition to the issuance of licence to the minorities to manufacture or possess intoxicating liquor to be used for sale on their religious ceremonies or festivals.
14. Such licences in the case of these petitions were granted by the Collector/Director Excise and Taxation Department Balochistan, Quetta to the petitioners from the date of promulgation of Hadd Order. The same was renewable on annual basis. In case of the present petitioners except in C.P.
No, 179 of 1989, the licences of the petitioners were renewed which were valid upto 30th June, 1990.
The crucial point for determination, therefore, was whether without any notice the licence so issued could be cancelled on the grounds other than contained in section 19 of the Hadd Order.
15. There is no dispute that Government of Balochistan or Director Excise and Taxation Department ever alleged any contravention of the conditions as laid down under Article 19 of the Hadd Order or Hadd Rules made thereunder against the licensee vendors nor they issued them any notice for cancelling such licences. In this regard there is material on record that decision for cancellation of the licences granted to the petitioners was made as a result of policy or policy decision taken by the Chief Minister of Balochistan and not on the basis whether or not the petitioners defied any condition as laid down in such licences. The Director also did not apply his mind independently but in pursuance of the policy decision taken by the Provincial Government of Balochistan, he passed the orders of cancellation without issuing any notice to the licence vendors/holders. Thus the decision was taken against the principles of natural justice (audi alteram partem).
16. A question arose at this juncture whether a licence creates a right or it is merely a privilege and thus not justiciable. The learned Advocate-General Balochistan emphatically argued this point to oppose the grant of writ in favour of the petitioners. It was canvassed that licence simpliciter is a privilege and confers no legal right. Reliance was placed on the case reported in PLD 1975 SC 667 referred to in the preceding paras. When this proposition was put to Mr. Basharatullah the learned counsel for the petitioners, he invited our attention to the fact that in the reported case as referred to hereinabove petitioners had prayed for a writ seeking grant of licence as they deposited the required fee. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, therefore, after detailed discussion concluded that grant of licence is a privilege. But the learned counsel further argued that once a licence is granted and after its grant steps are taken in pursuance thereof, then rights are conferred on such a person by virtue of law as such it becomes a right. Our attention was drawn to the case of Karamat Hussain and others v. Muhammad Zaman and others as reported in PLD 1987 SC 139. While making a distinction between the two the Honourable Supreme Court in the aforesaid case held:-- "A privilege is some particular benefit or advantage conferred on a person or a class of persons which other citizens do enjoy while a right is some benefit conferred on a person by virtue of a given law."
' The given law in the instant case is Hadd Order and the Rules made thereunder. Licence was granted by the Collector under Article 17 of the Hadd Order to the petitioners, therefore, this could be cancelled only in accordance with law, and more so the cancellation could not be ordered without notice to the petitioners. I find substantial force in the contention of Mr. Basharatullah that licence issued to the petitioners were not licences simpliciter because after issuance of the same the petitioners purchased stock of liquor to be provided to the lawful consumers. With the issuance of such licences a right was created by law in favour of some of the petitioners as traders, and also a benefit is created in favour of others as consumers who are holding permits under law to purchase intoxicating liquor for consumption from such traders. With the cancellation of such licences without any notice, rights as created by law in favour of both traders and consumers have been infringed. In the circumstances, it becomes absolutely difficult if not impossible, to hold that licences issued were licences simpliciter. These licences, therefore, fall in the exception of the ruling as mentioned in PLD 1975 SC 667.
17. In my considered view and keeping in view the distinction made by the Honourable Supreme Court between a privilege and a right, issuance of licences to the petitioners created a right in their favour as they have purchased the entire stock of intoxicating liquor for selling the same to the lawful vendees. Licences of this kind, therefore, could not be cancelled without any notice to the petitioners, as cancellation of such licences would indeed put the petitioners/licence-holders to monetary loss and otherwise it would be against the principles of audi alteram nartem. It may further be observed that the law specifically provides conditions which, if violated, would entitle the Collector to cancel licences. Admittedly the Collector did not act in accordance with the provisions of Hadd Order, thus the well-settled principle that things should be done in accordance with law or should not be done in accordance with law or should not be done at all, was not adhered to. The orders of cancellation, therefore, being violative of principles of natural justice as well as ex facie oppressive and unjust being against the manner provided by law are not sustainable.
18. Here the ground taken by learned Advocate-General whether such an action is justiciable, becomes pertinent. The learned Advocate-General vehemently urged that mere cancellation of a licence is not justiciable and in support of said contention he relied on the case of Muhammad Himayoon v. The Director of Industries and Mineral Development Department and another as reported in 1986 CLC 454 (Karachi). I have thoroughly gone through the said judgment. The facts of the said case are quite distinguishable from the facts of the case in hand because in the said case the petitioners himself violated the terms of letter and failed to deposit advance amount of Rs,3,00,000 (Rupees three lac) and daily amount of Rs,20,000, therefore, his licence was cancelled.
Thus with all respect, I agree with the conclusions drawn by the Division Bench because the petitioner himself had violated the conditions of contract. But the aforesaid judgment is inapt to the facts of the present case, therefore, is not benficial to the respondents.
' In my calculated opinion a decision has to be taken keeping in view the circumstances of each case and the nature of order passed in each case to determine whether a particular case is justiciable or not. If a statutory functionary acts ex facie in an unjust and oppressive manner, the High Court should not refrain to exercise its writ jurisdiction to grant relief to an aggrieved party. It has been so held by the Supreme Court of Pakistan as back as in the year, 1958 in the case of Messrs East and West Steamship v. Pakistan and others as reported in PLD 1958 SC (Pak.)
41. In the present case the order of the Collector cancelling the licences of the petitioners was patently illegal and unjust being based on extraneous considerations in pursuance of a policy which is in violation of the Hadd Order itself, therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of Advocate-General to say that such actions are not justiciable.
' The last submission made by the learned Advocate-General was that keeping in view the principles as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Federation of Pakistan v.
Muhammad Saifullah Khan as reported in PLD 1989 SC 166, that writ may be refused. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary in nature and even if the Court finds that a party has a good case it may refrain from giving him the relief if greater harm is likely to be caused thereby than the one sought to be remedied. It was further observed that individual interest must be subordinated to the collective good. Therefore, the learned Advocate-General while trying to make us believe that exercise of discretion in the circumstances of present case would be against the collective good and would cause a greater harm than the remedy prayed for. In order to prove that greater harm would be caused not a single instance or consequence was put forward by the learned Advocate- General except that it would injure the sentiments of the Muslim Majority. In reply to said argument, suffice is to observe that it is the Constitution of the country which has conferred certain rights to the minorities and the injunctions of great religion of Islam nowhere provides for infringing the rights of minorities. The right of the minorities may not be allowed to be infringed on mere assumptions and presumptions and must be determined with reference to law and Constitution instead of idiosyncratic and subjective feelings. I am, therefore, with all respect, in full agreement with the observations made by the Honourable Supreme Court that "let the justice be done and let the heaven not fall".
' From the above discussion I am inclined to declare that the orders of cancellation of licences issued to the petitioners by respondent No,2 on the direction of the respondent No,1 being violative of the principles of natural justice and of law, have been passed without lawful authority and thus, carry no legal effect. It may be observed that in C.P. No, 179 of 1989, since the date of the licence has already expired in the year 1989 and no licence to be valid at present was produced alongwith the petition, therefore, the said petition is infructuous.
' Resultantly the orders of cancellation of licences are hereby set aside. The parties, however, have w bear their own costs.
' MUNAWAR AHMED MIRZA, J.---I have the benefit of going through main judgment recorded by my learned brother MrJustice Amirul Mulk Mengal and the dissenting note of learned Chief Justice.
Facts, leading to these petitions have been discussed in the main judgment, therefore, need not be reiterated.
2. Basically petitioners have alleged, that licences for sale of liquor were validly granted by competent authority in accordance with Article 17 of Prohibition (Enforcement of Hadd) Order, 1979 (hereinafter referred as "Prohibition Order") but same have been arbitrarily cancelled towards 7-9- 1990 disregarding principles of natural justice and relevant law.
3. Main thrust of arguments addressed by M/s. Basharatullah and H.Shakil Ahmad learned counsel for petitioners, suggested legal recognition of licences/permits under Article 37 (h) of 'The Constitution' and Article 17 of `Prohibition Order'. They maintained that respondents had no juristiction to cancel the same except under the prescribed procedure which was not adhered to in the instant case. Learned counsel argued that rights of minorities have been duly protected by the Constitution and law which however were flouted by impugned cancellation. They emphasised that grant of licences had created a right in favour of petitioners, and same could not be taken away without providing opportunity of hearing. According to them proposition of law was appropriately determined in the judgment of Mr.Justice Amirul Mulk Mengal.
' To supplement their submissions reliance was placed on the observations in cases (i)
Superintendent of Police, Special Branch, Karachi and others v. Abubakar and another (1972 SCMR- 154) (ii) Raees Ahmad v. The Rationing Controller, Karachi and another (PLD 1975 Karachi 25), (iii)
M/s. East and West Steamship Company v. Pakistan through Secretary Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Commerce, Karachi and others (PLD 1958 SC 41), (iv) M/s. Malik and Haq and another v.
Muhammad Shamsul Islam Chowdhury and others (PLD 1961 SC 531) (v) The University of Dacca through Vice-Chancellor and another v. Zakir Ahmad (PLD 1965 SC 90). Besides for explaining meaning of 'Privilege' Longman's Dictionary of English Language 1988 Edition P-1174 and Twentieth Century Chamber's Dictionary 1983 Edition page 1023 was referred. An attempt was made to challenge propriety of dissenting note whereby claim was declared to be not justiciable. Learned counsel further urged, that principle of law enunciated in Federation of Pakistan and others v. Haji Muhammad Saifullah Khan and others PLD 1989 SC 166 relied upon for declining to exercise discretion to grant relief in the writ was inapplicable in the instant cases because national interest was not involved.
4. Whereas learned Advocate-General stenuously opposing the petitions, contended that, trade of liquour offends against tenets of Islam whereby religious feelings of Muslim residents of the country at large are affected, therefore, writ of mandamus being discretionary relief was rightly refused by learned Chief Justice. Relying on Muhammad Akbar Khan v. Province of West Pakistan PLD 1961 SC 17 he canvassed that grant of licence, is a 'Privilege' simpliciter and cannot be equated with any Tangible right, therefore, same was not justiciable. He also supplemented his submissions by referring to observation in case (i) Government of Pakistan v. Zamir Ahmed Khan PLD 1975 SC 667,
(ii) Muhammd Himayoon v. The Director of Industries and Mineral Development Department and another 1986 CLC 454 and (iii) Ghulam Haider and others v. Station House Officer PLD 1988 Quetta
52. Advocate-General further argued that licence had merely provided a facility for restricted supply of liquour, therefore, no vested right was created entitling the petitioners to plead violation of principle of natural justice. Without prejudice it was contended that petitioners have alternate remedy for compensation before the appropriate forum if at all they were really aggrieved or had suffered losses.
' I have carefully considered the above arguments in the light of relevant law.
' Before dialating upon merits it may be seen that grievance of petitioners relates to right for consumption by non-Muslim citizens of Pakistan as part of religious ceremony or by non-Muslim foreigners during subsistence of licences which is to expire on 30th of June, 1990. Learned counsel for petitioners have candidly conceded that there is absolutely no religious ceremony or recognized ritual of any community of non-Muslims during remaining period of licence i.e, June, 1990; therefore, obviously to that extent, purpose of licence challenged through these petitions ceases to exist. Additionally petitioners in the Constitutional Petition No, 181 of 1989 are non-Muslim citizen of Pakistan. Their claim in said petition relates to facility of liquor on religious ceremonies, same has accordingly, become infrucutous. It may be seen that as regards supply of liquor to foreigners, learned Advocate-General on the basis of official record categorically asserted that none at all has even approached for grant of requisite permits. This factual position has not been controverted by the other side. Thus in the absence of demand by any foreigner, petitioners cannot be truly aggrieved.
6. Now reverting to merits, firstly it may be seen that Hon'ble Supreme Court in case Muhammad Akbar Khan v. Province of West Pakistan PLD 1961 SC 17 while commenting on the nature of liquor licence, have termed it as `privilege' conferred on the licensee for regulating trade within permissible limits. In another case, Government of Pakistan v. Zamir Ahmed Khan PLD 1975 SC 667 although legal position pertaining to initial grant of licence was discussed yet considering effect of licence it has been described merely a privilege and not a right. Similarly Division Bench of Balochistan High Court in reported judgment of Ghulam Haider and others v. Station House Officer, City PLD 1988 Quetta 52 has unequivocally observed, the licence simpliciter to be merely a privilege and not a legal right. Learned counsel for petitioners attempted to argue that `Privilege' also creates vested rights. Reference was made to meaning contained in firstly; Longman's Dictionary of the English Language Fifth Impression 1988 Edition p. 1174 indicating it a right immunity or advantage granted exclusively to a particular person or group; a prerogative secondly Chamber's Twentieth Century Dictionar; 1983 Edition at p. 1023 describing 'privilege' to be an advantage; right or favour granted to or enjoyed by an individual prerogative; sacred and vital civil right....However Black's Law Dictionary (Revised Fourth Edition) at p.1359 defines privilege. A particular and peculiar benefit or advantage enjoyed by a person, company or class, beyond the common advantages of other citizens. An exceptional or extraordinary power or exemption; A right, power franchise or immunity held, by a person or class, against or beyond the course of the law. Thus considering principle of law and importing proper meanings of 'privilege' obviously cannot be equated with vested right. The licence, for restricted trade of alcohol, therefore, merely provides a facility, benefit or advantage to the licence-holder for distribution or sale of the intoxicant liquor in the prescribed manner to the people enjoying immunity during subsistence of licence. Furthermore factually, even during subsistence of valid licence the sale to all category of persons is regulated by the permits issued by Department. Accordingly, withdrawal or cancellation does not automatically affect any vested right of licence-holder. At best main grievance could be, the likely loss to the tune of stock- in-hand, or possible gain subject, however, to independent determination before appropriate forum. In the circumstances, I am inclined to agree with the conclusions in dissenting note that cancellation of licence simpliciter is not justiciable, and petitioner could not voice failure of natural justice because merely possibility to make some gains has been allegedly affected. Adequate alternate remedy by way of compensation being available to petitioner, even otherwise constitutional petitions are not maintainable.
' Next it may be seen that drinking has been prohibited by Almighty Allah, because of its evil effects.
These dictates supersede manmade laws, and extends to the benefits of whole mankind. Even under the law, it appears that non-Muslims claiming permission for drinking have to show that their respective religion recognizes or sanctions drinking of alcohol. Therefore, general principle of law in case Federation of Pakistan v. Haji Muhammad Saifullah reported in PLD 1989 SC 166 and followed by Division Bench of this Court in case Muhammad Farooq and others v. The Deputy Commissioner, Quetta District, Quetta and others 1989 CLC 1823 are fully attracted. Consequently, I am, persuaded to hold that keeping in view facts it is not a fit case for the grant of discretion in favour of petitioners.
' Thus for the foregoing reasons, petitions being incompetent are directed to be dismissed. Parties are, however, left to bear their own costs.
' These petitions were dismissed by short order dated 31-5-1990 and here are reasons for the same.