1. MUHAMMAD YAQUB ALI, J.-The subject-matter of this appeal by special leave of this Court is the disposal under the Displaced Parsons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 of house No. S- I-17-12 situated in Krishna Gali No. 2, Gawalmandi, Lahore.
2. The house originally belonged to one Qamar Din. On 1-2-1943 he sold it to Hira Lai and Moti Lai by a registered sale deed. Mutation No. 205 pertaining to the transfer of the house was effected in the Revenue records on 24-12-1943. The names of the new owners were also recorded in Khasra Imarti maintained by the Corporation of City of Lahore.
3. On the Partition of the sub-continent in August 1947, Hira Lai and Moti Lai migrated to India. Taking advantage of their absence Qamar Din entered into unauthorised possession of the house and eventually sold it on 6-5-1952 to one Abdul Hameed for a consideration of Rs. 8,000. In turn Abdul Hameed sold it to Haji Jan Muhammad respondent No. 1 on 16-2-1954 for a sum of Rs. 8,500. Both these conveyances were evidenced by registered sale deeds.
4. Allah Ditta appellant herein was employed as a. Constable in the Directorate of Enforcement set up by the Central Government to unearth hidden evacuee properties or properties which had been subject-matter of irregular transfers. On some date prior to 30-11-1961 the appellant laid information with the Director of his Establishment that the house in the occupation of respondent No. 1 was evacuee property. An investigation was held which revealed that the house -elonged to Hira Lai and Moti Lai evacuees and was in unauthorised occupation of respondent No. 1. Thereupon a reference was made to the Chief Settlement Commissioner by the Director of Enforcement under para. 6 of S. R. O.
5. No. 824 (x)/1961 issued by the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Works on the 1st of September 1961, under clause (b) of section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 with the recommendation that if the Chief Settlement Commissioner is - satisfied that the information furnished by the appellant is substantially correct he may on payment of the evaluation price transfer the house to the appellant.
6. As it was proved that the house had in fact been sold by Qamar Din to Hira Lai, Moti Lai and had become evacuee property Raja Muhammad Zia Ullah Khan exercising the powers of the Chief Settlement Commissioner resumed the house in dispute and transferred the same to the appellant by order made on 21-3-1962. Permanent Transfer Deed .Was on a later date issued in the name of the appellant.
7. When respondent No. 2 came to know about the transfer of the house in favour of the appellant he filed an application under section 22 of the Administration of Evacuee Properties Act for a declaration that the house was not an evacuee property. The ground raised in the application was that the respondent No. 1 was a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration and as the house-had not been treated an evacuee property up to 31-12-1956, section 3 of the Administration of Evacuee Properties Act, 1957 provided a bar to treating the house as evacuee property from the 1st day of January 1957.
8. The application was dismissed by the Deputy Custodian by order dated 13-7-1963 and an appeal against that order was rejected by the Custodian on 28-11-1963. The respondent No. 1 then moved the Chief Settlement Commis--sioner for. Permission to file a belated C. H. Form for the transfer of the house which was in his possession since 16-2-1954. This application too was rejected by the Chief Settlement Commissioner on 8-5-1964 with the observation that if the respondent was so advised he may pursue his remedy in the High Court.
9. On the 19th of May 1965, respondent No. 1 filed Writ Petition No. 645 in the erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan, Lahore Bench calling in question the order of transfer of the house in possession to the appellant, the rejection of the application made by him under section 22 of the Administration of Evacuee Properties Act, 1957 and the refusal by the: Chief Settlement Commissioner to entertain his belated C. H. Form for-- transfer of the house in accordance with the provisions of Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act.
10. The plea that the house in dispute was not evacuee property and that under section 3 of the Administration of Evacuee Properties Act, 1957 the Settlement and Rehabilitation authorities were debarred from treating it as evacuee property was repelled by the learned Judges hearing the writ petition on the short ground that the order passed by the Custodian was not impugned by the respondent in continuation of those proceedings as by applying to the Chief Settlement Commissioner for permission to file a belated C. H. Form he had conceded that the house in his possession was evacuee property.
11. The other two contentions raised in the writ petition found favour with the learned Judges. It was held that the order passed by Raja Zia Ullah Khan for transfer of the house on 21-3-1962 was without lawful authority as clause (b) of section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensa--petition and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 under which S. R. O. No. X24 (K)/1961 was deleted by the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1962 (Il of 1962) w. e. f. 13-1- 1962. The rejection of the C. H. Form filed by respondent No. 2 by the Chief Settlement.
12. Commissioner as belated was also held to be without lawful authority following the decision of this Court in Ch. Altaf Hussain v. Chief Settle-. Ment Commissioner, Pakistan, Lahore and others (PLD1965SC68The transfer of the, house in favour of the appellant being without lawful authority respondent: No. 2 as claimant displaced person `in possession' on the terminal date: viz.. 20-12-1958 under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilita-. Petition) Act and the Schedule thereto entitled to its transfer. A direction was: accordingly given to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner, Lahore to: transfer the house to respondent No. 2 on payment of the evaluation price.
13. Leave to appeal from the order of the High Court was granted on 6-10-66 to consider the effect of the deletion of clause (b) of section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act on the cases pending for transfer of concealed evacuee properties to the informers under S. R. O. No. 824 (K)/1961. It was also held that the High Court had acted in excess of its jurisdiction in passing the order of transfer of the house in favour of the respondent instead of remanding the case to the Settlement authorities.
14. The contention raised in the appeal proceeds on the supposition that by laying information with the Directorate of Enforcement that an evacuee property was in unauthorised possession or was the subject-matter of irregular transfer the informer was clothed with the right to obtain its transfer.
15. This however is not correct. In Mian Rafiud Din v. Chief Settlement Commissioner, Pakistan (1), Hamoodur Rahman, C. J. Delivering the majority judgment of the Court explained the correct legal position as follows "Again as was pointed out in the case of Syed Abdur Rashid v. Pakistan and others PLD 1964 SC 793 there was no question of displaced persons coming to Pakistan from territories which now constitute India being entitled as of right to get properties in Pakistan in lieu of properties left by them in India. The evacuee laws were designed purely to alleviate the hardship and misery of as large a number of displaced persons as possible who had been uprooted as a result of the setting up of the two Dominions of India and Pakistan by rehabilitating them and in this sense too it was `fallacious to conceive of a claim . . . As being in the nature of a right or interest in property'. It was `rather a question of purely granting a benefit or a privilege' and it was, therefore, within the competence of the authorities to determine as to who were the persons best fitted for the grant of such benefit."
16. Keeping this general perspective of evacuee legislation in mind the learned Chief Justice then proceeded to examine the relevant provisions of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, the entries in the Schedule to the Settlement Scheme No: I relating to the transfer of evacuee properties to claimant, non-claimant displaced persons and even locals. This survey yielded to the conclusion that the applicants for transfer of houses, shops etc. Did not acquire a vested right in those properties.
17. Dealing with S. R. O. No. 824 (K)/1961 in Abida Khatoon v. Ghulam Shabbir (2) this Court has specifically observed : "The writ appears to have been moved in the brief (PLD 1971 SC 252) that tie informant like a complainant in a criminal case has an interest in the end result, and therefore independent locus standi to pursue the proceeding and (PLD 1964 SC 793) that in the event of the information leading to a positive result, the informant has a vested interest in the property. Neither of these suppositions has the least support in law. If the Settlement Authorities acting on a reference by the Enforcement Staff hold the transfer to be irregular, the transferee having a vested right in the property may move by way of appeal, and, if a writ be competent, in the High Court. But the informant has no vested right in the property and certainly would have no right of appeal or revision under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 to have the decision reconsidered or reversed, if it went in favour of the transfer being regular."
18. A more direct authority is a later decision of this Court in Muhammad Haneef v. Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore (PLD 1971 SC 252). In that case the peti--tioner had laid information with regard to the irregular transfer of a shop and claimed that the same be retransferred to him. In the meantime clause (b) of section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation)
19. Act, 1958 was repealed. Following the decision in Abida Khatoon v. Ghulam Shabbir the Chief Settlement Commissioner rejected the petitioner's applica--petition. The High Court declined to interfere with the order in writ jurisdiction. Petition for leave to appeal was moved to this Court which was dismissed with the following remarks "It was contended that as the petitioner had moved in the matter in 1961 before the repeal of section 10 (b) a vested right was created in his favour under section 6 of the General Clauses Act.
20. The Chief Settlement Commissioner following the decision in Abida Khatoon v. Mian Ghulum Shabbir held that no vested right was created in the petitioner and by order dated 12-4-1967 dismissed his application for transfer of the shop. The High Court has in writ jurisdiction upheld the view of the Chief Settlement Commissioner and declined to inter--fere with his order.
21. The learned counsel is unable to show that by laying information with the Directorate of Enforcement regarding irregular transfer of the shop to its occupants a vested right of transfer of the shop was created in his favour. The words used in S. R. O. 824 are "the Chief Settlement Commissioner may transfer" and as pointed out in Abida Khatoorr's case he, for a variety of reasons, may decline to give to an informer the property which on the information given by him is proved to have been irregularly transferred. We see no ground to depart from the view adopted earlier by the Court and refuse leave to appeal. The petition is dismissed."
22. Under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation)! Act, 1958 only those persons were eligible for transfer of a house, shop etc. Who were in possession before the 20th of December 1958. A person who laid information under S. R. O. No. 824(K)/1961 that an evacuee property) was in unauthorised possession or was the subject-matter of irregular transfer, was obviously not in possession, He was, therefore, not eligible to apply for transfer of the house, shop etc. In respect of which he laid information to the Directorate of Enforcement. The legal force behind the S. R. O. No. 824(K)/1961 which was promulgated by the Central Government on 1-9-1961, was clause (b) of section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act. It authorised the Chief Settlement Commissioner to dispose of an evacuee house, shop etc. In such other manner as may be prescribed by the Central Government. Section 10 was re-drafted by the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1962 (II of 1962). Both clauses (a) and (b) were substituted by subsection (2); "Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), the Central Government may order the transfer in public interest of any property out of the compensation pool in such manner as it may deem proper." ., Power to transfer evacuee properties to informers who were not in possession was thus taken away with effect from the 13th January 1962 when the Ordi--nance came into force. The provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act also did not apply as no right had come to be vested in the informers. All pending cases under S. R. O. No. 824 (K)/1961 therefore lapsed with the repeal of clause (b) of section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958.
23. Muhammad Amin v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and another (PLD 1966 Lah 473). Sh.
24. Muhammad Amin petitioner in that,case was a claimant displaced person from Jammu & Kashmir.
25. On partition he obtained allotment of an open site in the city of Lyallpur and set up a dairy farm on it. When the Settlement operations started he submitted C. H. Form for transfer of the property in his possession. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner accepted the form and transferred to him not only the site of the dairy farm comprising an area of 18 kanals and one marla but also included in the transfer an adjoining residential bungalow occupied by a local, Ch. Jalalud Din, Advocate. On 10-11-1960 the Director of Enforcement addressed a letter to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner that a complaint had been submitted by Mst. Jannat Bibi to the effect that the property No. 143 consisting of two units had been irregularly transferred to Mohd. Amin and that the inquiry had been made by the Enforcement Staff which revealed that the property transferred to Muhammad Amin consisted of two separate independent units. He was allottee of only one of them but had managed to get both the properties transferred in his favour. It was recom--mended that the bungalow transferred to Muhammad Amin be cancelled from his name and be given to Mst.
26. Jannat, as an informer. The reference was accepted by the Chief Settlement Commissioner on 30- 6-1962 holding that the transfer of the bungalow to Mnhammad Amin was irregular and illegal.
27. The order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner was challenged by Muhammad Amin inter alia on the grounds that clause (b) of section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act under which S. R. O. No. y 24 (K)/1961 was issued by the Central Government under Ordinance II of 1962 stood repealed w.e.f. 13-1-1962. The order passed by the Chief Settlement Commissioner was therefore without lawful authority. Dealing with this aspect of the case our brother Anwarul Haq, J. Remarked :- "The contention that the notification issued by the Central Government on the 1st of September 1961, has ceased to have any legal sanction after the amendment of section 10(b) of the Act by Ordinance II of 1962 has to be accepted in view of the dictum of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Muhammad Siddiq v. Chief Settlement C--mmirsioner.
28. The question, however, is whether the proceedings which were initiated against the petitioner before the amendment of section 10(b) of the Act could be continued or not. It was contended by Mr. Karam Elahi Chauhan that even though Ordinance 11 of 1962 did not contain any saving clause in respect of pending proceedings, the situation was governed by section 6 of the Central General Clauses Act. A similar argument was raised before their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Muhammad Siddiq's case but the point was not decided for the reason that their Lordships observed that even assuming for the sake of argument that this contention was correct, they found that the transaction in dispute did not amount to an irregular transfer.
29. It seems to me that section 6 of the General Clauses Act does apply in the present case.
30. The only question which needs to be answered in this behalf is whether there is a contrary intention, explicit or implied, appearing in the re--enacted provision. Such a contrary intention cannot be inferred from the mere omission of a saving clause in the amending Ordinance, for that omission is easily explained by the presence of section 6 itself of the General Clauses Act.. It was, however, contended by Sh. Khurshid Ahmad that as the new subsection (2) of section 10 of the Act, which had taken the place of the old clause (b) of the same section, was radically different from the old provision, therefore, there was an implied intention on the part of the Legislature to lay down that pending proceeding shall abate. The learned counsel elaborated the difference between the old and the new provisions, but it is not necessary to dilate on them for, in my opinion, the mere fact that the new provision is radically different from the old, does not necessarily lead to the inference that the Legislature intended to express an intention to the effect that pending proceedings shall not survive in terms of section 6 of the General Clauses Act. Whenever there is repeal of a Statute, followed by re-enactment, the possibility of a radical alteration in the substance and content of the law cannot be ruled out, but merely because of this alteration it cannot be said that the Legislature has expressed its intention that all rights and liabilities accruing under the repealed legislation must automatically disappear. In the presence of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, such an intention must appear explicitly or by necessary implication from the repealing or re-enacting legislation ; otherwise it must be presumed that the Legislature, being aware of the provisions of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, did not intend to interfere with the operation of that section. I consider, therefore, that even after the repeal and re--enactment of the old section 10(b) of the Act, in a radically amended form, proceedings against the petitioner could continue by virtue of clauses (c) and (d) of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, as no intention to the contrary can be spelt out of the amending Ordinance."
31. Mian Rafiud Din v. Chief Settle--ment Commissioner, Lahore, Abida Khatoon v. Ghulam Shabbir and Muhammad Haneef v. Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore) our brother Anwarul Haq revised the view he had taken in Sh. Muhammad Amin v. Chief Settlement Commission r and another and agreed that by laying information with the Director Enforcement that some property is in unauthorised possession or has been the subject-matter of an irregular transfer the informer does not acquire a vested right of transfer in that property.
32. The next finding of the High Court that the Chief Settlement Commis--sioner had acted without lawful authority in rejecting the C. H. Form filed by the respondent No. 1 is supported by the decision of this Court in Ch. Altaf Hussain v. Chief Settlement Commissioner, Pakistan, Lahore and others. It was "The contention that this form was submitted out of time is grounded on paragraph 2, Chapter II of Settlement Scheme No. I prepared by the Chief Settlement Commissioner under directions of the Central Government by virtue of powers conferred by section 16 (1)(b) and (c) of the Act. This paragraph 2 of Chapter II prescribes that the Chief Settlement Commissioner "shall from time to time by notification in the official Gazette, invite applications for the transfer of property under this Scheme from such persons as may be-specified in the notification." The argument was advanced in the High Court and has been repeated before us that only two notifications were issued by the Chief Settle--ment Commissioner under this provision, which are printed at page 305 and 73.Of the Manual. By the first notification dated the 19th of May 1959, the last date fixed for the applications under paragraph 2 of Settlement Scheme No. I was the 15th day of July 1959. Under the second notification dated the 28th of October 1959, this limiting date was extended up to the 10th of November 1959. Subsequent to these two notifications it appears that Press Notes and Memoranda were being issued from time to time by the Chief Settlement Commissioner granting further extension for such applications but it is true that at the time when Mr. Bashir Hussain, accepted the second form of Mr. Altaf Hussain, no such extension Memorandum or Press Note existed. Subse-- quent to that date, however, Press Notes or Memoranda were issued from time to time and applications of this character admitted by the relevant authorities. The contention therefore raised on behalf of the Settlement Department as well as on behalf of Mr. Shabbir Hussain that the only legal mode of extension possible, of time limit for such applications, being a notification in the Gazette, all subsequent exten--sions of time allowed under orders of the Chief Settlement Commissioner were invalid, appears to be contrary to the practice that has undoubtedly prevailed in this respect in the Department. If such a contention is acceded to, all these forms which had been accepted by the Department under subsequent Press Notes or Memoranda would have to be treated as without legal sanction. The true view, however, of the provisions of paragraph 2 of Settlement Scheme No. I seems to be that this is a mere enabling provision which empowers the Chief Settlement Commissioner to invite applications for the transfer of property under the Scheme, from relevant persons from time to time. The paragraph does not in terms authorise him to lay down a limiting date for the purpose and construing this paragraph strictly, it would not be right to import any such limiting factor into the situation."
33. Both the contentions raised by Mian Fazl-e-Mahmood in support of the appeal viz., that a vested right had accrued to the appellant before deletion of clause (b) of section 10 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and a Rehabilitation) Act and that the Chief Settlement Commissioner was right in rejecting the belated C. H. Form filed by the respondent for transfer of the house, are thus found to be without any substance.
34. The appeal is accordingly dismissed but in the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.
35. ANWARUL HAQ, J.-I agree with the order proposed to be made in this case by my learned brother Muhammad Yaqub A.I, J. At the time I decided the case of Sh. Mohammad Amin in the High Court the decisions of the Supreme Court as to the nature of the right enjoyed by an informant were not before me, and the whole argument regarding the applicability of section 6 of the General Clauses Act proceeded on the basis that the informant had acquired a vested right which would continue to be governed by the old law. In the light of the several decisions of this Court, as mentioned by my learned brother, I agree that the view taken by me in Sh. Muhammad Amin's case needs to be revised.